Epictetus - Encheiridion and Fragments (Oldfather)

Epicurean Focus

The Encheiridion (“Handbook”) is a short summary of Epictetus’s teaching, compiled by his pupil Arrian from the Discourses*. For centuries it was the best-known Stoic text, and it is still the most widely read. The Fragments that follow it are sayings of Epictetus preserved by later writers. For the full lectures, including Epictetus’s direct attacks on Epicurus, see the Discourses.*

Judgments, Not Things

The handbook opens with the division of the world into what is and is not “under our control”: “Some things are under our control, while others are not under our control.” Our body, property and reputation are not our own. The next step is the claim that we are disturbed only by our opinions: “It is not the things themselves that disturb men, but their judgements about these things,” and death itself is “nothing dreadful.”

Epicurus agreed that false opinions are the chief source of human misery, and that “death is nothing to us.” But his reason was different. For Epicurus death is nothing because it is the end of all sensation, not because the wise man has decided to treat it as indifferent (DL X.124–125). And Epicurus never held that bodily pain and pleasure are mere matters of judgment. They are real, and the wise man deals with them by reasoning about which choices lead to more pleasure and less pain.

Accepting Whatever Happens

“Do not seek to have everything that happens happen as you wish, but wish for everything to happen as it actually does happen, and your life will be serene.” This follows from the Stoic belief that all events are ordered by a good providence. In piety, “the chief element is this, to have right opinions about them—as existing and as administering the universe well and justly,” and to “submit to everything that happens.” The handbook ends with Cleanthes’ prayer to be led by Zeus and Destiny (53).

Epicurus held that some things happen by necessity, some by chance and some through our own choice, and that what is in our control “is subject to no master” (DL X.133). He did not teach that we should will whatever happens, because he did not believe it was arranged for our good.

Pleasure as a Temptation

When “you get an external impression of some pleasure, guard yourself,” and weigh the time of enjoyment against the time of regret. This sounds Epicurean, and Epicurus also taught weighing pleasures against their consequences. The difference is in the goal. For Epictetus the weighing is a way of resisting pleasure. For Epicurus it is a way of obtaining the most pleasure over a whole life.

Epictetus on Atoms

One of the fragments shows how little Stoic ethics depended on physics in Epictetus’s teaching: “What do I care, says Epictetus, whether all existing things are composed of atoms, or of indivisibles, or of fire and earth?” Epicurus held the opposite. Without the study of nature “there is no way of securing the purity of our pleasures” (Principal Doctrine 12), because only knowledge of how the world works removes the fear of the gods and of death.

Outline Of The Argument

Editor’s note: The Encheiridion has no chapter titles. Each entry gives the opening words of the chapter and links to it.

• 1 Some things are under our control, while others are not under our control.
• 2 Remember that the promise of desire is the attainment of what you desire, that of aversion is not to fall into what is avoided, and that he who fails in his …
• 3 With everything which entertains you, is useful, or of which you are fond, remember to say to yourself, beginning with the very least things, “ What is its …
• 4 When you are on the point of putting your hand to some undertaking, remind yourself what the nature of that undertaking is.
• 5 It is not the things themselves that disturb men, but their judgements about these things.
• 6 Be not elated at any excellence which is not your own.
• 7 Just as on a voyage, when your ship has anchored, if you should go on shore to get fresh water, you may pick up a small shell-fish or little bulb?
• 8 Do not seek to have everything that happens happen as you wish, but wish for everything to happen as it actually does happen, and your life will be serene.
• 9 Disease is an impediment to the body, but not to the moral purpose, unless that consents.
• 10 In the case of everything that befalls you, remember to turn to yourself and see what faculty you have to deal with it.
• 11 Never say about anything, “I have lost it,” but only “1 have given it back.’ Is your child dead ἢ It has been given back, Is your wife dead?
• 12 If you wish to make progress, dismiss all reasoning of this sort: “If I neglect my affairs, shall have nothing to live on.” “If I do not punish my slave-boy …
• 13 If you wish to make progress, then be content to appear senseless and foolish in externals, do not make it your wish to give the appearance of knowing anything;
• 14 If you make it your will that your children and your wife and your friends should live for ever, you are silly;
• 15 Remember that you ought to behave in life as you would at a banquet.
• 16 When you see someone weeping in sorrow, either because a child has gone on a journey, or because he has lost his property, beware that you be not carried …
• 17 Remember that you are an actor in a play, the character of which is determined by the Playwright: if He wishes the play to be short, it is short;
• 18 When a raven croaks inauspicfously, let not the external impression carry you away, but straightway draw a distinction in your own mind, and say, “‘ None of …
• 19 You can be invincible if you never enter a contest in which victory is not under your control.
• 20 Bear in mind that it is not the man who reviles or strikes you that insults you, but it is your judgement that these men are insulting you.
• 21 Keep before your eyes day by day death and exile, and everything that seems terrible, but most of all death;
• 22 If you yearn for philosophy, prepare at once to be met with ridicule, to have many people jeer at you, and say, “ Here he is again, turned philosopher all …
• 23 If it should ever happen to you that you turn to externals with a view to pleasing someone, rest assured that you have lost your plan of life.
• 24 Let not these reflections oppress you: “I shall live without honour, and be nobody anywhere.” For, if lack of honour is an evil, you cannot be in evil …
• 25 Has someone been honoured above you at a dinner-party, or in salutation, or in being called in to give advice?
• 26 What the will of nature is may be learned from a consideration of the points in which we do not differ from one another.
• 27 Just as a mark is not set up in order to be missed, so neither does the nature of evil arise in the universe.!
• 28 If someone handed over your body to any person who met you, you would be vexed;
• 29 In each separate thing that you do, consider the matters which come first and those which follow after, and only then approach the thing itself.
• 30 Our duties are in general measured by our social relationships.
• 31 In piety towards the gods, I would have you know, the chief element is this, to have right opinions about them—as existing and as administering the universe …
• 32 When you have recourse to divination, remember that you do not know what the issue is going to be, but that you have come in order to find this out from the …
• 33 Lay down for yourself, at the outset, a certain stamp and type of character for yourself, which you are to maintain whether you are by yourself or are …
• 34 When you get an external impression of some pleasure, guard yourself, as with impressions in general, against being carried away by it;
• 35 When you do a thing which you have made up your mind ought to be done, never try not to be seen doing it, even though most people are likely to think …
• 36 Just as the propositions, “It is day,” and “ It is night,” are full of meaning when separated, but meaningless if united;
• 37 If you undertake a réle which is beyond your powers, you both disgrace yourself in that one, and at the same time neglect the rdéle which you might have …
• 38 Just as you are careful, in walking about, not to step on a nail or to sprain your ankle, so be careful also not to hurt your governing principle.
• 39 Each man’s body is a measure for his property,!
• 40 Immediately after they are fourteen, women are called “ladies ’’ by men.
• 41 It is a mark of an ungifted man to spend a great deal of time in what concerns his body, as in much exercise, much eating, much drinking, much evacuating of …
• 42 When someone treats you ill or speaks ill of you, remember that he acts or speaks thus because he thinks it is incumbent upon him.
• 43 Everything has two handles, by one of which it ought to be carried and by the other not.
• 44 The following statements constitute a non sequiiur: “1 am richer than you are, therefore am superior to you’’;
• 45 Somebody is hasty about bathing ;1 do not say that he bathes badly, but that he is hasty about bathing.
• 46 On no occasion call yourself a philosopher, and do not, for the most part, talk among laymen about your philosophic principles, but do what follows from …
• 47 When you have become adjusted to simple living in regard to your bodily wants, do not preen yourself about the accomplishment;
• 48 This is the position and character of a layman: He never looks for either help or harm from himself, but only from externals.
• 49 When a person gives himself airs because he can understand and interpret the books of Chrysippus, say to yourself, “If Chrysippus had not written obscurely, …
• 50 Whatever principles are set before you, stand fast by these like laws, feeling that it would be impiety for you to transgress them.
• 51 How long will you still wait to think yourself worthy of the best things, and in nothing to transgress against the distinctions set up by the reason?
• 52 The first and most necessary division in philosophy is that which has to do with the application of the principles, as, for example, Do not lie.
• 53 Upon every occasion we ought to have the following thoughts at our command: Lead thou me on, O Zeus, and Destiny, To that goal long ago to me assigned.

The Translation (Oldfather)

Translated by W. A. Oldfather, Epictetus: The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments, Loeb Classical Library, Volume II (London: William Heinemann; New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1928). The scanned volume is at the Internet Archive: Volume II.

How to read the references. Each chapter of the Encheiridion is a link target, such as #ench-5, and each fragment, such as #frag-1 (the doubtful fragments are #dfrag-29 and so on). The small “vol.” links open the scanned page of the Loeb volume. The Greek text and Oldfather’s introduction to the Encheiridion are omitted. His notes are kept as numbered footnotes, except his notes on readings of the Greek text.

About the text. The text follows the proofread transcription of Oldfather’s volume made by the volunteers of Wikisource.

Fragments

^{vol. 2} FRAGMENTS

Introductory Note

The genuine fragments of Epictetus are not very numerous, and since several of them are of unusual interest, it has seemed best to add them at this point. One fragment, No. 28 b, I have added to those listed by Schenkl, since its discovery was subsequent to his latest edition.

Earlier editions have included a large number of aphorisms gathered from Stobaeus, and from a gnomology purporting to contain excerpts from Democritus, Isocrates, and Epictetus. The researches of a group of scholars, principally H. Schenkl,¹ R. Asmus,² and A. Elter,³ have thrown such doubt upon the authenticity of these aphorisms that it would scarcely serve any useful purpose to reproduce them in the present work.

^{vol. 2} FRAGMENTS

Fragment 1

From Arrian the pupil of Epictetus. To the man who was bothering himself about the problem of being

What do I care, says Epictetus, whether all existing things are composed of atoms, or of indivisibles, or of fire and earth? Is it not enough to learn the true nature of the good and the evil, and the limits of the desires and aversions, and also of the choices and refusals, and, by employing these as rules, to order the affairs of our life, and dismiss the things that are beyond us? It may very well be that these latter are not to be comprehended by the human mind, and even if one assume that they are perfectly comprehensible, well, what profit comes from comprehending them? And ought we not to say that those men trouble themselves in vain who assign all this as necessary to the philosopher’s system of thought? Is, therefore, also the precept at Delphi superfluous, “Know thyself”?—That, indeed, no, the man answers.—What, then, does it mean? If one bade a singer in a chorus to “know himself,” would he not heed the order by paying attention both to his fellows in the chorus and to singing in harmony with them?—Yes.—And so in the case of a sailor? ^{vol. 2} or a soldier? Does it seem to you, then, that man has been made a creature to live all alone by himself, or for society?—For society.—By whom?—By Nature.—What Nature is, and how she administers the universe, and whether she really exists or not, these are questions about which there is no need to go on to bother ourselves.

Fragment 2

From Arrian the pupil of Epictetus

He who is dissatisfied with what he has and what has been given him by fortune is a layman in the art of living, but the man who bears all this in a noble spirit and makes a reasonable use of all that comes from it deserves to be considered a good man.

Fragment 3

From the same

All things obey and serve the Cosmos,⁴ both earth, and sea, and sun, and the other stars, and the plants and animals of earth; obedient to it also is our body, both in sickness and in health, when the Cosmos wishes, both in youth and in old age, and when passing through all the other changes. Therefore it is reasonable also that the one thing which is under our control, that is, the decision of our will, should not be the only thing to stand out against it. For the Cosmos is mighty and superior to us, and has taken better counsel for us than we can, by uniting ^{vol. 2} us together with the universe under its governance. Besides, to act against it is to side with unreason, and while accomplishing nothing but a vain struggle, it involves us in pains and sorrows.

Fragment 4

Rufus. From the remarks of Epictetus on friendship⁵

Of things that are, God has put some under our control, and others not under our control. Under our control He put the finest and most important matter, that, indeed, by virtue of which He Himself is happy, the power to make use of external impressions. For when this power has its perfect work, it is freedom, serenity, cheerfulness, steadfastness; it is also justice, and law, and self-control, and the sum and substance of virtue. But all other things He has not put under our control. Therefore we also ought to become of one mind with God, and, dividing matters in this way, lay hold in every way we can upon the things that are under our control, but what is not under our control we ought to leave to the Cosmos, and gladly resign to it whatever it needs, be that our children, our country, our body, or anything whatsoever.

Fragment 5

Rufus. From Epictetus on friendship

What man among us does not admire the saying of Lycurgus the Lacedaemonian? For when he had ^{vol. 2} been blinded in one eye by one of his fellow-citizens, and the people had turned over the young man to him, to take whatever vengeance upon the culprit he might desire, this he refrained from doing, but brought him up and made a good man of him, and presented him in the theatre. And when the Lacedaemonians expressed their surprise, he said, “This man when I received him at your hands was insolent and violent; I am returning him to you a reasonable and public-spirited person.”

Fragment 6

Rufus. From Epictetus on friendship

But above all else this is the function of nature, to bind together and to harmonize our choice with the conception of what is fitting and helpful.

Fragment 7

The same

To fancy that we shall be contemptible in the sight of other men, if we do not employ every means to hurt the first enemies we meet, is characteristic of extremely ignoble and thoughtless men. For it is a common saying among us that the contemptible man is recognized among other things by his incapacity to do harm; but he is much better recognized by his incapacity to extend help.

^{vol. 2}

Fragment 8

Rufus. From the remarks of Epictetus on friendship

Such was, and is, and will be, the nature of the universe, and it is not possible for the things that come into being to come into being otherwise than they now do. And not only has mankind participated in this process of change and transformation, and all the other living beings upon earth, but also those which are divine, and, by Zeus, even the four elements, which are changed and transformed upwards and downwards,⁶ as earth becomes water, and water air, and air again is transformed into ether; and there is the same kind of transformation also downwards. If a man endeavours to incline his mind to these things, and to persuade himself to accept of his own accord what needs must befall him, he will have a very reasonable and harmonious life.

Fragment 9

A philosopher who is well known in the Stoic school brought out of his handbag the fifth book of the Discourses of the philosopher Epictetus, which had been arranged by Arrian, and agree, no doubt, with the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus. In that book, written of course in Greek, we find, a passage to this purport: Things seen by the mind (which the philosophers call φαντασίας),⁷ whereby the intellect of man is struck at the very first sight of anything which penetrates to the mind, are not subject to his will, nor to his ^{vol. 2} control, but by virtue of a certain force of their own thrust themselves upon the attention of men; but the assents (which they call συγκαταθέσεις), whereby these same things seen by the mind are recognized, are subject to man’s will, and fall under his control. Therefore, when some terrifying sound comes from the sky, or from the collapse of a building, or sudden word comes of some peril or other, or something else of the same sort happens, the mind of even the wise man cannot help but be disturbed, and shrink, and grow pale for a moment, not from any anticipation of some evil, but because of certain swift and unconsidered motions which forestall the action of the intellect and the reason. Soon, however, our wise man does not give his assent (this is, οὑ συγκατατίθεται οὐδὲ προσεπιδοξάζει)⁸ to τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας⁹ (that is, these terrifying things seen by his mind), but rejects and repudiates them, and sees in them nothing to cause him fear. And this, they say, is the difference between the mind of the fool and the mind of the wise man, that the fool thinks the cruel and harsh things seen by his mind, when it is first struck by them, actually to be what they appear, and likewise afterwards, just as though they really were formidable, he confirms them by his own approval also, καὶ προσεπιδοξάζει¹⁰ (the word the Stoics use when they discuss this matter);¹¹ whereas the wise man, when his colour and expression have changed for a brief instant, οὑ συγκατατίθεται,¹² but keeps the even tenor and strength of the opinion which he has always had about mental impressions of this kind, as things ^{vol. 2} that do not deserve to be feared at all, but terrify only with a false face and a vain fear.

This is the sentiment and expression of the philosopher Epictetus, derived from the doctrines of the Stoics, that we have read in the book of which I spoke above.

Fragment 10

I have heard Favorinus say that he had heard the philosopher Epictetus say, that most of those who gave the appearance of philosophizing were philosophers of this kind: ἄνευ τοῦ πράττειν, μέχρι τοῦ λέγειν¹³ (this means, “apart from deeds, as far as words”). There is a still more vigorous expression which he was accustomed to use, that Arrian has recorded in the books which he wrote about his discourses. For Arrian says that when Epictetus had noticed a man lost to shame, of misdirected energy, and evil habits, bold, impudent in speech, and concerned with everything else but his soul, when he saw a man of that kind, continues Arrian, handling also the studies and pursuits of philosophy, and taking up physics, and studying dialectics, and taking up and investigating many a theoretical principle of this sort, he would call upon gods and men, and frequently, in the midst of that appeal, he would denounce the man in these words: Ἄνθρωπε, ποῦ βάλλεις; σκέψαι εἰ κεκάθαρται τὸ ἀγγεῖον. ἂν γὰρ εἰς τὴν οἴησιν βάλλῃς, ἀπώλετο. ἢν σαπῇ, ἢ οὖρον ἢ ὂξος γένοιτ᾽ ἂν, ἢ τι τούτων χεῖρον.¹⁴ Surely there is nothing weightier, nothing truer than these words, in which the greatest of philosophers declared that the writings and teachings of philosophy, when poured into a false and low-lived ^{vol. 2} person, as though into a dirty and defiled vessel, turn, change, are spoiled, and (as he himself says κυνικώτερον)¹⁵ become urine, or something, it may be, dirtier than urine.

The same Epictetus, moreover, as we have heard from Favorinus, was in the habit of saying that there were two vices which are far more severe and atrocious than all others, want of endurance and want of self-control, when we do not endure or bear the wrongs which we have to bear, or do not abstain from, or forbear, those matters and pleasures which we ought to forbear. “And so,” he says, “if a man should take to heart these two words and observe them in controlling and keeping watch over himself, he will, for the most part, be free from wrongdoing, and will live a highly peaceful life.” These two words, he used to say, were Ἀνέχου and Ἀπέχου.¹⁶

Fragment 10a (181)

When the salvation of our souls and regard for our true selves are at stake, something has to be done, even without stopping to think about it, a saying of Epictetus which Arrian quotes with approval.

Fragment 11

From the homilies of Arrian, exhorting to virtue

Now when Archelaus¹⁷ sent for Socrates with the intention of making him rich, the latter bade the messenger take back the following answer: “At Athens four quarts of barley-meal can be bought for an obol,¹⁸ and there are running springs ^{vol. 2} of water.” For, look you, if what I have is not sufficient for me, still, I am sufficient for it, and so it too is sufficient for me. Or do you not see that Polus¹⁹ was not accustomed to act Oedipus the King with any finer voice or more pleasure to his audience than Oedipus at Colonus, the outcast and beggar? And then shall the man of noble nature make a poorer showing than Polus, and not play well any role to which the Deity assigns him? And will he not follow the example of Odysseus, who was no less pre-eminent in his rags than in his rich and purple cloak?

Fragment 12

From Arrian

There are certain persons who exhibit their high spirit rather gently,²⁰ and in a sort of passionless manner do everything that even those who are swept away by their anger do. We must be on our guard, therefore, against the error of these persons, as something much worse than violent anger. For those who give way to violent anger are soon sated with their revenge, but the others prolong it like men who have a light fever.

Fragment 13

From the Memorabilia of Epictetus

But, says someone I see the good and excellent perishing from hunger and cold.—And do you not see ^{vol. 2} those who are not good and excellent perishing from luxury, and bombast, and vulgarity?—Yes, but it is disgraceful to be supported by another.—And who, O miserable fellow, is supported by himself alone, except the Cosmos? Whoever accuses Providence, therefore, because the wicked are not punished, and because they are strong and rich, is acting just as though, when the wicked had lost their eyes, he said they were not being punished because their finger-nails were in good condition. Now, as for me, I assert that there is much more difference between virtue and property than there is between eyes and finger-nails.

Fragment 14

From the Memorabilia of Epictetus

… bring forward the ill-natured²¹ philosophers, who think that pleasure is not something natural, but a sequel of things that are natural, as justice, self-control, and freedom. Why indeed, then, does the soul take delight in the lesser goods of the body, and enjoy calm therein, as Epicurus says,²² and yet not find pleasure in its own goods, which are very great? Verily nature has also given me a sense of shame, and frequently I blush, when I feel that I am saying something disgraceful. It is this emotion which does not allow me to lay down pleasure as the good and end of life.

^{vol. 2}

Fragment 15

From the Memorabilia of Epictetus

At Rome the women have in their hands Plato’s Republic, because he insists on community of women. For they pay attention only to the words, and not to the meaning of the man; the fact is, he does not bid people marry and live together, one man with one woman, and then go on to advocate the community of women, but he first abolishes that kind of marriage altogether, and introduces another kind in its place.²³ And in general people delight in finding excuses for their own faults; for, indeed, philosophy says we ought not to stretch out even our finger at random!²⁴

Fragment 16

From the Memorabilia of Epictetus

One ought to know that it is not easy for a man to acquire a fixed judgement, unless he should day by day state and hear the same principles, and at the same time apply them to his life.

Fragment 17

From Epictetus

Now when we have been invited to a banquet, we take what is set before us; and if a person should ^{vol. 2} bid his host to set before him fish or cakes, he would be regarded as eccentric. Yet in the world at large we ask the gods for things which they do not give us, and that too when there are many things which they actually have given us.

Fragment 18

From the same

Those are amusing persons, he said, who take great pride in the things which are not under our control. A man says, “I am better than you; for I have many estates, and you are half-dead with hunger.”²⁵ Another says, “I am a consular.” Another, “I am a procurator.” Another, “I have thick curly hair.” But one horse does not say to another horse, “I am better than you, for I have quantities of fodder, and a great deal of barley, and my bridles are of gold, and my saddle-cloths are embroidered,” but “I can run faster than you can.” And every creature is better or worse because of its own particular virtue or vice. Can it be, then, that man is the only creature without a special virtue, but he must have recourse to his hair, and his clothes, and his grandsires?

Fragment 19

The same

When men are sick and their physician gives them no advice, they are annoyed, and think that ^{vol. 2} he has given them up. And why should not a man feel that way toward the philosopher, and so conclude that he has given up hope of one’s ever coming to a sound state of mind, if he no longer tells one anything that is of any use?

Fragment 20

The same

Those whose bodies are in good condition can endure heat and cold; so also those whose souls are in an excellent condition can endure anger, and grief, and great joy, and every other emotion.

Fragment 21

From Epictetus

For this reason it is right to praise Agrippinus,²⁶ because, although he was a man of the very highest worth, he never praised himself, but used to blush even if someone else praised him. His character was such, said Epictetus, that when any hardship befell him he would compose a eulogy upon it; on fever, if he had a fever; on disrepute, if he suffered from disrepute; on exile, if he went into exile. And once, he said, when Agrippinus was preparing to take lunch, a man brought him word that Nero ordered him into exile; “Very well,” said he, “we shall take our lunch in Aricia.”²⁷

^{vol. 2}

Fragment 22

From Agrippinus²⁸

When Agrippinus was governor,²⁹ he used to try to persuade the persons whom he sentenced that it was proper for them to be sentenced. “For,” he would say, “it is not as an enemy or as a brigand that I record my vote against them, but as a curator and guardian; just as also the physician encourages the man upon whom he is operating, and persuades him to submit to the operation.”

Fragment 23

From Epictetus

Nature is wonderful, and, as Xenophon³⁰ says, “fond of her creatures.” At all events we love and tend our body, the most unpleasant and dirtiest thing that there is; why, if we had had to tend our neighbour’s body for no more than five days, we could not have endured it. Just consider what a nuisance it is to get up in the morning and brush some other person’s teeth, and then after attending to a call of nature to wash those parts. Truly it is wonderful to love a thing for which we perform so many services every day. I stuff this bag here;³¹ and then I empty it; what is more tiresome? But I must serve God. For that reason I remain, and endure to wash this miserable paltry body, and to ^{vol. 2} feed and shelter it; and when I was younger, there was still another behest which it laid upon me, yet nevertheless I endured it. Why, then, when Nature, which gave us our body, takes it away, do you not bear it?—I love it, says somebody.—Well, but as I was just now saying, is it not Nature that has given you this very affection? But the same Nature also says, “Let it go now, and have no more trouble with it.”

Fragment 24

The same

If a man dies young, he blames the gods <because he is carried off before his time. But if a man fails to die when he is old, he too blames the gods>, because, when it was long since time for him to rest, he has trouble; yet none the less, when death draws nigh, he wishes to live, and sends for the doctor, and implores him to spare no zeal and pains. People are very strange, he used to say, wishing neither to live nor to die.

Fragment 25

From Epictetus

When you attack someone with vehemence and threatening, remember to tell yourself beforehand that you are a tame animal;³² and then you will never do anything fierce, and so will come to the end of your life without having to repent, or to be called to account.

^{vol. 2}

Fragment 26

You are a little soul, carrying around a corpse, as Epictetus used to say.

Fragment 27

We must discover, said he, an art that deals with assent, and in the sphere of the choices we must be careful to maintain close attention, that they be made with due reservations, that they be social, and that they be according to merit; and from desire we must refrain altogether, and must exercise aversion towards none of the things that are not under our control.

Fragment 28

It is no ordinary matter that is at stake, said he, but it is a question of either madness or sanity.

Fragment 28a

Socrates used to say, “What do you want? To have souls of rational or irrational animals?” “Of rational animals.” “Of what kind of rational animals? Sound or vicious?” “Sound.” “Why, then, do you not try to get them?” “Because we have them.” “Why, then, do you strive and quarrel?”

Fragment 28b

“Me miserable, that this has befallen me!” Say not so, but rather, “Fortunate that I am, because, ^{vol. 2} although this has befallen me, I continue to live untroubled, being neither crushed by the present nor afraid of the future.” For something of this kind might have befallen anyone; but not everyone would have continued to live untroubled by it. Why, then, count the former aspect of the matter a misfortune, rather than this latter good fortune? And in general do you call a man’s misfortune that which is not an aberration from man’s nature? And does that seem to you to be an aberration from the nature of man which does not contravene the will of his nature? What then? This will of man’s nature you have already learned; this, then, which has befallen you does not prevent you, does it, from being just, high-minded, self-controlled, self-possessed, deliberate, free from deceit, self-respecting, free, and everything else, the possession of which enables the nature of man to come into its own?

Remember for the future, whenever anything begins to trouble you, to make use of the following judgement: This thing is not a misfortune, but to bear it in a noble spirit is good fortune.

Doubtful and Spurious Fragments

Fragment 29

From the Encheiridion of Epictetus

Under all circumstances take thought of nothing so much as safety; for it is safer to keep silence than to speak; and refrain from saying what will be devoid of sense and full of censure.

^{vol. 2}

Fragment 30

From Epictetus

We ought neither to fasten our ship to one small anchor nor our life to a single hope.

Fragment 31

From the same

We ought to measure both the length of our stride, and the extent of our hope, by what is possible.

Fragment 32

From Epictetus

It is much more necessary to cure the soul than the body; for death is better than a bad life.

Fragment 33

From the same

Those of our pleasures which come most rarely give the greatest delight.

Fragment 34

From the same

If a man should overpass the mean, the most delightful things would become least delightful.

^{vol. 2}

Fragment 35

No man is free who is not master of himself.

Fragment 36

The truth is something immortal and eternal, and does not present us with a beauty that withers from the passage of time, nor a freedom of speech which can be taken away by justice, but it presents us with what is just and lawful, distinguishing the unlawful therefrom, and refuting it.

The Encheiridion, or Manual

^{vol. 2} THE ENCHEIRIDION OF EPICTETUS

1. Some things are under our control, while others are not under our control. Under our control are conception, choice, desire, aversion, and, in a word, everything that is our own doing; not under our control are our body, our property, reputation, office, and, in a word, everything that is not our own doing. Furthermore, the things under our control are by nature free, unhindered, and unimpeded; while the things not under our control are weak, servile, subject to hindrance, and not our own. Remember, therefore, that if what is naturally slavish you think to be free, and what is not your own to be your own, you will be hampered, will grieve, will be in turmoil, and will blame both gods and men; while if you think only what is your own to be your own, and what is not your own to be, as it really is, not your own, then no one will ever be able to exert compulsion upon you, no one will hinder you, you will blame no one, will find fault with no one, will do absolutely nothing against your will, you will have no personal enemy, no one will harm you, for neither is there any harm that can touch you.

With such high aims, therefore, remember that you must bestir yourself with no slight effort to lay hold of them, but you will have to give up some ^{vol. 2} things entirely, and defer others for the time being. But if you wish for these things also, and at the same time for both office and wealth, it may be that you will not get even these latter, because you aim also at the former, and certainly you will fail to get the former, which alone bring freedom and happiness.

Make it, therefore, your study at the very outset to say to every harsh external impression, “You are an external impression and not at all what you appear to be.” After that examine it and test it by these rules which you have, the first and most important of which is this: Whether the impression has to do with the things which are under our control, or with those which are not under our control; and, if it has to do with some one of the things not under our control, have ready to hand the answer, “It is nothing to me.”

2. Remember that the promise of desire is the attainment of what you desire, that of aversion is not to fall into what is avoided, and that he who fails in his desire is unfortunate, while he who falls into what he would avoid experiences misfortune. If, then, you avoid only what is unnatural among those things which are under your control, you will fall into none of the things which you avoid; but if you try to avoid disease, or death, or poverty, you will experience misfortune. Withdraw, therefore, your aversion from all the matters that are not under our control, and transfer it to what is unnatural among those which are under our control. But for the time being³³ remove utterly your desire; for if you desire some one of the things that are not under our control you are bound to be unfortunate; and, at the ^{vol. 2} same time, not one of the things that are under our control, which it would be excellent for you to desire, is within your grasp. But employ only choice and refusal, and these too but lightly, and with reservations,³⁴ and without straining.

3. With everything which entertains you, is useful, or of which you are fond, remember to say to yourself, beginning with the very least things, “What is its nature?” If you are fond of a jug, say, “I am fond of a jug”; for when it is broken you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your own child or wife, say to yourself that you are kissing a human being; for when it dies you will not be disturbed.

4. When you are on the point of putting your hand to some undertaking, remind yourself what the nature of that undertaking is. If you are going out of the house to bathe, put before your mind what happens at a public bath—those who splash you with water, those who jostle against you, those who vilify you and rob you. And thus you will set about your undertaking more securely if at the outset you say to yourself, “I want to take a bath, and, at the same time, to keep my moral purpose in harmony with nature.” And so do in every undertaking. For thus, if anything happens to hinder you in your bathing, you will be ready to say, “Oh, well, this was not the only thing that I wanted, but I wanted also to keep my moral purpose in harmony with nature; and I shall not so keep it if I am vexed at what is going on.”

5. It is not the things themselves that disturb men, but their judgements about these things. For ^{vol. 2} example, death is nothing dreadful, or else Socrates too would have thought so, but the judgement that death is dreadful, this is the dreadful thing. When, therefore, we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never blame anyone but ourselves, that means, our own judgements. It is the part of an uneducated person to blame others where he himself fares ill; to blame himself is the part of one whose education has begun; to blame neither another nor his own self is the part of one whose education is already complete.

6. Be not elated at any excellence which is not your own. If the horse in his elation were to say, “I am beautiful,” it could be endured; but when you say in your elation, “I have a beautiful horse,” rest assured that you are elated at something good which belongs to a horse. What, then, is your own? The use of external impressions. Therefore, when you are in harmony with nature in the use of external impressions, then be elated; for then it will be some good of your own at which you will be elated.

7. Just as on a voyage, when your ship has anchored, if you should go on shore to get fresh water, you may pick up a small shell-fish or little bulb³⁵ on the way, but you have to keep your attention fixed on the ship, and turn about frequently for fear lest the captain should call; and if he calls, you must give up all these things, if you would escape being thrown on board all tied up like the sheep. So it is also in life: If there be given you, instead of a little bulb and a small shell-fish, a little wife and child, there will be no objection to that; only, if the Captain calls, give up all these things and run ^{vol. 2} to the ship, without even turning around to look back. And if you are an old man, never even get very far away from the ship, for fear that when He calls you may be missing.

8. Do not seek to have everything that happens happen as you wish, but wish for everything to happen as it actually does happen, and your life will be serene.

9. Disease is an impediment to the body, but not to the moral purpose, unless that consents. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to the moral purpose. And say this to yourself at each thing that befalls you; for you will find the thing to be an impediment to something else, but not to yourself.

10. In the case of everything that befalls you, remember to turn to yourself and see what faculty you have to deal with it. If you see a handsome lad or woman, you will find continence the faculty to employ here; if hard labour is laid upon you, you will find endurance; if reviling, you will find patience to bear evil. And if you habituate yourself in this fashion, your external impressions will not run away with you.

11. Never say about anything, “I have lost it,” but only “I have given it back.” Is your child dead? It has been given back. Is your wife dead? She has been given back. “I have had my farm taken away.” Very well, this too has been given back. “Yet it was a rascal who took it away.” But what concern is it of yours by whose instrumentality the Giver called for its return? So long as He gives it you, take care of it as of a thing that is not your own, as travellers treat their inn.

12. If you wish to make progress, dismiss all ^{vol. 2} reasoning of this sort: “If I neglect my affairs, I shall have nothing to live on.” “If I do not punish my slave-boy he will turn out bad.” For it is better to die of hunger, but in a state of freedom from grief and fear, than to live in plenty, but troubled in mind. And it is better for your slave-boy to be bad than for you to be unhappy. Begin, therefore, with the little things. Your paltry oil gets spilled, your miserable wine stolen; say to yourself, “This is the price paid for a calm spirit, this the price for peace of mind.” Nothing is got without a price. And when you call your slave-boy, bear in mind that it is possible he may not heed you, and again, that even if he does heed, he may not do what you want done. But he is not in so happy a condition that your peace of mind depends upon him.³⁶

13. If you wish to make progress, then be content to appear senseless and foolish in externals, do not make it your wish to give the appearance of knowing anything; and if some people think you to be an important personage, distrust yourself. For be assured that it is no easy matter to keep your moral purpose in a state of conformity with nature, and, at the same time, to keep externals; but the man who devotes his attention to one of these two things must inevitably neglect the other.

14. If you make it your will that your children and your wife and your friends should live for ever, you are silly; for you are making it your will that things not under your control should be under your control, and that what is not your own should be your own. In the same way, too, if you make it your will that your slave-boy be free from faults, you are a fool; for you are making it your will that vice be not ^{vol. 2} vice, but something else. If, however, it is your will not to fail in what you desire, this is in your power. Wherefore, exercise yourself in that which is in your power. Each man’s master is the person who has the authority over what the man wishes or does not wish, so as to secure it, or take it away. Whoever, therefore, wants to be free, let him neither wish for anything, nor avoid anything, that is under the control of others; or else he is necessarily a slave.

15. Remember that you ought to behave in life as you would at a banquet. As something is being passed around it comes to you; stretch out your hand and take a portion of it politely. It passes on; do not detain it. Or it has not come to you yet; do not project your desire to meet it, but wait until it comes in front of you. So act toward children, so toward a wife, so toward office, so toward wealth; and then some day you will be worthy of the banquets of the gods. But if you do not take these things even when they are set before you, but despise them, then you will not only share the banquet of the gods, but share also their rule. For it was by so doing that Diogenes and Heracleitus, and men like them, were deservedly divine and deservedly so called.

16. When you see someone weeping in sorrow, either because a child has gone on a journey, or because he has lost his property, beware that you be not carried away by the impression that the man is in the midst of external ills, but straightway keep before you this thought: “It is not what has happened that distresses this man (for it does not distress another), but his judgement about it.” Do ^{vol. 2} not, however, hesitate to sympathize with him so far as words go, and, if occasion offers, even to groan with him; but be careful not to groan also in the centre of your being.

17. Remember that you are an actor in a play, the character of which is determined by the Playwright: if He wishes the play to be short, it is short; if long, it is long; if He wishes you to play the part of a beggar, remember to act even this rôle adroitly; and so if your rôle be that of a cripple, an official, or a layman. For this is your business, to play admirably the rôle assigned you; but the selection of that rôle is Another’s.³⁷

18. When a raven croaks inauspiciously, let not the external impression carry you away, but straightway draw a distinction in your own mind, and say, “None of these portents are for me, but either for my paltry body, or my paltry estate, or my paltry opinion, or my children, or my wife. But for me every portent is favourable, if I so wish; for whatever be the outcome, it is within my power to derive benefit from it.”

19. You can be invincible if you never enter a contest in which victory is not under your control. Beware lest, when you see some person preferred to you in honour, or possessing great power, or otherwise enjoying high repute, you are ever carried away by the external impression, and deem him happy. For if the true nature of the good is one of the things that are under our control, there is no place for either envy or jealousy; and you yourself will not wish to be a praetor, or a senator, or a consul, but a free man. Now there is but one way that leads to this, and that is to despise the things that are not under our control.

^{vol. 2} 20. Bear in mind that it is not the man who reviles or strikes you that insults you, but it is your judgement that these men are insulting you. Therefore, when someone irritates you, be assured that it is your own opinion which has irritated you. And so make it your first endeavour not to be carried away by the external impression; for if once you gain time and delay, you will more easily become master of yourself.

21. Keep before your eyes day by day death and exile, and everything that seems terrible, but most of all death; and then you will never have any abject thought, nor will you yearn for anything beyond measure.

22. If you yearn for philosophy, prepare at once to be met with ridicule, to have many people jeer at you, and say, “Here he is again, turned philosopher all of a sudden,” and “Where do you suppose he got that high brow?” But do you not put on a high brow, and do you so hold fast to the things which to you seem best, as a man who has been assigned by God to this post; and remember that if you abide by the same principles, those who formerly used to laugh at you will later come to admire you, but if you are worsted by them, you will get the laugh on yourself twice.

23. If it should ever happen to you that you turn to externals with a view to pleasing someone, rest assured that you have lost your plan of life. Be content, therefore, in everything to be a philosopher, and if you wish also to be taken for one, show to yourself that you are one, and you will be able to accomplish it.

24. Let not these reflections oppress you: “I ^{vol. 2} shall live without honour, and be nobody anywhere.” For, if lack of honour is an evil, you cannot be in evil through the instrumentality of some other person, any more than you can be in shame.³⁸ It is not your business, is it, to get office, or to be invited to a dinner-party? Certainly not. How, then, can this be any longer a lack of honour? And how is it that you will be “nobody anywhere,” when you ought to be somebody only in those things which are under your control, wherein you are privileged to be a man of the very greatest honour? But your friends will be without assistance? What do you mean by being “without assistance”? They will not have paltry coin from you, and you will not make them Roman citizens. Well, who told you that these are some of the matters under our control, and not rather things which others do? And who is able to give another what he does not himself have? “Get money, then,” says some friend, “in order that we too may have it.” If I can get money and at the same time keep myself self-respecting, and faithful, and high-minded, show me the way and I will get it. But if you require me to lose the good things that belong to me, in order that you may acquire the things that are not good, you can see for yourselves how unfair and inconsiderate you are. And which do you really prefer? Money, or a faithful and self-respecting friend? Help me, therefore, rather to this end, and do not require me to do those things which will make me lose these qualities.

“But my country,” says he, “so far as lies in me, ^{vol. 2} will be without assistance.” Again I ask, what kind of assistance do you mean? It will not have loggias or baths of your providing. And what does that signify? For neither does it have shoes provided by the blacksmith, nor has it arms provided by the cobbler; but it is sufficient if each man fulfil his own proper function. And if you secured for it another faithful and self-respecting citizen, would you not be doing it any good? “Yes.” Very well, and then you also would not be useless to it. “What place, then, shall I have in the State?” says he. Whatever place you can have, and at the same time maintain the man of fidelity and self-respect that is in you. But if, through your desire to help the State, you lose these qualities, of what good would you become to it, when in the end you turned out to be shameless and unfaithful?

25. Has someone been honoured above you at a dinner-party, or in salutation, or in being called in to give advice? Now if these matters are good, you ought to be happy that he got them; but if evil, be not distressed because you did not get them; and bear in mind that, if you do not act the same way that others do, with a view to getting things which are not under our control, you cannot be considered worthy to receive an equal share with others. Why, how is it possible for a person who does not haunt some man’s door, to have equal shares with the man who does? For the man who does not do escort duty, with the man who does? For the man who does not praise, with the man who does? You will be unjust, therefore, and insatiable, if, while refusing to pay the price for which such things are bought, you want to obtain them for ^{vol. 2} nothing. Well, what is the price for heads of lettuce? An obol,³⁹ perhaps. If, then, somebody gives up his obol and gets his heads of lettuce, while you do not give your obol, and do not get them, do not imagine that you are worse off than the man who gets his lettuce. For as he has his heads of lettuce, so you have your obol which you have not given away.

Now it is the same way also in life. You have not been invited to somebody’s dinner-party? Of course not; for you didn’t give the host the price at which he sells his dinner. He sells it for praise; he sells it for personal attention. Give him the price, then, for which it is sold, if it is to your interest. But if you wish both not to give up the one and yet to get the other, you are insatiable and a simpleton. Have you, then, nothing in place of the dinner? Indeed you have; you have not had to praise the man you did not want to praise; you have not had to put up with the insolence of his doorkeepers.

26. What the will of nature is may be learned from a consideration of the points in which we do not differ from one another. For example, when some other person’s slave-boy breaks his drinking-cup, you are instantly ready to say, “That’s one of the things which happen.” Rest assured, then, that when your own drinking-cup gets broken, you ought to behave in the same way that you do when the other man’s cup is broken. Apply now the same principle to the matters of greater importance. Some other person’s child or wife has died; no one but would say, “Such is the fate of man.” Yet when a man’s own child dies, immediately the cry is, “Alas! Woe is me!” But we ^{vol. 2} ought to remember how we feel when we hear of the same misfortune befalling others.

27. Just as a mark is not set up in order to be missed, so neither does the nature of evil arise in the universe.⁴⁰

28. If someone handed over your body to any person who met you, you would be vexed; but that you hand over your mind to any person that comes along, so that, if he reviles you, it is disturbed and troubled—are you not ashamed of that?

29. ⁴¹ In each separate thing that you do, consider the matters which come first and those which follow after, and only then approach the thing itself. Otherwise, at the start you will come to it enthusiastically, because you have never reflected upon any of the subsequent steps, but later on, when some difficulties appear, you will give up disgracefully. Do you wish to win an Olympic victory? So do I, by the gods! for it is a fine thing. But consider the matters which come before that, and those which follow after, and only when you have done that, put your hand to the task. You have to submit to discipline, follow a strict diet, give up sweet cakes, train under compulsion, at a fixed hour, in heat or in cold; you must not drink cold water,⁴² nor wine just whenever you feel like it; you must have turned yourself over to your trainer precisely as you would to a physician. Then when the contest comes on, you have to “dig in”⁴³ beside your opponent, and sometimes dislocate your wrist, sprain your ankle, swallow ^{vol. 2} quantities of sand, sometimes take a scourging, and along with all that get beaten. After you have considered all these points, go on into the games, if you still wish to do so; otherwise, you will be turning back like children. Sometimes they play wrestlers, again gladiators, again they blow trumpets, and then act a play. So you too are now an athlete, now a gladiator, then a rhetorician, then a philosopher, yet with your whole soul nothing; but like an ape you imitate whatever you see, and one thing after another strikes your fancy. For you have never gone out after anything with circumspection, nor after you had examined it all over, but you act at haphazard and half-heartedly.

In the same way, when some people have seen a philosopher and have heard someone speaking like Euphrates⁴⁴ (though, indeed, who can speak like him?), they wish to be philosophers themselves. Man, consider first the nature of the business, and then learn your own natural ability, if you are able to bear it. Do you wish to be a contender in the pentathlon, or a wrestler? Look to your arms, your thighs, see what your loins are like. For one man has a natural talent for one thing, another for another. Do you suppose that you can eat in the same fashion, drink in the same fashion, give way to impulse and to irritation, just as you do now? You must keep vigils, work hard, abandon your own people, be despised by a paltry slave, be laughed to scorn by those who meet you, in everything get the worst of it, in honour, in office, in court, in every paltry affair. Look these drawbacks over carefully, if you ^{vol. 2} are willing at the price of these things to secure tranquillity, freedom and calm. Otherwise, do not approach philosophy; don’t act like a child—now a philosopher, later on a tax-gatherer, then a rhetorician, then a procurator of Caesar. These things do not go together. You must be one person, either good or bad; you must labour to improve either your own governing principle or externals; you must work hard either on the inner man, or on things outside; that is, play either the rôle of a philosopher or else that of a layman.

30. Our duties are in general measured by our social relationships. He is a father. One is called upon to take care of him, to give way to him in all things, to submit when he reviles or strikes you. “But he is a bad father.” Did nature, then, bring you into relationship with a good father? No, but simply with a father. “My brother does me wrong.” Very well, then, maintain the relation that you have toward him; and do not consider what he is doing, but what you will have to do, if your moral purpose is to be in harmony with nature. For no one will harm you without your consent; you will have been harmed only when you think you are harmed. In this way, therefore, you will discover what duty to expect of your neighbour, your citizen, your commanding officer, if you acquire the habit of looking at your social relations with them.

31. In piety towards the gods, I would have you know, the chief element is this, to have right opinions about them—as existing and as administering the universe well and justly—and to have set yourself to obey them and to submit to everything that happens, and to follow it voluntarily, in the ^{vol. 2} belief that it is being fulfilled by the highest intelligence. For if you act in this way, you will never blame the gods, nor find fault with them for neglecting you. But this result cannot be secured in any other way than by withdrawing your idea of the good and the evil from the things which are not under our control, and placing it in those which are under our control, and in those alone. Because, if you think any of those former things to be good or evil, then, when you fail to get what you want and fall into what you do not want, it is altogether inevitable that you will blame and hate those who are responsible for these results. For this is the nature of every living creature, to flee from and to turn aside from the things that appear harmful, and all that produces them, and to pursue after and to admire the things that are helpful, and all that produces them. Therefore, it is impossible for a man who thinks that he is being hurt to take pleasure in that which he thinks is hurting him, just as it is also impossible for him to take pleasure in the hurt itself. Hence it follows that even a father is reviled by a son when he does not give his child some share in the things that seem to be good; and this it was which made Polyneices and Eteocles enemies of one another, the thought that the royal power was a good thing. That is why the farmer reviles the gods, and so also the sailor, and the merchant, and those who have lost their wives and their children. For where a man’s interest lies, there is also his piety. Wherefore, whoever is careful to exercise desire and aversion as he should, is at the same time careful also about piety. But it is always appropriate to make libations, and ^{vol. 2} sacrifices,and to give of the firstfruits after the manner of our fathers, and to do all this with purity, and not in a slovenly or careless fashion, nor, indeed, in a niggardly way, nor yet beyond our means.

32. ⁴⁵ When you have recourse to divination, remember that you do not know what the issue is going to be, but that you have come in order to find this out from the diviner; yet if you are indeed a philosopher, you know, when you arrive, what the nature of it is. For if it is one of the things which are not under our control, it is altogether necessary that what is going to take place is neither good nor evil. Do not, therefore, bring to the diviner desire or aversion, and do not approach him with trembling, but having first made up your mind that every issue is indifferent and nothing to you, but that, whatever it may be, it will be possible for you to turn it to good use, and that no one will prevent this. Go, then, with confidence to the gods as to counsellors; and after that, when some counsel has been given you, remember whom you have taken as counsellors, and whom you will be disregarding if you disobey. But go to divination as Socrates thought that men should go, that is, in cases where the whole inquiry has reference to the outcome, and where neither from reason nor from any other technical art are means vouchsafed for discovering the matter in question. Hence, when it is your duty to share the danger of a friend or of your country, do not ask of the diviner whether you ought to share that danger. For if the diviner forewarns you that the omens of sacrifice have been unfavourable, it is clear that death is portended, or the injury of some member of your body, or exile; ^{vol. 2} yet reason requires that even at this risk you are to stand by your friend, and share the danger with your country. Wherefore, give heed to the greater diviner, the Pythian Apollo, who cast out of his temple the man who had not helped his friend when he was being murdered.⁴⁶

33. Lay down for yourself, at the outset, a certain stamp and type of character for yourself, which you are to maintain whether you are by yourself or are meeting with people. And be silent for the most part, or else make only the most necessary remarks, and express these in few words. But rarely, and when occasion requires you to talk, talk, indeed, but about no ordinary topics. Do not talk about gladiators, or horse-races, or athletes, or things to eat or drink—topics that arise on all occasions; but above all, do not talk about people, either blaming, or praising, or comparing them. If, then, you can, by your own conversation bring over that of your companions to what is seemly. But if you happen to be left alone in the presence of aliens, keep silence.

Do not laugh much, nor at many things, nor boisterously.

Refuse, if you can, to take an oath at all, but if that is impossible, refuse as far as circumstances allow.

Avoid entertainments given by outsiders and by persons ignorant of philosophy; but if an appropriate occasion arises for you to attend, be on the ^{vol. 2} alert to avoid lapsing into the behaviour of such laymen. For you may rest assured, that, if a man’s companion be dirty, the person who keeps close company with him must of necessity get a share of his dirt, even though he himself happens to be clean.

In things that pertain to the body take only as much as your bare need requires, I mean such things as food, drink, clothing, shelter, and household slaves; but cut down everything which is for outward show or luxury.

In your sex-life preserve purity, as far as you can, before marriage, and, if you indulge, take only those privileges which are lawful. However, do not make yourself offensive, or censorious, to those who do indulge, and do not make frequent mention of the fact that you do not yourself indulge.

If someone brings you word that So-and-so is speaking ill of you, do not defend yourself against what has been said, but answer, “Yes, indeed, for he did not know the rest of the faults that attach to me; if he had, these would not have been the only ones he mentioned.”

It is not necessary, for the most part, to go to the public shows. If, however, a suitable occasion ever arises, show that your principal concern is for none other than yourself, which means, wish only for that to happen which does happen, and for him only to win who does win; for so you will suffer no hindrance. But refrain utterly from shouting, or laughter at anyone, or great excitement. And after you have left, do not talk a great deal about what took place, except in so far as it contributes to your own improvement; for such behaviour indicates that the spectacle has aroused your admiration.

^{vol. 2} Do not go rashly or readily to people’s public readings,⁴⁷ but when you do go, maintain your own dignity and gravity, and at the same time be careful not to make yourself disagreeable.

When you are about to meet somebody, in particular when it is one of those men who are held in very high esteem, propose to yourself the question, “What would Socrates or Zeno have done under these circumstances?” and then you will not be at a loss to make proper use of the occasion. When you go to see one of those men who have great power, propose to yourself the thought, that you will not find him at home, that you will be shut out, that the door will be slammed in your face, that he will pay no attention to you. And if, despite all this, it is your duty to go, go and take what comes, and never say to yourself, “It was not worth all the trouble.” For this is characteristic of the layman, that is, a man who is vexed at externals.

In your conversation avoid making mention at great length and excessively of your own deeds or dangers, because it is not as pleasant for others to hear about your adventures, as it is for you to call to mind your own dangers.

Avoid also raising a laugh, for this is a kind of behaviour that slips easily into vulgarity, and at the same time is calculated to lessen the respect which your neighbours have of you. It is dangerous also to lapse into foul language. When, therefore, anything of the sort occurs, if the occasion be suitable, go even so far as to reprove the person ^{vol. 2} who has made such a lapse; if, however, the occasion does not arise, at all events show by keeping silence, and blushing,⁴⁸ and frowning, that you are displeased by what has been said.

34. When you get an external impression of some pleasure, guard yourself, as with impressions in general, against being carried away by it; nay, let the matter wait upon your leisure, and give yourself a little delay. Next think of the two periods of time, first, that in which you will enjoy your pleasure, and second, that in which, after the enjoyment is over, you will later repent and revile your own self; and set over against these two periods of time how much joy and self-satisfaction you will get if you refrain. However, if you feel that a suitable occasion has arisen to do the deed, be careful not to allow its enticement, and sweetness, and attractiveness to overcome you; but set over against all this the thought, how much better is the consciousness of having won a victory over it.

35. When you do a thing which you have made up your mind ought to be done, never try not to be seen doing it, even though most people are likely to think unfavourably about it. If, however, what you are doing is not right, avoid the deed itself altogether; but if it is right, why fear those who are going to rebuke you wrongly?

36. Just as the propositions, “It is day,” and “It is night,” are full of meaning when separated, but meaningless if united;⁴⁹ so also, granted that for ^{vol. 2} you to take the larger share at a dinner is good for your body, still, it is bad for the maintenance of the proper kind of social feeling. When, therefore, you are eating with another person, remember to regard, not merely the value for your body of what lies before you, but also to maintain your respect for your host.

37. If you undertake a rôle which is beyond your powers, you both disgrace yourself in that one, and at the same time neglect the rôle which you might have filled with success.

38. Just as you are careful, in walking about, not to step on a nail or to sprain your ankle, so be careful also not to hurt your governing principle. And if we observe this rule in every action, we shall be more secure in setting about it.

39. Each man’s body is a measure for his property,⁵⁰ just as the foot is a measure for his shoe. If, then, you abide by this principle, you will maintain the proper measure, but if you go beyond it, you cannot help but fall headlong over a precipice, as it were, in the end. So also in the case of your shoe; if once you go beyond the foot, you get first a gilded shoe, then a purple one, then an embroidered one. For once you go beyond the measure there is no limit.

40. Immediately after they are fourteen, women are called “ladies” by men. And so when they see that they have nothing else but only to be the bed-fellows of men, they begin to beautify themselves, ^{vol. 2} and put all their hopes in that. It is worth while for us to take pains, therefore, to make them understand that they are honoured for nothing else but only for appearing modest and self-respecting.

41. It is a mark of an ungifted man to spend a great deal of time in what concerns his body, as in much exercise, much eating, much drinking, much evacuating of the bowels, much copulating. But these things are to be done in passing; and let your whole attention be devoted to the mind.

42. When someone treats you ill or speaks ill of you, remember that he acts or speaks thus because he thinks it is incumbent upon him. That being the case, it is impossible for him to follow what appears good to you, but what appears good to himself; whence it follows, that, if he gets a wrong view of things, the man that suffers is the man that has been deceived. For if a person thinks a true composite judgement⁵¹ to be false, the composite judgement does not suffer, but the person who has been deceived. If, therefore, you start from this point of view, you will be gentle with the man who reviles you. For you should say on each occasion, “He thought that way about it.”

43. Everything has two handles, by one of which it ought to be carried and by the other not. If your brother wrongs you, do not lay hold of the matter by the handle of the wrong that he is doing, because this is the handle by which the matter ought not to be carried; but rather by the other handle—that he is your brother, that you were brought up together, and then you will be laying hold of the matter by the handle by which it ought to be carried.

^{vol. 2} 44. The following statements constitute a non sequitur: “I am richer than you are, therefore I am superior to you”; or, “I am more eloquent than you are, therefore I am superior to you.” But the following conclusions are better: “I am richer than you are, therefore my property is superior to yours”; or, “I am more eloquent than you are, therefore my elocution is superior to yours.” But you are neither property nor elocution.

45. Somebody is hasty about bathing;⁵² do not say that he bathes badly, but that he is hasty about bathing. Somebody drinks a good deal of wine; do not say that he drinks badly, but that he drinks a good deal. For until you have decided what judgement prompts him, how do you know that what he is doing is bad? And thus the final result will not be that you receive convincing sense-impressions of some things, but give your assent to others.

46. On no occasion call yourself a philosopher, and do not, for the most part, talk among laymen about your philosophic principles, but do what follows from your principles. For example, at a banquet do not say how people ought to eat, but eat as a man ought. For remember how Socrates had so completely eliminated the thought of ostentation, that people came to him when they wanted him to introduce them to philosophers, and he used to bring them along. So well did he submit to being overlooked. And if talk about some philosophic principle arises among laymen, keep silence for the most part, for there is great danger that you will spew up immediately what you have not digested. ^{vol. 2} So when a man tells you that you know nothing, and you, like Socrates, are not hurt, then rest assured that you are making a beginning with the business you have undertaken. For sheep, too, do not bring their fodder to the shepherds and show how much they have eaten, but they digest their food within them, and on the outside produce wool and milk. And so do you, therefore, make no display to the laymen of your philosophical principles, but let them see the results which come from these principles when digested.

47. When you have become adjusted to simple living in regard to your bodily wants, do not preen yourself about the accomplishment; and so likewise, if you are a water-drinker, do not on every occasion say that you are a water-drinker. And if ever you want to train to develop physical endurance, do it by yourself and not for outsiders to behold; do not throw your arms around statues,⁵³ but on occasion, when you are very thirsty, take cold water into your mouth, and then spit it out, without telling anybody.⁵⁴

48. This is the position and character of a layman: He never looks for either help or harm from himself, but only from externals. This is the position and character of the philosopher: He looks for all his help or harm from himself.

Signs of one who is making progress are: He censures no one, praises no one, blames no one, finds fault with no one, says nothing about himself as though he were somebody or knew something. When he is hampered or prevented, he blames himself. And if anyone compliments him, he smiles to himself at the person complimenting; while if anyone censures him, he makes no defence. He goes ^{vol. 2} about like an invalid, being careful not to disturb, before it has grown firm, any part which is getting well. He has put away from himself his every desire, and has transferred his aversion to those things only, of what is under our control, which are contrary to nature. He exercises no pronounced choice in regard to anything. If he gives the appearance of being foolish or ignorant he does not care. In a word, he keeps guard against himself as though he were his own enemy lying in wait.

49. When a person gives himself airs because he can understand and interpret the books of Chrysippus, say to yourself, “If Chrysippus had not written obscurely, this man would have nothing about which to give himself airs.”

But what is it I want? To learn nature and to follow her. I seek, therefore, someone to interpret her; and having heard that Chrysippus does so, I go to him. But I do not understand what he has written; I seek, therefore, the person who interprets Chrysippus. And down to this point there is nothing to justify pride. But when I find the interpreter, what remains is to put his precepts into practice; this is the only thing to be proud about. If, however, I admire the mere act of interpretation, what have I done but turned into a grammarian instead of a philosopher? The only difference, indeed, is that I interpret Chrysippus instead of Homer. Far from being proud, therefore, when somebody says to me, “Read me Chrysippus,” I blush the rather, when I am unable to show him such deeds as match and harmonize with his words.

50. Whatever principles are set before you, stand fast by these like laws, feeling that it would be ^{vol. 2} impiety for you to transgress them. But pay no attention to what somebody says about you, for this is, at length, not under your control.

51. How long will you still wait to think yourself worthy of the best things, and in nothing to transgress against the distinctions set up by the reason? You have received the philosophical principles which you ought to accept, and you have accepted them. What sort of a teacher, then, do you still wait for, that you should put off reforming yourself until he arrives? You are no longer a lad, but already a full-grown man. If you are now neglectful and easy-going, and always making one delay after another, and fixing first one day and then another, after which you will pay attention to yourself, then without realizing it you will make no progress, but, living and dying, will continue to be a layman throughout. Make up your mind, therefore, before it is too late, that the fitting thing for you to do is to live as a mature man who is making progress, and let everything which seems to you to be best be for you a law that must not be transgressed. And if you meet anything that is laborious, or sweet, or held in high repute, or in no repute, remember that now is the contest, and here before you are the Olympic games, and that it is impossible to delay any longer, and that it depends on a single day and a single action, whether progress is lost or saved. This is the way Socrates became what he was, by paying attention to nothing but his reason in everything that he encountered. And even if you are not yet a Socrates, still you ought to live as one who wishes to be a Socrates.

^{vol. 2} 52. The first and most necessary division in philosophy is that which has to do with the application of the principles, as, for example, Do not lie. The second deals with the demonstrations, as, for example. How comes it that we ought not to lie? The third confirms and discriminates between these processes, as, for example, How does it come that this is a proof? For what is a proof, what is logical consequence, what contradiction, what truth, what falsehood? Therefore, the third division is necessary because of the second, and the second because of the first; while the most necessary of all, and the one in which we ought to rest, is the first. But we do the opposite; for we spend our time in the third division, and all our zeal is devoted to it, while we utterly neglect the first. Wherefore, we lie, indeed, but are ready with the arguments which prove that one ought not to lie.

53. Upon every occasion we ought to have the following thoughts at our command:

Lead thou me on, O Zeus, and Destiny,
To that goal long ago to me assigned.
I’ll follow and not falter; if my will
Prove weak and craven, still I’ll follow on.⁵⁵

“Whoso has rightly with necessity complied,
We count him wise, and skilled in things divine.”⁵⁶

“Well, O Crito, if so it is pleasing to the gods, so let it be.”⁵⁷

“Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but they cannot hurt me.”⁵⁸

Footnotes

1. Die epiktetischen Fragmente, Sitzungsberichte der philos. hist. Classe der K. Akad. der Wiss., Wien, 115 (1888), 443-546. Also ed. maior 1916, Chapter III, pp xlviii-lii. ↩

2. Quaestiones Epicteteae, Freiburg i. B., 1888. ↩

3. Epicteti et Moschionis Sententiae, Bonn, 1892. ↩

4. A pantheistic form of expression for God, common enough in Stoicism in general, but rare in Epictetus. Cf. also frag. 4, where, however, the expression may really belong to Rufus. ↩

5. The natural way to take this and the next few titles is to assume that Epictetus had quoted with approval a fairly long passage from his revered teacher Musonius Rufus. ↩

6. That is, from the heavier to the lighter, and again from the lighter to the heavier. ↩

7. External impressions. ↩

8. Does not assent or confirm by approval. ↩

9. Such external impressions. ↩

10. Also confirms by his approval. ↩

11. The word seems to occur only here, and may be peculiar to Epictetus. ↩

12. Does not give his consent. ↩

13. Without doing, as far as speaking. ↩

14. Man, where are you stowing all this? Look and see if the vessel has been cleansed. For if you stow it in the vessel of opinion, it is ruined; if it spoils, it turns into urine, or vinegar, or, it may be, something worse. ↩

15. Somewhat after the fashion of the Cynics. ↩

16. Bear and forbear. ↩

17. The king of Macedon. ↩

18. A penny and a half, or three cents; in other terms, the sixth part of the day’s wage of an ordinary labourer. ↩

19. A famous actor of the fourth century. See J. B. O’Connor, Chapters in the History of Actors and Acting (1908), 128-30. ↩

20. Capps suggests that ἡσυχῇ is used here as it is in Menander, Hero, 20. ↩

21. Or “morose,” that is, from the point of view of the Epicureans. The reference is to the Stoics, who rejected the “pleasure” of Epicurus, and accepted only that which followed on virtuous conduct. ↩

22. Frag. 425 (Usener). ↩

23. The commununity of women which Plato proposed was, first of all, restricted to a small, highly-trained, and devoted band of warrior-saints; and, second, such that no man and woman should pair off for more than a very temporary “marriage,” all such matings being carefully supervised by the highest authorities. Instead of being more licentious than ordinary monogamous marriage (which frequently deserves Bernard Shaw’s jibe, that it is popular largely because it combines the maximum of temptation with the maximum of opportunity), Plato’s proposal was relatively a denial of the flesh, and a marked move towards asceticism. ↩

24. See II. 11, 17. The remark in this connection is no doubt ironical, mockingly justifying the process of “rationalization” just described. ↩

25. The phrase is from Plato, Symposium, 207 B. ↩

26. A distinguished Roman Stoic of the middle of the first century after Christ. See I. 1, 28-30; I. 2, 12-13; frag. 22. ↩

27. The first stop outside Rome for persons travelling south and east, the common direction, as in the well known egressum magna me excepit Aricia Roma (Horace, Sat. I. 5, 1). Compare the version of the same incident in I. 1, 30. ↩

28. Ascribed to Epictetus by Gaisford and Asmus, but there is some doubt about the ascription, for the resemblance with I. 18 is not conclusive. ↩

29. He was proconsul of Crete and Cyrenaica under Claudius. For all that is known about him see Prosopographia Imperii Romani, III. p. 4, No. 16. ↩

30. Memorabilia, I. 4, 7, where, however, the expression is used of a “wise Creator.’ ↩

31. Pointing to his belly. ↩

32. See IV. 5, 10. ↩

33. The remark, as many others of the admonitions, is addressed to a student or a beginner. ↩

34. See M. Aurelius, 1, 4, where Mr. Haines (in L.C.L.) suggests that the reference is to some such reservations as recommended in James iv. 15: “For that ye ought to say is, If the Lord will, we shall live, and do this, or that.” ↩

35. The Greeks ate a good many different bulbous plants, as we use a variety of different plants for “greens.” ↩

36. That is, the slave-boy would be in a remarkable position of advantage if his master’s peace of mind depended, not upon the master himself, but upon the actions of his slave-boy. ↩

37. A reverent designation for God. See I. 25, 13. ↩

38. That is, every man is exclusively responsible for his own good or evil. But honour and the lack of it are things which are obviously not under a man’s control, since they depend upon the action of other people. It follows, therefore, that lack of honour cannot be an evil, but must be something indifferent. ↩

39. See note on frag. 11. ↩

40. That is, it is inconceivable that the universe should exist in order that some things may go wrong; hence, nothing natural is evil, and nothing that is by nature evil can arise.—Thus in effect Simplicius, and correctly, it seems. ↩

41. This chapter is practically word for word identical with III. 15. Since it was omitted in Par., and not commented on by Simplicius, it may have been added in some second edition, whether by Arrian or not. ↩

42. That is, cold water not at all; while wine may be drunk, but only at certain times, i.e., probably with one’s meals. Such prohibitions are still common in Europe, particularly in popular therapeutics. ↩

43. See note on III. 15, 4. ↩

44. See note on III. 15, 8. ↩

45. See II. 7 where the principal points made here are illustrated at greater length. ↩

46. A few more unimportant details are given by Aelian, Varia Historia, 3, 44; and Simplicius in his commentary on this passage, p. 258 c ff. (Heinsius), or p. 411 (Schweighäuser). The point of the story is that a man does not need to go to a diviner in order to learn whether he should defend his country or his friends. That question was long ago settled by the greatest of diviners, Apollo at Delphi, who ordered to be cast out of his temple an inquirer that had once failed to defend his own friend. ↩

47. A favourite way of introducing a new work of literature to the reading public, somewhat like our modern musical recitals, or artists’ exhibitions. See also III. 23 for similar public lectures given by a philosopher. ↩

48. The ordinary person, to be sure, can no more call up a blush off-hand than he can a sneeze or a hiccough, and the observation of nature implied by the command is, therefore, imperfect (cf. note in IV. 11, 1). But all Epictetus means is that one should make no effort to conceal any natural expression of moral resentment under such circumstances. ↩

49. Compare I. 25, 11–13. It does not seem possible in our idiom to use the same expressions for ἀξία, “worth,” or “value,” which occurs three times in this section, and ἀπαξία, “lack of worth,” or “lack of value,” which occurs twice. ↩

50. That is, property, which is of use only for the body, should be adjusted to a man’s actual bodily needs, just as a shoe is (or at least should be) adjusted to the actual needs of a man’s foot. The comparison seems to have been a commonplace; see Demophilus, Similitudines, 20 (Mullach); Horace, Epist. I. 7, 98 and 10, 42 f. ↩

51. Two judgements connected with “and.” Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen,⁴ III. 1 (1909), 106, and note 3. Compare also I. 26, 14; II. 9, 8. An example of an inconsistent composite judgement is given in Ench. 36. ↩

52. The implication must be that a hurried bath, like a hurried shave, is apt to leave something to be desired. ↩

53. That is, in cold weather (see III. 12, 2 and 10), because this takes a person out of doors where people can see him. ↩

54. See III. 12, 17, and note. ↩

55. From Cleanthes. See note on II. 23, 42. ↩

56. Euripides, frag. 965 Nauck. ↩

57. Plato, Crito, 43 D (slightly modified). ↩

58. Plato, Apology, 30 C–D (somewhat modified). ↩