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What Is The Issue Behind The Question Whether All Wise Men Are Equally Wise?

Among the sayings about the wise man that Diogenes Laertius collected from the Epicurean school is one short sentence:

One wise man is not wiser than another.

Diogenes Laertius X.121 (tr. Bailey)

At first sight this looks like an odd thing to say. Men differ in learning, in experience, in temperament and in talent. Why would a school that trusted the evidence of the senses deny what everyone can see?

The answer is that the ancient question was never really about who knows more facts. It was a test question. How a school answered it showed what that school thought the goal of life was, and whether that goal can be reached. Cicero puts the connection plainly. In the third book of On Ends, the Stoic Cato explains why his school says that no wise man is wiser than another, and in doing so he states the rule that governs every answer to the question:

So it is consistent with the principles already stated that those who deem the End of Goods, that which we term the extreme or ultimate Good, to be capable of degree, are on their own theory also bound to hold that one man can be wiser than another, and similarly that one can commit a more sinful or more righteous action than another; which it is not open to us to say, who do not think that the End of Goods can vary in degree.

Cicero, On Ends III.48 (tr. Rackham)

That is the issue behind the question. Does the highest good come in degrees, so that there is always more of it to get? Or does it have a definite top, a limit? If it has no top, then every wise man can always become wiser, and no one is ever finished. If it has a limit, then at the limit there is equality, however much men differ in other ways.

The Stoics and Epicurus both said that one wise man is not wiser than another. They reached that same sentence from opposite starting points, and the difference between their reasons tells us a great deal about both schools.

Where The Test Comes From: Plato’s Philebus

Section titled “Where The Test Comes From: Plato’s Philebus”

Cato’s rule did not begin with the Stoics. Plato had already made “more and less” the test of the good. In the Philebus, Socrates divides things into those that have a limit and those that “admit of more and less,” and then asks where pleasure belongs:

SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?

PHILEBUS: They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree.

SOCRATES: Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good.

Plato, Philebus 27e-28a (tr. Jowett)

Philebus, the champion of pleasure in the dialogue, concedes that pleasure has no limit and even boasts of it. Socrates turns the boast into an objection: what has no limit cannot be what makes a thing good. Later in the dialogue he restates the point in terms of purity. The pleasures “which are in excess have no measure,” and belong “to the class of the infinite, and of the more and less” (52c). Then he asks what makes whiteness pure:

SOCRATES: How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is that purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours?

PROTARCHUS: Clearly that which is most unadulterated.

SOCRATES: True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful?

Plato, Philebus 53a-b (tr. Jowett)

This is the ground on which the later answers stand. Plato set the test that the highest good must have a limit, because something that admits of more and less without end can never be complete. The Stoics accepted the test, and so did Epicurus. They disagreed over what passes it. Plato and the Stoics said pleasure fails it and looked for the limit in something else. Epicurus accepted the test and denied that pleasure fails it.

Diogenes Laertius usually closes his account of a school with a summary of its doctrines, and the same standard questions come up again and again: what the end of life is, whether virtue is enough for happiness, whether virtue can be lost, whether all faults are equal, whether there is a middle state between virtue and vice, and what the wise man will and will not do. The question of equality among wise men sits inside this group. The table below gathers every place in the Lives where a school takes a position on it or on the doctrines that decide it. The full passages follow the table.

SchoolPosition recorded by Diogenes LaertiusWhere
Epicurus and his schoolOne wise man is not wiser than another. Faults are not all equal. Once a man is wise he does not fall back. Not every bodily constitution or nation allows a man to become wise. Divine happiness admits no increase; human happiness admits the addition and subtraction of pleasuresX.117, X.121, X.122 (Bailey’s numbering)
Stoics (Zeno, Chrysippus, Persaeus)All goods are equal and admit of no increase. All faults are equal. There is nothing between virtue and vice. One cannot be more just than just. He who has one virtue has all. The wise are free from all errorVII.101, VII.120, VII.122, VII.125, VII.127
Stoic dissentersHeraclides of Tarsus and Athenodorus: faults are not equal. Chrysippus: virtue can be lost (against Cleanthes). Panaetius and Posidonius: virtue is not enough for happiness without health, means and strengthVII.121, VII.127, VII.128
Ariston of ChiosThings between virtue and vice are to be treated with complete indifference; the wise man is like a good actor who plays any part equally wellVII.160
HerillusThe end is knowledge; only the wise aim at the true end, the unwise at a lesser oneVII.165
Cynics (Antisthenes and his successors)Virtue is enough for happiness; it can be taught and, once gained, cannot be lost; the wise man cannot errVI.11, VI.12, VI.105
Peripatetics (Aristotle)There is a middle stage of improvement between virtue and vice. Virtue is not enough for happiness. The virtues do not always go together. The wise man has moderate passions, not noneV.30, V.31, VII.127
PlatoVirtue is enough for happiness but uses bodily and external goods as instruments; the wise man is no less happy without themIII.78
CyrenaicsNo pleasure is more pleasant than another. Yet not every wise man lives pleasantly. Some virtues are found even in the foolish. Progress in philosophy is possible. One man feels more pain than anotherII.87, II.91, II.93
HegesiasComplete happiness cannot existII.94
AnnicerisThe wise man is no less happy even with few pleasuresII.96
Megarians (Euclides)The good is one thing called by many namesII.106
Pyrrhonist SkepticsThere is no natural good or evil at allIX.101

The passages from Books II through IX below are quoted from the translation of C. D. Yonge, Lives of Eminent Philosophers. The passages from Book X are quoted from Cyril Bailey’s translation. The section numbers in Books II through IX follow the standard divisions of the Greek text, as printed in R. D. Hicks’ Loeb edition.

The Stoics gave the most complete and the most famous answer, and it is the one the other schools argued against. For Zeno and Chrysippus virtue is the only good, and goodness does not come in amounts:

But it seems that all goods are equal, and that every good is to be desired in the highest degree, and that it admits of no relaxation, and of no extension.

Diogenes Laertius VII.101

Cato says the same in Cicero: “Goodness is absolute, and is not a question of degree; … the value in its case depends on kind and not on quantity” (On Ends III.34).

If the good cannot be more or less, then neither can its opposite. Every fault is equally a fault:

And they lay down the position that all offences are equal, as Chrysippus argues in the fourth book of his Ethic Questions, and so say Persæus and Zeno. For if one thing that is true is not more true than another thing that is true, neither is one thing that is false more false than another thing that is false; so too, one deceit is not greater than another, nor one sin than another. For the man who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus, and the man who is only one, are both equally not in Canopus; and so too, he who commits a greater sin, and he who commits a less, are both equally not in the right path.

Diogenes Laertius VII.120

There is therefore no middle ground between the wise man and the fool:

Another doctrine of the Stoics is, that there is nothing intermediate between virtue and vice; while the Peripatetics assert that there is a stage between virtue and vice, being an improvement on vice which has not yet arrived at virtue. For the Stoics say, that as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust, and cannot be more just than just, or more unjust than unjust; and that the same rule applies to all cases.

Diogenes Laertius VII.127

The virtues come as a package: “they say that virtues reciprocally follow one another, and that he who has one has all” (VII.125). And the wise are “free from all error, in consequence of their not being prone to any wrong actions” (VII.122).

From these premises the equality of wise men follows at once. A stick that is straight cannot be straighter than another straight stick. Seneca states the Stoic form of Plato’s test in so many words:

Therefore the power and the greatness of virtue cannot rise to greater heights, because increase is denied to that which is superlatively great. You will find nothing straighter than the straight, nothing truer than the truth, and nothing more temperate than that which is temperate. … What can be added to that which is perfect? … Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect.

Seneca, Moral Letters 66.8-9 (tr. Gummere)

And he carries the point all the way up to the supreme god of the Stoic system:

In what respect is Jupiter superior to our good man? His goodness lasts longer; but the wise man does not set a lower value upon himself, just because his virtues are limited by a briefer span. Or take two wise men; he who has died at a greater age is not happier than he whose virtue has been limited to fewer years: similarly, a god has no advantage over a wise man in point of happiness, even though he has such an advantage in point of years.

Seneca, Moral Letters 73.13 (tr. Gummere)

The price of this answer is that everyone who falls short of perfect wisdom is equally a failure. Cato draws the conclusion himself, with two images that Cicero later attacked:

For just as a drowning man is no more able to breathe if he be not far from the surface of the water, so that he might at any moment emerge, than if he were actually at the bottom already, and just as a puppy on the point of opening its eyes is no less blind than one just born, similarly a man that has made some progress towards the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he that has made no progress at all.

Cicero, On Ends III.48

Even inside the Stoic school this was too much for some. Diogenes Laertius records that “Heraclides of Tarsus, indeed, the friend of Antipater, of Tarsus, and Athenodorus, both assert that offences are not equal” (VII.121). Chrysippus and Cleanthes disagreed on whether the perfect state, once reached, could be lost: “Chrysippus is of opinion that virtue can be lost, but Cleanthes affirms that it cannot; the one saying that it can be lost by drunkenness or melancholy, the other maintaining that it cannot be lost on account of the firm perceptions which it implants in men” (VII.127). And the later Stoics Panaetius and Posidonius “do not admit that virtue has this sufficiency of itself, but say that there is also need of good health, and competency, and strength” (VII.128).

The Schools Close To The Stoics: Cynics, Ariston, Herillus

Section titled “The Schools Close To The Stoics: Cynics, Ariston, Herillus”

The Cynics held a simpler form of the same view. Antisthenes taught “that virtue was of itself sufficient for happiness, and was in need of nothing, except the strength of Socrates” (VI.11), and among his sayings is “Virtue is a weapon of which a man cannot be deprived” (VI.12). Diogenes Laertius sums up the school:

Another of their doctrines is, that virtue is a thing which may be taught, as Antisthenes affirms in his Heraclides; and that when it has once been attained it can never be lost. They also say that the wise man deserves to be loved, and cannot commit error, and is a friend to every one who resembles him, and that he leaves nothing to fortune.

Diogenes Laertius VI.105

Ariston of Chios pushed indifference further than Zeno. He taught that the chief good was “to live in perfect indifference to all those things which are of an intermediate character between virtue and vice; making not the slightest difference between them, but regarding them all on a footing of equality. For that the wise man resembles a good actor; who, whether he is filling the part of Agamemnon or Thersites, will perform them both equally well” (VII.160). Herillus made knowledge the end and drew a hard line between two classes of men: “those who were not wise aimed at the latter [a subordinate end]; but that only the wise man directed his views to the former” (VII.165). The Megarian Euclides had already taught “that the chief good is unity; but that it is known by several names; for at one time people call it prudence; at another time God; at another time intellect” (II.106). A good that is one single thing leaves no room for more and less.

The Schools That Allowed Degrees: Peripatetics And Platonists

Section titled “The Schools That Allowed Degrees: Peripatetics And Platonists”

Aristotle’s school answered the other way. Between vice and virtue it placed “a stage between virtue and vice, being an improvement on vice which has not yet arrived at virtue” (VII.127). Aristotle denied that virtue alone is enough:

And he taught that virtue was not sufficient of itself to confer happiness; for that it had need besides of the goods of the body, and of the external goods, for that a wise man would be miserable if he were surrounded by distress, and poverty, and circumstances of that kind. … He also asserted that the virtues did not reciprocally follow one another, for that it was possible for a prudent, and just, and impartial man, to be incontinent and intemperate; and he said, that the wise man was not destitute of passions, but endowed with moderate passions.

Diogenes Laertius V.30-31

On this view one wise man may well be better off than another. His happiness depends in part on health, wealth and fortune, and a man may have some virtues without the rest. Plato, in Diogenes Laertius’ summary, stands between the two camps: “virtue was sufficient of herself for happiness, but nevertheless required the advantages of the body as instruments to work with … Still that the wise man would be not the less happy, even if destitute of these auxiliary circumstances” (III.78).

In Cicero, Cicero himself argues the Peripatetic side against Cato. He rejects the drowning man and the puppies as false analogies and offers his own: “one man’s eyesight is dim, another’s general health is weak; apply remedies, and they get better day by day … similarly with all who earnestly pursue virtue; they get better, their vices and errors are gradually reduced.” Then he adds the remark that shows the weakness of the Stoic position: “But still the elder Gracchus was not a Wise Man; who ever was? or when, or where, or how?” (On Ends IV.65). A standard that no one has ever met cannot guide anyone’s life.

The Cyrenaics: Equal Pleasures, Unequal Lives

Section titled “The Cyrenaics: Equal Pleasures, Unequal Lives”

The Cyrenaics, the other ancient school of pleasure, are important here because they show that making pleasure the goal does not by itself settle the question. They held “that no one pleasure was different from or more pleasant than another” (II.87). Yet because they placed the good in each particular pleasure and treated happiness as a sum of particular pleasures that is hard to collect, they could not promise the wise man a pleasant life:

But they admit that every wise man does not live pleasantly, and that every bad man does not live unpleasantly, but that it is only a general rule admitting of some exceptions. And they think it sufficient if a person enjoys a happy time in consequence of one pleasure which befalls him. … and that some of the virtues may exist even in the foolish.

Diogenes Laertius II.91

They also allowed degrees in learning and in suffering: “They admit, too, that there is such a thing as improvement in philosophy, and in other good studies. And they say that one man feels grief more than another” (II.93). Their followers split. Hegesias concluded “that complete happiness cannot possibly exist” (II.94). Anniceris held the opposite, that “even if the wise man should meet with some annoyance, he would be no less happy — even though he should have but few actual pleasures” (II.96).

The Pyrrhonists removed the question altogether. If nothing is good by nature, there is no standard against which one wise man could be measured against another: “Another of their doctrines is, that there is no such thing as any natural good, or natural evil” (IX.101).

Epicurus agreed with the Stoics that one wise man is not wiser than another. But he rejected every premise they used to get there. For Epicurus the good is pleasure, not virtue, and the decisive fact about pleasure is that it has a natural limit:

The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.

Principal Doctrine 3 (tr. Bailey)

The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures, and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind.

Principal Doctrine 18 (tr. Bailey)

Torquatus states the same doctrine in Cicero: “complete absence of pain Epicurus considers to be the limit and highest point of pleasure; beyond this point pleasure may vary in kind, but it cannot vary in intensity or degree” (On Ends I.38).

Even Seneca, arguing for the Stoics, admits that Epicurus’ good passes the test he had set for virtue:

… we find mentioned in the works of Epicurus two goods, of which his Supreme Good, or blessedness, is composed, namely, a body free from pain and a soul free from disturbance. These goods, if they are complete, do not increase; for how can that which is complete increase? … Just as fair weather, purified into the purest brilliancy, does not admit of a still greater degree of clearness; so, when a man takes care of his body and of his soul, weaving the texture of his good from both, his condition is perfect, and he has found the consummation of his prayers, if there is no commotion in his soul or pain in his body. Whatever delights fall to his lot over and above these two things do not increase his Supreme Good; they merely season it, so to speak, and add spice to it.

Seneca, Moral Letters 66.45-46 (tr. Gummere)

Seneca’s “two goods” is a Stoic summary, and his word “season” makes the variety of pleasures sound trivial, which Epicurus never thought. But the point that matters here comes through. By Seneca’s own rule, “the ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect,” and Epicurus’ good, at its limit, does not increase. Plato’s whiteness makes the same point from the other side. The purest white is not the greatest quantity of white but white without admixture of other colours. Epicurus’ limit of pleasure is not the greatest quantity of pleasure either. It is pleasure without admixture of pain.

This is the key to Epicurus’ position. He treats the good as neither all or nothing, as the Stoics did, nor as a scale with no top. Pleasure, and the happy life made of it, has a definite limit: the removal of all pain. Below that limit there is more and less: more pain or less, more pleasure or less. At the limit nothing more can be added.

That limit is a concept, not a moment we live through. It is like a heap. No one can point to the grain of sand that turns a pile into a heap, and yet heaps are real, and anyone can tell a heap from a few scattered grains. In the same way no moment of human life comes marked “pure pleasure” or “total absence of pain,” and none needs to. Epicurus posited no ideal Form or essence of painlessness, and no arrangement of atoms that bears that name. What is true and real for us is what the senses, the anticipations and the feelings report, and they report more pain and less, more pleasure and less, and the direction in which a life is moving. The limit is drawn from that experience. It is no less real than a heap, and it tells us what the goal is and which way to go.

Principal Doctrine 3 does not contradict this. “Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind” speaks of particular experiences, the separate segments of a life, not of a life taken as a whole. Each experience is pleasant or painful, and no single experience is both. But a man lives through many experiences, in body and in mind, at the same time and one after another. That no single experience can be both pleasure and pain does not mean that a whole life cannot hold both. Epicurus’ own last day held both: the pain of his disease and the joy of remembering his conversations with his friends.

Apply Cato’s own rule from On Ends III.48 to this. A school whose highest good “can vary in degree” without end must say that one man can always be wiser than another. Epicurus’ highest good has a limit beyond which it cannot be increased, so by Cato’s rule Epicurus is entitled to say, as he does, that one wise man is not wiser than another. The reason is not that wisdom is all or nothing. “Wise man,” like “heap,” names something real that has no exact boundary, and no single lesson turns a student into a wise man. The reason is that the goal the wise man pursues has a limit. There is no higher level of the goal for a “wiser” man to aim at, so one wise man, considered as wise, does not stand above another. The men themselves still differ in learning, talent and temperament, as Epicurus’ own ranking of his students shows.

Epicurus applies the same reasoning to time, and the parallel with Seneca’s two wise men is close:

Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure.

Principal Doctrine 19 (tr. Bailey)

The mind that understands the limits of pleasure “supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time … nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short, in any way, of the best life” (Principal Doctrine 20). And like the Stoic, the Epicurean measures himself against a divine standard. But where Seneca says the wise man equals Jupiter because virtue is all or nothing, Epicurus says a man may “rival even Zeus in happiness” when his body is secure from hunger, thirst and cold (Vatican Saying 33), and that the man who lives by these teachings “shall live like a god among men” (Letter to Menoeceus 135). The difference from the Stoic wise man is decisive. The Stoic is either perfect or miserable, and Cicero asked who ever was perfect. The Epicurean does not need to stand at the limit to be happy. He needs to organize his life so that pleasure predominates, and a man who does that can rival Zeus, as Epicurus himself did on the last day of his life.

But men are not gods, and the same summary in Diogenes Laertius draws exactly that distinction. This passage is the clearest statement of how Epicurus saw the good:

They say also that there are two ideas of happiness, complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and the happiness which is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures.

Diogenes Laertius X.122 (tr. Bailey)

Complete happiness, the concept taken to its extreme, is what Epicurus pictures in a god, and it “admits of no increase.” There the equality is complete: nothing can be added to it. Human happiness is different. It “is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures.” In human life some pain always remains somewhere. Illness, injury and loss come to every man, and the body that feels pleasure also feels pain. One man’s life holds more pleasure than another’s, and the same man’s life holds more at one time than at another. One wise man may be enjoying a quiet evening with friends while another is climbing a mountain, sailing a rough sea, or building a business, and their lives will not hold the same pleasures in the same order. Among men, happiness is always a matter of more or less.

Epicurus did not claim total freedom from pain for himself. On the day he died he wrote to his friend Idomeneus:

On this truly happy day of my life, as I am at the point of death, I write this to you. The disease in my bladder and stomach are pursuing their course, lacking nothing of their natural severity: but against all this is the joy in my heart at the recollection of my conversations with you.

Diogenes Laertius X.22 (tr. Bailey)

He called the day “truly happy” while his disease was “lacking nothing of its natural severity.” A man does not need total absence of pain to be happy. What he needs is pleasure enough to outweigh the pain, and the Epicurean summary says the same of the wise man: “even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy” (X.118). Total absence of pain marks the limit of the concept. It is not a state that a man must enter, even for a moment, in order to be happy. A man chooses and arranges his life so that pleasure predominates, and when it predominates far enough he can, in Epicurus’ words, “rival even Zeus in happiness,” though some pain remains.

So the Epicurean sentence must be read carefully. It does not say that all wise men are equally happy at every moment. Complete equality belongs only to the limit itself, the extreme that Epicurus pictures in a god. What the sentence says is that one wise man is not wiser than another: they all pursue the same goal with the same limit, and none of them can go beyond it. The Epicurean summary adds that once a man has attained wisdom he does not fall back from it (X.117). How near each one comes to it, and how often, depends on his body, his circumstances and his fortune, and in that respect their lives differ, more or less.

What Epicurus Did Not Accept From The Stoics

Section titled “What Epicurus Did Not Accept From The Stoics”

Because Epicurus reached his conclusions by a much different road than did the Stoics, he did not have to accept the Stoic consequences. Laertius’ Epicurean summary rejects them one by one.

Faults are not equal. “They hold that faults are not all of equal gravity” (X.122). The man one furlong from Canopus is closer than the man a hundred furlongs away.

Men differ in nature, and the wise remain different men. “A man cannot become wise with every kind of physical constitution, nor in every nation” (X.117). The wise man “will be more deeply moved by feelings, but this will not prove an obstacle to wisdom” (X.117). Lucretius explains that training never wipes out a man’s native temperament, and then says why that does not matter:

So is it with the race of men. However much training gives some of them an equal culture, yet it leaves those first traces of the nature of the mind of each. Nor must we think that such maladies can be plucked out by the roots, but that one man will more swiftly fall into bitter anger, another be a little sooner assailed by fear, while a third will take some things more gently than is right. … One thing herein I see that I can affirm, that so small are the traces of these natures left, which reason could not dispel for us, that nothing hinders us from living a life worthy of the gods.

Lucretius, De Rerum Natura III.307-322 (tr. Bailey)

That is the Epicurean answer in brief: men are not made equal, but men who are not equal can know the same goal and live happily by it.

There are grades of students, and progress is real. Seneca reports that Epicurus himself ranked learners by how they reached the truth:

Epicurus remarks that certain men have worked their way to the truth without any one’s assistance, carving out their own passage. And he gives special praise to these, for their impulse has come from within, and they have forged to the front by themselves. Again, he says, there are others who need outside help, who will not proceed unless someone leads the way, but who will follow faithfully. Of these, he says, Metrodorus was one; this type of man is also excellent, but belongs to the second grade.

Seneca, Moral Letters 52.3 (tr. Gummere)

A third class, of whom Hermarchus was an example, “can be forced and driven into righteousness”; and of the last two classes Epicurus “is more ready to congratulate the one, but he feels more respect for the other; for although both reached the same goal, it is a greater credit to have brought about the same result with the more difficult material upon which to work” (52.4). The phrase “both reached the same goal” is the Epicurean position exactly. Epicurus did not pretend that Metrodorus and Hermarchus were alike in talent, and he did not treat the man still on the way as no better off than the man who had not started. What he denied was that, once they arrived, one of them stood higher than the other.

Once wise, a man does not fall back. “When once a man has attained wisdom, he no longer has any tendency contrary to it or willingly pretends that he has” (X.117). On this point the Epicureans stood with Cleanthes and the Cynics against Chrysippus. But they did not claim that the wise man never errs. The Stoics and the Cynics did claim that (VII.122; VI.105). The Epicurean wise man forms opinions, tests them against the evidence, and corrects them. What does not leave him is his understanding of what the goal is and how it is reached.

There is a further reason to look closely at this sentence. The Yonge translation reverses it: “It is possible for one wise man to be wiser than another” (Yonge, Lives, Book X). The Greek does not support this. In Miroslav Marcovich’s critical edition of Diogenes Laertius (Teubner, 1999), the two principal manuscripts, B and P, both carry a negative. P reads οὐ κινεῖται (“does not move”). Marcovich prints οὐκ εἶναί τε ἕτερον ἑτέρου σοφώτερον, “and that one is not wiser than another,” a reading proposed by the early editors Sambucus and Aldobrandini, and he lists the sentence as Usener’s fragment 561. R. D. Hicks, in the Loeb edition (1925), follows the reading of P, οὐ κινεῖσθαί τε ἕτερον ἑτέρου σοφώτερον, and translates “One wise man does not move more wisely than another,” that is, he acts no more wisely than another. Bailey has “One wise man is not wiser than another,” and the Usener collection has “It is not possible for one Sage to be wiser than another” (Usener 561). The readings differ only over whether the sentence speaks of being wise or of acting wisely. All of them deny that one wise man ranks above another. Yonge’s positive version should not be relied on for this sentence.

The question whether all wise men are equally wise is really a question about the shape of the goal of life. The ancient schools gave three kinds of answer.

  1. The goal is all or nothing. This is the Stoic and Cynic answer. The wise are equal because perfection cannot be more perfect. Everyone else is equally a failure: the man nearly at the surface drowns with the man at the bottom, and the one-furlong sinner is as far from Canopus as the hundred-furlong sinner. Cicero’s question points out the problem: “who ever was?”
  2. The goal has no top. This was Philebus’ boast in Plato’s dialogue: pleasure “would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree.” It is also the answer of those for whom happiness keeps growing with more goods and better fortune, and in another way of the Cyrenaics, for whom happiness is a sum of particular pleasures that is never safely complete. On this answer one wise man can always be wiser and happier than another. Hegesias drew the bleak conclusion that complete happiness cannot exist at all.
  3. The goal has a limit. This is Epicurus’ answer. Pleasure has a natural limit, the removal of all pain, and beyond that it is varied, not increased. At the limit, the extreme that Epicurus pictures in the happiness of a god, nothing more can be added and the equality is complete. The limit is real in the way a heap is real, though no moment of human life is marked off as pure pleasure. No man is free of all pain, as Epicurus’ own last day shows, and no man needs to be in order to be happy. Human happiness rises and falls with the addition and subtraction of pleasures, so among men it is always more or less. What wise men have in common is the goal they pursue, which has the same limit for all of them. Real differences of talent, temperament, learning and circumstance remain, faults remain unequal, and progress toward the goal is real progress.

The Epicurean denies the Stoic claim that anything short of perfection is worthless. It also denies the modern assumption that there is always more to get and that no one is ever finished. Epicurus held that the best life has a definite shape, that a man can know what it is and how to live it, and that he does not need to be the most gifted man in the world, or free of every pain, to live happily.

  • Miroslav Marcovich, ed., Diogenis Laertii Vitae Philosophorum, vol. I (Stuttgart and Leipzig: Teubner, 1999), p. 790: the Greek text of X.121 with the manuscript readings described above.
  • R. D. Hicks, tr., Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Loeb Classical Library, 2 vols., 1925), vol. II, pp. 646-647: Greek text and translation of X.120-121.
  • Tiziano Dorandi, ed., Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Cambridge University Press, 2013): the most recent critical edition of the Greek text.
  • Hermann Usener, Epicurea (1887), fr. 561 (Usener collection on this site).
  • Wim Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (Philosophia Antiqua 168; Leiden: Brill, 2023): the first book-length study of the Epicurean wise man, with chapters on the sage’s fallibility, his friendships with other sages, and his livelihood, drawing on the Herculaneum papyri of Philodemus.
  • René Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (Cambridge University Press, 2014): reconstructs the Stoic definitions of wisdom and argues that for the early Stoics the change from fool to sage was sudden and complete, and could pass unnoticed by the sage himself.
  • Geert Roskam, On the Path to Virtue: The Stoic Doctrine of Moral Progress and its Reception in (Middle-)Platonism (Leuven University Press, 2005): the Stoic doctrine of moral progress toward wisdom, which had to be squared with the claim that all who fall short of wisdom are equally vicious, and its reception among the Middle Platonists, Plutarch among them.
  • Ákos Brunner, Cicero’s Presentation of Stoic Ethics in De Finibus Book III (doctoral dissertation, Central European University, 2011), PDF: a study of Cato’s account of Stoic ethics in the book that contains the argument of III.48, with a section on the problems in that account.