Is The Wise Man Guided By Opinion?
The Syllogism
Section titled “The Syllogism”In the second book of his Academic Questions, Cicero, speaking for the skeptical New Academy, sets out the argument that the whole dispute over knowledge turns on:
If the wise man ever assents to anything, he will likewise sometimes form opinions: but he never will form opinions: therefore he will never assent to anything.
— Cicero, Academic Questions II.XXI (tr. Yonge)
The schools of Cicero’s day read this argument in three ways.
- Arcesilas accepted both premises, so the wise man never assents to anything. He suspends judgment on every question.
- Carneades sometimes granted that the wise man does assent. It follows that the wise man is sometimes guided by opinion.
- The Stoics, and Antiochus who followed them on this point, denied the first premise. Their wise man assents only to “comprehensive” impressions, which carry a mark of truth that no false impression could share, so he can assent without ever forming an opinion. For the Stoics, opinion is always a weak assent and always a fault.
All three positions share one assumption: that opinion is something a wise man ought to be ashamed of. Cicero tells us where that assumption came from. Zeno the Stoic introduced it, and Arcesilas took it over from him:
But error, and rashness, and ignorance, and opinion, and suspicion, and in a word everything which was inconsistent with a firm and consistent assent, he discarded from virtue and wisdom.
— Cicero, Academic Questions I.XI (tr. Yonge)
No one, I say, of preceding philosophers had said positively, no one had even hinted that it was possible for man never to form opinions: and that for a wise man it was not only possible, but indispensable.
— Cicero, Academic Questions II.XXIV (tr. Yonge)
Epicurus rejected that assumption at its root.
What Opinion Is For Epicurus
Section titled “What Opinion Is For Epicurus”For Epicurus, opinion is not a dirty word. It is simply the judgment the mind adds to what the senses report, and it can be true or false:
Opinion they also call supposition, and say that it may be true or false: if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it is true; if it is not confirmed or is contradicted, it is false. For this reason was introduced the notion of the problem awaiting confirmation: for example, waiting to come near the tower and see how it looks to the near view.
— Diogenes Laertius X.34 (tr. Bailey)
Error never lies in the sensation itself. It lies only in the opinion we add:
Now falsehood and error always lie in the addition of opinion with regard to what is waiting to be confirmed or not contradicted, and then is not confirmed or is contradicted.
— Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus 50 (tr. Bailey)
Opinions that pass the tests are true, and they are knowledge. Sextus Empiricus reports Epicurus’ own example. That void exists is an opinion about something no one can see. It is true because it is not contradicted by what we do see, since motion would be impossible without void:
And lack of contrary testimony is the congruity of the supposed and opined non-evident object with the apparent—as when Epicurus says that void exists, which is a thing non-evident, and this is supported by an obvious fact, namely motion; for if void does not exist, neither ought motion to exist, the moving body having no place into which to pass over …
— Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians I.213 (tr. Bury)
The Wise Man Holds Opinions, And Is Not Ashamed Of Them
Section titled “The Wise Man Holds Opinions, And Is Not Ashamed Of Them”The Epicurean wise man therefore assents, and he holds opinions. Among the sayings about the wise man that Diogenes Laertius preserves is a direct answer to Arcesilas:
He will give definite teaching and not profess doubt.
— Diogenes Laertius X.121 (tr. Bailey)
The Greek (dogmatieîn kai ouk aporēseîn) means that he will hold positive doctrines and will not be left at a loss.
What Marks The Wise Man: He Keeps Opinion Separate From Evidence
Section titled “What Marks The Wise Man: He Keeps Opinion Separate From Evidence”What sets the wise man apart is not that he never forms opinions. It is that he never confuses an opinion with the evidence. Cicero’s own spokesman Lucullus attests to this as Epicurus’ doctrine, even while he dismisses it:
For Epicurus, who wished to remedy those errors, which seem to perplex one’s knowledge of the truth, and who said that it was the duty of a wise man to separate opinion from evident knowledge, did no good at all; for he did not in the least remove the errors of opinion itself.
— Cicero, Academic Questions II.XIV (tr. Yonge)
Epicurus stated the rule in Principal Doctrine 24:
If you reject any single sensation, and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion, as to the appearance awaiting confirmation, and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations, as well, with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgment.
— Epicurus, Principal Doctrine 24 (tr. Bailey)
Lucretius explains the supposed deceptions of the senses the same way:
Wondrously many other things of this sort we see, all of which would fain spoil our trust in the senses; all in vain, since the greatest part of these things deceives us on account of the opinions of the mind, which we add ourselves, so that things not seen by the senses are counted as seen. For nothing is harder than to distinguish things manifest from things uncertain, which the mind straightway adds of itself.
— Lucretius, De Rerum Natura IV.462-468 (tr. Bailey)
Cicero mocks the Epicurean Timagoras for applying exactly this rule. Timagoras said that when he pressed his eye he never truly saw two flames from one candle, “for that the error was one of opinion, and not one of his eyes” (Academic Questions II.XXII). Cicero meant it as ridicule. In fact it is the Epicurean doctrine in one sentence: the eye reports truly what reaches it, and the mistake, if there is one, is in what the mind adds.
Waiting For Evidence, But Not Forever
Section titled “Waiting For Evidence, But Not Forever”Some opinions must wait for more evidence. The tower seen from far away is “the problem awaiting confirmation” (DL X.34), and the wise man holds his opinion about its shape as waiting until he comes closer. This is the reverse of the Academic course. The Academic suspends judgment on every question, permanently. The Epicurean suspends judgment only on particular questions, and only until the evidence comes in. Where the evidence will not decide between several explanations, as with many events in the sky, he keeps all of them that fit the facts, and he refuses to pick one arbitrarily:
But when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth.
— Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles 87 (tr. Bailey)
The Epicurean Answer To The Syllogism
Section titled “The Epicurean Answer To The Syllogism”- “If the wise man ever assents to anything, he will sometimes form opinions.” True, and harmless. Forming opinions is not a fault. Forming them rashly is the fault: treating what is still awaiting confirmation as if it had been confirmed.
- “The wise man never forms opinions.” False. He forms opinions constantly, tests them by confirmation and non-contradiction, and assents to those that pass.
- “Therefore he never assents to anything.” False, and self-refuting, as Lucretius pointed out:
Again, if any one thinks that nothing is known, he knows not whether that can be known either, since he admits that he knows nothing. Against him then I will refrain from joining issue, who plants himself with his head in the place of his feet.
— Lucretius, De Rerum Natura IV.469-472 (tr. Bailey)
Epicurus also parts company with the Stoics. He needs no special, infallible “comprehensive impression.” Every sensation is true as a report of what reaches us, and truth or falsehood enters only with the opinion we add. The standard is the same for every opinion: “confirmatory testimony and lack of contrary testimony form a criterion of the truth of a thing, but lack of confirmatory testimony and contradictory testimony of its falsehood. And the base and foundation of all is the evidence of sense” (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians I.216).
Can The Wise Man Be Wrong And Still Be Wise?
Section titled “Can The Wise Man Be Wrong And Still Be Wise?”Behind the syllogism lies a deeper question: what kind of being is the wise man? Each school’s answer to the syllogism follows from its answer to this question.
| School | Does the wise man form opinions? | Can he be wrong and still be wise? |
|---|---|---|
| Plato | Opinion is a lower faculty than knowledge | Wisdom is knowledge of what never changes, so opinion is no part of it |
| Stoics | Never | No. One error would show he was never wise |
| Arcesilas | Never | He avoids error only by never committing himself to anything |
| Carneades and his followers | Sometimes, on the probable | He may follow a false probability, but he never claimed it was true |
| Antiochus | Never, as with the Stoics | No in his theory of knowledge, though he allowed degrees of fault and of happiness |
| Epicurus | Yes, and he tests them | Yes. An opinion awaiting confirmation can prove false, and he corrects it |
Plato. Plato set knowledge and opinion apart as different powers with different objects. In the Republic, Socrates and Glaucon agree that opinion is “darker than knowledge, but lighter than ignorance” (Republic 478c, tr. Jowett). Knowledge belongs to the unchanging Forms, and opinion to the changing world the senses show us. On that view, wisdom has nothing to do with the senses. The New Academy inherited Plato’s low regard for opinion and his distrust of the senses.
The Stoics. The Stoic wise man never forms an opinion and is never deceived. Cicero says that even Arcesilas agreed with Zeno here: “there is nothing more incompatible with the idea which we have of the gravity of a wise man than error, levity, and temerity” (Academic Questions II.XX). For the Stoics wisdom is all or nothing, and everyone short of it is a fool:
For just as a drowning man is no more able to breathe if he be not far from the surface of the water, so that he might at any moment emerge, than if he were actually at the bottom already, and just as a puppy on the point of opening its eyes is no less blind than one just born, similarly a man that has made some progress towards the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he that has made no progress at all.
— Cicero, On Ends III.48 (tr. Rackham)
So the Stoic wise man cannot be wrong and still be wise. A single false assent would prove that he was never wise at all. The Stoics themselves admitted that such a man hardly ever appears. Seneca wrote that a good man of the first class “perhaps springs into existence, like the phoenix, only once in five hundred years” (Seneca, Moral Letters 42.1, tr. Gummere). That is the price of defining wisdom as infallibility.
Arcesilas. Arcesilas kept the Stoic ideal of a wise man who is never deceived, and showed that no one could meet it by the Stoics’ own test. His solution was to have the wise man assent to nothing. Arcesilas thought that “nothing could be more discreditable than for a man’s assent and approbation to precede his knowledge and perception of a fact” (Academic Questions I.XII). His wise man is never wrong only because he never says anything is so.
Carneades and his followers. Carneades allowed the wise man to follow what is probable, and sometimes, Cicero reports, to form opinions. At the end of the dialogue Catulus takes this line: “I imagine that a wise man will assent to what is not actually perceived — that is to say, will form opinions: being, however, aware at the same time that they are only opinions, and knowing that there is nothing which can be comprehended and perceived” (Academic Questions II.XLVIII). This wise man can follow a false probability, but he can never be shown wrong in any serious sense, because he never claimed to know anything. He also never gains knowledge. Cicero describes him as a man who “will fear to yield rashly to opinion, and will think that he has succeeded admirably if in matters of this kind he has found out anything which is likely” (Academic Questions II.XLI).
Antiochus. Antiochus of Ascalon, whose views Lucullus defends in the dialogue, claimed to be restoring the Old Academy of Plato. He also tried to bring Stoic doctrine into it. On the question of opinion he sided with the Stoics: Cicero names “the Stoics and their follower on this point, Antiochus” as the men who deny that assent must lead to opinion (Academic Questions II.XXI). Like Zeno, Antiochus held that only the wise man truly knows anything: “Zeno and Antiochus both deny that any of you know anything” (Academic Questions II.XLVII). His wise man therefore never forms opinions and is never deceived. Cicero points out that this was no part of the Old Academy he claimed to follow: “who is there, either of the Old Academy or of the Peripatetics, who has ever made these two assertions which are the subject of discussion, — either that that alone could be perceived which was a truth of such a nature, as what was false could not be; or that a wise man was never guided by opinion? Certainly no one of them ever said so” (Academic Questions II.XXXV). Yet in ethics Antiochus left the Stoics. He “energetically resists” their doctrine that all offences are equal, and he held that virtue alone is enough for a happy life, “but not of the happiest possible life” (Academic Questions II.XLIII). So his wise man is infallible in what he assents to, but he can still fall short in happiness. Cicero thought the blend could not hold: Antiochus “was called an Academic; but he would have been, with very little alteration, something very like a Stoic,” and “we must either give the wise man to the Stoics or to the Old Academy. He cannot belong to both” (Academic Questions II.XLIII).
Epicurus. The Epicurean wise man is not infallible, and he does not need to be. His wisdom lies in his method, not in a guarantee that he will never err. He trusts what the senses report. He holds his opinions about what lies beyond them as true when they are confirmed or not contradicted, and as waiting when the evidence is not yet in. When an opinion awaiting confirmation turns out false, as when the figure we took for Plato in the distance proves not to be Plato when he comes near (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians I.215), the senses themselves correct him. He has not lost his wisdom, because he never mistook the opinion for the evidence. He has used it.
The Epicureans also rejected the Stoic all-or-nothing scheme on which the infallible wise man depends. They held “that faults are not all of equal gravity” (Diogenes Laertius X.122). They held that once a man has attained wisdom “he no longer has any tendency contrary to it,” and that he “will be more deeply moved by feelings, but this will not prove an obstacle to wisdom” (Diogenes Laertius X.117). And they did not pretend that the wise man controls everything. “In but few things chance hinders a wise man, but the greatest and most important matters, reason has ordained, and throughout the whole period of life does and will ordain” (Principal Doctrine 16).
The result is a wise man who is a real human being: confident where the evidence is clear, patient where it is not yet in, ready to correct an opinion that the evidence fails to confirm, and never reduced to the Academic’s permanent silence or the Stoic’s impossible perfection. The Stoics made wisdom something no one could reach, and the Academics made it something no one could use. Epicurus made it something a man can reach, and use to live well.
Are True Opinion And Knowledge The Same Thing?
Section titled “Are True Opinion And Knowledge The Same Thing?”For Epicurus, largely yes. A true opinion, in his sense of the term, is knowledge. Plato and the Stoics drew a sharp line between the two, and Epicurus did not.
Plato and the Stoics. For Plato, knowledge and true opinion differ in kind. True opinions “run away out of the human soul, and thus are of no great value until one makes them fast with causal reasoning … But when once they are fastened, in the first place they turn into knowledge, and in the second, are abiding” (Meno 98a, tr. Lamb). For the Stoics, opinion is always a weak assent and always a fault, and knowledge is a comprehension so firm that no argument can shake it, which only the wise man has. On either view a man can hold a true opinion without knowing it. A lucky guess is the standard example.
Epicurus. Epicurus defined the truth of an opinion by the test it passes: “if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it is true; if it is not confirmed or is contradicted, it is false” (Diogenes Laertius X.34). An untested guess is therefore not yet a true opinion at all. It is an opinion “awaiting confirmation,” like the judgment about the distant tower. So the gap that Plato needed reasoning to close, between an opinion that happens to be true and knowledge, does not arise. Once an opinion has passed the test, it is established, and an established true opinion is knowledge. The tests work in two ways:
- Confirmation, for things that can become evident. On seeing a figure in the distance, I guess that it is Plato, and “when he has drawn near the fact that he is Plato is further testified—the distance being reduced—and is confirmed by actual evidence of sense” (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians I.212). The opinion has become evident knowledge.
- Non-contradiction, for things that can never be seen. That void exists is supported because denying it would abolish the motion we see (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians I.213-214). This is how we know that atoms and void exist, that nothing comes from nothing, and that the universe is boundless. The opposite of each is contradicted by what we see. That is why the wise man “will give definite teaching and not profess doubt” about them.
Before any opinion comes the evidence itself. Sensations, feelings and preconceptions are not opinions at all. They are the standards against which opinion is judged: “the decision of opinion depends on some previous clear and immediate evidence, to which we refer when we express it” (Diogenes Laertius X.33). What we grasp in this direct way is the most basic kind of knowledge, with no opinion added.
One distinction remains. “Not contradicted” is not always the same as “established.” For void, the opposite view is contradicted by the evidence, so the opinion is established. But many events in the sky allow several explanations, none of which is contradicted. Each is a possible account, but we do not know which one is at work in a given case, and Epicurus forbids choosing one arbitrarily: “when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth” (Letter to Pythocles 87). Here we know the range of possible causes, and we know that every one of them is natural, but we do not know which single cause is operating.
So Epicurus recognizes four conditions of the mind, not two:
- Clear evidence: sensations, feelings and preconceptions, which are not opinions, and on which all knowledge rests.
- Established opinion: confirmed, or not contradicted where its opposite is contradicted. This is true opinion, and it is knowledge.
- Opinion awaiting confirmation: not yet true or false so far as we can tell, and held as waiting.
- Several uncontradicted explanations: we know the natural possibilities, but not which one is at work.
Epicurus’ own vocabulary was not technical on this point. Diogenes Laertius even describes the preconception as “an apprehension or right opinion or thought or general idea stored within the mind” (X.33). There is no point in pressing a sharp Platonic or Stoic contrast between “knowledge” and “opinion” onto his words. What matters is the test. An opinion that passes it is true, and a true opinion is knowledge. Knowledge is not reserved for a philosopher who has seen the Forms or for a Stoic wise man who never errs. It is open to anyone who uses the evidence of the senses correctly.
Related Pages
Section titled “Related Pages”- Cicero, Academic Questions
- Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians
- Two Roads But One Dead End - Epicurean v Stoic Epistemology
- The “Academic Questions” Behind Evaluation Of Pleasure and Happiness
- Epicurus Against The White Flags Of Surrender - Sextus Empiricus and the Pyrrhonists
- Canonics - Knowledge For The Only Real World