The Epicurean Alternative To Divine Creation
The First Question
Section titled “The First Question”Every philosophy has to answer one question before it can answer any other: how did the world we live in come to be? Either it was designed and made by a mind, and presumptively has a purpose behind it, or it came about through the workings of nature with no mind behind it and no purpose other than what we add to it. Everything else follows from the answer. If a designer made the world, then the designer’s purposes define what the world is for, what we are for, what is right and wrong, and what happens to us after death. If no designer made it, then we must find all of those answers in nature itself.
Epicurus came to philosophy through exactly this question. Diogenes Laertius records that “he took to philosophy because he despised the teachers of literature, since they were not able to explain to him the passage about Chaos in Hesiod” (DL X.2). Hesiod’s Theogony begins: first of all there came to be Chaos. The boy Epicurus wanted to know what Chaos came from, and no one could tell him. He did not come to philosophy already sure of what he wanted to find. He came looking for the truth about where the world came from, and he followed the evidence where it led. Had it led to a creator who gives commands and rewards and punishes by them, he would have had every reason to follow that path. It led instead to atoms and void.
For that reason the origin of the world is the first question in Epicurean physics, and in the Epicurean view it is the first question in philosophy as a whole. Epicurus told Pythocles what to study first and most:
And most of all give yourself up to the study of the beginnings and of infinity and of the things akin to them, and also of the criteria of truth and of the feelings, and of the purpose for which we reason out these things. For these points when they are thoroughly studied will most easily enable you to understand the causes of the details.
“The beginnings and infinity” come first on that list. The Letter to Herodotus, which Epicurus wrote as a summary for those who could not read his longer books (Letter to Herodotus 35), opens its account of nature with the same principle: “First of all, that nothing is created out of that which does not exist: for if it were, everything would be created out of everything with no need of seeds” (Letter to Herodotus 38).
Lucretius’ Poem Is The Proof
Section titled “Lucretius’ Poem Is The Proof”The clearest evidence that Epicurean students were expected to master this question before anything else is the shape of Lucretius’ poem On the Nature of Things. It is the fullest account of Epicurean philosophy to survive from antiquity, and it was written to bring a Roman reader, Memmius, into the school. It does not begin with the pleasures of friendship or the limits of desire. It begins with nature. Books One and Two set out atoms and void. Book Three shows that the soul is mortal. Book Four explains the senses. Book Five tells how our world, and life on it, came to be without a maker. Book Six explains the storms, earthquakes and plagues that people blamed on divine anger. The ethics are woven through all six books, but they rest on the physics, and the physics rests on the answer to the question of origins.
Lucretius praises Epicurus first of all as the man who went beyond “the fiery walls of the world” and brought back the truth about what can and cannot come to be:
And so it was that the lively force of his mind won its way, and he passed on far beyond the fiery walls of the world, and in mind and spirit traversed the boundless whole; whence in victory he brings us tidings what can come to be and what cannot, yea and in what way each thing has its power limited, and its deepset boundary-stone.
And the first principle he lays down is aimed squarely at divine creation:
This terror then, this darkness of the mind, must needs be scattered not by the rays of the sun and the gleaming shafts of day, but by the outer view and the inner law of nature; whose first rule shall take its start for us from this, that nothing is ever begotten of nothing by divine will. Fear forsooth so constrains all mortal men, because they behold many things come to pass on earth and in the sky, the cause of whose working they can by no means see, and think that a divine power brings them about. Therefore, when we have seen that nothing can be created out of nothing, then more rightly after that shall we discern that for which we search, both whence each thing can be created, and in what way all things come to be without the aid of gods.
The order is the point. First the truth about how things come to be; then, as a result of knowing it, the end of the fear that comes from not knowing it.
The Same Battle Today
Section titled “The Same Battle Today”This is not an ancient quarrel that has been settled by modern science. It is still being fought, and in nearly the same terms. In 1802 William Paley’s Natural Theology argued that just as a watch found on a heath proves a watchmaker, the eye and the hand prove a designer. The modern “intelligent design” movement makes the same argument from the complexity of living cells. The “fine-tuning” argument holds that the basic constants of physics fall within the narrow range that allows stars, chemistry and life, and that this cannot be an accident. On the other side, many scientists and philosophers answer that if there are vast numbers of worlds, or regions of space, or universes, then some of them will have conditions suited to life, and we should not be surprised to find ourselves in one of those. That is the Epicurean answer, given more than two thousand years ago, in the language of infinite worlds and equal distribution.
Even today’s leading scientists stop short of an answer. Near the end of A Brief History of Time, Stephen Hawking wrote that even a complete theory of physics would leave the question open:
Even if there is only one possible unified theory, it is just a set of rules and equations. What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe? The usual approach of science of constructing a mathematical model cannot answer the questions of why there should be a universe for the model to describe. Why does the universe go to all the bother of existing?
— Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (1998 edition), p. 190
Martin Rees, the Astronomer Royal, wrote of the fine-tuning of the universe for life:
The distinctive and special-seeming recipe characterising our universe seems to me a fundamental mystery that should not be brushed aside merely as a brute fact.
— Martin Rees, “Numerical Coincidences and ‘Tuning’ in Cosmology” (2004)
The answer Rees leans toward is the one Epicurus gave, but Rees himself calls it “highly speculative”:
There may be many ‘universes’ of which ours is just one. In the others, some laws and physical constants would be different. But our universe wouldn’t be just a random one. It would belong to the unusual subset that offered a habitat conducive to the emergence of complexity and consciousness. If our universe is selected from a multiverse, its seemingly designed or fine tuned features wouldn’t be surprising.
— Martin Rees, “Numerical Coincidences and ‘Tuning’ in Cosmology” (2004)
And the physicist Sean Carroll opens a paper on why there is something rather than nothing this way:
It seems natural to ask why the universe exists at all. Modern physics suggests that the universe can exist all by itself as a self-contained system, without anything external to create or sustain it. But there might not be an absolute answer to why it exists.
— Sean Carroll, “Why Is There Something, Rather Than Nothing?” (2018)
None of these men argues for a designer. But all of them leave the question open, as if the evidence needed to close it had not yet come in. Here the Epicureans part company with modern science. Epicurus held that we already have enough evidence to reach the conclusion, and that we have had it for more than two thousand years. Nothing comes from nothing and nothing passes into nothing; that is confirmed by everything we see, and the opposite has never once been seen. It follows that the ultimate constituents of the universe were never created and will never be destroyed: they have always existed and always will. It follows too that the universe is boundless, that matter in it is unlimited, and that worlds arise within it naturally, again and again, wherever the right atoms meet. No observation made since, and none that could be made in the future, can overturn that conclusion, because any observation would have to show something coming from nothing, and that is the one thing nature never shows.
Someone will say that we should still keep an open mind, because evidence of a creator might turn up some day. Epicurus answered that objection in his rule for judging opinions. An opinion is true if the evidence confirms it or does not contradict it, and false if the evidence fails to confirm it or contradicts it (Diogenes Laertius X.34). Sextus Empiricus, no friend of Epicurus, reported the rule this way:
Hence confirmatory testimony and lack of contrary testimony form a criterion of the truth of a thing, but lack of confirmatory testimony and contradictory testimony of its falsehood. And the base and foundation of all is the evidence of sense.
The claim that the universe was made from nothing fails both tests. Nothing we have ever seen confirms it, and everything we have ever seen contradicts it. Epicurus did hold that some questions must wait for more evidence, as when we wait to come closer to a distant tower before we judge its shape. But we wait only when the evidence is divided or not yet in. We do not wait when all the evidence points one way and none points the other. To suspend judgment forever on a possibility that has no evidence for it, and that contradicts all the evidence we do have, makes no more sense than to hold open the possibility that the far side of the moon is populated by pink elephants.
So the question “why does the universe exist?” has the answer Epicurus gave it. The totality of things never began, so it needs no maker and no reason outside itself. What modern science treats as an open question, or as a mystery, or as a speculation, Epicurus treated as a conclusion that the evidence already justifies. The fault lies not in the evidence but in the refusal to take the last step and draw the conclusion the evidence supports.
That refusal largely results from philosophical skepticism. Much of modern science has taken over the outlook of the ancient Academic and Pyrrhonist skeptics, who held that we can never be certain of anything beyond what appears to us, and who therefore suspended judgment on every question about the nature of things. Under that outlook every conclusion stays provisional, and nothing can ever be called settled, not even that nothing comes from nothing. Epicurus rejected that position at its root. If our senses, honestly used, give us knowledge of what is true, then reasoning that stays in agreement with the senses can give us knowledge of what we cannot see, including the eternity of the atoms and the infinity of the universe. Lucretius answered the skeptic directly:
Again, if any one thinks that nothing is known, he knows not whether that can be known either, since he admits that he knows nothing. Against him then I will refrain from joining issue, who plants himself with his head in the place of his feet. And yet were I to grant that he knows this too, yet I would ask this one question; since he has never before seen any truth in things, whence does he know what is knowing, and not knowing each in turn, what thing has begotten the concept of the true and the false, what thing has proved that the doubtful differs from the certain?
The Epicurean case against skepticism is set out in full in Epicurus Against The White Flags of Surrender: Sextus Empiricus and the Pyrrhonists and Two Roads But One Dead End.
The answer a person gives still decides how a rational person will live his life. If the world was made by a mind that issues commands and rewards and punishes by them, then the reasonable course is to learn those commands and obey them, whatever they cost us here, and to look to that mind for the meaning of our lives. If the world was not made, then no one stands outside nature to give it a purpose or to judge us after death. Then nature, through the feelings of pleasure and pain it gave us, is our guide, and the goal of life is to be found within life itself. Everything in Epicurean ethics depends on getting this first question right.
The Epicureans answered it in two steps. First they showed that the case for a designer fails. Then they showed how worlds like ours form without one.
Step One: The Case For A Designer Fails
Section titled “Step One: The Case For A Designer Fails”The leading account of creation in Epicurus’ day was Plato’s Timaeus, in which a divine craftsman builds the world after an eternal model. The Stoics soon took up the same conviction, that the world is the work of a divine intelligence for the sake of gods and men, differing from Plato mainly on how the making was done. So in answering Plato the Epicureans were answering the Stoics as well. Cicero’s Epicurean spokesman Velleius puts the questions:
What power of mental vision enabled your master Plato to descry the vast and elaborate architectural process which, as he makes out, the deity adopted in building the structure of the universe? What method of engineering was employed? What tools and levers and derricks? What agents carried out so vast an undertaking? And how were air, fire, water and earth enabled to obey and execute the will of the architect?
Moreover I would put to both of you the question, why did these deities suddenly awake into activity as world-builders after countless ages of slumber?
Lucretius presses the same questions. Why would blessed beings, untroubled for endless ages, suddenly want something new? Whom would creation benefit, when no one who does not yet exist is harmed by never being born? And where would a creator have found the idea of a world, or of a human being, before any such thing existed to serve as a model?
Further, how was there first implanted in the gods a pattern for the begetting of things, yea, and the concept of man, so that they might know and see in their mind what they wished to do, or in what way was the power of the first-beginnings ever learnt, or what they could do when they shifted their order one with the other, if nature did not herself give a model of creation?
And if the world was made for us, why is so much of it hostile to us?
But even if I knew not what are the first-beginnings of things, yet this I would dare to affirm from the very workings of heaven, and to prove from many other things as well, that by no means has the nature of things been fashioned for us by divine grace: so great are the flaws with which it stands beset.
Epicurus also denied that the regular motions of the heavens show a ruling mind. Those motions must not be thought “due to any being who controls and ordains or has ordained them and at the same time enjoys perfect bliss together with immortality,” for “trouble and care and anger and kindness are not consistent with a life of blessedness.” The regular succession of the heavens comes instead from “the original inclusion of matter in such agglomerations during the birth-process of the world” (Letter to Herodotus 77).
These arguments are developed further in Epicurean Responses To The Intelligent Design Argument. But showing that the case for a designer fails is only half the work. The creationist can still ask: if no mind arranged the world, how did scattered atoms ever come to form anything as orderly as earth, sea, sky and living things? The Epicurean answer rests on three linked doctrines.
Step Two: How Worlds Form Without A Designer
Section titled “Step Two: How Worlds Form Without A Designer”1. The Atoms Are Infinite In Number
Section titled “1. The Atoms Are Infinite In Number”The universe is boundless, both in the amount of matter and in the extent of space:
Furthermore, the infinite is boundless both in the number of the bodies and in the extent of the void. For if on the one hand the void were boundless, and the bodies limited in number, the bodies could not stay anywhere, but would be carried about and scattered through the infinite void, not having other bodies to support them and keep them in place by means of collisions. But if, on the other hand, the void were limited, the infinite bodies would not have room wherein to take their place.
And the universe has no beginning in time. The atoms have been moving, colliding and combining for an infinite time already.
2. The Kinds Of Atoms Are Not Infinite
Section titled “2. The Kinds Of Atoms Are Not Infinite”Atoms differ from one another only in shape, size and weight. Epicurus held that their shapes are many beyond imagining, but not infinite:
Besides this the indivisible and solid bodies, out of which too the compounds are created and into which they are dissolved, have an incomprehensible number of varieties in shape: for it is not possible that such great varieties of things should arise from the same atomic shapes, if they are limited in number. And so in each shape the atoms are quite infinite in number, but their differences of shape are not quite infinite, but only incomprehensible in number.
He reached this through the minimum parts. Every atom is made of a definite number of partless minima, and a definite number of parts can be arranged in only a limited number of ways. To get a new shape you must add more parts. So an unlimited number of shapes would mean atoms of unlimited size, and we see no such thing:
For suppose the first-bodies to be of three least parts, or if you will, make them larger by a few more; in truth when you have tried all those parts of one body in every way, shifting top and bottom, changing right with left, to see what outline of form in that whole body each arrangement gives, beyond that, if by chance you wish to make the shapes different, you must needs add other parts … and so greater bulk in the body follows on newness of forms.
Lucretius adds the evidence of the senses. Colors, smells, tastes and sounds all run between fixed extremes. If the shapes of atoms were unlimited, there would always be some new purple brighter than the brightest, and some smell fouler than the foulest:
And since these things are not so, but a fixed limit to things marks the extreme on either side, you must needs confess that the first-matter too has a limited difference in shapes.
Put the first two doctrines together, and there must be infinitely many atoms of every kind:
For since the difference of forms is limited, it must needs be that those which are alike are unlimited, or else that the sum of matter is created limited, which I have proved not to be.
3. Isonomia: Equal Distribution Through The Infinite
Section titled “3. Isonomia: Equal Distribution Through The Infinite”Cicero’s Epicurean Velleius calls the third doctrine “the supremely potent principle of infinity”:
Moreover there is the supremely potent principle of infinity, which claims the closest and most careful study; we must understand that it has the following property, that in the sum of things everything has its exact match and counterpart. This property is termed by Epicurus isonomia, or the principle of uniform distribution. From this principle it follows that if the whole number of mortals be so many, there must exist no less a number of immortals, and if the causes of destruction are beyond count, the causes of conservation also are bound to be infinite.
Things of the same standing are spread evenly through the infinite. A kind that looks rare to us is plentiful somewhere else. Lucretius’ example is the elephant, seldom seen in Italy but so numerous in India that they make “a bulwark of ivory”:
For in that you see that certain animals are more rare, and perceive that nature is less fruitful in them, yet in another quarter and spot, in some distant lands, there may be many in that kind, and so the tale is made up; even as in the race of four-footed beasts we see that elephants with their snaky hands come first of all, by whose many thousands India is embattled with a bulwark of ivory, so that no way can be found into its inner parts: so great is the multitude of those beasts, whereof we see but a very few samples.
In the same way the motions of destruction and of creation stay in balance, so that neither wins for ever: “So war waged from time everlasting is carried on by the balanced strife of the first-beginnings” (II.569-580). Velleius applies the principle to divine beings, but it applies just as well to atoms, to species of living things, and to worlds.
Why The Limit On Kinds Matters So Much
Section titled “Why The Limit On Kinds Matters So Much”David Sedley’s Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity (2007) shows why these doctrines, taken together, are the Epicurean alternative to divine creation. (The full set of passages is collected in The Power Of Infinity.) Democritus, the great atomist before Epicurus, had held that the shapes of atoms are infinite in number. Sedley points out the danger in that view. With infinitely many kinds of atoms, nothing guarantees that any particular arrangement of atoms ever happens twice, so even among infinite worlds a world like ours might be a one-time stroke of luck:
If it is not guaranteed that our world formation recurs elsewhere in the infinite universe, it follows that its occurrence somewhere even once was not after all inevitable, but fortuitous. The concession is not ruinous, because the lucky fluke was still physically possible. But it immediately invites back in the explanatory hypothesis of a divine creator who, against the odds, turned that mere possibility into reality.
— Sedley, Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity, p. 160
Epicurus closes that door. With a limited number of kinds of atoms, infinitely many atoms of each kind, and a limit to how large a world can grow (Lucretius II.1116-1117), the number of possible kinds of world is beyond counting but still finite. Spread through infinite space and endless time, every kind of world that can exist does exist, and it forms again and again:
Furthermore, there are infinite worlds both like and unlike this world of ours. For the atoms being infinite in number, as was proved already, are borne on far out into space. For those atoms, which are of such nature that a world could be created out of them or made by them, have not been used up either on one world or on a limited number of worlds, nor again on all the worlds which are alike, or on those which are different from these. So that there nowhere exists an obstacle to the infinite number of the worlds.
Sedley states the conclusion:
If even one world-type in that unimaginably vast set of permutations is capable of sustaining life as beneficially as ours does, it is — as we ourselves might choose to put it — a statistical certainty that worlds of that type exist not only here but also elsewhere in the universe, and will continue to form in the future. The existence of our world is therefore neither a bizarre fluke nor an act of god, but a simple working out of distributive inevitabilities on an infinite scale.
— Sedley, p. 164
Given only the premises that there are a finite number of possible world-types, and that across an infinite universe these will be distributed in a more or less regular and endlessly repeated pattern, the case appears to go through: even in the absence of intelligent creation, there had to be worlds like ours.
— Sedley, p. 166
Epicurus had several grounds for holding that the kinds of atoms are limited: the minimum parts, the fixed limits we see in nature, and the fact that only a limited number of kinds lets infinity do its work in forming worlds like ours. All of them point the same way.
How Atoms Sort Themselves Into A World
Section titled “How Atoms Sort Themselves Into A World”Infinite atoms and equal distribution show that worlds like ours must form somewhere. The remaining question is how. How do scattered atoms of every kind come to be sorted into earth below, sea and air above it, and sun and stars above that? The atomists found the answer in something anyone can watch: the way moving matter sorts itself.
What A Vortex Is, And What It Does
Section titled “What A Vortex Is, And What It Does”A vortex is a body of fluid, water or air, turning around a center: the swirl of water draining from a basin, a whirlpool, a dust devil, a tornado, a waterspout at sea. The Greek word was dinos, “whirl.” A vortex does more than spin. It sorts. When things of different weight and shape are caught in the same whirl, heavy pieces gather in one place and light ones in another. Stir a cup of tea and the leaves collect at the center of the bottom. No one arranges them. The motion and the differences between the pieces are enough.
Aristotle noticed that the early natural philosophers took their idea of world-formation from exactly this:
The form of causation supposed they all borrow from observations of liquids and of air, in which the larger and heavier bodies always move to the centre of the whirl. This is thought by all those who try to generate the heavens to explain why the earth came together at the centre.
Democritus gave everyday examples of the same sorting:
… as one may see in the case of seeds that are being winnowed and in the case of pebbles along the beaches; for in the one case, by the whirling of the sieve lentils are ranged separately with lentils, barley with barley, and wheat with wheat; and in the other case, owing to the motion of the waves, the oblong pebbles are pushed into the same place as the oblong, and the round as the round, as though the similarity in things had a certain force of attraction for them.
— Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians I.117-118 (tr. Bury)
For Epicurus a vortex is fully real, as real as the wind and water we see whirling. But it is not a third kind of thing beside body and void, and it is not a force or a power standing over the atoms. Atoms and void are the ultimate constituents of everything, and nothing exists eternally the same except atoms and void. That does not mean that nothing else is real. Everything else that exists, from a grain of sand to a whirlwind to a whole world, is just as real, as a compound of atoms or as a property or event of such compounds. A whirl is one of those events: a motion of bodies, moving by their own weight, colliding, rebounding and sometimes swerving, with no mind and no plan.
Epicurus Corrects The Earlier Atomists
Section titled “Epicurus Corrects The Earlier Atomists”Leucippus and Democritus put the vortex at the center of world-formation, and Democritus called it necessity. In R. D. Hicks’s translation of Diogenes Laertius, “All things happen by virtue of necessity, the vortex being the cause of the creation of all things, and this he calls necessity” (DL IX.45). Epicurus kept the main idea, that like goes with like by natural motion without a designer, and corrected the rest. A whirl does not work by necessity, because atoms swerve. And a whirl alone is not enough to make a world. A world needs seeds of the right kind, gathering and growing little by little:
And that such worlds are infinite in number we can be sure, and also that such a world may come into being both inside another world and in an interworld, by which we mean a space between worlds; it will be in a place with much void, and not in a large empty space quite void, as some say: this occurs when seeds of the right kind have rushed in from a single world or interworld, or from several: little by little they make junctions and articulations, and cause changes of position to another place, as it may happen, and produce irrigations of the appropriate matter until the period of completion and stability, which lasts as long as the underlying foundations are capable of receiving additions.
For it is not merely necessary for a gathering of atoms to take place, nor indeed for a whirl and nothing more to be set in motion, as is supposed, by necessity, in an empty space in which it is possible for a world to come into being … Sun and moon and the other stars were not created by themselves and subsequently taken in by the world, but were fashioned in it from the first and gradually grew in size by the aggregations and whirlings of bodies of minute parts, either windy or fiery or both, for this is what our sensation suggests.
Lucretius: Like Uniting With Like
Section titled “Lucretius: Like Uniting With Like”Lucretius tells how our world formed. It began “not by design,” but through atoms trying “meetings and motions of every kind” over a great age (V.416-431). At first there was only a storm of atoms of every kind; then like began to join like:
… but only a sort of fresh-formed storm, a mass gathered together of first-beginnings of every kind, whose discord was waging war and confounding interspaces, paths, inter-lacings, weights, blows, meetings, and motions, because owing to their unlike forms and diverse shapes, all things were unable to remain in union, as they do now, and to give and receive harmonious motions. From this mass parts began to fly off hither and thither, and like things to unite with like, and so to unfold a world, and to sunder its members and dispose its great parts, that is, to mark off the high heaven from the earth, and the sea by itself, so that it might spread out with its moisture kept apart, and likewise the fires of the sky by themselves, unmixed and kept apart.
The heavy atoms of earth crowded to the middle, and the smaller, smoother and rounder atoms of sea, air, sun and stars were squeezed out and rose:
Yea, verily, first of all the several bodies of earth, because they were heavy and interlaced, met together in the middle, and all took up the lowest places; and the more they met and interlaced, the more did they squeeze out those which were to make sea, stars, sun, and moon, and the walls of the great world. For all these are of smoother and rounder seeds, and of much smaller particles than earth.
This is the same sorting that the whirl of the sieve and the motion of the waves produce. Sedley puts it this way: “vast collections of atoms have a propensity to organize themselves mechanically into certain patterns of motion, and thus in many cases to take on at least the outline structure of a world automatically” (p. 164). The full set of passages on whirls of atoms, air and wind in Epicurus, Lucretius and Diogenes of Oinoanda is collected in The Role Of The Vortex In The Creation Of Worlds.
Answering The Stoic Objection
Section titled “Answering The Stoic Objection”The Stoic Balbus, in Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods, mocks the idea that atoms falling together by chance could make a world:
Is it possible for any man to behold these things, and yet imagine that certain solid and individual bodies move by their natural force and gravitation, and that a world so beautifully adorned was made by their fortuitous concourse? He who believes this may as well believe that if a great quantity of the one-and-twenty letters, composed either of gold or any other matter, were thrown upon the ground, they would fall into such order as legibly to form the Annals of Ennius. I doubt whether fortune could make a single verse of them.
— Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods II.93 (tr. Yonge, II.XXXVII)
Balbus pictures one throw of one handful of letters. The Epicurean universe is something else entirely: an infinite number of throws, for an infinite time, with a limited alphabet, and with matter that sorts itself by natural motion rather than falling at random. Sedley compares it to “an infinite line of monkeys with typewriters” (p. 159), in which a finished play turns up once in every so many monkeys, however large that number may be. Democritus’ universe, with its infinite kinds of atoms, would be like monkeys at “typewriters each of which has an infinite number of different keys” (p. 161), and then there is no reason to expect even one finished line. The limit on the kinds of atoms is what makes the Epicurean answer work.
What Repeats, And What Does Not
Section titled “What Repeats, And What Does Not”Because atoms swerve, a world with the same physical makeup as ours need not repeat our history. Unlike Democritus and the Stoics, Epicurus did not teach that other worlds hold exact doubles of us living the same lives (Sedley, pp. 164-65). What recurs is the kind of world, with the conditions that produce and sustain life, not the same individuals. Each of us is still unique, and each of our lives is still our own to live.
Why This Comes First
Section titled “Why This Comes First”Lucretius said he would show “in what way all things come to be without the aid of gods.” He kept that promise. Infinite atoms of a limited number of kinds, spread evenly through infinite space and endless time, always moving, colliding, swerving and sorting, produce worlds like ours without any designer. Our world is neither a miracle nor a fluke. It is what nature does, given enough time and room.
That is why an Epicurean starts here. Once a person understands that the world was not made for him by a mind that commands him and will judge him, he can turn with confidence to the questions that follow: how to know what is true, how to live, what to choose and what to avoid, and how to make the most of the one life he has. He can dismiss, refute and even laugh at the claim that some power above nature is watching him, ready to reward or punish. The answer to the first question determines every other answer, and Epicurus answered it by following the evidence of nature, not by consulting the poets or the priests.
Related Pages
Section titled “Related Pages”- The Power Of Infinity: Infinite Atoms, Limited Kinds, And Isonomia
- The Role Of The Vortex In The Creation Of Worlds
- Epicurean Responses To The Intelligent Design Argument
- Greater Than The Sum Of Its Parts: Emergence In Epicurean Philosophy
- Epicurean Physics and Modern Science: Five Core Claims That Endure
- Outline of Epicurean Philosophy: “The Atoms Are Infinite In Number, But Their Kinds Are Not” (Physics)