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Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists and Against the Ethicists (Bury)

Epicurean Focus

Section titled “Epicurean Focus”

Against the Physicists (also cited as Adversus Mathematicos IX–X) and Against the Ethicists (M XI) complete Sextus’s attack on the “Dogmatists.” The first work argues that nothing can be known about gods, cause, body, place, motion, time, number, or becoming and perishing. The second argues that nothing is good or evil by nature and that there is no “art of life.” Because Epicurus held firm views on every one of these subjects, Sextus reports and attacks him again and again. These two works preserve Epicurus’s account of how men first conceived the gods, the story of how he came to philosophy as a boy, the Epicurean doctrine of time as “a symptom of symptoms,” the cradle argument for pleasure, and Epicurus’s definition of philosophy. For the wider picture see the introduction to Sextus Empiricus.

A note on links: Bury numbers the two books of Against the Physicists I and II, and Against the Ethicists has its own numbering. On this page the books are linked as #1- (Physicists I), #2- (Physicists II) and #3- (Ethicists). So Against the Ethicists section 96 is #3-96.

Epicurus as a Boy: “I Must Go Off to Them”

Section titled “Epicurus as a Boy: “I Must Go Off to Them””

The most vivid Epicurean passage in these books is a story about Epicurus himself. Hesiod’s line “Verily first created of all was Chaos” raises the question of what Chaos came from. “And this, as some say, was the reason why Epicurus took to philosophizing.” When still quite a youth “he asked his schoolmaster, who was reading out the line ‘Verily first created of all was Chaos,’ what Chaos was created from, if it was created first.” The schoolmaster replied that this was the business of the philosophers. “Well then,’ said Epicurus, ‘I must go off to them, if it is they who know the truth of things.”

Diogenes Laertius tells the same story from Apollodorus: Epicurus “took to philosophy because he despised the teachers of literature, since they were not able to explain to him the passage about Chaos in Hesiod” (DL 10.2). Both accounts show the same young man. He did not accept a poet’s word or a teacher’s evasion. He went looking for the truth about nature. This is the opposite of the passive, retiring Epicurus of later caricature.

The Gods

Section titled “The Gods”

The Soul

Section titled “The Soul”

Atoms, Void and Body

Section titled “Atoms, Void and Body”

Time: “A Symptom of Symptoms”

Section titled “Time: “A Symptom of Symptoms””

This is the fullest surviving ancient account of the Epicurean doctrine of time outside Epicurus’s own Letter to Herodotus (72–73).

The Evidence of the Senses

Section titled “The Evidence of the Senses”

Pleasure and the Good

Section titled “Pleasure and the Good”

Where the Sceptic Concedes the Epicurean Case

Section titled “Where the Sceptic Concedes the Epicurean Case”

The most revealing pages for Epicureans come where Sextus describes the Sceptic’s own life (Ethicists 141–167). The Sceptic suspends judgement about things good and evil “by belief.” But some things come “by necessity,” such as pain and pleasure, and these, Sextus admits, cannot be argued away: “in a man who is distressed because of hunger or thirst, it is not feasible to implant, by means of the Sceptical argument, the conviction that he is not in distress.” Here the great Sceptic concedes the Epicurean point. The feelings of pleasure and pain are not opinions, and no argument can overrule them. That is why Epicurus made them a standard of truth.

Sextus then consoles the Sceptic in pain with an argument that is Epicurus’s own. Suffering, he says, is either small and daily and easily remedied, or “very violent and intense,” in which case it “terrifies us, after all, but for a moment, like a lightning-flash, and then either destroys us or is destroyed,” or else moderate and drawn out, with “many intervals of rest and periods of relief.” Compare Principal Doctrine 4: “Pain does not last continuously in the flesh, but the acutest pain is there for a very short time, and even that which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not continue for many days at once.” Sextus does not name his source.

Philosophy as an Activity

Section titled “Philosophy as an Activity”

Where Sextus Answers Epicurus, and the Epicurean Reply

Section titled “Where Sextus Answers Epicurus, and the Epicurean Reply”

Sextus’s basic move in these books is to set argument against argument until the reader gives up. Against motion he sets Diodorus’s puzzles. Against body he sets the geometers’ “length without breadth.” Against pleasure he sets the claim that every pursuit breeds anxiety. Epicurus’s answer was that arguments must answer to the evidence of the senses and the feelings, not the other way round. Sextus himself admits that motion is evident, that the Cynic who “stood up and walked about” made a point no argument could answer, and that hunger and thirst cannot be argued away. Those admissions are the ground Epicurus built on.

A Note on This Text

Section titled “A Note on This Text”

Bury’s Volume III (1936) has no freely available scan. The text on this page was prepared from a privately owned copy of the volume. It is OCR text, corrected by hand in every passage quoted above. Scattered misreadings may remain elsewhere, and verse quotations are sometimes run together as prose. Bury’s footnotes and the facing Greek are omitted.

Outline Of The Argument

Section titled “Outline Of The Argument”

Editor’s note: The numbers below (1, 2, 3…) are this outline’s own topical numbering. Each entry links to the place in Bury’s translation where that stretch of argument begins, and links inside the entries go to individual numbered sections. Book and section are joined by a hyphen in the link, so section 25 of Book I is #1-25. Each book restarts its section numbering at 1, and Against the Ethicists is linked as book 3. Entries marked Epicurean note are our own commentary.

Outline - Against the Physicists, Book I: Gods, Cause, Whole and Part, Body

Section titled “Outline - Against the Physicists, Book I: Gods, Cause, Whole and Part, Body”

1. Introduction: The Principles of the Universe (1:1–12)

Section titled “1. Introduction: The Principles of the Universe (1:1–12)”

Begins at I.1

  • Sextus will attack the most comprehensive doctrines of physics rather than its details. Undermining the foundations of a wall brings the towers down with it.
  • The best physicists divide the principles of the universe into the efficient (active) and the material (passive). Sextus claims Homer, Anaxagoras, Hesiod, Parmenides, Empedocles and the Stoics for this division.
  • He will first raise doubts about the efficient principles, beginning with God, and first about how men came to conceive of God at all.

2. How Men Came to Conceive of Gods (1:13–48)

Section titled “2. How Men Came to Conceive of Gods (1:13–48)”

Begins at I.13

  • The Dogmatists say philosophy is the practice of wisdom, and wisdom is “the knowledge of things divine and human.” If the doctrine of gods is doubtful, so is that definition.
  • The theories surveyed: lawgivers invented the gods to frighten wrongdoers (with Orpheus on the cannibal age); Euhemerus (powerful men deified); Prodicus (useful things deified); Democritus (great images impinging on men); Aristotle (inspired states of the soul in sleep, and the order of the heavens); the orderly heavens compared to an army and a ship; the later Stoics (the first men had keener minds).
  • Epicurean note: “Epicurus thinks that men derived the conception of God from the presentations received in sleep,” from “great images of human shape” seen in dreams. Compare Lucretius 5.1161–1182.
  • Sextus answers the lawgiver theory. How did the lawgivers themselves get the idea? And “all men have one common preconception about God, according to which he is a blessed creature and imperishable and perfect in happiness and receptive of nothing evil.” Epicurean note: this is the Epicurean preconception of the gods (Letter to Menoeceus 123).
  • Against Euhemerus, men deified after death were soon despised unless they took a divine name, like Heracles. Against Prodicus, worshipping rivers and lakes “surpasses the height of lunacy.”
  • Epicurean note: “Against Epicurus, too, one may make the same objections.” Dream images might give the idea of gigantic men, but not of a being “blessed and imperishable.” The reply that these qualities were added by magnifying a happy man is, Sextus says, circular (I.45–47).

3. Do Gods Exist? The Three Positions (1:49–59)

Section titled “3. Do Gods Exist? The Three Positions (1:49–59)”

Begins at I.49

4. For the Gods: The Argument from Universal Agreement (1:60–74)

Section titled “4. For the Gods: The Argument from Universal Agreement (1:60–74)”

Begins at I.60

5. For the Gods: The Argument from the Order of the Universe (1:75–122)

Section titled “5. For the Gods: The Argument from the Order of the Universe (1:75–122)”

Begins at I.75

  • Matter is motionless and shapeless, so a self-moving, eternal power must move and shape it, and this is God.
  • The universe is a “unified body,” as its “sympathies” show: tides and creatures wax and wane with the moon. It must be held together by the best structure, which is rational and divine.
  • Cleanthes: there must be a best animal, and since man is imperfect, it is God.
  • Xenophon’s Socrates: as a statue implies a sculptor, so man implies a superior mind. We have a little earth and water from the universe, and so also a little of its mind. The counter-argument: then the universe also has gall and phlegm.
  • Zeno: “The rational is better than the non-rational; but nothing is better than the Universe; therefore the Universe is rational.” Plato’s Timaeus argues the same. Alexinus’s parody: then the universe is also a poet and a grammarian.
  • The universe is not moved “of necessity and by vortex, as Democritus said,” but by an intelligent nature. Like an “Archimedean sphere,” the universe points to its maker.
  • Epicurean note: this section is the Stoic and Platonic case for a designing god, the case Epicurus and Lucretius rejected (Lucretius 5.156–234).

6. For the Gods: The Absurdity of Denying Them (1:123–136)

Section titled “6. For the Gods: The Absurdity of Denying Them (1:123–136)”

Begins at I.123

  • Without gods there would be no piety, holiness, wisdom (“the science of things both divine and human”), justice, or prophecy.
  • Pythagoras and Empedocles held a kinship with animals and forbade eating them. Sextus replies that the Stoics ground justice in shared reason, not in a spirit pervading all things.
  • Zeno’s syllogism: “One may reasonably honour the Gods; but those who are nonexistent one may not reasonably honour; therefore Gods exist.” Its parody proves that the Stoic Wise Man exists, “as their ‘Wise man’ has remained indiscoverable up till now.”
  • In defending Zeno, Diogenes of Babylon compares the gods to the atoms: “if atoms had existed, they also exist now; for according to the conception of such bodies, they are imperishable and uncreate.”

7. Against the Gods (1:137–190)

Section titled “7. Against the Gods (1:137–190)”

Begins at I.137

  • If God is an animal, he has senses. Then he finds some things sweet and others bitter, some sights and sounds pleasing and others vexing, and so he is open to “change for the worse” and is perishable (I.139–147).
  • God is neither limited nor unlimited, neither body nor incorporeal.
  • God cannot have the virtues. Continence and fortitude require things hard to resist and endure. Courage requires something to fear. Wisdom requires knowing pain. Good counsel requires something unknown to him.
  • Epicurean note: two of these arguments touch Epicurean doctrine. The Dogmatists say God knows suffering by contrast with pleasure, but “it is owing to the withdrawal of everything that gives pain that pleasure really subsists.” This is the Epicurean limit of pleasure (PD 3). And a god who is ignorant of anything must fear “whether there exist in the infinite any things destructive of himself,” the standard objection to the Epicurean gods.
  • If God speaks, he must have organs of speech, “But this is absurd and borders on the fairy-tales of Epicurus.” And which dialect would he speak?
  • Carneades’s sorites arguments: if Zeus is a god, so is Poseidon, then every river and stream. If the sun is a god, then the day, the month and the year. If Aphrodite, then Eros, Eleos and Phobos. If Demeter, then Earth and every stone.

8. Suspension of Judgement About the Gods (1:191–194)

Section titled “8. Suspension of Judgement About the Gods (1:191–194)”

Begins at I.191

  • The arguments on both sides balance, popular notions of the gods conflict, and the poets’ myths are “full of all kinds of impiety,” as Xenophanes complained of Homer and Hesiod.
  • Sextus turns to the passive principle, matter.

9. Concerning Cause: The Case For (1:195–206)

Section titled “9. Concerning Cause: The Case For (1:195–206)”

Begins at I.195

  • Some say cause exists, the Sophists who deny motion say it does not, and the Sceptics say “no more.”
  • The case for: seed, nature, soul and God are causes. Without causes, anything would come from anything (“a horse being formed from a man,” snow in Egypt). Whoever denies cause has a cause for denying it.

10. Concerning Cause: The Case Against (1:207–266)

Section titled “10. Concerning Cause: The Case Against (1:207–266)”

Begins at I.207

  • Cause is relative, and relatives are only conceived. A cause must coexist with its effect, but becoming and motion are doubtful.
  • Neither body nor incorporeal can cause body or incorporeal. The Stoics say a body causes something incorporeal in a body.
  • Epicurean note: “Epicurus says that both bodies are the causes of bodies and incorporeals of incorporeals.” Aenesidemus’s attack begins from a body that is “ungenerated, like the atom of Epicurus.”
  • The moving does not cause the motionless, the simultaneous does not cause the simultaneous, the prior does not cause the posterior. The hoop and the hoop-trundler cause each other’s motion equally.
  • Fire does not burn by itself but only with burnable wood, as the syllable “δι” needs both letters. The sun has neither one power nor many. The cause neither acts on the surface (which is incorporeal) nor through pores.
  • Nothing touches anything. Whole cannot touch whole, part cannot touch part, and whole cannot touch part.

11. The Passive: Nothing Is Affected (1:267–330)

Section titled “11. The Passive: Nothing Is Affected (1:267–330)”

Begins at I.267

  • Neither the existent nor the non-existent is affected. Socrates dies neither while alive nor when dead.
  • Affection comes by addition, subtraction or change, and none of these exists.
  • Subtraction: the incorporeal cannot be subtracted, “the mathematicians talk idly when they say that they will bisect a given straight line.” A line of nine points cannot be cut into equal halves, nor can a circle be halved through its centre.
  • Body cannot be subtracted from body, equal from equal, greater from less or less from greater. A monad taken from a decad is taken from neither the ten nor the remaining nine.
  • Addition: a palm added to a cubit is added neither to itself, nor to the cubit, nor to the sum.
  • Transposition is subtraction plus addition, and so it too is abolished.

12. Whole and Part (1:331–358)

Section titled “12. Whole and Part (1:331–358)”

Begins at I.331

  • The Stoics distinguish the Whole (the cosmos) from the All (cosmos plus the void outside).
  • Epicurean note: Epicurus uses “Whole” and “All” for bodies and void alike: “the nature of the Whole of things is bodies and void,” and “the All is unlimited in both respects.” He holds that the part is other than the whole, “as the atom is other than the compound, since the former is devoid of quality whereas the compound has qualities.” Compare Letter to Herodotus 39–42 and 54.
  • The whole is neither other than its parts nor identical with them, and the parts are parts neither of the whole, nor of each other, nor of themselves. The same puzzle applies to words in a line of Homer.
  • The Dogmatists retreat, saying whole and part exist only in our consciousness. Sextus says this does not escape the difficulty.

13. Concerning Body: The Elements (1:359–366)

Section titled “13. Concerning Body: The Elements (1:359–366)”

Begins at I.359

  • Sextus lists the views on the first elements: earth, water, the unlimited, air, fire, combinations of these, “and Democritus and Epicurus, atoms,” homoeomeries, Diodorus’s minimal bodies, and Asclepiades’s molecules. The incorporeal principles are numbers (Pythagoreans), limits (Mathematicians) and Ideas (Plato).
  • One answer serves for all: the difficulties about body for some, and the difficulties about incorporeals for the others.

14. Body and the Geometers’ Definitions (1:366–436)

Section titled “14. Body and the Geometers’ Definitions (1:366–436)”

Begins at I.366

  • Body as “that which has three dimensions”: body is neither separate from its dimensions nor their sum, since a sum of incorporeals is incorporeal.
  • The line, defined as “a point which has flowed,” is impossible. The point is neither body nor incorporeal, and a line is neither one point extended nor many points in a row.
  • “Length without breadth” cannot be conceived by any of the ways in which concepts are formed. Epicurean note: Sextus lists those ways: “through the presentation of things manifest to the senses or through transition from things manifest,” by resemblance, composition or analogy, as with the Cyclops and the pygmy. This is the Epicurean account of how thoughts arise from sensations (DL 10.32).
  • Aristotle’s defense (the length of a wall seen without its breadth) fails.
  • The geometers’ own theorems contradict their definitions. A revolving line that sweeps out a circle, a side measuring a square, and a rolling cylinder all imply that lines have breadth. Surfaces as limits make contact between bodies impossible.

15. Body Neither Sensible Nor Intelligible (1:437–440)

Section titled “15. Body Neither Sensible Nor Intelligible (1:437–440)”

Begins at I.437

  • Body is “a complex quality perceived through the combination of form, size, and solidity,” so it is not sensible. And since nothing sensible exists from which to form its concept, it is not intelligible either. Epicurean note: this is the Epicurean definition of body (compare II.240 and Letter to Herodotus 68–69).
  • Sextus turns to the incorporeals.

Outline - Against the Physicists, Book II: Place, Motion, Time, Number, Becoming

Section titled “Outline - Against the Physicists, Book II: Place, Motion, Time, Number, Becoming”

1. Place, Void and Room (2:1–6)

Section titled “1. Place, Void and Room (2:1–6)”

Begins at II.1

2. Chapter I. Does Place Exist? (2:6–36)

Section titled “2. Chapter I. Does Place Exist? (2:6–36)”

Begins at II.6

  • For place: the six directions are parts of place. Plato now stands where Socrates stood. The light and the heavy have places of their own. The “in which” of becoming exists. Hesiod’s Chaos is place, and place remains even if all bodies are abolished in thought.
  • Sextus replies that arguing from the parts of place assumes place. The question is place in the exact sense, not “in Alexandria.”
  • Epicurean note: Hesiod’s line is self-refuting, since one may ask what Chaos came from. “And this, as some say, was the reason why Epicurus took to philosophizing.” As a boy he asked his schoolmaster where Chaos came from. When told this was the business of philosophers, “Well then,’ said Epicurus, ‘I must go off to them, if it is they who know the truth of things.” Compare DL 10.2.
  • Against place: place is neither body nor void (which would have to stay, move away or perish when a body arrives). It is neither matter, form, the interval between limits, nor the limits themselves.
  • Against the Peripatetics: if place is “the limit of the containing body,” then Heaven is nowhere, the First God becomes the place of all things, and place is a surface.

3. Chapter II. Does Motion Exist? The Kinds and the Views (2:37–69)

Section titled “3. Chapter II. Does Motion Exist? The Kinds and the Views (2:37–69)”

Begins at II.37

4. Moved by Another or by Itself? (2:70–84)

Section titled “4. Moved by Another or by Itself? (2:70–84)”

Begins at II.70

  • If moved by another, the mover must either follow the moved thing or leave it, and either way the result is absurd. Epicurean note: “the atoms will not move because they do not admit of addition or subtraction or change.” This assumes that motion requires the moved thing to be “affected,” which the Epicureans did not accept. Atoms move by their own weight and by collision (Letter to Herodotus 43–44, 61).
  • If self-moved, a thing would move in all directions or one. If it moved one way, all things would; if some up and some down, nothing would combine.

5. Diodorus Cronos and His Critics (2:85–120)

Section titled “5. Diodorus Cronos and His Critics (2:85–120)”

Begins at II.85

  • Diodorus: nothing “is moving,” though things “have moved.” A thing moves neither in the place where it is nor where it is not.
  • The objections to Diodorus (preterites imply presents, things spin in place, motion involves two places, “place” is ambiguous) are answered on Diodorus’s behalf. The examples are the men who married at different times, Helen’s three husbands, and the ball that touches the roof.
  • Diodorus’s sorites on “motion of the major part” is set aside as sophistical.
  • If a thing moves, it moves “now,” in an indivisible present, and so through indivisible places, where it never moves but only has moved.

6. Motion Under Infinite Division and Under Indivisibles (2:121–168)

Section titled “6. Motion Under Infinite Division and Under Indivisibles (2:121–168)”

Begins at II.121

7. Chapter III. Does Time Exist? Definitions (2:169–188)

Section titled “7. Chapter III. Does Time Exist? Definitions (2:169–188)”

Begins at II.169

8. Time: Direct Arguments (2:189–214)

Section titled “8. Time: Direct Arguments (2:189–214)”

Begins at II.189

  • Time is neither limited nor unlimited, neither divisible nor indivisible. It is made of a past that no longer exists and a future not yet existing, and the present is neither an indivisible nor a divisible.
  • Time is neither generable nor ingenerable, nor partly each.

9. The Substance of Time: Epicurus and Demetrius (2:215–247)

Section titled “9. The Substance of Time: Epicurus and Demetrius (2:215–247)”

Begins at II.215

10. Chapter IV. Concerning Number: The Pythagorean Theory (2:248–284)

Section titled “10. Chapter IV. Concerning Number: The Pythagorean Theory (2:248–284)”

Begins at II.248

  • The Pythagoreans make number the principle of all things. The principles must be non-evident, as the atomists rightly saw, but also incorporeal.
  • Epicurean note: the atomists are “partly right, but partly went wrong,” in making the principles bodies (II.252–257). The Pythagoreans claim that Epicurus agreed that intelligible bodies are composed of incorporeals, “when he said that ‘body is conceived by means of a combination of form and magnitude and resistance and weight.’”
  • The One and the Indefinite Dyad are the supreme principles. All things are classed as absolute, contrary or relative. From these come point, line, plane and solid, the elements, and the harmonies of the cosmos.

11. Against Number (2:285–309)

Section titled “11. Against Number (2:285–309)”

Begins at II.285

  • If things are “one” only by participating in the One, nothing particular is one, just as no particular man would be Man. The Idea of the One can be shared neither whole nor in parts.
  • Number is not perceived by sense, since it must be taught. Plato’s puzzle in the Phaedo: how do two ones become two by being put together, and also by being divided?
  • Putting one beside one either adds something (making four) or nothing (no dyad).

12. Chapter V. Concerning Becoming and Perishing (2:310–351)

Section titled “12. Chapter V. Concerning Becoming and Perishing (2:310–351)”

Begins at II.310

  • A survey of the theories of generation: from one unqualified thing (the Stoics), from one qualified thing (water, air, fire, earth), and from two, four, five or six things.
  • Epicurean note: “Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and Democritus and Epicurus and a host of others held that the generation of things is from innumerables.” Democritus and Epicurus made them “unlike and impassive (namely, the atoms).”
  • Becoming and perishing fall with time, motion, cause, addition and subtraction, and touch. Neither the existent nor the non-existent becomes.
  • The Dogmatists appeal to “the evidence of sense”: water becomes cold, bronze becomes a statue, a baby is born. Sextus replies that the baby merely passes from one place to another.
  • Nothing perishes. Socrates died neither living nor dead. Diodorus’s wall perishes neither while its stones touch nor when they are apart.

Outline - Against the Ethicists

Section titled “Outline - Against the Ethicists”

1. Introduction (3:1–2)

Section titled “1. Introduction (3:1–2)”

Begins at Ethicists 1

  • With logic and physics done, Sextus turns to ethics. The Sceptic’s frame of mind brings a life “Ever devoid of care, uniformly free from distraction” (Timon).
  • Ethics is about the distinction between things good and evil.

2. Chapter I. The Threefold Division of Things (3:3–20)

Section titled “2. Chapter I. The Threefold Division of Things (3:3–20)”

Begins at Ethicists 3

  • The Old Academy, Peripatetics and Stoics divide existing things into good, evil and indifferent. Xenocrates tried to prove the division, but his proof is just the division restated.
  • Logical objections to the division: it is a disguised universal, and it should first divide the “different” from the “indifferent.”
  • When the Sceptic says “some things are good,” “are” means “appear,” not “really exist.”

3. Chapter II. The Conceptions of Good and Evil (3:21–41)

Section titled “3. Chapter II. The Conceptions of Good and Evil (3:21–41)”

Begins at Ethicists 21

  • Epicurean note: Sextus begins with a concept, “for, according to the sapient Epicurus, ‘It is not possible either to seek or to doubt without a preconception.’”
  • The Stoic definitions: good is “utility or not other than utility,” in three senses. Plato and Xenocrates use “good” in unconnected senses.
  • Other definitions: “that which is desirable for its own sake,” “that which contributes to happiness.”
  • These definitions give only a property of the good, not the good itself. All agree the good is useful and choiceworthy, but then fall into “a truceless war, one man calling it virtue, another pleasure, another painlessness.”

4. Chapter III. Do Good and Evil Exist? The Disagreement (3:42–67)

Section titled “4. Chapter III. Do Good and Evil Exist? The Disagreement (3:42–67)”

Begins at Ethicists 42

  • All men agree that good and evil exist, but disagree about what they are, as Ethiopians and Persians disagree about beauty.
  • The schools disagree about the classes of goods. Epicurean note: some “even assign to them the most principal good; and of this sort are they who approve of carnal pleasure,” that is, to the goods of the body. Sextus does not name the school.
  • Health as a test case: the poets call it the prime good. Crantor’s contest of the goods ranks courage first, health second, pleasure third and wealth last (3:51–58). The Stoics call health a “preferred indifferent,” and Ariston says even that is too much.

5. Nothing Is Good or Evil by Nature (3:68–95)

Section titled “5. Nothing Is Good or Evil by Nature (3:68–95)”

Begins at Ethicists 68

  • What is good by nature should be good for all, as fire warms all. But nothing is good for all.
  • Epicurean note: “Epicurus, for example, asserts that pleasure is a good,” while a Cynic calls it an evil, the Stoics an indifferent, Cleanthes something unnatural “like a cosmetic,” and Archedemus something natural but valueless “like the hairs in the armpit.” Each chooses by his own reasoning: “Zeno one by which he opined that virtue is the good, Epicurus another by which he chose pleasure.”
  • Nothing is desirable for its own sake: neither the desire itself, nor any external thing, nor any merely bodily state. The agreeable feeling an object produces is “personal to ourselves,” and each man judges it differently.
  • Folly is not evil by nature, since fools do not perceive it as evil.

6. The Epicurean Cradle Argument (3:96–98)

Section titled “6. The Epicurean Cradle Argument (3:96–98)”

Begins at Ethicists 96

7. The “Fair,” the Animals, and Courage (3:99–109)

Section titled “7. The “Fair,” the Animals, and Courage (3:99–109)”

Begins at Ethicists 99

8. Chapter IV. Can One Live Happily Believing in Natural Goods? (3:110–140)

Section titled “8. Chapter IV. Can One Live Happily Believing in Natural Goods? (3:110–140)”

Begins at Ethicists 110

  • Sextus’s central claim: all unhappiness comes from perturbation, and perturbation from eager pursuit and avoidance. The Dogmatist, believing things good or evil by nature, is always pursuing and fleeing, and is never at rest.
  • Only the man who holds that nothing is good or evil by nature “will live happily and unperturbed.”
  • Supposed goods breed evils: wealth breeds love of money, fame breeds love of fame, and “in the case of pleasure we shall find the same thing.”
  • Epicurean note: the opponents answer that gaining the good ends the distress, as animals “are driven for the sake of drinking through pain to pleasure and as soon as they are satisfied cease from their previous distress.” Sextus replies that possession breeds envy and fear. Epicurus’s answer is the classification of desires: natural and necessary desires are easily satisfied, and the empty desires for wealth and fame are the ones that never end (Letter to Menoeceus 127–128; PD 15, 29).
  • The dogmatic philosopher who redirects a man from wealth to virtue only “creates a new disease in place of the old.” Only Scepticism, teaching that nothing is good by nature, removes perturbation.

9. Chapter V. Is the Sceptic Happy in Every Respect? (3:141–167)

Section titled “9. Chapter V. Is the Sceptic Happy in Every Respect? (3:141–167)”

Begins at Ethicists 141

10. Chapter VI. Is There an Art of Life? (3:168–215)

Section titled “10. Chapter VI. Is There an Art of Life? (3:168–215)”

Begins at Ethicists 168

11. Chapter VII. Can the Art of Life Be Taught? (3:216–257)

Section titled “11. Chapter VII. Can the Art of Life Be Taught? (3:216–257)”

Begins at Ethicists 216

  • General arguments against teaching: neither the existent nor the non-existent, neither body nor incorporeal, neither the true nor the false can be taught. Epicurean note: body is not sensible, “whether body is, as Epicurus asserts, a combination of size and form and solidity,” and the intelligible body is disputed, “some saying that it is indivisible, others divisible.”
  • There is no teacher and no learner. Expert cannot teach expert, nor layman layman. Learning comes neither by pointing (what is evident needs no teaching) nor by speech.
  • Applied to the art of life: the unwise man cannot grasp what the wise man teaches, as the blind cannot grasp colours.
  • Wisdom cannot perceive unwisdom, neither by experience nor by inference. Epicurean note: Sextus again lists the ways of forming concepts, “empirically by way of sense-evidence or by way of analogical inference,” through resemblance, composition or analogy (3:250–251). Compare DL 10.32.
  • Sextus closes “the whole of our exposition of the Sceptic Way.”

The Translation (Bury)

Section titled “The Translation (Bury)”

Translated by the Rev. R. G. Bury, Sextus Empiricus, Volume III, Against the Physicists, Against the Ethicists, Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936). Bury’s facing Greek text and footnotes are omitted. The headings are Bury’s, and the bold numbers are his section numbers. See the introduction for notes on the text.

Against the Physicists, Book I

Section titled “Against the Physicists, Book I”

[1] We have explained above the reason why the physical division of philosophy is being examined by us after the logical, although in point of time it seems to precede all the other divisions; and with regard to it we shall pursue again the same method of inquiry, and not delay long on particular points as Cleitomachus has done and the rest of the Academic troupe (for by plunging into alien subject matter and framing their arguments on the basis of assent to dogmatic assumptions not their own they have unduly prolonged their counter-statement); instead of this, we shall attack the most important and most comprehensive dogmas, as in the doubts cast on these we shall find the rest also included. [2] For just as, in a siege, those who have undermined the foundation of a wall find that the towers tumble down along with it, so too in philosophical investigations those who have routed the primary assumptions on which the theories are based have potentially abolished the apprehension of every particular theory. [3] Thus it is not without plausibility that some people compare those who join in plunging into inquiries into particulars to hunters who pursue the quarry On foot or men who fish with a line or catch birds with bird-lime on a cane; whereas those who call in question all the particulars by starting with the most comprehensive postulates, they compare to men who surround (their prey) with lines and stakes and drag-nets. Hence, as it shows much more art to be able to catch a great number with a single onset than to hunt after the game laboriously one by one, so too it is much more artistic to bring one’s counter-argument against all in common rather than to develop it against the particular tenets.

[4] Seeing, then, that those who, in the department of Physics, seem to have classified most precisely the principles of the Universe declare that some of these are efficient, others material,—and it is claimed that the originators of their opinion was the poet Homer, who was followed by Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and Empedocles of Acragas and a vast number of others. [5] For the poet makes a statement about these principles where he speaks allegorically about Proteus and Eidothea, calling the first and most original cause “Proteus,” and the substance which turns into particulars “Eidothea.” [6] And Anaxagoras says—“All things were together, and Mind came and set them in order,” assuming that Mind, which according to him is God, is the efficient principle, and the multimixture of homoeomeries the material principle. [7] And Aristotle says that Hermotimus of Clazomenae and Parmenides of Elea and, much earlier, Hesiod held this view; for in picturing the birth of all things they joined in introducing Love (that is to say, the [8] moving and unifying cause of existents); as when Hesiod says—

Verily first created of all was Chaos, thereafter
Earth broad-bosom’d, unshakable seat of all things for
ever,
Aye and Love, who of all the immortal gods is the
fairest—

[9] and Parmenides, when he expressly declares that

Love was the first of the gods whom she in her wisdom
created.

[10] And, as I said before, Empedocles would seem to hold a like view; for he enumerates Strife and Love along with his four elements (Love as a unifying, Strife as a disintegrating cause), saying—

Fire and water and earth, and soft air reaching to heaven,
Strife pernicious, divided from these, and evenly balanc’d,
Love, together with these, in length and in breadth ever
equal.

[11] Moreover, the Stoics also, when they declare that there are two principles, God and unqualified matter, suppose that God acts and that matter is passive and [12] altered:—seeing then that some such classification is made by the best of the Physicists, come and let us first express our doubts about the efficient principles, arguing on the one hand dogmatically concerning God, and on the other hand more sceptically concerning the non-existence of anything active or passive. But since, in regard to every inquiry, the conception of the subject of inquiry must come first, let us consider how exactly we acquired the notion of God.

Concerning Gods

Section titled “Concerning Gods”

[13] The doctrine concerning Gods certainly seems to the Dogmatic philosophers to be most necessary. Hence they assert that “philosophy is the practice of wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human.” Accordingly, if we shall establish the doubtfulness of the inquiry concerning Gods, we shall virtually have demonstrated that neither is wisdom the knowledge of divine and human things, nor philosophy the practice of wisdom.

[14] Some, then, have asserted that those who first led mankind and considered what is of profit for life, being men of great intelligence, invented both the fancy about the Gods and the belief in the mythical events in Hades. [15] For, since life in old times was brutish and disorderly (for, as Orpheus says,—

There was a time when ev’ry man liv’d by devouring his
fellow

Cannibal-wise, and the stronger man did feast on the weaker),—purposing to check the wrongdoers they laid down laws, in the first place, for the punishing of such as [16] were manifestly doing wrong, and after this they also invented Gods as watchers of all the sinful and righteous acts of men, so that none should dare to do wrong even in secret, believing -that the Gods Cloaked in garments of mist all over the earth go roaming, Watching the violent doings of men and their lawful behaviour.”

[17] And Euhemerus, nick-named “the Atheist,” says—“When the life of mankind was without order, those who so far excelled the rest in strength and intelligence that all men lived subservient to their commands, being intent to gain for themselves more admiration and veneration, invented for themselves a kind of superhuman and divine authority, and in consequence were by the populace accounted Gods.” [18] And Prodicus of Ceos says—“The ancients accounted as Gods the sun and moon and rivers and springs and in general all the things that are of benefit for our life, because of the benefit derived from them, even as the Egyptians deify the Nile.” And he says that it was for this reason that bread was worshipped as Demeter, and wine as Dionysus, and water as Poseidon, and fire as Hephaestus, and so on with each of the things that are good for use. [19] And Democritus says that certain images impinge on men, and of these some are beneficent, others maleficent (whence also he prayed that he might have “propitious images”), and these images are great and gigantic, and are hard to destroy although not indestructible, and they signify the future to men beforehand, as they are visible and utter sounds. Hence the ancients, on receiving a presentation of these images, supposed that God exists, God being none other than these images, and possessed of an indestructible nature. [20] And Aristotle said that the conception of Gods arose amongst mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. It arose from events which concern the soul because of the inspired states of the soul which occur in sleep and because of prophecies. [21] For, says he, when the soul is by itself in sleep, then it takes on its own proper nature and prophesies and predicts the future. And it is in this state also when it is being separated from bodies at death. He certainly agrees that the poet Homer observed this fact; for Homer told of how Patroclus at the time of his death predicted the slaying of Hector, and Hector the end of Achilles. Owing, then, to these reasons (he says) men conceived the existence of some divinity, in itself like unto the soul and of all things the most intelligent. [22] Moreover (they derived this conception) from celestial phenomena also; for when they beheld the sun circling round in the day-time, and by night the orderly motion of the other stars, they supposed some God to be the cause of such motion and orderliness.

[23] Such, then, was the view of Aristotle; but there are others who assert that the mind, which is keen and mobile, while inspecting its own nature proceeded also to reflection on the Universe and conceived a Power superlatively cognitive, and analogous to itself but of a divine nature. [24] And there are some who have supposed that we have arrived at the conception of Gods from those events in the world which are marvellous; which opinion seems to have been held by Democritus, who says—“For when the men of old time beheld the disasters in the heavens, such as thunderings and lightnings, and thunderbolts and collisions between stars, and eclipses of sun and moon, they were affrighted, imagining the Gods to be the causes of these things.” [25] But Epicurus thinks that men derived the conception of God from the presentations received in sleep; “for,” says he, “when great images of human shape impressed them during sleep, they supposed that some such Gods of human shape [26] really existed.” And some have recourse to the unalterable and orderly motion of the heavenly bodies, and say that the first beginning of conceptions about the Gods arose from this; for just as, if a man seated on Trojan Ida had been gazing at the host of the Greeks marching along the plain in splendid order and array—

Riding first, in the van, were the knights with their chariots
and horses
Next came the men on foot;—

such a man would certainly have arrived at the idea that there exists someone who orders this array and gives commands to the soldiers marshalled under him, such as Nestor (or some other hero) who understood how

Rightly to marshal the steeds and the warriors armfed with
bucklers.”

[27] And just as the man who is familiar with ships, as soon as he sees in the distance a ship with a favouring wind behind it and with all its sails well set, concludes that there is somebody who directs its course and brings it into its appointed havens,—so too those who first looked up to heaven and beheld the sun running its courses from east to west and the orderly processions of the stars sought for the Artificer of this most beautiful array, conjecturing that it had not come about spontaneously but by the agency of some superior and imperishable nature, which is God. [28] And some of the later Stoics declare that the first men, the sons of Earth, greatly surpassed the men of to-day in intelligence (as one may learn from a comparison of ourselves with the men of the past), and that those ancient heroes possessed, as it were, in the keenness of their intellect, an extra organ of sense and apprehended the divine nature and discerned certain powers of the Gods.

[29] Such, then, are the statements of the Dogmatic philosophers regarding the conception of the Gods; but we do not suppose that they call for refutation; for the variety of the modes of conception which they assume stamps them with ignorance of the truth; for while there can be many modes of conceiving God, that one of them which is true is not apprehended. Yet even were we to deal with the particular suggestions, none of the statements will be found to be well-grounded. [30] Thus, for instance, those who think that certain lawgivers and clever men implanted in the rest the belief in Gods do not appear at all to attack the problem. For the problem was—“from what starting-point did men set out when [31] they arrived at a belief in Gods?”; whereas those men make the irrelevant statement that certain lawgivers implanted in men this opinion about Gods, not seeing that they have the original difficulty still remaining, when someone may inquire “But how did the lawgivers arrive at the conception of Gods, when nobody before had given them any tradition about Gods?”—[32] Further, all men possess a conception of Gods, but not in the same way; thus the Persians, for example, deify fire, the Egyptians water, and others other things of that sort. It is improbable, too, that all men should have been assembled together by the lawgivers to hear something about the Gods; for the tribes of mankind were not mixed together but unknown to one another, and it has been handed down to us by history that, as regards voyaging, the Argo was the first bark to sail the seas. [33] Yes, but before all this, someone perhaps will say, the lawgivers and leaders of each tribe invented this conception, and on this account different peoples conceived the existence of different Gods. But this is silly; for, on the contrary, all men have one common preconception about God, according to which he is a blessed creature and imperishable and perfect in happiness and receptive of nothing evil, and it is quite contrary to reason that all men should apprehend the same characteristics by chance instead of gaining these impressions naturally. Hence, the men of old times did not accept the existence of Gods by convention or owing to legislation.

[34] And those who say that the men who first led mankind and were the controllers of their public affairs, decked themselves with greater power and honour in order to secure the obedience of the multitude, and afterwards, when they died, were regarded as Gods,—they again fail to understand the problem. For how did the men who raised themselves to the position of Gods obtain that conception of the gods under which they ranked themselves? For this point, which needs explanation, is passed over. [35] Moreover, the view thus maintained is improbable. For the things done by leaders,—and especially such things as are false,—remain unaltered only during the life-time of the leaders, and at their death are done away, and one may meet with many who were counted as Gods during their life-time but were despised after their death, unless they had assumed some divine appellation, like Heracles the son of Zeus and Alcmena. [36] For originally, as they say, his name was Alcaeus, but he assumed the appellation of Heracles, who was regarded as a God by the men of that age. Hence, too, there is a story that at Thebes long ago a private statue of Heracles was discovered bearing the inscription “Alcaeus, son of Amphitryon, as a thank-offering to Heracles.” [37] And they say that the sons of Tyndareus assumed the title of “Dioscuri,” who likewise were reputed to be Gods; for the wise men of that time called the two hemispheres, that above the earth and that below the earth, “Dioscuri.” Wherefore also the poet, in riddling allusion to this, says about them—Living on one day, dying the next, in alternate succession—So they exist, and honour is theirs no less than the Godhead’s. And they set caps of felt upon them, and upon these stars, symbolizing the construction of the hemispheres. [38] Those, then, who thus assumed the rank of these Gods somehow secured that pre-eminence, but those who openly proclaimed themselves Gods in their own right were, instead, despised.

[39] Again, those who say that the ancients supposed that all the things which benefit life are Gods,—such as the sun and moon, rivers and lakes, and the like,—are not only defending an improbable view but also convicting the ancients of the utmost stupidity. For it is not likely that they were so foolish as to imagine that things they saw perishing before their eyes are Gods, or that they attributed divine power to things which were being devoured by themselves and dissolved. [40] For some things, perhaps, are reasonable, such as believing the Earth to be divine,—not that substance which is plowed into furrows or dug up, but the power which pervades it and its fruitful, and really most divine, nature. But to suppose that lakes and rivers, and whatsoever else is of a nature to be useful to us, are Gods surpasses the height of lunacy. [41] For, on this showing, one ought also to believe that men, and especially philosophers, are Gods (for they help to benefit our life), and most of the irrational animals (for they co-operate with us), and our domestic furniture and whatsoever else there is of a still more humble kind. But all this is extremely ludicrous; so that one must declare that the view set forth is not sound.

[42] Nor is Democritus to be credited in that he explains the less doubtful by the more doubtful. For nature supplies a great number and variety of facts which go to explain how men acquired the conception of Gods; but the notion that “there exist in the circumambient gigantic images of human shape,” and, in general, all such fictions as Democritus is pleased to invent for himself, is wholly inadmissible.

[43] Against Epicurus, too, one may make the same objections; as he imagines that Gods were conceived “in accordance with the presentations during sleep of images of human shape”; for why did there spring from these the conception of Gods rather than of gigantic men? [44] And one may object generally, against all the views set forth, that men do not form a notion of God by means of merely magnifying a creature of human shape, but by including also the fact that he is blessed and imperishable and exhibiting very great power in the Universe. But how, or from what starting-point, these qualities came to be conceived by those who first derived the conception of God, is not explained by those who attribute it to presentations during sleep or to the orderly array of the heavenly bodies.

[45] But to this they reply that, while the notion of God originated in the images presented during sleep or in the phenomena of the Universe, the idea that God is eternal and imperishable and perfect in happiness was introduced by way of transference from mankind. For just as by magnifying in fantasy the ordinary man we have obtained the conception of Cyclops, who was not—

Like to a corn-eating man, but rather a peak well-wooded High on the mountain-tops, when it loometh apart from its fellows, so when we have formed a notion of a man who is happy and blessed and fulfilled with all things good, then by intensifying these qualities we form a notion of God as he who excels in them all. [46] And again, imagined along-lived man

£5 they extended his life-time to infinity, by linking together with the present both the past and the future; and having thus arrived at the conception of eternity they went on to say that God is eternal. [47] Those that argue thus maintain, indeed, a plausible view, but they slide gently into circular reasoning, which is the most hopeless kind. For in order to conceive first the happy man, and from him to pass on to a conception of God, we ought to have conceived what happiness is, through participation in which the happy man is conceived. But, according to them, “happiness is a certain daemonic and divine nature,” and “he who has his daemon well disposed” is said to be “happy.” So that, in order to grasp human happiness we must previously have a notion of “God” and “daemon,” and in order that we may conceive God we must have a previous conception of the happy man. So then, as each of these waits for its conception to be derived from the other, it becomes for us inconceivable.

[48] Let this, then, serve as our criticism of those who inquire how the men of a past age acquired the notion of Gods; and let us inquire in the next place if there are Gods.

Do Gods Exist?

Section titled “Do Gods Exist?”

[49] Since not everything which is conceived partakes also in existence, but it is possible for a thing to be conceived and not exist—like a Hippocentaur and Scylla,—after our inquiry about the conception of Gods we shall have to examine also the question of their existence. For perchance the Sceptic, as compared with philosophers of other views, will be found in a safer position, since in conformity with his ancestral customs and the laws, he declares that the Gods exist, and performs everything which contributes to their worship and veneration, but, so far as regards philosophic investigation, declines to commit himself rashly.

[50] Of those, then, who have inquired as to the existence of God some say that God exists, some that he does not exist, some that he has existence “no more” than non-existence. That he exists is the view of most of the Dogmatists and the general **[51]**preconception of ordinary folk; that he does not exist is the view of those who are designated “atheists,” such as Euhemerus—

A hoary braggart, penning wicked books, and Diagoras of Melos, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Theodorus, and a host of others. Of these, Euhemerus declared that those counted as Gods were certain men of power, because of which they were deified by [52] the rest and reputed to be Gods; but Prodicus said that what benefits life is God, such as the sun and moon and rivers and lakes and meadows and crops and everything of that kind. [53] And Diagoras of Melos, the dithyrambic poet, was at first, they say, godfearing above all others; for he began his poem in this fashion—“By Heaven’s will and Fortune all things are accomplished”; but when he had been wronged by a man who had sworn falsely and suffered no punishment for it, he changed round and asserted that God does not exist. [54] And Critias, one of the Tyrants at Athens, seems to belong to the company of the atheists when he says that the ancient law givers invented God as a kind of overseer of the right and wrong actions of men, in order to make sure that nobody injured his neighbours privily through fear of vengeance at the hands of the Gods; and his statement runs thus:—

A time there was when anarchy did rule The lives of men, which then were like the beasts’. Enslaved to force; nor was there then reward For good men, nor for wicked punishment. Next, as I deem, did men establish laws For punishment, that Justice might be lord Of all mankind, and Insolence enchain’d; And whosoe’er did sin was penalized. Next, as the laws did hold men back from deeds Of open violence, but still such deeds Were done in secret,—then, as I maintain, Some shrewd man first, a man in counsel wise, Discovered unto men the fear of Gods, Thereby to frighten sinners should they sin E’en secretly in deed, or word, or thought. Hence was it that he brought in Deity, Telling how God enjoys an endless life, Hears with his mind and sees, and taketh thought And heeds things, and his nature is divine, So that he hearkens to men’s every word And has the power to see men’s every act. E’en if you plan in silence some ill deed, The Gods will surely mark it; for in them Wisdom resides. So, speaking words like these, Most cunning doctrine did he introduce, The truth concealing under speech untrue. The place he spoke of as the God’s abode Was that whereby he could affright men most,—The place from which, he knew, both terrors came And easements unto men of toilsome life—To wit the vault above, wherein do dwell The lightnings, he beheld, and awesome claps Of thunder, and the starry face of heaven, Fair-spangled by that cunning craftsman Time,—Whence, too, the meteor’s glowing mass doth speed And liquid rain descends upon the earth. Such were the fears wherewith he hedged men round, And so to God he gave a fitting home, By this his speech, and in a fitting place, And thus extinguished lawlessness by laws. And, after proceeding a little farther, he adds—Thus first did some man, as I deem, persuade Men to suppose a race of Gods exists.

[55] Theodorus “the Atheist,” too, is of the same mind as these men, and (according to some) Protagoras of Abdera; the former, seeing that he demolished the theological beliefs of the Greeks by a variety of [56] arguments in his treatise Concerning Gods; and Protagoras, where in one place he wrote expressly—“Concerning Gods I am not able to say either whether they exist or of what sort they a re; for the things which prevent me are many.” And when, because of this, the Athenians had condemned him to death he escaped and died by shipwreck at sea. [57] Mention is made of this story by Timon of Phlius, in the second book of his Silli,—

First of the Sophists existing then or that shall be hereafter, Neither in speech unclear nor dull of sight or of action, Protagoras; and they wished to reduce his writings to ashes, For that he wrote of the Gods that he knew not ana could not discover Who, if any, they truly are, and what is their nature, Giving all heed to candour. But that did profit him nothing; Wherefore he hastened to flee, that he might not descend into

Hades,
Doomed to drink of that potion cold which Socrates swal lowed.

[58] And, according to some, Epicurus in his popular exposition allows the existence of God, but in expounding the real nature of things he does not allow it. [59] And the Sceptics have declared that, owing to the equipollence of the opposed arguments, the Gods are existent “no more” than non-existent. This we shall learn when we have briefly run through the arguments urged on either side.

[60] Those, then, who maintain that Gods exist try to establish their thesis by four modes, arguing, firstly, from the universal agreement of mankind; secondly, from the orderly arrangement of the Universe; thirdly, from the absurd consequences of the denial of the existence of Deity; fourthly and lastly, by [61]undermining the opposing arguments. Arguing from the universal conception, they say that practically all men, both Greeks and barbarians, believe in the existence of the Divine, and because of this they agree in sacrificing and in praying and in setting up shrines for the Gods; and some do this in one way, some in another, as though all of them in common believed in the existence of some Divinity, but did not possess the same preconception regarding its nature. But if this preconception had been false, they would not all have agreed in this way; therefore Gods exist. [62] And besides, false opinions and temporary appearances do not survive longer but come to an end together with the persons for whose sakes they were retained. For example, men honour kings with sacrifices and with all the other religious rites with which they worship the Gods; but they observe these practices only so long as the kings themselves are there, and when they are dead they give them up as being illegal and impious. But the conception of the Gods has existed from eternity and persists unto eternity, as it probably derives its evidence from the very facts of existence.—[63] Moreover, even if one ought to pass over the belief of the ordinary man and put one’s trust in men who are clever and most highly gifted, one may see how poetry produces no great or brilliant work in which God is not the person invested with authority and power over the events which take place,—even as he was by the poet Homer in the war he described between the Greeks and barbarians. [64] And one may also see the host of the Physicists in accord with poetry; for Pythagoras and Empedocles and the Ionians and Socrates and Plato and Aristotle and the Stoics, and perhaps “the Garden philosophers” too (as the express statements of Epicurus testify), allow God’s existence. [65] Therefore, just as, if we had been inquiring about something which is perceived by sight, it would have been reasonable for us to have trusted those who have the sharpest sight, and if it had been about something audible, those of the sharpest hearing,—so also, when we are examining one of the things observed by reason we ought to trust none except those who are sharp of sight in mind and reason, such as were the philosophers.

[66] But in reply to this those of the opposite side are accustomed to argue that all men have a common conception about the legendary doings in Hades as well, and have the poets in agreement with them; and even more so about these things than about the Gods; yet we would not assert that the legendary [67] doings in Hades are real facts, through failing to understand, in the first place, that not only the fictions about Hades but, in general, every legend is such as to contain conflicting elements and to be impossible; as, for instance—

Tityus, too, I beheld, the glorious Earth-mother’s offspring, Lying flat on the ground; nine roods did he cover extended; Vultures twain sat on either side and tore at his liver, Plunged in his inward parts; with his hands he could not repel them:

Seeing he shamed the consort of Zeus, illustrious Leto.· [68] For if Tityus was lifeless, how was he under punishment when he possessed no consciousness? And if he possessed life, how was he dead? [69] And again, when it is related—

Tantalus, too, I beheld with mine eyes in agonies grievous Standing within a lake; and up to his chin came the water; Thirsty he stood, nor could he attain to reach it and drink it; Nay, for as oft as the old man stoop’d desirous of drinking Just so oft did the wave surge back; and close to his footprints

did the earth appear, so parch’d was it made by the
Daemon.

[70] For if he never tasted drink or food how did he survive and not perish through lack of necessary sustenance? And if he was immortal, how is he in the state described? For an immortal nature is inconsistent with pains and torments, since everything that suffers pain is mortal. [71] But, (retort the Stoics,) whereas the myth does thus contain within itself its own refutation, the conception of Gods is not of this kind, nor does it introduce inconsistency, but is evidently in accord with facts. Nor, indeed, is it possible to suppose that souls move downwards; for since they are of fine particles, and no less of a fiery than of a vaporous nature, they rather soar lightly to the upper regions. [72] Also, they persist as they are in themselves, and are not (as Epicurus said) “dispersed like smoke when released from their bodies.” For before that it was not the body that was in control of them, but it was they that were the causes of the body’s conjoined existence and, much more, of their own. [73] For having quitted the sphere of the sun they inhabit the region below the moon, and there because of the pureness of the air they continue to remain for a long time, and for their sustenance they use the steam which rises from the earth, as do the rest of the stars, and in those regions they have nothing to dissolve them. [74] If, then, souls persist, they are the same as daemons; and if daemons exist, one must declare also that Gods exist, their existence being in no wise hindered by the preconception about the legendary doings in Hades.

Such, then, is the argument from the general and [75] unanimous opinion about God; and let us also consider that which is based on the orderly arrangement of the Universe. The substance of existing things being of itself, they say, motionless and shapeless must be put in motion and shape by some cause; and on account of this just as, when we behold some very beautiful piece of bronze-work, we are anxious to know who the craftsman is, since the material is of itself motionless, so also when we behold the matter of the Universe moving and existing in definite shape and orderly arrangement we shall naturally look for the cause which moves it and shapes it into various forms. [76] And it is probable that this is nothing else than some power which pervades it, even as our soul pervades ourselves. This power, then, is either self-moving or moved by some other power. And if it is moved by another power, it will not be possible for that other to be moved unless it is moved by a further power; which is absurd. There exists, therefore, a power which is of itself self-moving, and this will be divine and eternal. For either it will be in motion from eternity or from some definite point of time. But it will not be in motion from a point of time; for there will exist no cause of its motion from a given point of time. So then, the power which moves matter and subjects it to ordered forms of generation and change is eternal. Consequently this power will be God.—[77] Moreover, that which generates what is rational and wise is certainly itself both rational and wise; but the aforementioned power is of such a nature as to construct men; therefore it will be rational and wise, and this is the mark of a divine nature. Gods, therefore, exist.—[78] Of bodies, too, some are unified, some formed of things conjoined, some of separate things. Unified bodies are such as are controlled by a single “attraction,” such as plants and animals; those formed of conjoined parts are such as are composed of adjacent elements which tend to combine into one main structure, like cables and turrets and ships; those formed of separate things are such as are compounded of things which are disjoined and isolated and existing by themselves, like armies and flocks and choruses. [79] Seeing, then, that the Universe also is a body, it is either unified or of conjoined or separate parts. But it is neither of conjoined nor of separate parts, as we prove from the “sympathies” it exhibits. For in accordance with the waxings and wanings of the moon many sea and land animals wane and wax, and ebb-tides and flood-tides occur in some parts of the sea. And in the same way, too, in accordance with certain risings and settings of the stars alterations in the surrounding atmosphere and all varieties of change in the air take place, sometimes for the better, but sometimes fraught with pestilence. And from these facts it is obvious that the Universe is a unified body. [80] For in the case of bodies formed from conjoined or separate elements the parts do not “sympathize” with one another, since if all the soldiers, say, in an army have perished (save one) the one who survives is not seen to suffer at all through transmission; but in the case of unified bodies there exists a certain “sympathy,” since, when the finger is cut, the whole body shares in its condition.

So then, the Universe also is a [81] unified body.—But since of unified bodies some are held together by mere “attraction,” others by organic structure, others by soul,—by attraction, like stones and sticks; by organic structure, like plants; and animals by soul,—the Universe also is certainly controlled by one of these. [82] Now it will not be held together by mere attraction. For the things controlled by attraction (such as sticks and stones) do not admit of any considerable alteration or change, but merely suffer the conditions produced by expansion or compression. [83] But the Universe admits of considerable alterations, as the atmosphere becomes at one time frosty, at another torrid, and at one time dry, at another damp, and at other times modified in other ways according to the motions of the heavenly bodies. So then, the Universe is not held together by mere attraction. [84] But if not by this, then certainly by organic structure; for even the bodies which are controlled by soul were first of all held together by organic structure. Necessarily, then, it must be held together by the best structure, since it contains the structures of all things. [85] But that which contains the structures of all things contains also such as are rational; and, moreover, that which contains the rational organic structures is certainly rational; for it is not possible for the whole to be inferior to the part. But if that structure which governs the Universe is the best, it will be intelligent and virtuous and immortal. And being such, it is God. Therefore Gods exist.—[86] Also, if there exist on the earth and in the sea, which have very dense parts, a variety of animals which share in the faculties of soul and of sense, it is much more probable that there exist in the air (which, as compared with earth and water, is very clear and pure) some animals endowed with soul and intelligence. And in accord with this is the saying that the Dioscuri are good daemons, “saviours of well-benched ships,” and that

Zeus over mortal men, upon Earth the sustainer of many,
Thrice ten thousand guardians has set, <divine and>
immortal.

[87] But if it is probable that animals exist in the air, it is certainly reasonable that animal organisms should also exist in the aether, from which men too derive their share of intellectual power, having drawn it from thence. And as ethereal animals exist, and are deemed to be far superior to terrestrial animals through being imperishable and unbegotten, it will be granted that Gods, which are no wise different from these, exist as well.

[88] And Cleanthes argued thus: “If one nature is better than another, there will be some best nature; if one soul is better than another, there will be some best soul: if, then, one animal is better than another, there will be some best animal; for such things are not of a kind to proceed ad infinitum. So then, as nature is not capable of increasing to infinity in goodness, nor soul, neither is the animal capable. [89] One animal, however, is better than another, as (say) the horse than the tortoise, and the bull than the ass, and the lion than the bull. And of all the terrestrial animals Man is the highest and best in respect of the disposition of both body and soul; therefore a certain best and most excellent animal will exist. [90] Yet Man cannot be absolutely the best animal, because, for instance, he walks in wickedness all his life, or, if not, at least for the greater part of it (for if ever he attains virtue, he attains it late and at the setting of life’s sun), and he is the victim of fate and feeble and in need of countless aids—such as food and coverings, and all the other requirements of the body, which stands over us like a rigorous tyrant and demands its daily tribute, and threatens us with disease and death unless we provide for its washing and anointing and clothing and feeding. So that Man is not a perfect animal, but imperfect and far removed from the perfect. [91] But that which is perfect and best will be better than Man and fulfilled with all the virtues and not receptive of any evil; and this animal will not differ from God. God, therefore, exists.”

Such, then, is the view of Cleanthes. [92] Xenophon, too, the Socratic, propounded an argument for the existence of Gods, ascribing the proof to Socrates, when in his interrogation of Aristodemus,he expresses himself in the following terms: “Tell me, Aristodemus, are there any persons whom you have admired for their wisdom? Yes, said he. Who then are they? I have admired Homer for his poetry, Polycleitus for his statuary, Zeuxis of course for his [93] painting. Then is it not because of the superlative craftsmanship of their productions that you approve of them? Yes, said he. If, then, the statue of Polycleitus should also become alive, would you not approve of the artist far more? Most certainly. Now, if when you saw a statue you said that it had been wrought by some artist, when you see a man well disposed in soul and well equipped in body, do you not think that he has been wrought by some superexcellent mind? [94] And when you observe further the arrangement and function of his parts; and, in the first place, that he has made man upright, and has given him eyes that he may see what is visible and ears that he may hear what is audible. And of what use would smell have been if he had not also supplied him with nostrils, or flavours either if he had not had a tongue constructed within him which discerns them? And when you know also that you have in your body a small portion of the earth, of which so much exists, and a little of the water of which so much exists, and so likewise of fire and of air; from what source do you think that you have by good luck derived your mind, if it alone is nowhere existent?”

[95] Such, then, is the argument of Xenophon; and the inductive value which it has is this:—“Of the great quantity of earth which exists in the Universe you possess a small portion, and of the great quantity of water which exists in the Universe you possess a small portion; therefore, you also possess a small portion of the mind which exists in the Universe in large quantity. Therefore the Universe is intelligent, and consequently is God.” But some meet this with a parallel argument, by altering its premisses, and say—“Of the great quantity of earth which exists in the Universe you possess a small portion; but also of the great quantity of water existing in the Universe you possess a small portion, and also of air and fire; therefore you possess also a small portion of the great quantity of gall existing in the Universe, and phlegm and blood. It will follow, therefore, that the Universe is gall-making and productive of blood; which is absurd.” [97] But others allege in defence that this parallel argument is not similar to the argument of Xenophon. For whereas he bases his inquiry on the simple and primary bodies,—such as earth and water and air and fire,—those who employ the parallel argument jump aside to compounds; for neither gall nor blood nor any bodily fluid is primary and simple, but a compound of the primary and elemental bodies.

[98] It is also possible to propound the same argument in this form: “If there had not been something earthy in the Universe, there would not have been anything earthy in you; and if there had not been something fluid in the Universe, there would not have been anything fluid in you; and so likewise with air and fire. Hence, too, if there had not been some mind in the Universe, there would not have been any mind in you; but there is mind in you. And because of this the Universe is rational; and being rational, it is also God.”—[99] To the same effect is the argument which is put in this form:—“If you saw a statue which was well wrought would you be in doubt as to whether an artistic intelligence had made it? Or would you not be so far from having any such suspicions that you would actually admire the excellence of its workmanship and its artistic quality? [100] If then, in such cases, when you behold the external form you take it as evidence of a constructor and assert that there exists a craftsman who made it,—when you see the mind within yourself, which is so far superior in its intricacy to any statue or any painting, do you suppose that it came into being as the creation of chance and not by some craftsman possessed of power and intelligence to a superlative degree? And he can dwell nowhere else save in the Universe, governing it and generating and increasing the things that are therein. And this person is a God; therefore Gods exist.”

[101] And Zeno of Citium, taking Xenophon as his starting-point, argues thus:—” That which projects the seed of the rational is itself rational; but the Universe projects the seed of the rational; therefore the Universe is rational. And thereby the existence thereof is also concluded.” [102] The plausibility of this argument is obvious. For the origin of motion in every nature and soul seems to come from “the regent part,” and all the powers that are sent forth into the parts of the whole are sent forth from the regent part as from a fount, so that every power which exists in the part exists also in the whole owing to its being distributed from its regent part. Hence, what the part is in point of power, that the whole must certainly be first. [103] Consequently, if the Universe projects the seed of a rational animal, it does not do so, like man, by frothy emission, but as containing the seeds of rational animals; but it does not contain them in the same way as we might speak of the vine “containing” its grapes,—that is, by way of inclusion,—but because the “seminal reasons” of rational animals are contained in it. So that the argument is this—“The Universe contains the seminal reasons of rational animals; therefore the Universe is rational.”

[104] And Zeno says again: “The rational is better than the non-rational; but nothing is better than the Universe; therefore the Universe is rational. And so likewise with the intelligent and that which partakes of animation; for the intelligent is better than the non-intelligent and the animate than the non-animate; but nothing is better than the Universe; therefore the Universe is intelligent and animate.”

[105] A similar argument is stated by Plato, where he writes in these terms:—“Let us declare the cause wherefor he that constructed constructed Becoming and this All. He was good and in him that is good there is no envy concerning anything. And being devoid of envy, he desired that all things should be, so far as possible, like unto himself. This principle, then, we shall be wholly right in accepting from men of wisdom as being above all the supreme originating principle of Becoming and the Cosmos.” [106] Then, after a few further remarks, he goes on to say—“So because of this reflection he constructed reason within soul and soul within body as he fashioned the All, that so the work he was executing might be of its nature most fair and most good. Thus, then, in accordance with the likely account, we must declare that this Cosmos is verily a living creature endowed with soul and reason because it has come into existence through the providence of God.” [107] Thus Plato has set out virtually the same argument as Zeno; for the former also asserts that “the All is most fair, being a work executed according to nature and according to the likely account a living creature endowed with soul, both intelligent and rational.”

[108] But Alexinus opposed Zeno with a parallel argument in this form:—“The poetic is better than the non-poetical and the grammatical than the non-grammatical, and the artistic product of the other arts than the inartistic; but nothing is better than the Universe; therefore the Universe is poetical and grammatical.” [109] But in answer to this counter-argument the Stoics say that, whereas Zeno has chosen what is absolutely better—that is, the rational than the non-rational, and the intelligent than the non-intelligent and the animate than the non-animate,—[110] Alexinus has not done so; for the poetic is not absolutely better than the non-poetic or the grammatical than the non-grammatical. So that we observe a great difference between the two arguments; for notice how Archilochus who is poetical is not better than the non-poetical Socrates, and Aristarchus who is grammatical is not better than the non-grammatical Plato.

[111] Furthermore, the Stoics and their supporters try to demonstrate the existence of the Gods from the motion of the Universe. For that the Universe is in motion everyone will admit, being driven thereto by many things. [112] It is moved, then, either by nature or by will or by vortex and of necessity. But that (it is moved) by vortex and of necessity is not probable. For the vortex is either disorderly or orderly. And if it is disorderly, it will not be able to move anything in an orderly way; but if it moves anything in a way that is orderly and harmonious, it will be divine and [113] supernatural; for it would never have moved the whole in an orderly and conserving way had it not been intelligent and divine. And if it is such, it will no longer be vortex; for this is disorderly and of short duration. So that the Universe will not be moved of necessity and by vortex, as Democritus said. [114] Nor yet by a non-perceptive nature, inasmuch as the intelligent nature is superior to this; and such natures are seen to be contained in the Universe; of necessity, therefore, it must itself possess an intelligent nature by which it is moved in an orderly way, and this indubitably is God.

[115] Moreover, constructions which move of their own accord are more marvellous than other kinds. Thus when we behold an Archimedean sphere in which the sun and moon and all the other stars are in motion, we are immensely struck by it—not, to be sure, because we are amazed at the woodwork or at the motion of these bodies, but at the artificer and the causes of the motion. Hence in the degree that percipients are more marvellous than things perceived, in the same degree the causes which move the former are the more marvellous. For since the horse is more marvellous than the plant, the moving cause of the horse is more marvellous than that of the plant; and since the elephant is more marvellous than the horse, the moving cause of the elephant, which transports so huge a bulk, is more marvellous than that of the [117] horse; and—to rise to the highest kinds—(more marvellous) than all the foregoing are the moving causes of the sun and moon and stars, and still more than these that which is their cause, the nature of the Universe. For the cause of the part does not extend to the whole, nor is it the cause thereof, but that of the whole extends to the parts; wherefore also it is more marvellous than the cause of the part. [118] So that since the nature of the Universe is the cause of the ordering of the whole Universe, it will also be the cause of the parts. And if so, it is most excellent. And if it is most excellent, it is both rational and intelligent, and besides it will be eternal. But such a nature is identical with God. Therefore God is something existent.

[119] Further, in every multipartite body which is regulated by nature there exists some ruling element, even as in our case this is said to exist either in the heart or in the brain or in some other part of the body; and in the case of plants in a different way,—in some cases in the roots, in others in the leaves, in others again in the central core. [120] Consequently, since the Universe also is multipartite and regulated by nature, there will exist in it an element which rules and originates its motions. And this can be nothing else than the nature of existing things, which is God. God therefore exists.

[121] But perhaps some will say that the result of this argument is that the earth is a most dominant and ruling force in the Universe, and even more dominant and ruling is the air; for without these it is not possible for the Universe to subsist; so that we shall assert that both the earth and the air are God. [122] But this is silly, and much like saying that the wall is the most dominant and ruling thing in the house; for without it the house cannot subsist. For just as, in this case, although the house cannot in fact subsist without the wall, yet the wall does not overrule and is not better than the master of the house,—so also in the case of the Universe, although it is impossible for the structure of the Whole to exist without earth and air, yet these do not overrule the nature which regulates the Universe; and this does not differ from God. God, therefore, exists.

Such, then, is the general character of these arguments. [123] Next let us consider the nature of the absurd consequences of abolishing Divinity. If Gods do not exist, piety is not existent. For piety is “the science of service to the Gods,” and there cannot be any service of things non-existent, nor, consequently, will any science thereof exist; and just as there cannot be any science of service to Hippocentaurs, they being non-existent, so there will not be any science of service to the Gods if they are non-existent. So that, if Gods do not exist, piety is non-existent. But piety exists; so we must declare that Gods exist.—[124] Again, if Gods do not exist, holiness is non-existent, it being “a kind of God-ward justice”; but according to the common notions and preconceptions of all men holiness exists, and because of this a holy thing also exists; and therefore the Divine exists.—[125] If, however, Gods do not exist, wisdom is abolished, it being “the science of things both divine and human”; and just as there is no science of things both human and Hippocentaurean owing to the fact that men exist but Hippocentaurs do not exist, so too there will be no science of things divine and human if men exist but Gods subsist not. But it is absurd to assert that wisdom does not exist; therefore it is also absurd to maintain that the Gods are non-existent.

[126] Furthermore, if justice too has been introduced because of the connexion of men with one another and with the Gods, if Gods exist not, neither will justice subsist; which is absurd. [127] Now Pythagoras and Empedocles and the rest of the Italian company declare that we have some fellowship not only with one another and with the Gods but also with the irrational animals. For there is one spirit which pervades, like a soul, the whole Universe, and which also makes us one with them. [128] Wherefore if we slay them and feed on their flesh we shall be doing what is unjust and impious, as destroying our kindred. Hence, too, these philosophers advised abstinence from animal food, and declared that those men were impious who Redden’d the Blessed Ones’ altars with warm blood pouring from victims.

[129] And Empedocles somewhere says—

Will ye not cease from the harrowing sound of slaughter?

Nor see ye
How in your reckless frenzy of mind ye devour one another? And—

Still in his halls doth slay and his horrible banquet prepareth. Likewise the son doth capture the sire, the children the

mother,
Reave them of life, and greedily feed on the flesh of their
kinsfolk.

[130] This, then, was the advice of Pythagoras, but mistaken; for it does not at once follow that, if there exists a spirit which pervades both us and them, there exists some form of justice as between us and the irrational animals. For, look you, the spirit also ranges through stones and through plants, so that we are united with them, but we have no relation of justice with plants and stones, nor to be sure do we act unjustly in cutting and sawing bodies of that kind.—[131] Why then do the Stoics assert that men have a certain just relation and connexion with one another and with the Gods? Not on account of the existence of the spirit which runs through all things,—since then there would also remain for us a duty towards the irrational animals,—but because we possess that reason which reaches out to one another and the Gods, whereas the irrational animals, having no share in this, will have no relation of justice towards us. So that, if justice is conceived because of a certain fellowship between men and men and between men and Gods, if Gods do not exist, it must follow that justice also is non-existent. But justice is existent; we must declare, therefore, that Gods also exist.

[132] In addition,—if Gods exist not, neither does prophecy exist, it being “the science which observes and interprets the signs given by Gods to men”; nor yet inspiration and astrology, nor divination, nor prediction by means of dreams. But it is absurd to abolish such a multitude of things which are already believed in by all men. Therefore, Gods exist.

[133] Zeno propounded this argument also:—“One may reasonably honour the Gods; but those who are nonexistent one may not reasonably honour; therefore Gods exist.” But some oppose to this argument a parallel one—“The wise one may reasonably honour; but one may not reasonably honour the non-existent; therefore wise men exist.” Which conclusion was unpleasing to the Stoics, as their “Wise man” has remained indiscoverable up till now. [134] In reply to the counter-argument Diogenes the Babylonian asserts that the second premiss in Zeno’s argument is virtually this—“But those who are not of such a nature as to exist one may not reasonably honour”; for when this premiss is accepted it is evident that the Gods are of such a nature as to exist. [135] But if so, they do actually exist. For if they had once existed at any time, they also exist now, just as, if atoms had existed, they also exist now; for according to the conception of such bodies, they are imperishable and uncreate. Hence the argument will deduce a consequent conclusion. But it is not true of the wise that they actually exist because they are of such a nature as to exist. [136] But others say that Zeno’s first premiss—“One may reasonably honour the Gods”—is ambiguous; for one of its significations is “one may reasonably pay honour to the Gods,” the other “one may hold them in honour.” But the first is taken as the premiss, and in the case of the wise this will be false.

[137] Such, then, in their character are the arguments brought forward by the Stoics, and by those of the other Schools, in favour of the existence of Gods; and in similar fashion we must show that those which maintain the non-existence of Gods do not fall short of the former in respect of their equipollence as [138] regards persuasion. If, then, Gods exist, they are animals; and, employing the same argument as that by which the Stoics maintained that the Universe is an animal, one may demonstrate that God, too, is an animal. For “the animal is better than the nonanimal; but nothing is better than God; therefore God is an animal”; and in support of this argument is adduced also the common conception of mankind, since ordinary folk and the poets, too, and the majority of the best philosophers testify to the fact that God is an animal. So that the steps of the logical sequence are secured. [139] For if Gods exist, they are animals. But if they are animals, they have sensation; for every animal is conceived as an animal by its participation in sensation. And if they have sensation, they also feel bitterness and sweetness; for they do not perceive sense-objects through some other sense, and not through taste as well; hence it is wholly improbable that God should be entirely deprived of [140] this or of any other sense; for the more numerous the senses he has, the better he will be, since it is preferable—as Carneades said—that, in addition to the five senses which belong to all men, yet others should supply him with evidence, in order that he may be able to apprehend a greater number of things, rather than that he should be robbed of the five. We must assert, then, that God possesses taste, and by it perceives things gustable. [141] But if he perceives by means of taste, he feels sweetness and bitterness; and feeling sweetness and bitterness, he will be pleased by some things and displeased by others; and being displeased by some things, he will be receptive of vexation and of change for the worse. But if so, he is perishable. So that if Gods exist, they are perishable. Therefore Gods do not exist.

If, however, God exists, he is an animal. [142] If he is an animal, he has sensation; for the animal differs from the not-animal by nothing else than by sensation. But if he has sensation, he hears and sees and smells and touches. [143] And if so, there are certain things in connexion with each sense which are congenial or repellent to him,—for instance, in respect of sight, things which are symmetrical and not the reverse; and in respect of hearing, sounds which are musical and not those of a different kind; and similarly with the rest of the senses. But if so, there are certain things which are vexatious to God; and if there are certain things vexatious to God, God is subject to change for the worse, and thus also to decay. Therefore God is perishable. But this is contrary to the general conception of him. Therefore the Divine does not exist.

[144] And it is also possible to base the argument still more effectively on a single sense,-—for instance, vision. For if the Divine exists, it is an animal. And if it is an animal, it sees, for—

He with the whole of his being beholdeth and marketh
and heareth.

And if he sees, he sees both white things and black. [145] But since white is what is divisive of sight, and black what is compressive of sight, God has his sight divided and compressed. And if he is receptive of division and compression, he is receptive also of decay. So then, if the Divine exists, it is perishable. But it is not perishable; therefore it does not exist.

[146] Again, sensation is a kind of alteration; for it is impossible for that which apprehends by means of a sense not to be altered, but to remain in the same condition in which it was before the act of apprehension. If God, then, has sensation, he is altered; and if he is altered, he is receptive of alteration and [147] change; and being receptive of change, he will certainly be receptive of change for the worse. And if so, he is also perishable. But it is absurd to say that God is perishable; therefore it is absurd also to claim that he exists.

[148] Furthermore, if any Divinity exists, it is either limited or unlimited. And it will not be unlimited, since then it would be both motionless and inanimate. For if the unlimited moves, it passes from place to place; and if it passes from place to place, it is in space, and being in space it is limited. Therefore, if any unlimited exists, it is motionless; or if it moves, it is not unlimited. [149] So likewise it is inanimate; for if it is held together by soul, it is certainly held together by movement from the centres to the limits and from the limits to the centres. But in the unlimited there is no centre nor lim it; so that the unlimited is not animate either. And on account of this, if the Divine is unlimited it neither moves nor is animate. But the Divine moves and participates, as is claimed, in animation; therefore the Divine is not unlimited.—Nor yet is it limited. [150] For since the limited is a part of the unlimited, and the whole is superior to the part, it is plain that the unlimited will be superior to the Divine and will master the Divine nature. But it is absurd to say that anything is superior to God and master over the nature of God; so then, the Divine is not limited either. But if it is neither unlimited nor limited, and besides these one can conceive no third possibility, the Divine will be nothing.

Again, if the Divine is anything, it is either a body [151] or incorporeal; but it is not incorporeal, since the incorporeal is inanimate and insensitive and incapable of any action; nor is it a body, since every body is both subject to change and perishable, whereas the Divine is imperishable; so then, the Divine does not exist.

[152] If, however, the Divine exists, it is certainly an animal. And if it is an animal, it is certainly both all-virtuous and happy (and without virtue happiness cannot subsist). And if it is all-virtuous, it possesses all the virtues. But it does not possess all the virtues unless it possesses both continence and fortitude. And it does not possess these virtues unless there are certain things which are hard for God to abstain from and hard to endure. [153] For continence is “a state of mind incapable of transgressing the rules of right reason, or a virtue which makes us superior to the things which seem hard to abstain from.”

For a man, they say, is continent not when he abstains from an old woman with one foot in the grave, but when he has the power of enjoying Lais or Phryne or some such charmer and then abstains. [154] And fortitude is “the science of things endurable and not endurable, or a virtue which makes us superior to the things which seem hard to endure.” For it is the man who holds firm when he is being cut and burned that shows fortitude, and not the man who is drinking sweet wine. [155] There will, then, exist certain things which are hard for God to endure and hard to abstain from. For if these do not exist, he will not possess these virtues,—namely, continence and fortitude. [156] And if he does not possess these virtues, since there is no mean state between virtue and vice, he will possess the vices which are contrary to these virtues, such as effeminacy and incontinence; for just as he who has not health has disease, so he who has not continence and fortitude is subject to the opposite vices, which is an absurd thing to say about God. [157] And if there are some things which are hard for God to abstain from and hard to endure, there are some things which are able to change him for the worse and to cause him vexation. But if so, God is receptive of vexation and of change for the worse, and hence of decay also. So that if God exists, he is perishable; but the second is not (true); therefore the first is not (true).

[158] Further, in addition to the foregoing arguments,—if God is all-virtuous he possesses courage; and if he possesses courage he possesses “knowledge of things fearful and not fearful and of things intermediate”; and if so, there is something which is fearful to God. [159] For, to be sure, the courageous man is not courageous because he possesses knowledge of the sort of things which are fearful to his neighbour, but of those which are fearful to him self; and these are not to be identified with those which are fearful to his neighbour. Consequently, since God is courageous, there is something which is fearful to him. [160] If there is something fearful to God, there is something which causes vexation to God. And if so, he is receptive of vexation, and therefore of decay. Hence, if the Divine exists, it is perishable. But it is not perishable; therefore, it does not exist.

[161] Moreover, if the Divine is all-virtuous, it also possesses greatness of soul. And if it possesses greatness of soul, it possesses “knowledge which makes it rise superior to circumstances.” If so, there exist certain circumstances above which it rises superior. And if so, there exist certain circumstances which are vexatious to it, and thus it will be perishable. But this is not (true); neither, then, is the original supposition.

[162] Furthermore: if God possesses all the virtues, he possesses wisdom. If he possesses wisdom, he possesses “knowledge of things good and evil and indifferent.” And if he possesses knowledge of these, he knows what the good things are and the evil and the indifferent. [163] Since, then, suffering is one of the indifferent things, he knows both suffering and what its real nature is. And if so, he has experienced it; for without experience he would not have formed a notion of it, but, just as the man who has not experienced white colour and black, owing to his being blind from birth, cannot possess a notion of colour, so too God cannot have a notion of suffering if he has not experienced it. [164] For when we, who have often experienced it, are unable to discern distinctly the special quality of the pain suffered by gouty patients, or to guess it from descriptions, or to get consistent accounts from the actual sufferers, since they explain it in different ways, and some say that they find it to resemble twisting, others bending, others stabbing,—surely, if God has had no experience at all of suffering, he cannot possess a notion of suffering. [165] Truly, they reply, he has not experienced suffering, but pleasure, and from this he has formed a notion of the other. But this is silly. For, in the first place, it is impossible. to acquire a notion of pleasure without having experienced suffering; for it is owing to the withdrawal of everything that gives pain that pleasure really subsists. [166] And, in the next place, if this be granted, it follows once more that God is perishable. For if he is receptive of such a collapse, God will be receptive of change for the worse, and is perishable. But this is not (true), nor, in consequence, is the original supposition (true).

[167] Also, if the Divine is all-virtuous and possesses wisdom, it possesses sound-deliberation, inasmuch as sound-deliberation is “wisdom regarding things requiring deliberation.” And if it possesses sound-deliberation, it deliberates. [168] And if it deliberates, there is something which is non-evident to it; for if there is nothing non-evident to it, it does not deliberate nor does it possess sound-deliberation, since deliberation is attached to what is non-evident, being “a search for the way of conducting ourselves rightly under present circumstances.” But it is absurd that God should not deliberate nor possess sound-deliberation. So then, he does possess this, and there is something which is non-evident to him. [169] And if there is something non-evident to God, it is impossible that this—if anything else—should not be non-evident to God, namely, whether there exist in the infinite any things destructive of himself. But if this is non-evident to him, he will certainly be afraid, owing to the expectation of these destructive things which will put him in a state of alarm and commotion. [170] And if he comes to be in a commotion of this sort, he will be receptive also of change for the worse, and therefore he will be perishable. From which it follows that he does not exist at all.

Here, too, is another argument: [171] If nothing is non-evident to God, but he of his own nature is capable of apprehending all things, he does not possess art, but just as we should not say that there exists in the frog or the dolphin, which swim by nature, an art of swimming, in the same way we should not say of God, who of his own nature apprehends all things, that he has art, since art has to do with a thing that is non-evident and not apprehended of itself. [172] But if God has not art, he will not have the art of living; and if so, neither will he have virtue. But if God has not virtue, he is non-existent.—And again: God being [173] rational, if he does not possess virtue, he certainly possesses its opposite, vice; but he does not possess its opposite, vice; therefore God possesses art, and there is something non-evident to God. From which it follows that he is perishable, as we argued before. But he is not perishable; therefore, he does not exist.

[174] Also, if (as we have shown) he does not possess wisdom, neither does he possess temperance; for temperance is “a state which preserves, in preferences and aversions, the decisions of wisdom.”—

[175] And besides, if there is nothing which will excite the desires of God, and nothing which will attract God, how shall we say that he is temperate, when temperance is conceived by us in accordance with this kind of definition? For just as we should not say that the pillar is temperate, so also we are bound to deny that God is temperate. And if he is stripped of these virtues, he is stripped of justice also and the rest. But if God possesses no virtue, he is nonexistent; and the antecedent (is true), therefore the consequent (is true).

[176] Again, if the Divine exists, it either has or has not virtue. And if it has it not, the Divine is base and unhappy, which is absurd. But if it has it, there will exist something which is better than God; for just as the virtue of the horse is better than the horse itself and the virtue of the man better than he who has it, so also the virtue of God will be better than God himself. [177] But if it is better than God, plainly he, as deficient, will be in a bad state and will be perishable. But if there is nothing intermediate between the opposites, and it is seen that God falls under neither of the opposites, one must declare that God does not exist.

[178] Further, if he exists, he is either gifted with speech or speechless. But to say that God is speechless is perfectly absurd and in conflict with our general conceptions. But if he is gifted with speech, he employs speech and has organs of speech, such as lungs and windpipe, tongue and mouth. But this is absurd and borders on the fairy-tales of Epicurus. So then, one must assert that God does not exist. [179] Moreover, if he employs speech, he converses. And if he converses, he certainly converses in some dialect. But if so, why does he employ the Greek tongue rather than the barbarian? And if the Greek, why the Ionian rather than the Aeolic or any of the others? And, of course, he does not employ them all; and so he employs none. For if he employs the Greek, how will he employ the barbarian, unless someone has taught him? (But how will anyone teach him,) unless he has interpreters similar to those amongst us who are able to interpret? We must say, then, that the Divine does not employ speech, and on this account it is non-existent.

[180] Again, if the Divine exists, it is either a body or incorporeal. But it will not be incorporeal for the reasons we have already stated. And if it is a body, it is either a compound of the simple elements or a simple and elemental body. And if it is a compound, it is perishable; for everything which is constructed by the union of things must necessarily dissolve and perish. [181] And if it is a simple body, it is either fire or air or water or earth. But whichever of these it is, it is without soul or reason, which is absurd. If, then, God is neither a compound nor a simple body, and besides these there is no other alternative, one must declare that God is nothing.

[182] Such, then, is the character of these arguments. And some have been propounded, in the form of a “sorites,” by Carneades, which his friend Cleitomachus recorded as being most excellent and convincing; and this is the form they take:—If Zeus is a God, Poseidon also is a God:—

Brethren three were we, all children of Cronos and Rhea, Zeus and myself and Hades, the third, with the Shades for his kingdom.

All things were parted in three, and each hath his share of
the glory.“

So that if Zeus is a God, Poseidon also, being his brother, will be a God. [183] And if Poseidon is a God, Achelous, too, will be a God; and if Achelous, Neilos; and if Neilos, every river as well; and if every river, the streams also will be Gods; and if the streams, the torrents; but the streams are not Gods; neither, then, is Zeus a God. But if there had been Gods, Zeus would have been a God. Therefore, there are no Gods.—[184] Further, if the sun is a God, day will also be a God; for day is nothing else than sun above the earth. And if day is God, the month too will be God; for it is a composite made up of days. And if the month is God, the year too will be God; for the year is a composite made up of months. But this is not <true>; neither then is the original supposition. And besides, they say, it is absurd to declare that the day is God, but not the dawn and midday and the evening.—[185] Again, if Artemis is a Goddess, Enodia too will be a Goddess; for the latter has been accounted a Goddess equally with the former; (and if) Enodia (is a Deity), so also is Prothyridia and Epimylius and Epiclibanius. But this is not (true); neither is [186] the original supposition.—Again, if we declare that Aphrodite is a Goddess, Eros, being the son of [187] Aphrodite, will be a God; but if Eros is a God, Eleos too will be a God; for both are psychic affections, and Eleos has been worshipped like Eros; at any rate, amongst the Athenians there are some altars to Eleos. [188] And if Eleos is a God, so also is Phobos—

Fear am I, most unshapely to behold, The god who shares in beauty least of all. And if Phobos, then all the rest of the soul’s affections. But these are not Gods; neither, then, is Aphrodite a Goddess. But if they had been Gods, Aphrodite too would have been a Goddess. Therefore Gods do not exist.—[189] Again, if Demeter is a Goddess, Ge too is a Goddess; for Demeter, they say, is nothing else than Gê-meter. If Ge is a Goddess, the mountains and the cliffs and every stone will be a God. But this is not (true); neither, then, is the original supposition.—[190] And Carneades propounds other sorites-arguments of this kind to show that Gods do not exist, the general character of which is sufficiently plain from the examples already set forth.

[191] Well then, such are the opposing arguments alleged by the Dogmatic philosophers in favour of the existence and of the non-existence of Gods. As a result of these the Sceptics’ suspension of judgement is introduced, especially since they are supplemented by the divergency of the views of ordinary folk about the Gods. [192] For different people have different and discordant notions about them, so that neither are all of these notions to be trusted because of their inconsistency, nor some of them because of their equipollence; and this is further confirmed by the mythologizing of the theologians and the poets; for it is full of all kinds of impiety.

[193] Hence, too, Xenophanes, in his criticism of Homer and Hesiod, says—Unto the gods are ascrib’d by Hesiod, like as by Homer, All of the acts which are counted by men disgraceful and

shameful,
Thieving and wenching and dealing deceitfully one with
another.

[194] Now, however, that we have established on these grounds that suspension follows from the dogmatic arguments concerning the efficient principles, let us next show, by a more sceptical discussion, that the account given of passive matter is no less open to doubt than that of the active cause.

Concerning Cause and the Passive

Section titled “Concerning Cause and the Passive”

[195] We have elsewhere discussed more exactly the notion of Cause; and now, contenting ourselves with the general conception of it, we affirm that, of those who have examined it, some have asserted that a cause of things exists, others that it does not exist, others that it is “no more” existent than nonexistent. Most, or almost all, of the Dogmatists assert its existence; the Sophists who deny change and transient motion assert its non-existence, as without such motion the agent does not subsist. And the Sceptics assert that cause is “no more” existent than non-existent. And that they do not do this inconsiderately one may learn from the arguments adduced on either side. [196] Let us begin first with those who maintain that a cause of things exists.

If, say they, seed exists, cause also exists since the seed is the cause of the things which grow and are generated; but seed exists, as is proved by the plants sown and the animals generated; cause, therefore, exists.—And again: [197] If nature exists at all, a cause exists; for nature is the cause of the things which grow or have grown up naturally. But nature exists, as is plain from its effects. For it is in fact absurd, they say, that when we have visited a sculptor’s workshop and have seen some of his statues complete and finished off, and some half-completed, and others in the first stage of their shaping, we should believe that there exists some craftsman and artificer of these things, but when we enter into this Universe and behold the earth in its centre, and next to this water, and thirdly the extent of air above, and the heaven and its stars, and the lakes and rivers, and the tribes of animals of every kind, and the varieties of plants, we should not suppose that there exists someone who is the cause of the construction of these things. So then, if nature exists, a cause exists. But in fact the first (is true); therefore the second (is true).—Further: [198] If a soul exists at all, it is a cause; for it is the cause of both living and dying,—of living when it is present, and of dying when it is being separated from its bodies. But the soul, they assert, exists, seeing that even he who says that the soul does not exist makes this statement by employing it. Therefore cause exists.—[199] Moreover, if God exists, cause exists; for he is the governor of all things. But according to the general notions of mankind God exists; cause, therefore, exists. Yet even if God does not exist, cause exists; for the non-existence of Gods is due to some cause. And thus both from the existence of God and from his non-existence there follows equally the existence of a cause.—[200] And further, since many things become and perish, increase and decrease, move and cease from movement, one must necessarily allow that there exist some causes of these things—some of becoming, others of perishing; some of increase, others of decrease; and also of motion [201] or want of motion. Moreover, even if these effects do not really exist but merely appear, the existence of their causes is introduced once more; for there exists some cause of their appearing to us as really existing things and not being such.—[202] Again, if there is no cause all things will have to come from everything and in every place, and also at every time. But this is absurd; for indisputably, if nothing is a cause, there is nothing to prevent a horse being formed from a man. And if there is nothing to prevent this, a horse will some time be formed from a man, and likewise, perchance, a plant from a horse. And for the same reason it will not be impossible for snow to congeal in Egypt and drought to occur in Pontus, and things proper to summer to happen in winter and things proper to winter to take place in summer. Hence, if what has for its consequence something impossible is itself also impossible, and many impossible consequences follow from the non-existence of cause, one must declare that the non-existence of cause also is a thing impossible.—[204] Also, he who says that cause does not exist says so either without a cause or with some cause. And if he does so without any cause, he is untrustworthy, besides the consequence he incurs of not maintaining this position any more than its opposite, as there pre-exists no reasonable cause which makes him say that cause is non-existent. But if he says so with some cause, he is self-refuted, and in the act of saying that no cause exists he is affirming the existence of some cause. [205] Hence also it is possible to propound to the same effect the argument stated above, relating to the sign and proof, which will take the following shape:—“If a cause exists, cause exists; but also if a cause does not exist, cause exists; but either it does or does not exist; therefore it exists.” For the existence of a cause follows from the existence of cause, as the [206] antecedent does not differ from the consequent; and the existence of a cause follows again from the existence of no cause, since he who says that no cause exists is moved by some cause when he says that no cause exists. So that the disjunctive in addition to the two hypothetical premisses is true, being composed of contradictories, and the conclusion is inferred from these premisses, as we have shown above.

Such then, summarily stated, are the arguments customarily adduced on this side by the Dogmatists. [207] Let us consider next the arguments of the Doubters; for these will give expression to arguments just as forcible as those set forth and nowise different from them in point of persuasiveness. Cause then, they say, is a relative thing; for it is a cause of something and to something, as, for instance, the lancet is a cause of something, namely cutting, and to something, namely flesh. [208] But relatives are only conceived and do not exist, as we have established in our chapter “Concerning proof”; therefore cause, too, will only be conceived and will not exist.—[209] Also, if cause exists, it must have the thing whereof it is said to be the cause, as (without this) it will not be a cause, but just as right is not right in the absence of that to which it is said to be relative, so also cause will not be cause in the absence of that to which it is conceived as relative. But, in fact, cause has not that whereof it is cause, owing to the non-existence of becoming and perishing and affection and motion in general, as we shall show in their proper places when we come to them. Therefore cause does not exist.

[210] Further, if cause exists, either body is cause of body, or the incorporeal of the incorporeal, or body of the incorporeal, or the incorporeal of body; but, as we shall establish, body is not cause of body, nor the incorporeal of the incorporeal, nor body of the incorporeal, nor conversely the incorporeal of body; therefore cause does not exist. [211] Moreover, the existing sects of the Dogmatists agree about the distinctions set forth, since the Stoics declare that “every cause is a body which is the cause to a body of something incorporeal’; for example, the lancet is a body, and “the flesh” is a body, and the expression “being cut” is incorporeal; and again, fire is a body, and “the wood is a body, and the expression “being burnt” is incorporeal.

[212] But those who assume that the God who is the Worldmaker and governs all things is incorporeal assert, on the contrary, that the incorporeal is the cause of body. And Epicurus says that both bodies are the causes of bodies and incorporeals of incorporeals,—bodies of bodies as the elements are of the compounds, and incorporeals of incorporeals as the incorporeal attributes of the primary bodies are of the incorporeal attributes of the compounds. [213] So that if we shall show that body cannot be a cause of body, nor the incorporeal of the incorporeal, nor the incorporeal of body, nor the converse, we shall thereby have established that none of the views mentioned is [214] correct.—Now body will never be the cause of body since both have the same nature; and if the one is said to be a cause inasmuch as it is body, the other also, as being a body, will certainly be a cause. And as both equally are causes, there is no passive effect, and when nothing is passive there will be no efficient agency. Therefore, if body is the cause of body, there is no cause.—[215] Moreover, the incorporeal cannot be said to be productive of the incorporeal, for the same reason; for if both partook of the same nature, why should this one be called the cause of that one rather than that one of this one? [216] It remains for us, then, to say either that body is the cause of the incorporeal, or conversely that the incorporeal is the cause of body. But this again is impossible; for that which acts must touch the passive matter in order to act, and the passive matter must be touched, in order to be acted on, but the incorporeal is not of such a [217] nature as either to touch or be touched. So then neither is body the cause of the incorporeal nor the incorporeal of body. From which it follows that no cause exists; for if body is not a cause of body, nor the incorporeal of the incorporeal, nor body of the incorporeal, nor the converse, and besides these there is no other possibility, of necessity nothing is a cause.

[218] It is thus, then, that some state in more simple form the premisses in the arguments now set forth; but Aenesidemus has, in his treatment of them, made a more elaborate use of the difficulties concerning becoming. [219] Body will not be the cause of body, since such a body is either ungenerated, like the atom of Epicurus, or generated, as is man, and either visible like iron and fire, or invisible like the atom. And whichever of these it is, it cannot effect anything. [220] For it acts on another thing either while continuing by itself or after uniting with the other. But while it remains by itself it would not be able to effect anything more than itself and its own nature; and when united with another it would not be able to produce a third thing which was not previously in existence. For neither is the one thing able to become two, nor do the two produce a third thing. [221] For if one is able to become two, each of the units which have so become, being one, will produce two, and each of the four, being one, will make two, and similarly each unit of the eight, and so on ad infinitum; but it is wholly absurd to say that an infinite number proceeds from one; therefore it is also absurd to say that anything more is generated from the one.—[222] The same (objection holds good) should anyone maintain that more is produced from less by addition; for if the one added to the one makes a third, the third added to the two will produce a fourth, and the fourth added to the three will produce a fifth, and so on, again, ad infinitum. Body, then is not the cause of body.—[223] Moreover, for the same reasons, the incorporeal is not the cause of the incorporeal; for nothing more can become either from one or from more than one. And besides, the incorporeal being an intangible nature cannot be either active or passive. [224] So that neither is the incorporeal capable of creating the incorporeal. And thus the converse is not possible either,—that is to say, body creating the incorporeal or the incorporeal, body.

For body does not contain within itself the nature of the incorporeal, and the incorporeal does not include the nature of body. Hence neither of [225] them can be produced from the other, but just as a horse does not spring from a plane-tree because the nature of the horse does not exist in the plane-tree, nor is a man produced from a horse because the nature of the man does not exist in the horse, so the incorporeal will never come into existence from body because the nature of the incorporeal does not exist in body; nor, conversely, will body come from the incorporeal. [226] Yet if the one does exist in the other, even so the one will not spring from the other. For if either of them is existent, it does not come into existence from the other, but it is already in existence and being already in existence it does not become, since becoming is the process towards existence. Neither, then, is body the cause of the incorporeal nor the incorporeal of body; from which it follows that nothing is a cause.

And again: [227] If there exists any cause of anything, either the unmoved is the cause of the unmoved, or the moved of the moved, or the moved of the unmoved, or the unmoved of the moved: but the motionless will not be the cause to the motionless of its want of motion, nor the moved to the moved of its motion, nor the motionless to the moved of want of motion, nor the converse, as we shall establish. Therefore, no cause exists. [228] Now the motionless will not be the cause to the motionless of its want of motion, nor the moved to the moved of its motion, because of their being indistinguishable. For when both are equally motionless, or both equally in motion, we shall no more say that this is the cause to that of its want of motion or its motion than that to this. For if the one, because it moves, is the cause of motion to the other, since the other also moves in like manner it will be said to be supplying motion to the first. For example, the hoop moves and the hoop-trundler also moves; why, then, should the hoop-trundler move because of the hoop rather than, conversely, the hoop because of the hoop-trundler? Certainly if the one does not move, neither will the other move. Hence if cause is “that by the presence of which the effect takes place,” since the effect takes place with both present, and it is effected when neither the hoop is absent nor the hoop-trundler, one must declare that the hoop-trundler is no more the cause of motion to the hoop than the hoop to the hoop-trundler. [229] And again, the pillar is motionless, and the lintel also is motionless. But one should not say that the lintel is motionless because of the pillar any more than the pillar because of the lintel; for when the one is removed the other tumbles down. So that for this reason we will not say that the motionless is the cause to the motionless of its want of motion or the moving to the moving of its motion.—[230] So likewise the motionless is not the cause of motion to the moving, nor the moving to the motionless of its want of motion, because of their opposite natures; for just as the cold can never heat, since it does not possess the quality of the hot, and as the hot can never chill, since it does not possess the quality of the cold, so too the moving can never be productive of want of motion, since it does not possess the quality of the motionless, nor can the converse take place.—[231] But if neither the motionless is the cause to the motionless of its want of motion, nor the moving to the moving of its motion, nor the motionless to the moving of its motion, nor the moving to the motionless of its want of motion, and besides these there is no other possibility conceivable, we must assert that nothing is a cause.

[232] Furthermore, if anything is the cause of anything, either the simultaneous is the cause of the simultaneous, or the prior of the posterior, or the posterior of the prior; but the simultaneous is not the cause of the simultaneous, nor the prior of the posterior, nor the posterior of the prior, as we shall establish. Therefore there does not exist any cause. [233] Now the simultaneous cannot be the cause of the simultaneous owing to the co-existence of both and the fact that this one is no more capable of generating that one than is that one of this one, since both are equal in point of existence. [234] Nor will the prior be capable of producing that which comes into being later; for if, when the cause exists, that whereof it is cause is not yet existent, neither is the former any longer a cause, as it has not that whereof it is the cause, nor is the latter any longer an effect, since that whereof it is the effect does not co-exist with it. For each of these is a relative thing, and relatives must necessarily coexist with each other, instead of one preceding and the other following. [235] It only remains for us, then, to say that the posterior is the cause of the prior; but this is a most absurd notion, worthy of men who turn things topsy-turvy; for we shall have to say that the effect is older than what produced it, and consequently is not an effect at all since it is without that whereof it is the effect. So just as it is foolish to say that the son is older than his father, or that the harvest is earlier in date than the sowing, so it is silly to maintain that what is as yet non-existent is the cause of what already exists.— [236] But if the simultaneous is not the cause of the simultaneous, nor the prior of the posterior, nor the posterior of the prior, and besides these there is no other possibility, no cause will exist.

[237] Moreover, if a cause exists it is the cause of something either wholly of itself and using only its own power, or else it needs for the purpose the assistance of the passive matter, so that the effect is conceived as due to the combination of both jointly. [238] And if it is its nature to effect something of itself and by using its own power, since it is constantly in possession of itself and its own power it ought always to be producing its effect, and not be at one time active and at another inactive. [239] But if, as some of the Dogmatists say, cause is not an absolute and independent thing but a relative thing, since it is viewed in relation to the thing affected and the thing affected also in relation to it, a worse consequence will emerge. [240] For if the one is conceived as relative to the other, and of these the one is active, the other passive, they will be one in conception but will be called by two names, the active and the passive; and because of this the efficient power will not reside in the cause any more than in that which is said to be passive. For just as the cause cannot act without what is called the passive thing, so also the so-called passive thing cannot be passive without the presence of the cause. [241] So it follows that the power productive of the effect does not reside in the cause any more than in the passive thing. Thus (for our meaning will be made clear by an example) if fire is the cause of burning, either it is productive of burning by itself and using only its own power, or it needs for this purpose the co-operation of the burning material. [242] And if it produces the burning by itself, being sufficient of its own nature, then, since it always possesses its own nature, it ought to have been continually burning. But it does not burn always, but burns some things and does not burn others; therefore it does not burn by itself and by using its own nature. [243] But if it does so in conjunction with the suitability of the burning wood, how can we assert that it, rather than the suitability of the wood, is the cause of the burning? For just as no burning takes place if the fire is non-existent, so also no burning takes place if the suitability of the wood is absent. Thus also, if it is the cause because the effect occurs when it is present and does not occur when it is absent, the suitability too will be the cause for both these reasons. [244] So just as, in the case of the syllable “δι,” which consists of the letters δ and ι, it is absurd of a man to say that the cause of the construction of this syllable is the δ, and that the ι is not the cause, so if we compare the act of burning to a syllable and the fire and the wood to letters, it is most absurd of a man to say that the fire is the cause of the burning and the wood not the cause. For the burning neither takes place without the fire nor without the wood, just as the syllable does not exist without the δ or without the ι. [245] Hence, once more, if the cause is not productive of anything either by itself or in conjunction with the suitability of the passive subject, the cause is productive of nothing.

[246] Further, if the cause exists, it either has one efficient power or many; but it cannot have one, as we shall establish, nor yet many, as we shall explain; therefore no cause exists. [247] It has not one power, since if it had one power it ought to affect all things alike and not in different ways. The sun, for instance, burns the regions about Ethiopia, but warms our regions, and only illumines the Hyperboreans; and it dries mud, but melts wax; and it whitens clothes, but blackens our complexion, and reddens certain fruits; and it is the cause of seeing to us, but of not seeing to the birds which feed by night, such as owls and bats. So that, if it had one power, it ought to produce the same effect in all cases; but it does not produce the same effect in all cases; therefore it has not one power. [248] Nor yet has it many, since then it ought to operate with them all in every case—burn everything, for example, or fuse everything, or congeal everything. But if it neither has one power nor many, it will not be the cause of anything.

[249] Yes, but the Dogmatists usually reply to this by saying that the effects produced by the same cause naturally vary owing to the materials affected and the distances, as in the case of the sun. For being close to the Ethiopians it naturally burns them, and being at a moderate distance from us it warms us, and being far removed from the Hyperboreans it does [250] not warm them at all but merely illumines them; and it dries mud by making the watery part steam out of the earthy part, but melts wax because it has not the peculiar quality of mud. [251] Now those who make this reply grant us, almost without dispute, that what acts is not different from what is acted upon. For if the melting of the wax occurs not because of the sun but because of the property of the substance of the wax, it is plain that neither of them is the cause of the melting of the wax but the combination of both of them, the sun and the wax. And as it is the conjunction of both which produces the effect,—namely, the melting,—the wax is not melted because of the sun any more than the sun melts because of the wax. And thus it is absurd not to ascribe the effect produced by the conjunction of two things to those two, but to attribute it to one of them only.

[252] Moreover, if there exists any cause of anything, either it is separate from the matter affected or it co-exists with it; but neither when separate from it nor when co-existing with it can it be the cause of its being affected, as we shall establish; therefore no cause of anything exists. [253] Now when separated from its matter, obviously it is not a cause, since the matter with respect to which it is termed a cause is not present, nor is the matter affected, since that which affects it is not present with it. [254] But if the one is coupled with the other, that one which is said to be the cause either acts only and is not acted upon, or both acts and is acted upon at once. And if it both acts and is acted upon, each of them will be both active and passive; for in so far as the cause acts the matter will be passive, but in so far as the matter acts the cause will be the passive thing. And thus that which acts will be no more active than passive, and that which is acted upon will be no more passive than [255] active; which is absurd.—But if it acts and is not acted upon, it acts either by mere contact—that is to say, superficial contact—or by permeation. And if it imposes itself externally and is applied to the passive matter on the surface only, it will not be able to effect anything; for surface is incorporeal, and the incorporeal is not of a nature either to act or to be acted upon. [256] Therefore the cause is not able to act at all upon the matter when applied on the surface only. Nor yet is it possible for it to act by permeation. For it will penetrate either through solid bodies or through certain intelligible and imperceptible pores. But it will not move through solid bodies; for body cannot pass through body. [257] And if it passes through certain pores, it ought to act while in contact with the surfaces which enclose the pores. But the surfaces are incorporeal, and it is contrary to reason that the incorporeal should either act or be acted upon. Neither, then, does the cause act by permeation. And from this it follows that it is not a cause at all.

[258] Regarding that which acts and that which is acted upon it is also possible to raise difficulties of a more general kind, based upon contact. For in order that a thing may act or be acted upon, it must touch or be touched; but, as we shall establish, nothing can either touch or be touched; therefore neither that which acts nor that which is acted upon exists. [259] For if one thing is in contact with another and touches it, it is in contact either as a whole with the whole, or as a part with a part, or as a whole with a part or as a part with the whole; but, as we shall show, it is not in contact either as part with part, or as whole with whole, or as whole with part, or the converse; therefore nothing touches anything. And if nothing touches anything, neither what is acted upon exists nor what acts. [260] Now it is according to reason that a whole does not touch a whole; for if whole touches whole, there will not be contact but the union of both, and the two bodies will be one body, because the one must touch the other with its depths, since these too are parts of the whole.—[261] Nor, again, is it possible for part to touch part. For the part is conceived as a part in respect of its relation to the whole, but in respect of its own limited extent it is a whole, and for this reason again either the whole part will touch the whole part, or a part of it a part. And if the whole touches the whole, they will be unified and both will become one body; while if with a part it touches a part, that part again, being conceived as a whole in respect of its own limited extent, will either touch as a whole the whole part, or touch a part of it with a part—and so on ad infinitum. Neither then does a part touch a part.—Nor, again, does a whole touch a part. [262] For if the whole shall touch the part, the whole, being contracted so as to equal the part, will be a part, and the part, being extended so as to match the whole, will be a whole; for what is equal to the part has the proportion of the part, and what is equal to the whole that of the whole. But it is perfectly absurd either to make the whole into a part or to claim that the part is equal to the whole. Neither then does the whole touch the part.—[263] Moreover, if the whole touches the part it will be smaller than itself, and again larger than itself; which is a worse consequence than the previous one. For if the whole occupies the same space as the part, it will be equal to the part, and being equal thereto it will be smaller than itself; and conversely, if the part is extended so as to match the whole, it will take up the same space as it, and as occupying the same space as the whole it will be larger than itself.—[264] And to the converse case the same argument applies; for if the whole cannot touch the part, for the reasons set forth a little while ago, neither will the part be able to touch the whole. Hence, if the whole does not touch the whole, nor the part the part, nor the whole the part, nor the converse, nothing touches anything. And for this reason nothing will be the cause of anything, nor will anything be affected by anything.

[265] Furthermore, if one thing touches another, it will touch it either when intercepted by something—such as a pore or a line—or when intercepted by nothing. And if it is intercepted by something, it will not be touching what it is said to touch but the thing which lies between them both; but if the one shall touch the other with absolutely nothing intervening between them, there will be a union of the two and not contact. [266] Neither, then, in this way does anything touch anything. Hence, if the conception of activity and passivity requires the previous agreement that one thing touches another, and it has been proved that nothing touches anything, we must declare that neither the active nor the passive exists.

Thus the active cause is a matter of doubt both separately in itself and when taken along with the thing affected by it. [267] And the account given of the thing affected is also doubtful in itself. For if a thing is affected, either what exists is affected or what exists not; but neither what exists is affected, as we shall establish, nor what exists not, as we shall show; [268] therefore nothing is affected. Now the existent is not affected, for in so far as it is existent and has its own nature it is not affected; and the non-existent will not be affected owing to the fact that it does not subsist at all. But besides existence and non-existence nothing exists; therefore nothing is affected. [269] For example, Socrates dies either when existing or when not existing. For these are two periods—the one that in which he exists and is alive, the other that in which he exists not but has perished; wherefore he must necessarily die in one or other of these periods. Now he does not die when he exists and is alive; for, to be sure, he is alive; nor, again, does he die when he has died, since then he will be dying twice over, which is absurd. So then, Socrates does not die. [270] And the argument used in this case may similarly be applied to the case of the thing affected. For the existent cannot be affected in so far as it is existent and is conceived according to its original substance; nor can the non-existent, for it does not subsist at all; nothing, therefore, is affected.—[271] And still more clearly, if the existent, when it is existent, is affected, opposites will exist in the same thing at the same time; but opposites do not exist in the same thing at the same time; therefore the existent, when it is existent, is not affected. For example, let it be granted that the existent is hard in its nature and is affected by softening, as we see in the case of iron. While, then, it is hard and existent it cannot become [272] soft, since, if it becomes soft when it is hard, opposites will exist in the same thing at the same time, and in so far as it is existent it will be hard, but in so far as it is affected while existent it will be soft. But the same thing cannot be conceived as at once both hard and soft; therefore, the existent, when it is existent, cannot be affected. [273] And the same argument holds good also in the case of white colour and black. For let it be granted that the existent, in so far as it is existent, is white and that it is affected by becoming black. If then the existent and white is held to be affected by becoming black at the time when it is white, it will have opposite properties; which is absurd. So then the existent, in so far as it is existent, is not of a nature to be affected.—[274] Further, if we say that the existent, when it is existent, is affected, there will exist something become before it has become; (but there is nothing become before it has become;) therefore the existent, when it is existent, is not affected. [275] For if the existent is hard, in so far as it is existent, it is hard and not soft; and if it (becomes) soft, it will be soft before it has become soft; for in so far as it is existent it is hard and not yet soft; but in so far as it is held to be affected at the time when it is existent, it will become soft before it has become soft. But such a result is absurd; one must, therefore, declare that the existent, in so far as it is existent, is not affected.—[276] And in the same way, the non-existent is not affected when it is non-existent. For the non-existent has no property, and being affected is not a property of that which has no property; neither, then, is the non-existent affected at all. But if neither the existent nor the nonexistent is affected at all, and besides these there is no other alternative, there is nothing which is affected.

[277] Moreover, if there is something which is affected, it is affected either through addition or through subtraction or through alteration and change. But no addition nor subtraction nor change and alteration exists, as we shall demonstrate; nothing therefore is affected. [278] For just as, in the case of nouns, modifications take place in these three ways, and when the first syllable is subtracted from the noun kdbios there is formed another noun bios, and when the same syllable is added to this the former noun is constructed; and by interchange of letters, as when the noun archon becomes Charon;—so, too, bodies may be said to be affected in three ways, either through addition or through subtraction or through [279]alteration—through subtraction like decreasing things; through addition, like increasing things; through conversion, like things that pass over from health to sickness. If, then, it shall be shown that nothing is subtracted from anything and that nothing is added to anything and that nothing is transposed from anything, it will thereby be established that there is nothing which is affected. [280] And let us discuss in the first place the mode of subtraction.

If one thing is subtracted from another, either body is subtracted from body, or the incorporeal from the incorporeal, or body from the incorporeal, or the incorporeal from body; but neither body is subtracted from body, as we shall prove, nor the incorporeal from the incorporeal, as we shall demonstrate, nor body from the incorporeal nor the incorporeal from [281] body, as we shall establish; therefore nothing is subtracted from anything. Now, that the incorporeal should be subtracted from the incorporeal is a thing impossible; for what is subtracted from a thing is not intangible, but the incorporeal, being intangible, does not submit to subtraction and separation. [282] Hence, too, the mathematicians talk idly when they say that they will bisect a given straight line. For the straight line shown to us on the board has length and breadth, whereas the straight line conceived by them is “length without breadth.” And the line shown on the board will not be a line, and those who attempt to cut it are cutting not the real line but the unreal.—[283] Or again, since, according to them, the line is conceived as composed of points, let us assume a certain straight line, which they say they cut into equal parts, composed of an odd number of points, such as nine. But in cutting this, either they will divide the fifth point (I mean the point conceived as lying between the first four and the last four), or else they will make one of the sections consist of four points and the other of five. Now they will not say that they cut the fifth point; for, according to them, the point is without parts, and it is impossible to conceive what is without parts as divided into parts. It only remains, therefore, to make the one section of the line consist of four points and the other of five, which again is absurd and at variance with their undertaking; for they promise to divide the given straight line scientifically into equal sections, but they divide it into unequal ones.—[284] And the same argument may be applied in the case of the circle. For they say that the circle is “a plane form enclosed by one line, of which all the straight lines extending from the centre to the circumference are equal to one another.” Then, on these conditions, the problem is to bisect the circle; and this is impossible. For the centre, which is in the very middle of the whole circle, either is bisected in the bisection of the circle, or is added on to one or other of the sections. [285] But it is impossible for it to be bisected; for how is it possible to conceive what is without parts as partitioned? And if it is added on to either of the sections, the sections become unequal and the circle is not divided in the middle.—[286] Also, that which cuts the line or the circle is either a body or incorporeal. But how can it be conceived as a body? For the thing cut—namely, the line or the circle—is intangible and incorporeal and imperceptible by us. And being such, it will not be cut by a body; for what is cut by a body must be acted upon and be touched, but the incorporeal is not of a nature either to touch or be touched. So that it is not possible to conceive of the line being cut or the circle divided by a body.—[287] Nor yet by anything incorporeal. For if what divides the line or the circle is incorporeal, it is either a point that cuts a point or a line a line. But neither can a point cut the point nor a line the line. [288] For a point will not cut the point since each of them is without parts, and the one which cuts has no parts wherewith to cut, nor has the one which is being cut any parts into which it may be cut. [289] Nor, again, will the line divide the line. For whether the cutting line is joined to the line that is being cut at an acute or at a right angle, it must necessarily be joined at a point in itself to a point in the divided line. As, however, the point of the joined line is without parts, and the point in the cut line is also without parts, no division will take place, since neither the cutting line is suited by nature for cutting, being without parts, nor the cut line for being cut, owing to its wholly lacking parts.—[290] Moreover, it is not possible to say that what cuts the line cuts the line by falling between two points in the line that is being cut. For this is still more absurd than the foregoing. For, in the first place, it is impossible that an intermediate limit should be set within the continuity of a line, and one must necessarily conceive the thing which cuts as striking at a point. [291] And, secondly, even if it be conceded that the sector cuts the line between two of the points in the line which is being cut, a worse result for the geometers will emerge. For the points which compose the line either are so continuous as not to admit of any point from outside coming between them, or else the line composed of them will not be a single and continuous line. [292] But if they are so continuous that there is no conceivable space between them for a point, so as to enable the sector to bisect the line, then one or other of two results must follow—either we must conceive the point on which it strikes as being divided, or, if this is impossible, we must conceive the existing points of the line as receding and affording it space and an interval, by crowding together now towards this side, and now towards that; [293] and each of these suppositions is absurd; for, as we have pointed out above, the point cannot be cut, owing to its being without parts, nor are the points in the line that is being cut of such a nature as to recede, for they are immobile. So then, the incorporeal neither is subtracted from an incorporeal nor admits [294] of subtraction.—And even if the geometers propose to show how one thing is subtracted from another by basing their argument on sensible lines and circles—that is, on those seen on the board,—they will not be able; for no subtraction can be conceived as taking place from the whole line or the whole circle, or from a part of them, as we shall show a little farther on in our exposition, when we come to deal with the investigation of bodies which are divided.

[295] And now that it has been shown concisely that no incorporeal can be subtracted from any incorporeal, it remains for us to say either that body is separated from body, or the incorporeal from body, or body from the incorporeal. [296] But the subtraction of body from the incorporeal is of itself inconceivable, and the separation of the incorporeal from body is a thing impossible; for what subtracts must touch what is subtracted, but the incorporeal is intangible and touch has been proved to be impossible; so that neither will the incorporeal ever be separated from body. And besides: what is separated from anything is, as it were, a part of that from which it is separated, but the incorporeal will not be a part of the body.—[297] Nor, again, can body be subtracted from body. For if body is subtracted from body, either the equal is subtracted from the equal, or the unequal from the unequal; but the equal cannot be subtracted from the equal, as we shall show, nor the unequal from the unequal, as we shall explain; therefore body is not subtracted from body. [298] Now the equal will not be subtracted from the equal,—the cubit, for instance, from the cubit,—since such a thing is not subtraction but the complete removal of the object. [299] And besides we will make the subtraction from the cubit either while it remains or while it does not remain. And if we do so while it remains, we shall be doubling the cubit instead of diminishing it; for how will the cubit still be really a cubit after a cubit has been subtracted from it? And if (the subtraction be made) while it does not remain, we are leaving nothing behind to submit to the subtraction; for it is impossible for anything to be subtracted from non-existents. So that the equal is not subtracted from the equal.—[300] Nor, again, is the unequal subtracted from the unequal. For if so, either the greater is subtracted from the less, as a cubit from a palm; or the less from the greater, as that which is a palm in length from that which is a cubit in length. [301] But the greater will not be subtracted from the less; for that which is subtracted from anything must be included in the thing from which the subtraction takes place, but the greater is not included in the less. And because of this, just as it is not possible to subtract six from five (for five does not include six), so too it is not possible to subtract the greater from the less; for the greater is not included in the less. So then, the greater is [302] not subtracted from the less.—Nor, again, is the less subtracted from the greater. For, as we have said, that which is subtracted from anything must be included in that from which the subtraction takes place. But the less is not included in the more; for if so, it will follow that both the greater and the more are included in the less, and this was shown to be impossible. So that the less will not be included in the greater, and thus it will not be subtracted either. [303] And that the rules of logical consistency are observed we may see from the examples given by the Doubters. Thus, if 5 is included in 6 as the less in the more, 4 also must necessarily be included in 5, as the less in the more, and 3 in 4, and 2 in 3, and 1 in 2; and because of this there are included in the number 6, 5 and 4 and 3 and 2 and 1, which make 15. [304] But if in 6, according to its own proper definition, 15 is included, there will necessarily be contained in 5, 4 and 3 and 2 and 1, which make 10. And just as 10 is included in 5, so also 3 and 2 and 1, which make 6, will inhere in 4; and, by analogy, 2 and 1, which make another 3, in 3; and in the 2 that is still left, 1. [305] Thus when the contents of the 6 numbers are added together—I mean the 15 and 10 and 6 and 3, and also the 1, the number 6 will be found to include the number 35. [306] And if this also is granted, the 6 will be capable of including numbers that are infinite times infinite; for the 35, again, will be inclusive of the subordinate numbers, such as 34, and this of 33, and this of 32, and so **[307]**downwards ad infinitum.—But if it is required, in order that one thing may be subtracted from another, that the thing subtracted should be included in that from which the subtraction is made, and it has been proved that neither is the greater included in the less nor the less in the greater, nor yet the equal in the equal (for what includes must be greater than what is included, but what is equal to a thing is neither less nor greater than the thing to which it is equal), then one must declare that nothing is subtracted from anything.

[308] Moreover, if one thing is subtracted from another, either it is a whole that is subtracted from a whole, or a part from a part, or a part from a whole, or a whole from a part; but neither is a whole subtracted from a whole, nor a part from a part, nor a whole from a [309] part, nor a part from a whole, as we shall establish; therefore one thing is not subtracted from another. Now that a whole should be subtracted from the whole is perfectly impossible; for no one subtracts a cubit from a cubit, nor a pint from a pint, since such an action will not be subtraction but the complete removal of the existing object. [310] And it is also an inconceivable assertion that the whole is subtracted from the part; for the part is less than the whole, and the whole is more than the part; and to say that the more is subtracted from the less is extremely incredible. For the whole did not exist in the part, so as to enable it to undergo subtraction therefrom, but [311] rather the part in the whole.—We are left, then, with what seems the more probable alternative, that either the part is subtracted from the whole or the part from the part. But this, too, is a thing not feasible. Let us consider the statement, as is the practice of the Sceptics, in the case of number. [312] Thus, let a decad be assumed, and from it let a monad be subtracted. Then this subtracted monad is subtracted either from the existing decad or from the nine which remains after the subtraction; but it is not subtracted either from the nine or from the decad, as we shall show; therefore the monad is not subtracted from the decad; and from this follows that nothing is subtracted from anything. [313] For if the monad is subtracted from the decad, either the decad is something other than the individual monads, or the decad is the sum total of the individual monads. But it is not likely that the decad is other than the individual monads; for it disappears when they disappear, and when they exist it too is present. [314] And if the decad consists of the monads themselves, if we say that the monad is subtracted from the decad, we shall certainly agree that the monad is subtracted from each monad, since the decad is nothing else than its monads; and also that it is subtracted from itself, because the decad is conceived as including this monad. [315] But if the single monad is subtracted from each monad and from itself, the removal of the single monad is the removal of the decad. But it is absurd to say that the removal of the monad is the removal of the decad. Therefore it is also absurd to maintain that the monad is subtracted from the decad.—Nor yet shall we say that the monad is subtracted from the remaining nine. For if the monad is subtracted from the nine, after its removal the nine ought not to be found complete; for that from which something is subtracted does not remain complete after the subtraction, since otherwise no subtraction will have been made from it. [316] And besides—if the monad is subtracted from the remaining nine, it is subtracted either from the whole nine or from its last monad. But it is not subtracted from the whole nine, since then—as the nine is nothing else than its individual monads—the removal of the monad is the removal of the nine, which is absurd; [317] nor is it subtracted from the last monad since, firstly, the monad is without parts and indivisible; and, further, how is the nine left complete and not (diminished) by one? But if the one is taken neither from the ten nor from the remaining nine, and besides these no third possibility can be conceived, one must declare that the one is not subtracted from the ten.—[318] Furthermore, if the one is taken from the ten, the one is taken away either while the ten is still remaining or while it is not remaining; but the one is never taken away from it either while it remains or while it does not remain; but there is no other alternative besides existence or non-existence; therefore the one is not subtracted from the ten. [319] Now that the one is not subtracted from the ten whilst it remains is at once apparent; for in so far as the ten remains, nothing is subtracted from it. And that it should be subtracted from it whilst it does not remain is also absurd. For nothing can be subtracted from the nonexistent. Therefore, one thing is not subtracted [320] from another.—And the same argument applies also to subtraction in the case of things measured,—for example, the subtraction of a cup from a gallon, or the subtraction of a palm from a cubit. For we must say that the subtraction is made either from the whole pint or from a part of it, and either whilst it remains or whilst it does not remain; but it is made from none of these, as we have shown; neither, then, in this way is one thing taken from another.

[321] So then, it is quite evident from these arguments that subtraction is nothing; and in the next place let us demonstrate that neither is one thing added to another. Let us suppose, then, a body of a cubit’s length, and added to this one of a palm’s length, so that the body formed of the original body and the addition is of seven palms’ length—to what, I ask, is the addition of the palm made? [322] For the palm is added either to itself or to the originally existing cubit or to the magnitude of seven palms composed of both; but the palm is not added either to itself or to the original cubit or to the magnitude composed of both,—I mean, of both the pre-existing cubit and the addition. Therefore one thing is not added to another. [323] Now the palm will not be added to itself; for as it is not other than itself, and does not double itself owing to the addition, it will not be added to itself. And if it is added to the original cubit, how is it that, when it is added to all of it, it does not equal it and make two cubits, so that the greater becomes less and the less greater? For if by the addition the palm is made equal to the cubit and the cubit to the palm, the cubit, which is the greater, by being made equal to the less will become less, whereas the palm, which is small, by being made equal to the cubit will come to be larger. [324] But if the palm is not added to itself nor to the pre-existing cubit, it is only left to us to say that it is added to the magnitude of seven palms composed of both. But this, again, is most irrational; for that which receives the addition must be in existence before the addition, but that which comes into existence from them is not in existence before them. Therefore, what is added is not added to what comes into existence from both the addition and what previously existed. [325] Moreover, the addition differs from that which results from it and does not coincide with it in time; for when the addition is being made, what results from them is not as yet existent, and when what has resulted from them exists, the addition will exist no longer. So that the palm is not added to what results from the addition and the pre-existing cubit. But since, once more, what is added is not added either to itself or to the pre-existing object or to the sum of them both, it is not added to anything at all.

[326] With regard to numbers also it is possible to raise the same difficulty. For if four be set down and one be added to it, to what, we may inquire, is the addition made? For the one is added either to itself, or to the four, or to the five which is made up of the sum of both. But it is not added to itself, because what is added to anything is other than the thing whereto it is added, but the one is not other than itself; and also because it does not double itself by becoming two. [327] Nor is it added to the four, because of its not equalling it or doubling it; for what is added to the whole four, which does not differ from its four individual ones, is a four. Nor, again, is it added to the five which is made up of itself and the four, because the five is not in existence before the addition, and what is added must always be added to something which pre-exists. Therefore, nothing is added to anything.

[328] But if nothing is subtracted from anything, as has been demonstrated, nor anything added to anything, as we have shown, it is also evident that nothing is transposed from anything; for transposition consists in the subtraction of one thing and the addition of another. [329] And if these are non-existent, what is affected must also be non-existent, inasmuch as affection occurs in some one of these ways. For no one could conceive of any affection possibly taking place otherwise than in one of these ways.

[330] Connected with the difficulty concerning this matter is that concerning the Whole, and also the problem of the Part, since subtraction seems to be the subtraction of a part from a whole, and addition, again, is the addition of a whole. Hence, if it should be proved that the account given of the whole and the part is doubtful, the difficulties previously raised regarding addition and subtraction, and the passive and the active, will be brought out still more clearly. And that it is not easy to define the whole and the part it will be our next task to demonstrate.

Concerning Whole and Part

Section titled “Concerning Whole and Part”

[331] The investigation of the Whole is necessary for the Physicists, since it is absurd that they, while professing to tell the truth about the Whole and the All, should not know how to define what the Whole is and what the parts are; and also for the Sceptics, as a means of convicting the Dogmatists of rashness. [332] Now the philosophers of the Stoic school suppose that “the Whole” differs from “the All”; for they say that the Whole is the Cosmos, whereas the All is the external void together with the Cosmos, and on this account the Whole is limited (for the Cosmos is limited) but the All unlimited (for the void outside the Cosmos is so). [333] But Epicurus usually gives the name of both Whole and All indifferently both to the nature of bodies and to that of void; for at one time he says that “the nature of the Whole of things is bodies and void,” and at another time that “the All is unlimited in both respects, in respect of both bodies and void,—that is, both in respect of the number of the bodies and in respect of the extent of the void, the infinity of the one matching that of the other.” [334] And those who totally deny the existence of void, such as the Peripatetics, predicate Whole and [335] All only of the bodies and not of the void.—There exists also some small dispute about the Part. For Epicurus maintained that the part is other than the Whole, as the atom is other than the compound, since the former is devoid of quality whereas the compound has qualities, being either white or black or, generally, coloured, and either hot or cold or possessed of some other quality. [336] But the Stoics assert that the part is neither other than the Whole nor the same; for the hand is neither the same as the man (for it is not a man) nor other than the man (for it is included in the conception of the man as man). [337] And Aenesidemus, “according to Heracleitus,” says that the part is both other than the whole and the same; for substance is both whole and part, whole in the Universe, but part in the nature of this particular animal. And “particle” itself is used in two senses, at one time as different from the separately conceived part—in which sense they speak of it as a part of a part, as the finger of the hand and the ear of the head—and at another time as not different, but as being a part of the whole, in which sense some say generally that “a particle is that which helps to fill up the whole.” [338] And now that these distinctions have been drawn [and the whole conceived as a result of the filling up by the parts], let us next proceed to our investigation.

If, then, there exists any whole,—such as man, horse, plant, ship (for these are names of wholes),—either it is other than its parts and is conceived according to its own separate reality and substance, [339] or the sum of the parts is said to be the whole. But the whole will not be other than its parts, either in its sensible appearance or in its conception. Not in appearance, since, if the whole were other than its parts and separate, when the parts are removed the whole ought to be found still remaining; but so far is it from true that when all the parts (say, of a statue) are removed the whole remains that even when but one part only is removed the whole is no longer found to subsist as a whole. [340] Nor yet in its conception, because the whole is conceived as that from which no part is missing. And because of this, if the whole is other than its parts, all the parts will be missing from the whole, and thus the whole will no longer exist.—And again,—the whole is a relative thing, for it is in relation to its parts that it is conceived as a whole, and just as the part is a part of something, so also the whole is a whole made up of certain parts. But relatives must co-exist with each other and be inseparable from each other. The whole, therefore, is not other than its parts nor separate [341] therefrom.—It only remains for us, then, to say that the parts are the whole. But if the parts are the whole, either all the parts are the whole, or a certain number of the parts, or some one of them. Now some one of the parts will not be the whole; for, assuredly, the head of the man is not the whole man, nor yet his neck or his hand or any other such member. [342] Nor, again, will the whole be a certain number of the parts. For, firstly, if certain of the parts are the whole, the rest will not be parts of the whole, which is absurd. And, secondly, the conception of the whole will be overthrown. For if certain of the parts are the whole, it is false to say that the whole is that from which none of the parts are missing; for some are missing. So that neither some one part nor certain of the parts are the whole. [343] And if all the parts are the whole, and the whole is nothing else than the sum of the parts, neither will it be a whole nor will the parts be parts. For just as separation is nothing apart from the things separated, or raftering apart from the rafters arranged in a certain way, or the fist apart from the hand held in a certain position, so too if the whole is nothing more than the sum of the parts, the parts will not be parts. [344] And again, just as, when “right” does not exist, “left” also is non-existent, and when “above” is not conceived neither is “below” conceived, in the same way, if the whole does not exist, the parts are not conceived [345] nor will any parts exist.—But let it be granted that all the parts are the whole, still we must inquire what it is that these are to complete—is it the whole, or one another, or themselves? But they are not parts either of the whole or of one another or of themselves, as we shall establish; therefore, they are not parts of anything. Now they will not be parts of the whole; for the whole is nothing more than the parts, and they themselves are said to be the whole. [346] Nor yet will they be parts of one another. For the parts of anything are included in the things whereof they are parts,—as, for instance, the hand in the man and the finger in the hand,—but the parts of the man subsist separately and are not included in one another; for the left hand does not complete the right, nor the right the left, nor the thumb the forefinger, nor the hands the head, but each of these has its own separate place. [347] So then the parts are not parts of one another. Nor yet of themselves; for it is impossible for anything to be a part of itself. If, then, the whole is not other than the parts, and the parts themselves are not the whole, [348] the whole is nothing.—And again, the part (such as the head) is said to complete the whole man and be a part of the man: and the man is certainly viewed as a man with head included; and therefore the head completes itself and is a part of itself. And because of this it is both greater and less than itself; for in so far as it is conceived as completed by itself it is greater than itself, but in so far as it completes, less. [349] And there is the same difficulty in the case of the plant and the cubit and, in general, of all the other things of which the term “whole” is predicated; for since the palm is conceived as part of the cubit (for it is with the inclusion of the palm that the cubit is conceived as a cubit), the palm both serves to complete itself and is a part of itself. But this is absurd and contrary, one may say, to our common notions.

[350] This difficulty applies also to the parts of speech. For in a line like this—

Sing, O goddess, the wrath of the son of Peleus, Achilles,—one must inquire about the words “wrath” and “sing” and “goddess” and “son of Peleus” and also “Achilles,” of what are they parts? For either the whole line is something other than these parts, or the sum of them is the line. But here one must bring up the difficulties already stated. If the word “wrath” is a part of the whole line, it will also be a part of itself; for the whole line was conceived as [351] including it; and if it is a part of the rest of the line (“Sing, O goddess, of the son of Peleus, Achilles”), surely a greater difficulty will emerge. For the part of anything is included in that of which it is a part, but “the wrath” is not included in “Sing, O goddess, of the son of Peleus, Achilles”; therefore “the wrath” is not a part of the whole line.

[352] Such being the difficulties raised about this topic, the Dogmatists—by way of providing themselves with a little breathing-space—are accustomed to argue that the external real and sensible object is neither whole nor part, but it is we who apply to it the terms “whole” and “part.” [353] For “whole” is a relative term, since a whole is conceived in relation to its parts. And again, “parts” are relative, for the parts are conceived in relation to the whole. And relatives are in our consciousness, and our consciousness is in us; so the whole and the part are in us. And the external real and sensible object is neither a whole nor a part but a thing of which we predicate our own consciousness. [354] In reply to them one must say, firstly, that it is absurd to argue that the neck and the head are not complementary parts of the external man but of our consciousness. But if the head and the neck are complements of the man and the neck is in us, the man will have to be in us. Which is absurd. So then, the whole and the parts do not [355] reside in our consciousness.—Yes, someone will say, but the whole man is in us, through consciousness, and has its complement not in the external neck and the external head but, once more, in the conceptions which correspond to these parts. For in fact the whole man is itself a concept of ours. [356] But he who argues thus does not escape from the difficulty. For, once again, either this man who is within us, whether he be a concept or our consciousness, is conceived as other than his parts, or else the man is conceived as his parts. But neither of these can be true, as we have established. Thus, too, the very conception itself is overthrown by the same difficulty. [357] And if so, we must declare that no whole exists. From which it follows that no part, either, exists. For each of these is a relative, and when one of a pair of relatives is abolished, the other also is abolished with it.

[358] Let this, then, stand as the statement of our doubts about these matters; and as we have now disputed sufficiently with the Dogmatists regarding the efficient principles of the Universe, let us now state in more general terms the difficulties regarding both these and the material principles.

Concerning Body

Section titled “Concerning Body”

[359] Concerning the primary and most fundamental elements there are two leading views, with several sub-divisions; for some have affirmed that the elements of existing things are bodies, others that [360] they are incorporeal. And of those who have declared them to be bodies, Pherecydes of Syros said that the principle and element of all things is earth; and Thales of Miletus, water; and his disciple, Anaximander, the unlimited; and Anaximenes and Idaeus of Himera and Diogenes of Apollonia and Archelaus of Athens (Socrates’ teacher) and (according to some) Heracleitus, air; and Hippasus of [361] Metapontum and (according to some) Heracleitus, fire; and Xenophanes, water and earth—

(Verily all we men are sprung from earth and from water) and Hippo of Rhegium, fire and water; and Oenopides of Chios, fire and air; and Onomacritus in his Orphica, [362] fire and water and earth; and Empedocles and the Stoics, earth and water and air and fire—

Four are the roots of all things, and list thou first to their
titles:

Shining Zeus, and Hera the life-bringer, and Aldoneus, Nestis, too, who wetteth with tears the fountain of mortals;—[363] and Democritus and Epicurus, atoms, unless one should regard this opinion as more ancient and—as the Stoic Poseidonius asserted—derived from a certain Phoenician called Mochus; and Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, homoeomeries; and Diodorus, surnamed Cronos, minimal and indivisible bodies; and Asclepiades the Bithynian, homogeneous molecules. [364] And of those who have dogmatically asserted that they are incorporeal, the Pythagoreans have said that the numbers are the principles of all things; and the Mathematicians, the limits of bodies; and Plato, the [365] ideas.—Such, then, being the divergence of opinion, both in general and in particular, amongst the Physicists, it will be possible to give one general answer to them all when we have discussed in turn the difficulties about bodies and those about incorporeals; for in this way each of the persons enumerated who admits that the principles of all things are corporeal will be brought face to face with the difficulties raised about body, and every one who asserts their incorporeality with those raised about incorporeals. [366] And let our discussion of body come first, commencing with an examination of the conception of “body.”

To begin with, then, as against those who conceive body as “what is capable of being acted upon or of affecting” (and of these it is recorded that Pythagoras was the leader), we have already pretty well abolished body and do not need for this purpose other fresh arguments; for if body is what is capable of being acted upon or acting, since we have proved that there is nothing which acts or is acted upon, the body as so conceived will be nothing. [367] But the subject before us must now be treated systematically with reference to the conceptions of the Mathematicians. They say that body is “that which has three dimensions, length, depth, breadth”; and of these, length is extent from above to below, breadth from left to right, and the third dimension (namely, depth) is from front to back. Hence, there are six modes of extension, two for each dimension,—up and down, to right and to left, forward and backward. [368] From this conception a vast number of difficulties seem to follow. For either body, in respect of its conception, is separate from these three dimensions, so that the body is one thing and the length and depth and breadth of the body something different, or else the body is the sum of these dimensions. [369] But it is not possible to conceive the body as separate from these dimensions; for where there is neither length nor breadth nor depth, there it is not possible to conceive body. And if the sum of these is body, since each of them is incorporeal and what is compounded of incorporeals is certainly incorporeal, the combination of all these together will have to be, not body but, incorporeal. [370] For just as the conjunction of lines, which are incorporeal, and the sum of points are never of a nature to make a solid and resistant body, so also the combination of length, depth, and breadth, being a combination of incorporeals, will not produce a body. But if there is no body apart from these, and these, too, are not body, [371] nothing is body.—And again, since the combination of length and breadth and depth makes body, either each of these separately, before combining, contained corporeality and the rational germs, as it were, of body, or body supervened after their conjunction. [372] And if each of them, before combining, contained corporeality, each will be a body; and further, since body is not length only, nor breadth, nor depth, but length and depth and breadth, each of these as possessing corporeality will become three, and thus length will not only be length but also breadth and depth, and depth not simply breadth but also length and breadth, and so likewise with the remaining dimension. [373] And if it is after these are conjoined that body supervenes, either their original nature remains after their conjunction or it changes to corporeality. And if their original nature remains, since they are incorporeal and remain incorporeal, [374] they will not produce a different body; but if it changes to body, then, since what admits of change is body, each of the dimensions, even before their conjunction, will be body and will produce body before there is body.—Also, just as the body which changes receives one quality instead of another but remains a body,—the white, for instance, in becoming black, and the sweet in becoming bitter, casts off one quality and receives another, while not ceasing to be a body,—so also these dimensions, if they change into body, will exchange one quality for [375] another; and if they are thus affected they will be bodies. If, then, the body as conceived exists neither before their conjunction nor after their conjunction, it is not possible to conceive body.

Furthermore, if there is no length or breadth or depth, neither will the body which is conceived as partaking of these exist; but there is no length and [376] breadth and depth, as we shall establish; therefore body does not exist. For length does not exist, since this, which is termed “line” by the Mathematicians, is the greatest dimension of body, and the line is “a point which has flowed,” and the point is “a sign which is without parts and without dimensions.” (Hence, if no sign without parts or dimensions exists,) neither will a line exist, and if the line does not exist neither will length exist, and if length does not exist neither will body subsist; for body, as conceived, includes length. [377] And that there exists no sign without parts or dimensions we may learn from what follows: if there is any such thing it is either a body or incorporeal. Now it is not a body, since then it would have had dimensions, as body has three dimensions. Nor yet is it incorporeal. [378] For if it is incorporeal, nothing will proceed from it; for that which generates generates by contact, but there can be no contact in the case of an incorporeal nature. So then, the sign is not incorporeal either. But if the sign is neither a body nor incorporeal it is inconceivable. [379] And if the sign does not exist, neither will the line exist. And if the line does not exist, neither will length exist; and from this follows also the nonexistence of body.

[380] Moreover, even if it be granted that the sign exists, length will not exist. For length is line, and the line the flux of a sign. The line then is either one sign extended, or it is conceived as many signs placed in a row. [381] But if it is one sign extended, it will not be a line, for this sign either occupies the same place or changes from place to place. And if this sign occupies the same place, it will not be a line but a point; for the line is conceived as a thing which has flowed. [382] And if it moves on from place to place it moved either by leaving one place and taking up another, or by occupying one place and extending into another. [383] But it will not make a line by leaving one place and taking up another; for it will remain, as at first, a point, and just as when it occupied its first place it was called a point and not a line, so, by the same reasoning, when it occupies its second place and its third, and all the rest, it will not be a line but, as before, a point. [384] And if it makes the line by occupying one place and extending into another, it extends over a place that is either divisible or indivisible. And if it is indivisible, it remains a point and does not become a line; for the line is a divisible [385] thing; and if it extends over a divisible place, then, since what extends over a divisible place is divisible and has parts, and what has parts is a body, the sign will be both divisible and a body; and this they do not want to admit. So then the line is not one single sign.—Nor yet is it many signs set in a row. [386] For these signs, as conceived, either are in contact with one another or do not touch one another but are separated by intercepting spaces. But if they are intercepted by spaces they will no longer make one line. And if they touch one another they either touch wholes as wholes or parts with parts. [387] And if they touch parts with parts they will no longer be without parts; for, to take an example, the sign which stands midway between two other signs will have several parts,—one by which it touches the sign in front of it, another by which it makes contact with that behind it, a third by which it touches the surface, a fourth by which it touches the part which lies above; so that it is no longer without parts but with many parts. [388] And if they touch wholes as wholes, signs will be contained in signs and will occupy the same place. And if they shall occupy the same place there will no longer be a row of them, so as to form a line, but they will all be one point. If, then, in order [389] to form a conception of body, one must first conceive length, and conceive line, again, before length, and sign before line, then—since the line has been shown to be neither a sign nor a compound of signs,—the line is nothing. And if the line does not exist, neither does length; and from this it follows that no body exists either.

[390] We pointed out just now, by examining the sign, that the line is inconceivable; but it is also possible to abolish it directly by examining its own conception. For the Geometers state that “the line is length [391]without breadth”; but we in our inquiry are unable to perceive length without breadth either in sensibles or in intelligibles; for whatever sensible length we perceive we perceive as including a certain breadth. So that there does not exist among sensibles any [body] without breadth. [392] Nor yet is it possible to imagine amongst intelligibles any length of this kind. For although we are able to think of one length as narrower than another, yet when we keep the same length and, in our thoughts, gradually pare off its breadth and keep on doing this up to a certain point, then we conceive the breadth becoming ever less and less, but when we have gone so far as to deprive the length of its breadth altogether, we no longer conceive even the length, but along with the removal of the breadth the conception of the length also is removed.

[393] In general, too, everything which is conceived is conceived either through the presentation of things manifest to the senses or through transition from things manifest, and this again in various ways—at one time through resemblance, at another through composition, at another by analogy, and this again by way either of increase or of decrease. [394] Thus it is through the presentation of things manifest that things like white and black and sweet and bitter are conceived; for these things, though they are sensible, are none the less conceived. And things are conceived through transition from things manifest either by way of resemblance (as, for instance, the absent [395] Socrates from a likeness of Socrates); or by way of composition (as, for instance, from man and horse the Hippocentaur, which is neither man nor horse but compounded of both); or by analogy, which may either magnify or diminish the object,—as when from seeing the man of average size, as presented to our senses, by magnifying him in imagination we conceive the Cyclops who was

Less like a corn-eating man than a forest-clad peak of the
mountains,

and by diminishing him we derive a conception of the pygmy. [396] Seeing, then, that there are so many modes of conception, if a length without breadth is conceived, it must be conceived after one of these modes; but it cannot be conceived after any of them, as we shall establish, so that it is inconceivable.—[397] Now the conception of a length without breadth will not be formed through the presentation of things manifest; for we have never met with length without breadth amongst objects that are apparent and manifest to the senses. [398] And it is likewise impossible for length without breadth to be imagined through transition from things manifest, or through resemblance; for amongst things manifest we have not got any length without breadth, so as to enable us to conceive a length without breadth resembling it. For what resembles anything ought to bear resemblance to what is known and seen; since then we have no length without breadth that is manifestly perceived, we shall not be able to discern the existence of any length without breadth which resembles it. [399] Nor, again, is it perceptible through composition; for let them tell us what objects made manifest by sense they compounded with what in order to form the notion of length without breadth,—and that they will not be able to tell us. [400] Nor yet was the notion of length without breadth suggested by analogy. For things conceived by way of analogy possess something in common with the things from which their conception is derived; for example, from the common feature of man’s size, by enlargement, we conceive the Cyclops, and conversely, by diminution of the same object, the pygmy. [401] Consequently, if things conceived by analogy have some feature in common with those from which the conception is derived, but we find nothing that is common both to length without breadth and to length with breadth, to enable us by starting from the latter to arrive at the conception of length without breadth,—then this conception is not formed by analogy either. [402] Hence, if everything which is conceived must be conceived in one of the ways mentioned, and we have shown that length without breadth cannot be conceived in any way, we must declare that length without breadth is inconceivable.

[403] But someone, perhaps, will say that we conceive length without breadth by a process of “intension” “when we have taken a certain length with a certain breadth; for if, starting with this, the breadth is gradually diminished, it will come in time to being without breadth, so that the decrease ends in length without breadth. [404] But, firstly, we have shown that the complete removal of breadth is also the abolition of length. And next, what is conceived through intension is not other than what was previously conceived but that very same thing after undergoing intension. [405] Since, then, we propose to conceive something from that which has a certain breadth, through intension of narrowness, we certainly shall not conceive length without breadth (for this is a [406]heterogeneous thing), but we shall apprehend a breadth that is ever getting more and more narrow, so that our conception ends in the least possible breadth, and after this there follows a transition to what is heterogeneous, that is to say, when the length is abolished along with the breadth.—[407] Also, in general, if we can conceive length without breadth through privation of breadth, since all privatives are non-existent in reality,neither does length without breadth exist; nor, in consequence, the line. Thus, horse is a thing which exists in reality, but “not horse” does not exist; and man exists, but “not man” does not exist. So then, if we perceive a breadth or a length, it will exist in reality; but “without breadth” will not exist. [408] As, then, those men who assert that they form a notion of an infinite magnitude as body by superimposing one magnitude on another are in error, and while they grasp a maximum through the superimposition of many magnitudes, yet this is not infinite but limited (for what they conceived last is capable of being contained [409] by the intellect, and what is capable of being contained by the intellect is limited, since otherwise, of course, what remains as yet uncontained by the intellect convicts what is contained of not being infinite),—so too in this case, the contraction of the breadth, when the intellect ends with a minimal breadth, is a breadth and not a length without breadth.—[410] And further: if it is possible for those who have conceived a length with a certain breadth to deprive it of its breadth and thus to conceive length without breadth, it will also be possible for them, when they have conceived flesh which possesses the property of vulnerability, by privation of the property [411] of vulnerability to conceive invulnerable flesh; and after conceiving a body with the property of solidity, it will be feasible for them, by privation of the property of solidity, to conceive a non-solid body. But this is impossible; for what is conceived as invulnerable is not flesh (for flesh was conceived as including the property of vulnerability), and the non-solid is not body (for body was conceived as including the property of solidity). So too the length conceived as without breadth is not length (for length is conceived as including a certain breadth).

[412] Aristotle, however, declared that the length without breadth of the Geometers is not inconceivable (“for in fact we apprehend the length of a wall without having a perception of the wall’s breadth” ); but he is in error. For when we apprehend the length of a wall without its breadth, we do not apprehend it as without any breadth but without the breadth which belongs to the wall. For it is possible by connecting the length of the wall with some breadth (whatever it be) to form a notion of it, so that its length is not apprehended without breadth but without this particular breadth. [413] But the task before Aristotle was to establish that it is possible to conceive, not the length which is devoid of a certain breadth, but that which is devoid of any breadth at all; and this he did not establish.

[414] Furthermore, since the Geometers assert that the line is not only “length without breadth” but also “the limit of a surface,” [this being length and breadth without depth,] it will be possible for us to discuss more generally the difficulties involved both in line and in surface. For if the line is the limit of a surface, and is length without breadth, then certainly, when surface is set beside surface either there are two parallel lines or one compounded of both. [415] And if the two parallel lines become one, since the line is the limit of the surface and the surface the limit of the body, when the two lines become one the two surfaces also will become one. And thus the two bodies also will be one body, and because of this the juxtaposition will no longer be juxtaposition but unification. But this is impossible; for though in some cases when bodies are juxtaposed unification is the natural result (as in the case of liquids), yet in other cases it is not so; for stone is not made one with stone, nor adamant with adamant, by juxtaposition. So that two lines will not become one.—[416] And again, if we grant that they do become one, and that owing to this there is unification of the bodies, their separation will have to take place not at the same limits but in various other parts, as they are forcibly pulled apart. But this is not so; for the nature of the limits remains the same both before the juxtaposition and after their separation. Therefore the two parallel lines do not become one.—Moreover, if the two lines become one the juxtaposed bodies will be smaller by one extreme edge; for the two lines have become one, and this one must necessarily have one edge. But juxtaposed bodies do not become smaller by one edge, so that the two lines will not be one.—[417] And if the two parallel lines remain two, the sum of the two will be greater than the one. And if the sum of the two shall be greater than the one line, each of them will possess breadth, which when ranged along with the other produces a larger dimension. And thus the line will not be “length without breadth”; or if it is, the result must be that the evidence of sense is rendered shaky, as we have shown.

[418] Let this, then, serve as our direct reply to the Mathematicians’ formal account of bodies and limits; [419] and let us pass on next to consider whether, even on their own assumptions, their account is admissible. The Geometers, then, are of opinion that the straight line by revolving describes circles with all its parts. But the fact that the line is length without breadth conflicts at once with this theorem of theirs. [420] For since every part of the line, as they assert, contains a sign, and the sign by revolving describes a circle, when the straight line, by revolving and describing a circle with all its parts, has measured out the distance of the surface which extends from the centre to the outermost circumference, then the parallel circles are either continuous or separate from one another. [421] But whichever of these alternatives the Geometers may adopt, they will involve themselves in an almost insuperable difficulty. For if these circles are separate from one another there will be a certain part of the surface which is not formed into a circle, and of the line which does not form a circle, namely that which is situated at this interval of the surface. But this is absurd; [422] for the line certainly contains at this part a sign, and the sign by revolving at this part describes a circle; for that the line at any part of it should not contain a sign, or that the sign should not by revolving describe a circle, is contrary to the Geometers’ doctrine. [423] And if the circles are continuous, either they are continuous in such a way as to be situated in the same place or so that they are conceived as lying side by side in such a way that no sign can be inserted between them; for if one is inserted, it is bound to describe a circle. And if they occupy the same place they will all become one, and because of this the greatest circle [424] will not differ from the least; for if the innermost circle, which is next the centre, is the least, and the outermost circle, next to the circumference, is the greatest, and all occupy the same place, the least circle will be equal to the greatest circle; which is contrary to sense. So then, the circles are not continuous in such a way as to occupy the same place. [425] And if they are so juxtaposed that no sign is inserted between them, they fill up the breadth of the surface from the centre up to the outermost circumference. Since, then, what fills up a breadth necessarily possesses breadth, the circles, as filling up the breadth of the surface, will possess breadth. But the circles are lines; and so the lines are not without breadth.

[426] And it is possible to construct a proof of a similar character to the same effect. The Geometers assert that the straight line which describes a circle describes it of itself by revolving; and therefore we will propound to them this syllogism—“If the straight line which describes a circle describes the circle of itself, the line is not a length without breadth; but the straight line which describes a circle does, according to them, describe the circle of itself; therefore the line is not a length without breadth.” For when the [427] straight line drawn from the centre revolves and of itself describes the circle, either the straight line moves through all the parts of the surface within the circumference, or it moves through some parts and not through others. But if it moves through some parts and not through others, it certainly does not describe a circle, as it moves through some parts of the surface but does not move through others. And if it moves through them all, it will measure out the whole of the breadth within the circumference, and as measuring out the breadth it will possess breadth; for what is capable of measuring out breadth possesses breadth whereby it measures. [428] So for this reason also one must deny that the line is length without breadth.

The same thing becomes more evident when the Geometers state that the line drawn as side of the square measures of itself the surface bounded by parallel lines. For if the line is length without breadth, certainly the side of the square, being a line without breadth, will not measure out the surface bounded by parallel lines which has breadth; or, if it measures this, it will itself also have breadth whereby it measures. So that either their theorem proves false, or else the definition of the line as length without breadth.

[429] Also, they say that the cylinder touches the surface along a straight line and when rolling forward, by the placing of straight lines in turn, one after another, it measures out the surface. If, then, the cylinder touches the surface along a straight line and when rolling measures out the surface by placing its straight lines in turn, one after another, the surface certainly consists of straight lines, and the superficies of the cylinder likewise is made of straight lines. Since, then, the surface possesses breadth and the superficies of the cylinder also possesses it, and what fills up breadth is not without breadth, the lines as they fill up breadth will not be without breadth.

Moreover, even if we grant that the line is length [430] without breadth, none the less the Geometers will find that their account of body is hopeless. For just as the sign when it has flowed makes the line, so also the line by flowing makes the surface, which is “a limit of body possessing two dimensions, length and breadth.” [431] Since, then, the surface is a limit of body, body is certainly limited. And if so, when body is set beside body, then either the limits touch the limits, or the things limited the things limited, or the things limited touch the things limited and the limits also touch the limits. Thus (for our meaning will be made clear by an example) if we were to conceive the external earthenware of the jar as the limit and the wine within the jar as the thing limited, then when two jars are set side by side either the ware will touch the ware, or the wine the wine, or both the ware the ware and the wine the wine. [432] And if the limits touch the limits, the things limited (that is, the bodies) will not touch each other; which is absurd. And if the things limited touch the things limited—that is, bodies touch bodies,—they will have to be outside their own limits; which again is absurd. [433] And if the limits touch the limits and the things limited also the things limited, the difficulties will be combined; for in so far as the limits touch one another the things limited will not touch one another; and in so far as the latter are in contact with one another they will be outside their own limits.—Furthermore, if the [434] surface is a limit and the body a thing limited, the surface is either a body or incorporeal. And if it is a body, it is false that the surface is without depth; for every body partakes of depth. Moreover, the limit will not touch anything, but every body will be [435] of unlimited size; for if the surface is body, since every body has a limit, that limit again, being a body, will have a limit, and this again a third, and the third a fourth, and so on ad infinitum. And if the surface is incorporeal, since the incorporeal cannot touch anything or be touched by anything, the limits will not be in contact with one another, and if these are not in contact neither will the things limited be in contact. [436] So that even if we disregard the line, the hopelessness of the account given of surface reduces us to a state of suspension.

So, then, we have now carried out our investigations, while confining ourselves to the notions of body and limits, and also to the Geometers’ theorems. [437] But it is possible, also, to repeat our former argument which deduces our thesis in a convincing way: If a body exists, it is either sensible or intelligible. And it is not sensible; for it is “a complex quality perceived through the combination of form, size, and solidity”; and a quality perceived through a combination of things is not sensible; therefore the body also, conceived as body, is not sensible. Nor yet is it intelligible. [438] For in order that there may be a conception of body, there must already exist in the nature of things some sensible object from which the conception of body may be formed. But nothing exists in the nature of things besides body and the incorporeal, and of these the incorporeal is of itself intelligible, and body, as we have proved, is not sensible. [439] Since, then, there does not exist in the nature of things any sensible object from which the notion of body may be formed, body will not be intelligible either. But if it is neither sensible nor intelligible, and besides these there is no other alternative, one must declare that body is nothing.

[440] But now that the account given of bodies has been shown by these arguments to be hopeless, we shall start afresh and try to demonstrate that the account given of the other things, the incorporeals, is equally so.

Against the Physicists, Book II

Section titled “Against the Physicists, Book II”

[1] After the foregoing discussion of body and limits, criticizing both the Physicists and the Geometers, the investigation of “Place” seems to follow next; for it is maintained by them all with one accord that body either is contained in place or moves in place. [2] Hence we must notice first that, according to Epicurus, “of the intangible nature one part is named void,’ another ‘ place,’ another ‘ room,’” the names being varied according to the different applications, since the same nature is termed “void” when destitute of any body, and is called “place” when occupied by a body, and becomes “room” when bodies pass through it. But the general designation “intangible nature” is given to it by Epicurus owing to its lack of resistant touch. [3] And the Stoics assert that “void is that which is capable of being occupied by an existent but is not so occupied, or an interval empty of body, or an interval unoccupied by body; and place is that which is occupied by an existent and made equal to that which occupies it” (calling body now “an existent,” as is plain from the interchange of the names); and“room,” they say, is “an interval partly occupied by body and partly unoccupied.” [4] But some have said that room is “the place of the larger body,” so that room differs from place in the fact that the latter does not imply magnitude of the contained body (for even if it contains a minimal body it is none the less termed “place” ), whereas the former implies considerable magnitude in the body it contains. [6] Now “void” we have already discussed in various ways in our sections “Concerning Elements,” and there is no need now to repeat the same account; on the present occasion we shall examine “place” and the allied subject of “room,” which itself also comes under the head of place. For along with these, which are more evident and subjects of almost universal agreement, the inquiry about void also will be shown to involve doubt, in so far as it deals with a less evident matter.

Chapter I. Does Place Exist?

Section titled “Chapter I. Does Place Exist?”

Now that the conception of place has been explained and the things allied therewith indicated, it remains for us—in accordance with the Sceptics’ custom—to expound the arguments on both sides and to justify the suspension of judgement deduced therefrom. [7] If, then, there exist upwards and downwards, and rightwards and leftwards, and forwards and backwards, some place exists; for these six directions are parts of place, and it is impossible that, if the parts of a thing exist, the thing of which they are parts should not exist. But upwards and downwards, and rightwards and leftwards, and forwards and backwards, do exist in the nature of things; [8] therefore place exists.—Moreover, if where Socrates was another man (such as Plato) now is, Socrates being dead, then place exists. For just as, when the liquid in the pitcher has been emptied out and other liquid poured in, we declare that the pitcher, which is the place both of the former liquid and of that poured in later, exists, so likewise, if another man now occupies the place which Socrates occupied when [9] he was alive, some place exists.—Again, if a body exists, place also exists; but in fact the first (is true); therefore the second (is true).—Further, if where what is light naturally moves there what is heavy naturally does not move, there exists a separate place for the light and for the heavy; but in fact the first (is true); therefore the second (is true). For certainly fire, which is naturally light, tends to ascend, and water, which is naturally heavy, presses downwards, and neither does fire move downwards nor water shoot upwards. There exists, therefore, a separate place both for the naturally light and for the naturally heavy.—Also, just as if there exists [10] that from which a thing becomes, and that by which a thing becomes, and that on account of which a thing becomes, so too there will exist that in which a thing becomes. But that from which a thing becomes (namely, its matter) exists, and that by which (namely, its cause), and that on account of which (that is, its end); therefore, that in which a thing becomes (that is, its place) exists also.—The [11] ancients also in planning the order of the Universe laid down place as the first principle of all things, and starting out from it Hesiod proclaimed how—Verily first created of all was Chaos; thereafter Earth broad-bosom’d, unshakable seat of all things for ever—

meaning by “Chaos” the place which serves to contain all things; for if this had not subsisted neither earth nor water nor the rest of the elements, nor the Universe as a whole, could have been constructed. [12] And even if, in imagination, we abolish all things, the place wherein all things were will not be abolished, but remains possessing its three dimensions—length, depth, breadth,—but without solidity; for this is an attribute peculiar to body.

There are also other reasons of this kind which the Dogmatic philosophers are wont to enumerate for the purpose of establishing the real existence of place. [13] But they are able to effect anything rather than this. For to try to argue from the parts of place that place itself also exists is perfectly childish; for he who does not grant them that the whole exists will not concede that the parts of the whole exist. And besides, since the parts of a thing are that very thing whereof they are the parts, he who argues—“If the parts of place exist, place exists”—is virtually saying “If place exists, place exists.” But this is absurd; for the thing in question is brought in for the purpose of confirming itself as though it were not in question. [14] And the same may be said when they deduce the existence of place from the fact that Plato now exists in the place where Socrates existed. For while we are inquiring whether the place in which the body exists, as distinct from the body itself which is said to be contained therein, is an existent thing they reply to us—as though it were agreed—that Socrates was in a place and that Plato is now contained in that place. [15] Now it is agreed that, speaking loosely, we say that a man is in Alexandria or in the gymnasium or in the school; but our investigation is not concerned with place in the broad sense but with that in the circumscribed sense, as to whether this exists or is merely imagined; and if it exists, of what sort it is in its nature, whether corporeal or incorporeal, and whether contained in place or not. And none of these points have those who employ the foregoing arguments been able to establish.—[16] Nor is it granted that there is any body which is naturally light, so that it moves into a separate place of its own, but even that which seems to be such is driven up into certain places by some cause and through compulsion. And further, even if it be granted that a naturally light and a naturally heavy exist, none the less it will again be a matter of doubt into what it moves, whether into some body or into a void or a limit or something else possessed of a [17] distinct nature. “Yes,” (they reply,) “but if the from which’ and the by which’ and the ‘ on account of which’ exist, the ‘ in which’ will also exist.” Not necessarily, we shall say. For if there is doubt about that” from which” a thing becomes (that is, the passive element), and about the “by which” (namely, the cause), and in general about becoming and perishing, or motion generally, then the “in which” also will necessarily be involved in the same doubt. And that these things are matters of doubt we have shown before in our discussion of agent and patient, and we shall point it out again when considering becoming and perishing, and also, at an earlier stage, motion. [18] For he who said—

Verily first created of all was Chaos; thereafter Earth broad-bosom’d, of all things the seat—is refuted by himself; for if someone asks him “from what did Chaos come into being?,” he will have no answer. And this, as some say, was the reason why Epicurus took to philosophizing. [19] For when still quite a youth a he asked his schoolmaster, who was reading out the line “Verily first created of all was Chaos,” what Chaos was created from, if it was created first. And when he replied that it was not his business, but that of the men called philosophers, to teach things of that sort, “Well then,” said Epicurus, “I must go off to them, if it is they who know the truth of things.”

So from this it is already evident that nothing pertinent is said to show that place is a real thing; [20] and to this we must further add the Sceptics’ arguments:—If there exists any place receptive of body, it is either body or void. But the place receptive of body is not body; for if every body must be in a place, and place is a body, place will be in a place, and this again in a third, and the third in a fourth, and so on ad infinitum. [21] So then the place receptive of body is not a body. And if the place receptive of body is a void, this void either remains when the body comes upon it, or moves away, or perishes. And if it remains when the body comes upon it, it will be at once both void and full,—void in so far as it remains, but full in so far as it admits the body. But it is irrational to say that the same thing is both void and full; the void, then, does not remain when the body comes upon it. [22] And if the void moves away, the void will be body, for that which moves away from place to place is a body. But the void is not a body, so that it does not move away either when the body comes upon it. And besides, if it moves away when the body comes upon it, it will no longer receive the body; and this too is itself an absurd notion. [23] It remains, therefore, to declare that the void perishes; which again is impossible. For if it perishes, it becomes in a state of change and motion [and if it perishes it is generable]; but that which becomes in a state of change and motion is a body [both generable and perishable]; so that the void does not perish. And so, if place is neither a body, as we have established, nor void, as we have shown, no place will exist.

[24] And furthermore, if place is conceived as containing body, and that which contains is outside of that which is contained, necessarily, if place exists, it must be some one of those things of which one is matter, another form, another the interval between the extreme limits of the body, another the extreme limits. [25] Now place will not be matter for many reasons,—because, for instance, the latter is corporealized but place is not corporealized, and matter passes over from place to place, but place does not pass over from place to place. And as regards matter we say that formerly it was air but now after condensation it has become water, or conversely that formerly it was water but now after rarefaction it has become air; but we do not speak thus in the case of place, but we say that formerly there was air in it but now there is water in it. So then place cannot be conceived as matter.—Nor, in fact, as form. [26] For form is inseparable from matter,—as in the case of the statue it is inseparable from the underlying bronze,—but place is separate from body; for the latter changes its position and moves on to another place, while the place wherein it was contained does not change position along with it. So that if form is inseparable from matter, whereas place is separate from it, place will not be form. And again,—the form changes its position along with the matter, but place, as I said before, does not change its position [27] along with body; so then place is not form.—So likewise it is not the interval between the limits; for this is enclosed by the limits, whereas place refuses to be enclosed by anything, but itself serves to enclose other things. Moreover, surface is a limit of body, and the interval after the surface is nothing else than the limited body. If, then, we assert that what is between [the limited bodies] is place, place will be [28] a body; which is contrary to sense.—It remains, then, to declare that the extreme limits of the body are place; but this itself, too, is a thing impossible, since the extremities of the body are continuous with the body and parts thereof and inseparable, whereas place is neither continuous with the body nor a part of it nor inseparable from the body. Neither, then, is place the extremities of the bodies. [29] But if place is neither matter nor form nor the interval between the limits nor the extremities of the body, and besides these one can conceive no other possibility, we must declare that place is nothing.

[30] “Yes,” say the Peripatetic philosophers, “but place is the limit of the containing body.” For since earth is contained in water, and water contained in air, and air in fire, and fire in Heaven,—just as the limit of the vessel is the place of the body in the vessel, so also the limit of water is the place of earth, and the limit of air is the place of water, and the limit of fire will be the place of air, and the limit of Heaven will be the place of fire. [31] When we come to the Heaven itself, however, according to Aristotle, it is not in place but abides within itself and in its own proper selfhood; for since place is the extreme limit of the containing body, and according to this philosopher nothing exists outside Heaven so that its limit should be the place of Heaven, it is necessary that Heaven, being contained by nothing, should exist in itself and be contained within its own limits, and not exist in place. [32] Hence Heaven is not existent anywhere; for that which exists anywhere both exists itself and its “where” is other than it, but Heaven has no other thing besides and outside of itself; and on this account, as existing itself within [33] itself, it will not be anywhere.—And so far as regards these statements of the Peripatetics, it seems likely that the First God is the place of all things. For according to Aristotle the First God is the limit of Heaven. Either, then, God is something other than the Heaven’s limit, or God is just that limit. And if He is other than Heaven’s limit, something else will exist outside Heaven, and its limit will be the place of Heaven, and thus the Aristotelians will be granting that Heaven is contained in place; but this they will not tolerate, as they are opposed to both these notions,—both that anything exists outside of Heaven and that Heaven is contained in place. And if God is identical with Heaven’s limit, since Heaven’s limit is the place of all things within Heaven, God—according to Aristotle—will be the place of all things; and [34] this, too, is itself a thing contrary to sense.—Also, in general, if the limit of the enclosing body is the place of the enclosed, this limit is either a body or incorporeal. And if it is a body, since every body must be in a place, place will be in a place and will no longer be place; but if the limit of the containing body is incorporeal, since the limit of every body is a surface, the place of each body will be a surface, [35] which is absurd.—Also, in general, how is it other than ridiculous to say that Heaven is itself its own place? For in this case the same thing will be both the container and the contained, and the same thing both one and two, both body and incorporeal. For in so far as it is the same thing it will be one, but in so far as it is both container and contained it will be two; and in so far as it is contained it will be body, but in so far as it is container, incorporeal; for it is place. [36] But the same thing cannot be conceived as at once both one and two, both body and incorporeal; so then, neither with this conception of it does the apprehension of place have an easy course.

And now that we have abolished this also, let us next consider whether any of the existing things can move in space.

Chapter II. Does Motion Exist?

Section titled “Chapter II. Does Motion Exist?”

[37] Aristotle said that there are six kinds of motion, and of these one is local transition, another change, another becoming, another perishing, another [38]increase, another decrease; but the majority—amongst whom Aenesidemus is included—allow that motion, in its main kinds, is twofold, one sort being that of change, the second that of transition; and of these [39] the motion of change is that by which the body, while remaining identical in substance, receives different qualities at different times, putting off one quality and putting on another,—the sort of thing which takes place in the case of wine changing into vinegar and in the case of the grape when it changes from a state of acidity to a sweet flavour, or when the chameleon or polypod takes on a variety of different colours at different times. [40] Hence, too, it must be affirmed that becoming and perishing and increase, and decrease as well, are particular forms of change; and they assert that these come under the head of the motion of change, unless perhaps someone should assert that increase belongs to transitional motion, as it is the progress of bodies towards length and breadth. [41] And transitional motion is that by which the moving object passes from place to place, either wholly or partially,—wholly as we see in the case of runners and walkers, and partially as in the case of a hand which is extended and clenched, or in the case of the parts of a sphere which is spinning round its centre. For while this as a whole remains in the same place, its parts change their places; for the part which was formerly below becomes above, and the above below, and the [42] before behind.—Some of the physicists, however,—and amongst them Epicurus—have declared that the motion of change is a particular form of transitional motion; for the composite object which changes in quality changes owing to the local and transitional motion of the rationally perceived bodies which compose it. [43] Thus, in order that a thing may become bitter from sweet, or black from white, the molecules which compose it must be arranged in a new order and take up different positions; and this could not be brought about otherwise than by the transitional motion of the molecules. And again,—in order that a thing may become soft from hard or hard from soft, the parts whereof it is composed must move in place; [44] for it is made soft by their expansion, but made hard by their coalescence and condensation. And owing to this the motion of change is, generically, nothing else than transitional motion. Consequently, we shall bring our criticisms to bear chiefly on this last, since if it is abolished the motion of change will also disappear.

[45] But before we begin our criticisms we must observe that there have been three main views regarding motion. Some say that motion exists, others that it does not exist, and others that it is “no more” existent than non-existent. That it exists is affirmed both by ordinary folk, who pay attention to appearances, and by the majority of physicists, such as Pythagoras and Empedocles and Anaxagoras and Democritus and Epicurus, to whose view also the Peripatetics have subscribed, and the Stoics as well, and a host of others. [46] But its non-existence is affirmed by Parmenides and Melissus, whom Aristotle has described as “Nature’s stationers” and “antinaturalists”—“stationers” from “standing still,” and “anti-naturalists” because Nature is the first principle of motion, and it they abolished by declaring that nothing moves. [47] For what moves must complete a certain interval, but every interval is incapable of being completed because it admits of division ad infinitum, so that no moving thing will exist. [48] And with these men Diodorus Cronos also is in agreement, unless it should be said that according to him something has moved but not a single thing is moving—as we shall explain later in the course of our argument, when we come to examine his view more closely. For the present it is enough to notice this point, that he too is of the same opinion as those who have abolished motion. [49] And that motion is “no more” existent than non-existent has been stated by the Sceptics; for motion is an existent thing if we are to judge by appearances, but judging by philosophical argument it is non-existent.

[50] Such, then, is the dissension with regard to this subject; and after this, in our endeavour to show the non-existence of motion, we shall bring forward our first objections by concentrating on the conception of motion. Some, then, in defining motion assert that “Motion is transition from place to place.” [51] And to these it is replied that while they have described straight-line motion—that is, up or down, forwards or backwards, to right or to left,—they have passed over circular motion, such as that by which the potter’s wheel revolves and the sphere spins round its pivots, and likewise axles and drums; for each of the bodies which move in this way does not pass on from place to place but moves whilst remaining in the same place.—[52] Hence, by way of escaping this objection, some rectify the definition put forward and say that “Motion is transition from place to place either of the whole body or of the parts of the whole.” For he who moves while walking passes as a whole from place to place, but the sphere which spins round on its pivots does not as a whole pass from place to place but changes its place part by part, and as it turns round the upper part comes to occupy the lower place and the lower part passes into the upper place; and the remaining parts likewise alternate. Hence, they say, we must declare that motion is a transition from place to place either of the whole moving body or of the [53] parts of the whole.—But these men in trying to escape the difficulty mentioned have fallen into another. For not everything which moves by way of transition passes from place to place either in its wholeness or part by part, but there are some of the bodies moving by transition which move with some of their parts while remaining in the same place, but move with others while not remaining in the same place but occupying one place after another, as we can see in the case of compasses when they are describing a circle and of a door that is being opened or shut. [54] For in the case of the compasses the leg that rests on the centre is evidently turning in the same place while that which revolves outside it and describes the circle passes from one place to another; and in the case of the door which is being shut or opened the pivot which is set in the socket turns there in the same place but the part of the door opposite thereto passes on to different places and leaves one and occupies another. [55] —These motions, then, are omitted from their description; but there is also another more surprising kind of transitional motion, in which the moving object is conceived as not going out from the place wherein it is either as a whole or part by part; and this too is omitted from their definition, as is obvious at once. And the peculiar character of this motion will be more evident when we have explained it by an example. [56] For if we should suppose that, when a ship is running before the wind, a man is carrying an upright rod from the prow to the stern and moving at the same speed as the ship, so that in the time in which the latter completes the distance of a cubit in a forward direction, in an equal time the man who is moving in the ship passes over the distance of a cubit in a backward direction, then, in the case thus supposed there will certainly be transitional motion, but the moving object will not go out from the place wherein [57] it is either wholly or in part; for the man who is moving in the ship remains in the same perpendicular both of air and of water owing to the fact that he is borne just as far forward as he seems to proceed backward. It is, then, possible for a thing which does not quit the place wherein it is either wholly or in part to move transitionally.—Such then, as it seems, [58] are cases of this sort; and there are other difficulties which may be encountered by those who thus define the notion of transitional motion. For if we conceive an indivisible and minimal body revolving in the same place,—that is, with a circular motion,—a transitional motion will exist, but the moving body will not quit the place wherein it is either wholly or in part—not wholly, since it is assumed to be revolving with circular motion in the same spot, nor in part, since it is without parts. [59] And the same argument applies, if we should construct a straight line out of indivisible bodies placed in a row, and conceive this as revolving in the same place, as do axles; for here again there will be transitional motion but the straight line will not quit the place wherein it is either as a whole (for the motion it has is circular only) or in part (for in indivisible bodies there are no parts).

[60] But those who do not admit the existence of any indivisibles will evade these objections, and they will say that it is only in conception that this sort of motion proceeds, and it must be examined in the case of existing bodies. [61] Consequently, these men will answer thus; but those who maintain that indivisible bodies exist, and that at the minimal point there is a termination to the division of bodies, will not be able to say anything in reply to criticisms of this kind. Nevertheless, even if we refrain from pursuing these, the argument which establishes the non-existence of motion and that which proves its existence will be found to be equipollent. [62] For the evidence of sense advocates the existence of motion, although about this there is disputation, inasmuch as some assert that motion is perceived by sense, but others that it is not perceived at all by sense but by the intellect through sensation. [63] And those who declare that motion is an object of sense support this view by the fact that the same affection is not produced in the sense—in sight, for example—by a moving object when it moves and by a stationary object when it remains stationary, but the motionless object produces one sort of affection and the moving object a different sort, so that in this way motion is perceptible by sense. [64] But those who maintain that it is not perceived by sense, but by the intellect through sensation, assert that every motion comes about through concurrent recollection; for by recalling that this particular body was formerly in that particular place but now is in this we acquire the conception of motion and of being moved. But recollection itself is the work not of any irrational sense but of the reasoning faculty. It results, therefore, that motion is not perceived by sense but by intellect. [65] And further, all motion is conceived as involving departure from and occupation of place; but sense cannot perceive either place (for no place is sensible), or occupation and departure (for these things are observed through memory, but sense being irrational is without memory). Therefore motion is not a sensible object.

[66] However, it is a matter of indifference whether motion is apprehended chiefly by sense or by intellect; for it is plain that the evidence of facts seems to bear out the view that motion exists. And for this reason the Dogmatic philosophers are in the habit of using no other means than this to put the Doubters to shame. [67] For, say they, if motion does not exist how does the sun run its own special course from its rising to its setting? Or how do the changes of the seasons—spring, summer, autumn and winter—take place? For it is owing to the sun’s motions, its advances and recessions, that these occur. [68] And how do ships, after putting out to sea from harbours, put in to land in other harbours? And how is it that the Doubter who abolishes motion goes forth from his house in the morning and, after transacting some ordinary business, returns to it again? For all these are irrefutable signs of motion. Hence also one of the ancient Cynics, when the arguments against motion were propounded to him, made no reply at all but stood up and walked about, thus flouting the folly of the sophist by the evidence of actual fact. [69] And there are hosts of similar arguments which those of the opposite side are wont to adduce in support of the existence of motion. And as we, too, are content with these as affording sufficient support for the establishment of this view, we shall now turn to argue for the opposite view. For if it be shown that the non-existence of motion is equal to the existence of motion in respect of probability and improbability, there will certainly follow assent to neither but suspension of judgement regarding both.

[70] If, then, anything has a primary motion (an element, for instance), it is moved either by itself or by another; but (it is moved) neither by itself, as we shall show, nor by another, as we shall explain; therefore it is not moved. Thus, for example, if everything which is moved is moved by another it is moved either while that which moves it accompanies it or while it does not accompany it; but, as we shall show, it is not moved either while it accompanies or while it recedes from it; therefore, what is moved is not moved by another. [71] For if what is moved is moved while its mover accompanies it, all things will have to accompany that one thing, whatsoever it be, which is being moved. Thus if, for the sake of argument, each one of the twenty-four letters is moved by another, it is necessary that all the rest should accompany Alpha when it is moved by Beta, since, just as Beta in moving Alpha follows Alpha, so also Gamma will accompany Beta as being its mover, and Delta Gamma and so on up to Omega. [72] So, too, with objects in the Universe, if each moving object must have its mover following it, all things will follow after a single moving object. But it is absurd to say that if one thing moves all things move; therefore the mover does not follow the thing moved.—[73] And if it is separated from it, as the hand is parted from the ball when it is being flung away, the movements away from it must necessarily cause the thing moved to be somehow affected and disposed by that which moves it. Since, then, what is affected cannot be affected otherwise than by way of addition or of subtraction or of change, what is moved will have to undergo one of these modes of affection at the hands of its mover when being moved, since, if it is not affected in any of these ways, it will stand still when its mover is separated from it. [74] But we have shown that the account given of subtraction and addition and change is open to doubt, so that neither when the mover is parted from it will what is moved be in motion.—[75] And besides, if what is moved moves through being affected either by way of subtraction or of addition or of change, the atoms will not move because they do not admit of addition or subtraction or change. Neither, then, is what moves moved by another. For if, in order that it should be moved by another, it must be moved either while that other follows with it or while it does not so follow, and each of these alternatives has been proved to be impossible, we must declare that it is not moved by another.—[76] Moreover, if everything which moves is moved by some other thing, that which moves it either is in motion itself or is motionless. But it is impossible for it to be motionless; for what causes motion is active, and what is active is in motion, therefore what causes motion is in motion. And if it is in motion, since everything in motion is moved by something else, it too, being in motion, will have to be moved by some third thing, and the third by a fourth, and the fourth by a fifth, and so on ad infinitum; so that motion comes to have no beginning. But this is absurd; therefore what is in motion is not moved by another.

Nor yet will a thing be moved by itself. [77] For if it is self-moved it is of a nature which is movable either in all directions or in some one direction, as in the case of the primary and elemental bodies, since our argument is against the Physicists. But if it has a nature which is movable in all directions, it will not [78] move; for it will not be borne upwards since it is also of a nature which is movable downwards, nor downwards as being movable upwards, nor forwards as movable backwards, nor backwards as movable forwards. And the same argument applies to the two [79] other directions. And if it possesses a nature capable of being moved in some one direction, if this be upwards (like fire and air), all things will move upwards, while if it be downwards only (like earth and water) all things will move downwards. And if it is of a nature which is partly movable in the upward direction and partly in the downward, no [80]combination will take place between the moving bodies; for if the elemental bodies are conceived as moving from the centre towards the limits, the whole will be dissolved; for each being separated from each will run on its own special course, the ascending upwards and the descending downwards. [81] And if they are supposed to be driven together towards the centre from the limits, they will certainly be transported either along the same or not along the same vertical line. And if they are borne along the same line, they will necessarily collide with one another, and thus they will either be of equal force and come to rest, neither side being victorious, and neither the upward nor the downward body yielding to force (though it is absurd to say that rest occurs in things which are by nature [82] in motion), or if, on the contrary, they are of unequal force they will be borne into one place only, either into that above if the ascending bodies have gained the mastery, or into that below if the descending bodies are the more powerful. But if they do not move along the same vertical line, they do not meet with one another, and not meeting they will not be capable of effecting any combination. But this is absurd. So then, that which is in motion is not self-moved.—[83] Again, if what is moved is self-moved, since everything which causes motion does so either by propelling or by dragging or by heaving up and pressing down, the self-moved too, being the cause of its own motion will have to cause motion either by propelling or by dragging or by heaving up and pressing down. [84] But if it moves by propelling it will be behind itself (for what propels is behind what is propelled), and if by dragging it will be in front of itself, and if by heaving and pressing, beneath itself. But it is impossible to conceive of a thing being either behind or before or beneath itself; therefore what is moved is not self-moved. But if what is moved is moved neither by another nor by itself, and besides these there is no other alternative, one must declare that what is moved is not in motion.

[85] And another weighty argument for the non-existence of motion is adduced by Diodorus Cronos, by means of which he establishes that not a single thing is in motion, but has been in motion. And the fact that nothing is in motion follows from his assumptions of indivisibles. [86] For the indivisible body must be contained in an indivisible place and therefore must not move either in it (for it fills it up, but a thing which is to move must have a larger place) or in the place in which it is not; for as yet it is not in this place so as to be moved therein; consequently it is not in motion. But, according to reason, it has been in motion; for that which was formerly observed in this place is now observed in another place, which would not have occurred if it had not been moved. Thus this man, in trying to support his own dogma, has admitted what is an absurdity; for how is it other than absurd to say that while nothing moves something has moved? But the Sceptics, being equally in doubt about being in motion and having been in motion, will not assent to any absurdity, such [87] as Diodorus has admitted.—This man, however, propounds the familiar argument to show that nothing moves, when he says—“If a thing moves, it moves either in the place where it is or in that where it is not; but it moves neither in the place where it is (for it remains therein) nor in that where it is not (for it does not exist therein); therefore nothing moves.” [88] Such then is his argument, and the method of proving its premisses is obvious. For as there are two places,—one being that wherein a thing is and the second that wherein it is not, and it being impossible to conceive a third place in addition to these two, the thing in motion, if it really moves, must move in one or other of these places; for it will not move in an inconceivable place. Now it does not move in the place wherein it is, for it fills it up; and, so long as it exists therein, it remains; and remaining therein it does not move. [89] And it is likewise impossible for it to move in the place wherein it is not; for where a thing does not exist, there it cannot either effect anything or be affected, and in the same way it cannot move; and just as no one could say that he who is in Rhodes is moving in Athens, so too in general one will not say of any body that it moves in that place where it does not exist. [90] Hence, if there are two places, that wherein it exists and that wherein it exists not, and it has been proved that the moving object cannot move in either of them, the moving object will not exist.

Such, then, is the method of proving his argument; but it is opposed by many in various ways, and we shall in the next place expound their objections. [91] Thus some assert that if preterites are true it is impossible that their presents should be false, and they must be true; and similarly the preterites must be false when the presents are false. For that thing whereof a limit exists, exists also itself, and of a thing non-existent no limit will exist. And if the preterite is a limit of the present, it is therefore necessary that when the preterite, which is a limit, exists the present also, whereof it is the limit, should exist. [92] And just as the preterite “to have become” is nothing if the present “to become” is not true, and just as the preterite “to have perished” is nothing if the present “to perish” has not pre-existed, so too it is impossible that the preterite “to have moved” should be true if the present “to move” is not true.

[93] Others assert that a thing can move in the place wherein it is contained; for the balls which spin round their pivots, and revolving axles, and drums, too, and potters’ wheels, and hosts of other bodies similar to these, move but move in the place wherein they are, so that one premiss of the argument—that [94] nothing moves in the place where it is—is false.—And others assert that the argument is propounded contrary to the conception of motion. For the moving object is conceived in conjunction with the place wherefrom it moves and that whereto it moves; consequently, when Diodorus says “If a thing moves, it moves either in the place wherein it is or in that wherein it is not” he says what is unsound and contrary to the conception of motion, inasmuch as the moving object does not move either in the place wherein it is, or in that wherein it is not, but through both places—both that wherefrom and that whereto [95] it moves.—And there have been some who have discerned an ambiguity. For “being contained in a place,” they say, has two meanings,—in the one “in a place” is used in the broad sense, as when we say of a man that he is “in Alexandria,” and in the other it is used of place in the exact sense, as the air which is moulded round the surface of my body might be said to be my place, and the jar is called the place of what is contained in it. So as “place” is now applied in two ways, they assert that the moving object can move in the place wherein it is—place in the broad sense,—as this possesses extension through which the processes of motion may take [96] place.—And some have thought that the argument of Diodorus is inconclusive, since it begins with a disjunctive premiss, and falsifies this by means of the succeeding statements, in that it proves that both its clauses are false,—both that a thing moves in the place where it is not and (that it does so) where it is.

[97] Such are the objections against the argument; but Diodorus seems to have answered the first one at once by explaining that when preterites are true their presents admit of being false. For suppose that a certain man married a year before and another a year after. Then, in the case of these men, the proposition “these men married,” which is a preterite, is true, but “these men are marrying,” which is a present, is false; for when this man was marrying that man was not yet marrying, and when that man was marrying this man was no longer marrying. And in their case the proposition “these men are marrying” would have been true of them only if they had been marrying simultaneously. It is possible, then, for the present to be false when the preterite is true. [98] Of the same sort, too, is the proposition “Helen had three husbands,” for neither when she had Menelaus as her husband in Sparta, nor when she had Paris in Ilium, nor when, after his death, she married Deiphobus, is the present—“she has three husbands”—true, though the preterite—“she had three husbands”—is true. [99] But here Diodorus is using sophistry and wishes to deceive us by ambiguity. For the proposition “these men married” has two senses, of which the one is plural and equivalent to “these men married together,” which is false, but the other is formed by the combination of one singular proposition “this man married,” and another singular proposition “that man married,” and of these singulars, again, the presents are true, namely, “this man is marrying” and “that man is marrying”; for these statements are true in both cases. [100] It is, then, impossible, if the presents are false, that their preterites should be found to be true; and of necessity both of them must either be abolished together or co-exist along with each other.

Nevertheless, Diodorus brings forward another argument against the same assumption, in which he employs a clearer example. [101] Let a ball, he says, be thrown on to an overhanging roof. Then, at the point of time that is midway in the throw, the proposition “the ball touches the roof” is false; for it is still on its way. But when it has touched the roof, the preterite “the ball has touched the roof” becomes true; therefore it is possible for the preterite to be true when the present is false, and therefore possible for a thing not “to be moving” in the present but “to have moved” in the preterite. [102] But I suspect that here too he goes astray. For the present—“the ball touches the roof”—is true not when the ball is travelling in mid air but when it begins to touch the roof. But when it comes down again, after ending its contact, then the preterite becomes true—“the ball touched the roof.” Therefore it is absurd of Diodorus to accept “to have moved” as true and to reject “to move” as false, when he ought either to assent to both or to reject both.

[103] And those who declare that a thing can move in the place where it is, by alleging the examples now of balls and now of axles and drums, fail to solve the difficulty and are equally entangled in it. For, as we have shown previously, each of these bodies remains in the same place as a whole but in respect of its parts it changes places, the part above occupying instead the place below and the part below the place above. And if so, the difficulty remains. [104] For each part of these bodies moves either in the place where it is or in that where it is not; but it moves neither in the place where it is, as we have established, nor in that where it is not, as we have proved; therefore it does not move.

[105] But, in the next place, some have asserted that the argument thus brought forward is contrary to the conception of a moving object; for a moving object is conceived as occupying two places, both that wherefrom it moves and that into which it passes. But in answer to these, too, it is easy to say that, even if it is the fact that the notion of the moving object is of this kind, it has no bearing on our problem because the question now before the Doubters is chiefly concerned not with the conception of motion but with its real existence, and about this those who make that sort of objection have said nothing. [106] And, moreover, even if we overthrow the argument they will have nothing to say against us. For when they assert that the moving object occupies two places, both that wherein it is and that whereinto it moves, we shall ask them—“When does the moving object pass over from the place wherein it is to the other place? Is it when it is in the first place or when it is in the second?” But when it is in the first place it does not pass over into the other; for it is still in the first. [107] And when it is not in this but in the second, once again it is not passing over but has already passed over; for it is a thing impossible and inconceivable that anything should pass over from that place wherein it does not exist. So that, even if we have this sort of conception of the moving object, the original difficulty remains none the less.

[108] Further, those who say that the term “place” has two senses, the “broad” sense and the “exact,” and that therefore motion can occur in place when conceived as “broad,” are giving an answer that is not to the purpose. For place conceived as exact precedes place conceived as broad; and it is impossible for anything to move in broad place if it has not [109] moved before in exact place; for as the latter serves to contain the moving body, so the broad place contains, along with the moving body, the exact place as well. As, then, no one can move over a distance of a stade without first having moved over a distance of a cubit, so it is impossible to move over broad place without moving over exact place. And when Diodorus propounded the argument against motion which has been set forth he was keeping to the exact sense of place; so if in its case motion is abolished, there is no argument left in the case of place in the broad sense.

Now it is perfectly foolish to say that the argument is unsound because of its beginning with a disjunctive premiss and asserting the falsity of this premiss. [111] For the steps in the argument are in logical sequence and the force they have is this,—“If a thing moves, it must move in one or other of the ways stated above; but the second (clause) is not (true); therefore the first is not (true).” For if the second is true when the first is true, when the second is not true the first will not be true either. And this is sound according to the assumptions of the Dialecticians themselves.

[112] These observations, then, it was necessary to make in answer to the objections made against the argument brought forward by Diodorus. And he also brings forward other arguments which are not so weighty but more sophistical, and of these we shall give an exposition so as to be able to avoid each of them in our investigations. For instance, he says, the moving object is in a place, and that which is in a place does not move; therefore the moving object does not move. [113] And motion being twofold,—the one sort that of the major portion, the second sort absolute,—and that of the major portion being the sort in which while most parts of the body are in motion a few are at rest, and the absolute sort that in which all the parts of the body are in motion,—-it seems that of these two motions that of the major portion precedes the absolute kind. [114] For in order that a thing should move absolutely,—that is, as a whole wholly,—it must first be conceived as moving in respect of its major portion; just as, in order that a man may become completely grey-headed he must first become grey as to the major part, and in order that a complete heap may be obtained, the major part of a heap must first be formed; in much the same way motion as to the major part must precede absolute motion; for absolute motion is an intensification of that of the major part. [115] But there does not exist any motion of the major part, as we shall establish; neither, then, will absolute motion exist.—For let us assume the existence of a body composed of three indivisible parts, two being in motion and one motionless; for this is what motion of the major part demands. [116] If, then, we were to add to this body a fourth indivisible which is motionless, there will again be motion. For if the body composed of three indivisibles, two in motion and one motionless, moves, it will also move when a fourth indivisible is added; for the three indivisibles, with which it was moving before, are stronger than the one indivisible which is added. But if the body composed of four indivisibles moves, that composed of five will also move; for the four indivisibles, with which it was moving before, are stronger than the added indivisible. [117] And if that which is composed of five moves, it will certainly move also when a sixth indivisible is added, the five being stronger than the one. And in this way Diodorus proceeds up to ten thousand indivisibles, by way of proving that motion of the major part is nonexistent; for it is absurd, he says, to assert that a body moves as to its major part when it has 9998 of its indivisibles motionless and two only in motion. So that nothing moves as to its major part. And if so, neither does anything move absolutely; from which it follows that nothing moves.

[118] Well then, such is the argumentation, but it seems sophistical and its refutation lies ready to hand; for motion as to the major part disappears simultaneously with the addition of the first indivisible, when there are two indivisibles in motion and two motionless. Hence, one must set aside arguments of that sort, and [119] use chiefly arguments such as these:—“If a thing moves, it moves now; if it moves now, it moves in the present time; and if it moves in the present time, it moves, therefore, in an indivisible time. For if the present time is divided, it will certainly be divided into the past and future, and thus it will no longer be present. [120] And if a thing moves in an indivisible time, it passes through indivisible places. And if it passes through indivisible places, it does not move. For when it is in the first indivisible place it does not move; for it is still in the first indivisible place. And when it is in the second indivisible place, again it does not move but it has moved. Therefore nothing moves.

[121] Furthermore, every motion involves three things, namely bodies and places and times,—bodies which are in motion, places wherein the motion occurs, times during which the motion occurs. [122] Either then the motion occurs while all these are being divided into an infinite number of places and times and into an infinite number of bodies, or while all come to end in what is indivisible and minimal, or while some of them are being divided ad infinitum and some coming to end in what is indivisible and minimal. But whether all are divided ad infinitum or all end in what is indivisible, the account given of motion will be found doubtful.

[123] Taking them in order, let us commence our argument with the first view, according to which all are divided ad infinitum. Now the champions of this view assert that the moving body at one and the same time completes the whole of a divisible interval, and does not occupy first the first part of the interval with the first part of itself, and secondly in order the second part, but passes through the whole divisible interval all at once and completely. But this is absurd and conflicts with apparent facts in a variety of ways. [124] Thus, if, in the case of our sensible bodies, we conceive of a man running over a distance of a stade, it will certainly be obvious that such a man must first complete the first half-stade and secondly in order the second; for to claim that he completes all at once the whole distance of a stade is perfectly absurd. [125] And if we were to divide one of the halfstades into two quarters, he will certainly pass over the first quarter first, and so likewise if we divide it into further parts. And if he runs over the stade when it is lighted up, it is evident that he will not cast a shadow over the stade all at once, but now over the first part, now over the second and now over the third. [126] And if he should run alongside the wall and keep touching it with his hand painted red, he will not mark the whole of the wall of the race-course with red paint at one and the same time, but the successive parts of it successively. What, then, the argument has proved in the case of things sensible, this we must also accept in the case of things [127]intelligible.—And besides, it is possible to overthrow this opinion by employing for the purpose a great number of diverse hypothetical cases. For let us suppose a distance of a cubit, and let it be divided at the middle into two half-cubits. And let its distances of a palm’s breadth be also divided, and let the divisors be solid so as to be able to resist and bring to rest the moving object. If, then, the moving object completes the whole of a divisible distance in one and the same time, and the motion is not one of orderly succession, the body which moves over the distance mentioned above will be resisted simultaneously both by the body which divides the two half-cubits and by that dividing the palm’s breadths. [128] But if it shall be resisted by these at the same time, the same thing will be at once both having moved and not having moved; for in so far as the divisor of the half-cubit distances has resisted it, it has moved over the halfcubit distance, but in so far as the divisor of the palm’s breadth distance has resisted it, it has not, on the contrary, moved over the same distance. But it is absurd to say that the same thing has at once both moved and not moved. Therefore it is also absurd to maintain that the moving object completes a divisible distance at once and as a whole and does not move by [129] gradations.—Again, let us suppose a distance of a cubit, and let certain bodies move at equal speeds, like the atoms of Epicurus, from each of its extremities. Then, since these bodies are assumed to be moving with equal speeds, they will certainly collide with one another in the middle of the distance of the cubit, and will either come to rest or be driven back towards the place from which they came. [130] And if they come to rest, it is quite evident that each of them was moving over the distance from the extremity to the centre at one time, and at another time was about to complete the distance from the centre towards the other extremity. But if they are repelled back towards the extremities of the whole distance, it is obvious again that they passed over the distances from the extremities to the centre at one time, and at another were driven back and retreated towards the extremities. And thus there is nothing which moves all at once and as a whole over a divisible distance.

[131] Moreover, in this way one can also refute those who assert that all things are divided ad infinitum, and yet assume that a moving object moves at once and as a whole over a divisible distance. If two bodies are moving with equal speeds over the distance of a cubit, it will follow that they must say that they do not both complete the same distance in the same time, but the one a greater the other a less; which is contrary to evidence. [132] For let the cubit’s distance of one of the bodies be divided at the centre, and let the divisor repel everything which collides with it. Since, then, they maintain that both bodies move during an equal time, and during the same time complete both the cubit’s distance and the parts thereof, and not the parts in one time and the whole in another, then certainly during the time in which the one of these bodies is moving over the whole distance of the cubit, the remaining body during an equal time will move over the distance of the half-cubit and being repelled will come to rest. [133] But each of them was assumed to be moving at an equal speed. Therefore things which move at equal speeds move over an unequal distance in the same time; which is contrary to evidence. So then the moving object does not move over a divisible distance at once and as a whole, but motion must take place by gradations.

[134] Moreover, in addition to what has been said, the object which moves over a greater distance in an equal time is speedier than that which moves over a less distance in the same time. For example, if of two bodies assumed to be in motion the one completes twenty stades in the space of an hour, the other only ten, it will be asserted unanimously and on all hands that the one which completes the twenty stades is the speedier, and that of the ten stades the slower. [135] But this fact which seems to be apparent and evident is destroyed—if we are to go by the hypothesis put forward—and becomes false. For that which moves in the same time will be both speedier and slower; which is nonsensical. For if it is not the case that the whole moves over a cubit’s distance in one time and over the parts of the cubit’s distance in another, but passes through both the whole distance and the parts of that whole in one and the same time, then the same thing will be both slower and speedier in the same time; for in so far as it completes in this time the cubit’s distance it will be speedier, but in so far as it completes that of half-a-cubit in the same time it will be slower. But it is perfectly absurd to say that a thing is, in the same time, both speedier and slower. So, then, the moving object does not move over a divisible interval all at once but by gradations.

[137] But the champions of this opinion may be sufficiently confuted by the hypothetical case now to be stated. Let us suppose the distance of a fingerlength, and let this be divided at the centre into two distances of half a finger, and let the divisor be of a nature capable of repelling and able to hurl back the colliding object, and let there be a body moving over this distance; now I assert that, in the case thus assumed, since the moving object completes in the same time both the whole distance and the parts of that whole, the same thing must both approach and retreat in the same time; which is a thing impossible. For if it completes in one and the same time both the [138] whole distance of a finger and the parts thereof, and the distance of the finger is both that from the extremity to the centre and that from this to the extremity, then the moving object will in the same time both go forward and, after colliding with the divisor, return backwards. But it is contrary to evidence that it should both approach and retreat in the same time; therefore it is also contrary to evidence that motion should take place in this way, just as it is to say that the hand is in the same time both extended and clenched, and not extended in one time and clenched in another.

[139] Consequently, the men mentioned above are in a hopeless position in making motion complete a distance all at once; and much more hopeless is it to suppose that it completes a divisible distance not all at once but gradually—the first stage first, and secondly the second. For if motion takes place in this way, when all the bodies and places and times are divided to infinity, there will be no beginning of motion. [140] For in order that a thing may have moved over a cubit’s distance, it must first pass through the first half-cubit and secondly the second in order. But in order that it may have completed the distance of the first half-cubit, it must first have passed through the first quarter of the cubit’s distance, and in the next place the second quarter; so also (the first fifth part), if it be divided into five, and if into six the first sixth part. [141] Since, then, every first part has another first part, because of the division to infinity, of necessity there can never be any beginning of motion, owing to the fact that the parts of the distance and those of the body are endless, and every one of them which is taken contains other parts.

[142] Such, then, are the arguments which it was proper to bring against those who say that bodies and places and times are divided to infinity (and these men are the Stoics); but those who, like Epicurus, have assumed that all things are reducible to indivisibles involve themselves in more formidable difficulties,—[143] such as, firstly, the fact that motion will not exist, as Diodorus showed when treating of indivisible places and bodies. For the indivisible body contained in the first indivisible place does not move; for it is contained in the indivisible place and fills it up. And again: the body situated in the second place does not move, for it has moved already. But if the moving object neither moves in the first place—inasmuch as it exists in the first—nor yet in the second, and besides these no third place is conceived, [144] then that which is said to move does not move.—And even apart from this sort of difficulty, it is possible to attack the position of the Epicureans by means of a hypothetical case. For suppose a distance made up of nine indivisible places arranged in a row, and let two indivisible bodies be moving over this distance from each of its extremities, and let them move at equal speeds. [145] Then, since their motions are equal in speed, each of these bodies will necessarily pass over four indivisible places. And on arriving at the fifth place, which is midway between the one set of four and the other, they will either come to a halt or one of them will get there first,—so that this one has passed through five indivisible places, the other only four,—or they will not come to a halt nor will one of them get there first but they will both meet together in their course and each occupy a half of the fifth indivisible place. [146] Now that both should come to a halt is extremely improbable; for when there is a place existing and nothing repelling their motion they will not halt. And that the one should get there before the other is contrary to the assumption; for it was assumed that both move at equal speeds. [147] It remains, then, to declare that both will meet together in their course and occupy the two halves of the vacant place. But if this one occupies the half on its side, and that one the half on its side, the place will not be indivisible but divisible into two halves. And so too the bodies; for as occupying a part of the place with a part of themselves they will not be indivisible. [148] —But if the places are divisible and the bodies also not indivisible, time too, of necessity, is not indivisible and minimal. For the indivisible body does not pass through an indivisible place and a part of that indivisible place in an equal time, but the whole indivisible place in one time and the part of it in a minimal time.—[149] Again, suppose there is a certain small ruler which on one side is provided at intervals with points, and let this be made to revolve, starting from one of its extremities, over a certain plane surface in one and the same time. Now as the extremity revolves, circles will be described which differ from one another in magnitude, the outermost which surrounds them all being the greatest and the innermost the smallest, and the intermediate ones in proportion, becoming either greater and greater as we advance from the centre or less and less as we recede from the outer circumference. [150] Since, then, the time of the revolution is one (and let this be indivisible), I ask how it is that, when the time in which the process of describing took place is one and the same and the motion also is one, the circles have come to be different from one another, some being great and some having a small circumference. [151] For it is not possible to say that there is a difference in the indivisible times in respect of magnitude, and because of this those of the circles which were described in greater indivisible times are greater, and those in less smaller. For if one indivisible time is greater than another, the time is not indivisible nor minimal, and the moving object does not move wholly in an indivisible time. [152] And furthermore, it is not possible either to assert that, while it is one indivisible time in which all the circles are described, the parts of the revolving ruler are not of equal speeds but some revolve more quickly, others more slowly, and by those which revolve more quickly the greater circles are constructed, but by those revolving more slowly the smaller. [153] But if in reality some parts move more quickly, others more slowly, the ruler ought to have been pulled to pieces during its revolution or certainly bent, as some of its parts rush ahead while others lag behind. But it is neither pulled to pieces nor bent; so then motion is inexplicable for those who assert [154] that all things are reducible to indivisibles.—Also, in general, if they are all indivisible—not only the time in which the motion occurs, but also the body which moves and the place in which the effects of the motion are completed,—then all the moving bodies will of necessity move at equal speeds, so that the sun is equal in speed to the tortoise; for both the former and the latter complete an indivisible distance in an indivisible time. But it is absurd to say that all moving objects move at equal speeds or that the tortoise is equal in speed to the sun; therefore it is absurd to maintain that, if all things are reducible to indivisibles, motion exists.

[155] It remains, then, to consider whether anything can move if some things are divided ad infinitum and others are reducible to indivisibles. And Strato the physicist, in fact, took this view; for he supposed that times are reducible to indivisibles, but bodies and places are divided ad infinitum, and that the moving object moves over the whole of a divisible distance in an indivisible time all at once and not by gradations. [156] That this view also is impossible one can certainly show by employing quite plain examples. For let us assume a distance of four fingers, and let the moving body complete this in two indivisible times, so that it passes over the one two-fingers’ distance in one indivisible time and the other likewise in one. And such being our assumption, from the distance stated let the distance of a finger be subtracted, so that the distance still left is one of three fingers. [157] But if the moving body passes over the whole distance of four fingers in two indivisible times it certainly will complete that of three fingers in one indivisible time and a half,—the distance of two fingers in one, and the remaining distance of a finger in a half. And thus, if an indivisible time is less by half than an indivisible time, no indivisible time exists but this too is divided into parts. [158] And the same argument applies if we add on a fifth finger to the distance of four fingers. For how will the moving object move over this? Will it be in an indivisible time? But if so, since it also completed double that distance in an indivisible time, the object which moves over it in the same time will be both fast and slow simultaneously,—fast inasmuch as it completes the distance of two fingers in an indivisible time, but slow inasmuch as it completes but one finger’s distance in an equal time. But if it completes the fifth finger in less than an indivisible time, the indivisible time is divisible; which they refuse to admit.

[159] Moreover, if the moving object completes all at once a divisible distance in an indivisible time, something will be coming to a halt causelessly, as we shall establish; but nothing comes to a halt causelessly; therefore motion does not take place in this way. [160] For suppose a certain vertical distance, say of ten cubits, and let a certain heavy body, such as a leaden ball, complete the whole of this distance from the top to the bottom in one minimal time. But to this distance let there be also added another distance of a cubit, so that the total becomes eleven cubits, and let the ball be started again from the top. [161] Then, when it has reached the end of the tenth cubit and the beginning of the eleventh, it will either come to a halt or it will pass over the latter as well—I mean the eleventh cubit. But that it should come to a halt is absurd; for if a body which is so heavy and moving through the air and having nothing to resist it shall come to a halt, it will certainly be halting causelessly, which is absurd. [162] And if it shall keep moving, then, since it passes over the whole distance of ten cubits in one indivisible time, as the motion is the same it will pass over the remaining distance of a cubit in the tenth part of the indivisible time, so that the indivisible time, in addition to being no longer indivisible, is also divided into ten parts.

[163] Moreover, if the moving object completes the whole of a divisible distance in one indivisible time, it will necessarily come to be in all the parts of the distance in one and the same time. But if it shall be in all the parts of the distance in one and the same time, it will not have moved over the distance but will have occupied it; which is absurd. [164] So then, the moving object does not move over a divisible distance in one indivisible time, since (if it does so) the same object at the same time will be both hot and cold, both illuminated and not illuminated. For let us suppose a distance of two cubits, and of this let the one cubit be heated by fire and the other be chilled. [165] Now if the moving body occupies the whole of this distance in one and the same indivisible time, when it is in the heated cubit it will be heated, and when in the chilled one it will be chilled. But it is both in the heated one and in the chilled one at the same time; therefore the same thing will be at once both hot and cold at the same time; and this is a thing impossible. [166] And not only so, but by the same method it will be possible to show also that the same thing will be at once both illuminated and not illuminated; and this too is contrary to the evidence of sense.

Furthermore, one will have to say that the moving object has moved over the distance, whatever the length one assumes this to have, in the same time. [167] For example, suppose a distance of four fingers, and let it be divided into eight parts, and, for the sake of explaining the matter clearly, let the first part of it be called A, the second B, the third C, and so on with the rest. Now if the moving object completes a divisible distance in one and the same time, it will be able to move over the distance BC in the same time in which it moves over the distance AB. But if so, it will also move over CD in the same time, and so on ad infinitum, so that in a single and indivisible time it will move over the whole distance of the earth.

[168] If, then, motion is secured neither when there is a division to infinity, nor when there is a reduction to indivisibles, nor when some things are divided to infinity but others reduced to indivisibles, then one must declare that motion is nothing. And from this there follows suspension of judgement because of the equipollence of the sense-evidence and of the arguments which contradict it.

Chapter III. Does Time Exist?

Section titled “Chapter III. Does Time Exist?”

[169] As motion involves, as I said before, three things—the moving body and the place wherein it moves and the time in which the movement is completed,—now that we have discussed the difficulties regarding body and place, we shall try also to investigate time; for regarding it also the accounts given both by the Physicists who suppose that the Universe is eternal, and by those who assert that it was constructed at a given time, will, perhaps, appear to be hopeless. [170] Now some declare that time is “the interval of the motion of the Universe,” and others that it is “the motion itself of the Universe.” But neither according to the view of the first nor according to that of the second does any time exist. For if interval of motion and motion are nothing apart from the moving object, time, since it is interval of cosmic motion or, more precisely, cosmic motion, will be nothing else than the moving Universe, and time will be the Universe in [171] a certain state; which is absurd.—And again: it is possible to conceive the motion of the Universe as non-existent at a certain time, so that time will not be the motion of the Universe.—[172] And again: all motion takes place in time, therefore the motion of the Universe also will take place in time. But time does not take place in time; for, if so, it will exist either in itself or as one (time) in another. But it will not exist in itself (for then the same time will be both one and two), nor as one time in another, because none of the things present exists in what is not present and none of those not present in what is present. So, then, on this account also one must not assert that time is the motion of the Universe.—[173] Once more: just as motion takes place in time, so also does rest; but just as no one says that rest is time, so neither is one right in asserting that the motion of the Universe is time.—Also, the motion of the Universe is perpetually the same but time is not perpetually the same, but is now called the same and again unequal; and when unequal, now more and now less. Therefore the motion of the Universe is one thing and time another. [174] And in fact those who, like Aristarchus the mathematician, have rejected the motion of the Universe, but have held that the earth moves, are not precluded from conceiving time. So, then, we must say that time is another thing and not the same as the motion [175] of the Universe.—Also, those who live in subterranean and unlighted caverns and those who are blind from birth have no conception of the motion of the Universe, but after sitting and standing up and walking they get a conception of the time in which they performed these three actions, and of the time of the three as greater, that of two as less, and that of one as least. But if it is possible for them to conceive time without conceiving the revolution of the heavens, this latter is one thing and time another.

[176] Aristotle declared that time is “the number of the prior and posterior in motion.” But if time is this—a “joint recollection” of the prior and posterior in motion,—what is at rest and motionless will not exist in time. Or else, if what is motionless is in time, and time is the number of the prior and posterior in motion, then that which is in time will be both at rest and in motion; which is impossible. [177] On this account Strato the Physicist rejected this notion and said that time is “the measure of all motion and rest”; for it is co-extensive with all moving objects when they are moving and with all immobile objects when they are motionless, and for this reason all things which exist exist in time. [178] But, very possibly, there is a vast number of things which conflict with his view; though it is enough now to mention the fact that what measures the motion or the rest exists in time [and is not time]; and if so, time will not be that which measures motion and rest; for time does not exist in time.—[179] And again: if time is the measure of motion and rest for the reason that it is co-extensive both with motion in so far as it is motion and with rest in so far as it is rest, then since, conversely, motion and rest are co-extensive with time, time will not be the measure of motion and rest any more than motion and rest the measure of time. [180] Perhaps, indeed, it would have been better to have said the latter; for whereas time is hard to observe, motion and rest are easy to discern, and what is easy to observe is not to be perceived through what is hard, but rather the reverse.

[181] It seems, too, that there is ascribed to the Physicists Epicurus and Democritus a conception of time such as this—“Time is a day-like and night-like phantasm”; and according to this, again, the nature of time is dubious. For if day and night are shown to be unreal, it follows that the day-like phantasm also [is not time or] is unreal. [182] For day, in its narrower conception as consisting of twelve hours—that is to say, from sunrise to sunset,—appears when we examine it to be unreal. For when the first hour exists, the eleven do not as yet exist; and when most of the hours are non-existent, day will not exist. [183] And again: when the second hour is present, the first no longer exists and the remaining ten are not yet in existence, so that in this case too, as most of the hours are non-existent, day will not exist. Always, then, if one hour exists but day is not one hour, no day will exist. [184] Nor, in fact, does one hour exist; for it is conceived by way of extension and is itself also composed of a number of parts of which some are not as yet and others no longer existent, so that what is compounded of them is unreal. But if there exists neither an hour nor a day nor, by analogy, a night, then time will not be a day-like or night-like phantasm.—[185] Moreover, the word “day” has two senses, being in the one sense that which is composed of the twelve hours, and in the other the air which is illuminated by the sun. Epicurus, then, asserts that time is a phantasm either of the day composed of the hours or of that which is air illuminated by the sun. [186] But he would not say that time is a phantasm of the day composed of the hours; for this day itself—I [187] mean the twelve-hour day—is time, and therefore, if the phantasm of this is conceived to be time, time will be the phantasm of time; which is nonsensical. So then one must not say that the phantasm of the twelve-hour day is time. Nor yet the phantasm of the day which is illuminated air; for this exists in time, and therefore, if time is our phantasm of this day, this day will exist in our phantasm. And this is [188] a result far worse than the first.—Also, when the Universe is destroyed, according to Epicurus, there exists neither day nor night, and consequently neither a diurnal nor a nocturnal phantasm. But it is absurd to say that when the Universe is destroyed time does not exist; for the statements that it was destroyed once and that it is being destroyed are indicative of times. And if so, time is one thing and the diurnal or nocturnal phantasm a different thing.

Let this, then, serve as our account of the difficulties regarding the real existence of time which [189] arise from the conception of it; but we can also establish our case by means of direct argument. For if time exists it is either limited or unlimited; but neither is it limited, as we shall establish, nor is it unlimited, as we shall show; therefore time is nothing. For if time is limited, there was once a time when time did not exist, and there will one day be a time when time will not exist. But it is absurd to say either that there was once a time when time did not exist, or that there will one day be a time when time will not exist, for the statements that “there once was” and that “there will be” are (as said before) indicative of different times. So, then, time is not limited.—Nor, in fact, is it unlimited. [190] For one part of it is past, the other future. Each of these times, then, either exists or does not exist. And if it does not exist, time is at once limited, and if it is limited the original difficulty remains—that there was once a time when time did not exist and there will one day be a time when time will not exist. [191] But if each exists—I mean both past and future time,—each will be in the present. And as existing in the present, both past and future time will be in present time. But it is absurd to say that past and future are conceived as in present time. So, then, time is not unlimited either. But if it is neither conceived as limited nor as unlimited, it will not exist at all.—[192] Also, what is composed of non-existents will be non-existent, and time is held to be composed of nonexistents—of the past which exists no longer and of the future which does not as yet exist; time, therefore, is non-existent.

[193] Furthermore: if time is anything, it is either indivisible or divisible; but it cannot be either indivisible, as we shall show, or divisible, as we shall establish; no time, therefore, exists. Now time cannot be indivisible, since it is divided into past, present, and future. [194] And it will not be divisible because everything divisible is measured by a part of itself; the cubit, for instance, is measured by the palm, and the palm is a part of the cubit, and the palm is measured by the finger, and the finger is a part of the palm. So, then, if time too is divisible, it ought to be measured by some part of itself. [195] But it is not possible for the other times to be measured by the present. For if the present time measures the past, the present time will be in the past, and being in the past it will no longer be present but past. And if the present measures the future, being within this it will be future and not present. Hence, too, it is not possible to measure the present by the other times; for, as being within it, each of them will be present and not either past or future. [196] But if one must certainly conceive time as either divisible or indivisible, and we have shown that it is neither divisible nor indivisible, it must be declared that time is nothing.

[197] Furthermore: time is tripartite; for one part of it is past, one present, and one future. And of these the past no longer exists and the future does not yet exist. It remains to say that one part exists, the present. The present time, then, is either indivisible or divisible. But it cannot be indivisible, for “nothing divisible is of a nature to exist in indivisible time,” as Timon says,—becoming, for example, and perishing, and everything of a similar kind. [198] And if it is indivisible, it will neither have a beginning whereby it is joined on to the past, nor an end whereby it is joined on to the future; for that which has a beginning and an end is not indivisible. But if it has neither a beginning nor an end, it will not have a middle either; for the middle is conceived by way of comparison in its relation to the other two. And as having neither beginning nor middle nor end, it will not exist at all. [199] And if present time is divisible, it is divided either into existent times or into non-existent. And if it should be divided into non-existent times, it will no longer be time; for that which is divided into non-existent times will not be time. And if it is divided into existent times, it will no longer, as a whole, be present but one part of it will be past, another future. And for this reason it will no longer, as a whole, be [present and] existent, as part of it no longer exists and part is not as yet existing. [200] But if of the three times—past, future, and present—it has been proved that not one exists, no time will exist.

And those who assert that present time is the limit of the past and the beginning of the future,—thus making one out of two non-existent times,—make not [201] only one but every time non-existent.—And further: if present time is the limit of past, and the limit of the past has passed away together with that whereof it is the limit, present time will no longer exist, if it [202] really is the limit of the past.—And again: if present time is the beginning of the future, and the beginning of the future does not yet exist, present time will not yet exist, and thus it will have most opposite properties; for inasmuch as it is present it will exist, but inasmuch as it has passed away together with the past it will exist no longer, and inasmuch as it accompanies the future it will not as yet exist. But it is absurd to conceive the same time as both existing and not existing, and no longer existing and not yet existing. So, then, in this way too one must deny that any time exists.

[203] One may also argue thus: if time is anything, it is either imperishable and ingenerable or perishable and generable; but it is neither imperishable and ingenerable, as shall be proved, nor perishable and generable, as this also shall be established; time, therefore, is not anything. Now it is not imperishable and ingenerable, seeing that part of it is past, part present, and part future. [204] For the day of yesterday exists no longer, that of to-day exists, and that of to-morrow has not yet come into existence. Hence one part of time (namely, the past) no longer exists, another (namely, the present) exists, and another (namely, the future) does not yet exist. And for this reason time will be neither ingenerable nor imperishable.—[205] But if it is perishable and generable, it is hard to say what it will perish into and from what it will come to exist. For neither does the future exist already, nor the past exist any longer. But how can a thing (come into existence) from non-existents, (or how can a thing) perish (into non-existents)? Time, then, is nothing.

[206] One may attack it also in this way: if time is anything, it is either generable or ingenerable, or partly generable and partly ingenerable. But time cannot be either generable or ingenerable or partly generable and partly ingenerable; therefore time is not anything. [207] For if it were generable, since everything which is generated becomes in time, time too being generated will be generated in time. Either, then, it will be generated as itself in itself or as one time in another. And if it is generated as itself in itself, it will be a thing which has come to exist before it has come to exist; which is absurd. [208] For since that in which a thing becomes must exist before that which is generated in it, time also, as generated in itself, must have come into existence before itself; just as a statue is wrought in a workshop, but the workshop existed before the statue, and a ship is constructed in a certain place, but the place was existing before the ship. So, then, if time too becomes in itself, it will exist before itself; and thus, inasmuch as it becomes, it will not yet exist, since everything which becomes, while it is becoming, does not exist as yet; but inasmuch as it becomes in itself, it must exist beforehand. [209] Time, then, will be at once both existent and non-existent. Inasmuch as it becomes it will not exist, but inasmuch as it becomes in itself it will exist. But it is absurd that the same thing at the same instant should both exist and not exist; therefore it is also absurd to say that time becomes [210] in itself.—Nor yet does it become as one time in another,—the future, for instance, in the present, and the present in the past. For if one time becomes in another, each of the times will necessarily quit its own position and occupy the post of the other. If, for example, the future time becomes in the present time, the future as becoming during the present will be present and not future; and if the present becomes in the past, as becoming during the past it will certainly not be present but past. [211] And the same argument applies if we reverse their order, making the past becoming in the present and the present in the future; for here again the same difficulties follow.—If, then, time does not become either in itself or as one time in another, time is not generable. But if it is neither ingenerable nor generable, and besides these one can conceive no third possibility, [212] one must declare that time is nothing.—Now the fact that it cannot be ingenerable is extremely easy to demonstrate. For if it is ingenerable and neither has become nor will become, one time alone, the present, will exist, and neither will the future, and the things therein, be any longer future, nor will the past, and the things done therein, be any longer past. But this is not so; nor, consequently, is time ingenerable.—[213] Nor yet is it partly generable and partly ingenerable, since, if so, the difficulties will be combined. For the generable must become either in itself or in another; but if it becomes in itself it will exist before itself, and if in another it will no longer be that time but, quitting its own post, it will be the time during which it becomes. [214] And the same argument applies also to the ingenerable; for if it is ingenerable, neither will the future time ever exist nor the past, but one time only, the present. But these results are absurd. It only remains, then, to say that as time is neither generable nor ingenerable, nor partly generable and partly ingenerable, time does not exist.

[215] And it will be possible to doubt about this matter in respect of its substance, just as we have previously shown its doubtfulness in regard to its conception. Thus, for instance, some of the Dogmatic philosophers assert that time is a body, others that it is incorporeal; and of those who assert it to be incorporeal some regard it as a thing conceived as self-existent, others as a property of something else. [216] Thus Aenesidemus “according to Heracleitus” stated that time is a body; for it does not differ from the existent and the first body. Hence, too, when he mentions in his First Introduction that the simple appellations, which are the parts of speech, apply to six things, he asserts that the names “time” and “unit” are [217] applied to the substance, which is corporeal, whereas the extents of the times and the sums of the numbers are chiefly expressed by multiples of these. For “now,” which is an indication of time, and also “unit” are nothing else than the substance; while “day” and “month” and “year” are multiples of “now” (I mean, of time), and “two” and “three” and “ten” and “a hundred” are multiples of “unit.” So that these people make time a body; [218] but the Stoic philosophers supposed it to be incorporeal; for they assert that of the “Somethings” some are bodies, others incorporeal, and they enumerate four kinds of the incorporeals, namely, “expression” and void and place and time. And from this it is evident that, in addition to supposing time to be incorporeal, they also regard it as a thing conceived as self-existent.

[219] Epicurus, as Demetrius the Laconian interprets him, declares that time is “a symptom of symptoms, accompanying days and nights and hours and affections and non-affections and motions and rests.” For all these are symptoms attached to things, and as accompanying all these time may naturally be called “a symptom of symptoms.” [220] For in general—to go back a little, for the readier following of our exposition—some existent things are self-existent, while others are viewed as attached to such as are self-existent. And such things as substances (like body and void) are self-existent; and such as are viewed as attached to the self-existents are what they call “properties.” [221] And of these properties some are inseparable from the objects whereto they belong, while others are naturally separated from them. Inseparable, for instance, from the things whereto they belong are the resistance of body and the [222] non-resistance of void; for body can never be conceived as without resistance, or void without non-resistance; but each has a property that is eternal, the one resistance, the other non-resistance. But not inseparable from the things whereto they belong are such properties as motion and rest. [223] For such bodies as are composite are neither in restless motion continually nor continually motionless, but have at one time the property of motion, at another that of rest, although the atom, when it is by itself, is in perpetual motion. For it must collide either with a void or with a body; and if it collides with a void, it passes through this because of its non-resistance; but if with a body, it moves back from this by way of [224]rebound, because of its resistance.—Thus these things are “symptoms” which time accompanies—I mean day and night and hour and affections and non-affections and motions and rests. For day and night are symptoms of the surrounding air, of which day is a property due to the illumination from the sun, while night results from the privation of the illumination from the sun. [225] And hour again, being a part either of day or of night, is a symptom of the air, like day and night. And time extends parallel to every day and every night and hour; and for this reason a day or a night is called long or short, as we pass over the time which is a property thereof. The affections, too, and non-affections are either pains or pleasures, and on this account are not substances but symptoms of those who are affected either pleasurably or painfully, and not timeless symptoms. [226] And besides these, motion and also rest are, as we have already established, symptoms of bodies and not without time; for certainly we measure by time the quickness and slowness of motion, and the greater or less amount of rest. [227] Well then, from this it is plain that Epicurus thinks that time is incorporeal, but not in the same sort of way as do the Stoics; for whereas they, as has been said, supposed that time is an incorporeal thing conceived as self-existent, Epicurus supposed it to be a property of certain things.

[228] Such were the views of these men; but Plato—and, as some say, Aristotle—declared that “time is the number of the prior and posterior in motion”; and Strato the physicist—and, as others say, Aristotle—that it is “the measure of motion and rest.”

[229] Hence, as there also exists such a divergence of opinion regarding the substance of time, one can already infer from the difficulties stated above that from it too it is impossible to learn anything for certain; but still we ought now to bring against Plato and Aristotle and Strato the physicist the objections we made at the beginning when we deduced from the [230] conception of time that time is nothing, and against those who maintain that the substance of time is corporeal—I mean the Heracleiteans—we should bring the argument most ready to hand that if time is a body, and every body is conceived as either at rest or in motion, and what is at rest or in motion is conceived as at rest or in motion in time, (then the body is conceived as being at rest or in motion in a body ); but the body is not conceived as at rest or in motion in a body; therefore time is not a body.—[231] Also, according to the Heracleiteans, “the existent,” which is body, is in time; but time is not in time; therefore the existent and body is not time. Also, the living creature lives in time, as also the dead is dead in time; wherefore time is not a living creature or a body.—[232] Moreover, those who assert that “the first body” of Heracleitus does not exist are not precluded from conceiving time; but if time had been the first body of Heracleitus, they would have been precluded; therefore” the existent” of Heracleitus is not time. [233] Also, the existent of Heracleitus, as Aenesidemus says, is air; but time is vastly different from air, and just as nobody says that fire or water or earth is time, so for the same reason nobody will say that air is time; so, then, the existent is not time.

[234] Let this, then, serve as a concise statement of the objections to this view; and brief, too, is our argument against the Stoics, who declare that of the “Somethings” some are bodies, others incorporeals, and suppose that time is a particular species of the incorporeals which is conceived as self-existent. For the “Something,” the highest genus, will not exist owing to its being unable to be either a body or an incorporeal or at once both body and incorporeal. [235] For if it is a body, all its particulars will have to be bodies and none incorporeal; and just as all the particulars of Animal are animals and none inanimate, and those of Vegetable vegetables and none animate, so too it will follow that, as “Something” is a body, its particulars are bodies and none of them incorporeal. But if it is incorporeal, its particulars will all be incorporeal and none will be a body. [236] And in the same way, if it is at once both body and incorporeal all its particulars will be at once both bodies and incorporeals and none will be by itself either a body only or an incorporeal. So that if the “Something” is not a body nor incorporeal, nor at once both body and incorporeal, the “Something” is nothing. And if this is destroyed, there are also destroyed along [237] with it all its particulars; which is absurd.—Furthermore, each of the incorporeals assumed together with time—such as “expression” and void and place—have been doubted by the Sceptics; and as each of these has been doubted, it will not be granted that time is of the same genus as they.

[238] And as against Epicurus, who maintains that time is a “symptom of symptoms,” although many other arguments can be brought, it will suffice for the present to state this one—that whereas substances in a certain condition are perhaps observed and belong to the class of things really existent, what are called the properties of substances, being not other than [239] the substances, are non-existent; for there exists no “resistance” apart from the resistant body, nor does any non-resistance subsist apart from the nonresistant and void, nor motion apart from the moving body, nor rest apart from the stationary; but just as generalship is nothing apart from the acting general, nor headship of a training-school apart from the acting head, so too each of these properties is nonexistent apart from that whereof it is a property. [240] Hence when Epicurus asserts that we conceive body by means of a combination of size and shape and resistance and weight, he is forcing us to form a conception of existent body out of non-existents; for if no size exists apart from that which is endowed with size, nor shape apart from what is shaped, nor resistance apart from what resists, how is it possible from things non-existent to form a conception of an existent body? [241] So that, in order that time may exist, symptoms must exist, and in order that symptoms may exist there must be a really existent property; but there is no really existent property; so [242] then, time cannot exist.—I pass over the argument that the things of which time is said to be a property and also the things of which it is said to be a symptom are indiscoverable,—such as day, night, hour, motion, rest, affection, non-affection. Thus “day,” which is said to be of twelve hours—as we pointed out above—does not exist during the twelve hours but during only one, the present, which is not a day. [243] And the same account holds good of “night.” And “hour” again, being conceived as extended and, as it were, tripartite, appears to us when we examine it to be non-existent. For neither does it exist when the first part of it exists (for the other parts do not as yet exist), nor when the second; for then the first part exists no longer and the third does not as yet exist. [244] But since, in this way, most of its parts are non-existent, it cannot exist itself. But let it be granted that day exists and that night and hours exist; then, since these are time, and Epicurus asserts that time is a symptom of them, time itself, according to Epicurus, will be a [245] symptom of itself.—Furthermore, the account given of motion has been shown to be in many respects dubious owing to the impossibility of a thing moving either in the place where it is or in that where it is not. And along with this the doctrine of rest is also destroyed; for if motion does not exist, neither will rest exist. For it is by contrast with the moving object that the motionless is conceived, and by contrast with the motionless the moving; hence as left does not exist if right is non-existent, so if either of these does not exist, the other cannot be conceived. [246] And besides, say the Doubters, that which is at rest is compelled to be at rest by some cause; but that which is compelled is affected, and what is affected moves; therefore that which is at rest moves. But if Epicurus asserts that time is related to the symptoms, and they have been shown to be doubtful, he will have to confess that their property, time, is also [247] doubtful.—And further: motion is an incorporeal, and also affection, and each of the things mentioned, and time too is an incorporeal. Since, then, it is not probable that incorporeals are properties of incorporeals, let us declare that time is not a symptom of the symptoms mentioned.

So now that we have shown the difficulties about time in respect of its substance, let us inquire next about number.

Chapter IV. Concerning Number

Section titled “Chapter IV. Concerning Number”

[248] Since number also is one of the things linked closely with time—seeing that the measurement of time (as, for instance, of hours and days and months, and years as well) does not take place without numeration,—after the investigation of the latter which we have now completed we consider that it is well for us to give an orderly discussion of the former; and that the more so because the most learned of the Physicists have attributed so great a potency to numbers as to deem them the principles and elements of all things. These men are Pythagoras of Samos and his school. [249] For they say that those who are genuinely philosophizing are like those who work at language. Now the latter first examine the words (for language is composed of words); and since words are formed from the syllables, they scrutinize the syllables first; and as syllables are resolved into the elements of [250] written speech, they investigate these first; so likewise the true physicists, as the Pythagoreans say, when investigating the Universe, ought in the first place to inquire what are the elements into which the Universe can be resolved.—Now to assert that the principle of all things is apparent is contrary to physical science; for every apparent thing must be composed of non-apparents, and what is composed of things is not a principle, but rather the component of that compound (is a principle). [251] Hence one ought not to say that the apparent things are principles of all things, but the components of the apparent things, and these are no longer apparent.—Thus they assumed the principles of existing things to be non-evident and non-apparent, yet they did not do so with one consent. [252] For those who declared that atoms or homoeomeries or molecules or, in general, intelligible bodies are the principles of all existing things proved partly right, but partly went wrong. For in so far as they consider the principles to be non-evident, their procedure is correct, but in so far as they assume them to be corporeal they go wrong. For just as the intelligible and non-evident bodies [253] precede the sensible bodies, so the incorporeals ought to be the principles of the intelligible bodies. And logically so: for just as the elements of a word are not words, so also the elements of bodies are not bodies; but they must be either bodies or incorporeals; certainly, then, they are incorporeals.—[254] Moreover, it is not admissible to say that it is a property of atoms to be eternal, and that on this account they can be the principles of all things although they are corporeal. For, in the first place, those who assert that homoeomeries or molecules or minimals and indivisibles are elements assign to them an eternal existence, so that the atoms are no more elements than they. [255] Next, let it be granted that the atoms are in very truth eternal; yet, just as those who allow that the Universe is ingenerable and eternal seek none the less, in theory, for the principles which first composed it, so also we—as those Physical philosophers, the Pythagoreans, say—examine theoretically the problem as to what are the components of these eternal bodies perceptible by the reason. [256] Their components, then, are either bodies or incorporeals. And we will not say that they are bodies, since then we should have to say that the components of these also are bodies, and, as the conception thus proceeds ad infinitum, that the Whole is without beginning. [257] It only remains, therefore, to declare that the intelligible bodies are composed of incorporeals; and this, too, Epicurus acknowledged, when he said that “body is conceived by means of a combination of form and magnitude and resistance and weight.”

Well then, it is plain from what has been said that the principles of the bodies perceptible by reason must be incorporeal. [258] But if certain incorporeals exist before the bodies, these are not already of necessity elements of existing things and primary principles. For see how the Ideas, which are incorporeal, exist before the bodies, according to Plato, and everything which becomes becomes because of its relation to them; yet they are not principles of existing things since each Idea taken separately is said to be a unit, but two or three or four when taken in conjunction with one or more others, so that there is something which transcends their substance, namely number, by participation in which the terms one or two or three or a still higher number than these is predicated of them. [259] The solid forms also, which are of an incorporeal nature, are conceived before bodies; but they, again, are not principles of all things, for the plane forms precede them in conception, since out of these the solid are composed. [260] Yet, indeed, one should not posit the plane forms either as elements of existing things, for each of these likewise is composed of prior things—namely lines—and lines have numbers already pre-conceived, inasmuch as the compound of three lines is called a triangle and that of four a quadrangle. And since the simple line is not conceived apart from number but, as drawn from a point to a point, involves the number two, and all the numbers themselves fall under the One (for the two is a single two, and the three is one particular thing, [261] a three, and the ten is one sum of number), Pythagoras, moved by these considerations, declared that the One is the principle of existing things, by participation in which each of the existing things is termed one; and this when conceived in its self-identity is conceived as One, but when, in its otherness, it is added to itself it creates the “Indefinite Dyad,” so-called because it is not itself any one of the numbered and definite dyads but they all are conceived as dyads through their participation in it, even as they try to prove in the case of the monad. [262] There are, then, two principles of existing things, the First One, by participation in which all the numbered ones are conceived as ones, and also the Indefinite Dyad, by participation in which the definite dyads are dyads.

And that these are in very truth the principles of all things the Pythagoreans teach in a variety of [263] ways. Of existing things some, they say, are conceived absolutely, some by way of contrariety, some relatively. Absolute, then, are those which subsist of themselves and in complete independence, such as man, horse, plant, earth, water, air, fire; for each of these is regarded absolutely and not in respect of its relation to something else. [264] And contraries are all those which are regarded in respect of their contrariety one to another, such as good and evil, just and unjust, advantageous and disadvantageous, holy and unholy, pious and impious, in motion and at rest, and all other things similar to these. [265] And relatives are the things conceived as standing in a relation to something else, such as right and left, above and below, double and half; for right is conceived as standing in relation to left, and left also as standing in relation to right, and below as related to above, and above as related to below; and similarly in the [266] other cases.—And they say that things conceived as contraries differ from relatives. For in the case of contraries the destruction of the one is the generation of the other, as in the case of health and disease, of motion and rest; for the generation of disease is the removal of health and the generation of health is the removal of disease, and the existence of motion is the destruction of rest and the generation of rest the removal of motion. And the same account holds good also in the case of pain and painlessness, of good and evil, and in general of all things that are of opposite natures. [267] But relatives have the property both of co-existence and of co-destruction one with the other; for there is no right unless a left also exists, nor a double unless the half also, whereof it is [268] the double, pre-exists.—Furthermore, in the case of opposites, as a universal rule, no intermediate state is conceived, as for instance in the cases of health and disease, life and death, motion and rest; for there is nothing between healthiness and illness, and between living and being dead, or again between moving and resting. But in the case of relatives there is a middle state; for the equal (let us say) will be between the greater and the smaller, these being relatives; and so likewise the adequate between the more and the less, and the harmonious between the high and the [269] deep.—So then, as there are these three classes—the self-existent things, those conceived as in opposition, and also those conceived as relatives,—above all these there must stand of necessity a certain genus, and it must exist first for the reason that every genus must exist before the particulars classed under it. When it, then, is abolished all the particulars are abolished along with it, but when the particular is abolished the genus is not also done away with; for the former [270] depends on the latter, and not conversely.—Thus the disciples of the Pythagoreans postulated the One as the supreme genus of the things conceived as self-existent. For even as this is self-existent, so also each of the absolute things is one and is conceived by itself. [271] But of the opposites the equal and the unequal are, they said, the principles and hold the rank of genus; for in them is seen the nature of all the opposites,—that of rest, for instance, in equality (for it does not admit of the more and the less), and that of motion in inequality (for it does admit of the more and the less). [272] So too the natural in equality (for it is an inextensible extreme), but the unnatural in inequality (for it admits of the more and less). The same account holds good also in the case of health and disease, and of straightness and crookedness. [273] The relatives, however, are classed under the genus of excess and defect; thus great and greater, much and more, high and higher are conceived by way of excess; but small and smaller, few and fewer, low and lower [274] by way of defect.—But since self-existents and opposites and relatives, which are genera, are found to be subordinate to other genera—namely, the One, and equality and inequality, and excess and defect,—let us consider whether these genera also can be referred back to others. [275] Equality, then, is brought under the One (for the One first of all is equal to itself), but inequality is seen in excess and defect; for things of which the one exceeds and the other is exceeded are unequal. But both excess and defect are ranked under the head of the Indefinite Dyad, since in fact the primary excess and defect is in two things, that which exceeds and that which is exceeded. [276] Thus as the highest principles of all things there have emerged the primary One and the Indefinite Dyad; and from these, they say, spring both the numerical one and the numerical two,—the one from the primary One, and the two from the One and the Indefinite Dyad. For the two is twice the one, and when the two did not as yet exist among the numbers neither did the twice exist amongst them, but it was taken from the Indefinite Dyad, and in this way the numerical two sprang from it and the One. [277] And in the same way the rest of the numbers were constructed from these, the One always limiting and the Indefinite Dyad generating two and extending the numbers to an infinite amount.—Hence they say that, of these principles, the One holds the position of the efficient cause and the Dyad that of the passive matter; and just as they have constructed the numbers composed of these, so also they have built up the Universe and all things in the Universe. [278] Thus the point, for example, is ranked under the head of the One; for as the One is an indivisible thing, so also is the point; and just as the One is a principle in numbers, so too the point is a principle in lines. So that the point comes under the head of the One, but the line is regarded as belonging to the class of the Dyad; for both the Dyad and the line are conceived by way of [279] transition.—And again: the length without breadth conceived as lying between two points is a line. So then, the line will belong to the Dyad class, but the plane to the Triad since it is not merely regarded as length, as was the Dyad, but has also taken to itself a third dimension, breadth. [280] Also when three points are set down, two at an interval opposite to each other, and a third midway in the line formed from the two, but at a different interval, a plane is constructed. And the solid form and the body, as also the pyramid, are classed under the Tetrad. For when the three points are placed, as I said before, and another point is placed upon them from above, there is constructed the pyramidal form of the solid body; for it now possesses the three dimensions length, breadth, and [281] depth.—But some assert that the body is constructed from one point; for this point when it has flowed produces the line, and the line when it has flowed makes the plane, and this when it has moved towards depth generates the body which has three dimensions. [282] But this view of the (later) Pythagoreans differs from that of the earlier ones. For these latter formed the numbers from two principles, the One and the Indefinite Dyad, and then, from the numbers, the points and the lines and both the plane and the solid forms; but the former build up all of them from a single point. For from this the line is produced, and from the line the plane, and from this the body.

[283] This, however, is the way in which the solid forms are constructed, with the numbers leading; and, finally, from these (solids) the sensibles are composed, earth and water and air and fire, and the Universe at large; and it, they declare (holding fast once more to the numbers), is ordered according to harmony, since it is in numbers that the ratios reside of those symphonies which make up the perfect harmony,—namely, the “By-Fours” and the “By-Fives” and the “By-alls,” of which the first lies in the ratio 4: 3, the second in the ratio 3: 2, the third in that of 2; 1. [284] But this subject has been discussed more exactly in our inquiry regarding the criterion and in our treatise On the Soul.

And now that it has been shown that the Italian Physicists ascribe a great potency to numbers, let us pass on and bring forward the difficulties consequent [285] on this position. Thus when they assert that none of the numerables—such as things sensible and perceived—is one, but is called one through its participation in the One which is, as it were, primary and elemental, then if the animal pointed out is one, the plant which is not pointed out will not be one. For many things must not really be one, but each of them—such as an animal, a stick, a plant—must be conceived as one through participation in the One. [286] For if the animal pointed out is one, that which is not an animal,—a plant, for instance,—will not be one; and if the plant is one, that which is not a plant—for instance, an animal—will not be one. But, in fact, that which is not an animal—for instance, a plant—is termed one; and, again, that which is not a plant—for instance, an animal—is termed one. It is not true, therefore, that each of the numerables is one. But that by participation in which each thing is conceived as one is both one and many, one in respect of itself but many in respect of its comprehension. [287] And this plurality, again, is not exhibited in the case of the numerables. For if the plurality of animals is a plurality, that of plants will not be a plurality; and if that of the latter is a plurality, that of animals, conversely, will not be a plurality. But in fact plurality is predicated both of plants and of animals, and of many other things; therefore it is not the plurality exhibited in the case of numerables which is really plurality, but rather that plurality by participation in which this plurality was conceived.—[288] Now when the Pythagorean philosophers make such statements, what they say resembles the assertion that no particular man is Man, but only He by participation in whom each single person is conceived as a man and many are termed men. For Man is conceived as “a rational mortal animal,” and because of this neither Socrates is Man nor Plato nor any other particular man. [289] And if Socrates, as Socrates, is Man, Plato will not be Man, nor will Dion or Theon; and if Plato is Man, Socrates will not be Man. But in fact Socrates is termed man and Plato too and each of the others; therefore it is not each of the particular men which is Man, but he by participation in whom each of them is conceived as a man, and he is not one of themselves. [290] And the same argument applies also in the case of plants and all the rest. But it is absurd to say that none of the particular men is a man, nor of the plants a plant; therefore it is also absurd to deny that each of the numerables, in respect of its own definition, is one.—[291] And again, the difficulty brought against genus seems to tell beforehand against this theory of the Pythagoreans. For as generic Man neither is perceived along with particular men (since then it will itself also be particular), nor subsists separately (since then the particular men will not become men by participation in it), nor is included [292] amongst these men themselves (for it is inconceivable that an infinite number of them should have participation in it and that it should be included partly amongst the dead and partly amongst the living);—as then this account is doubtful, so also the account given of this One is still more doubtful, owing to the fact that it is neither perceived along with the particular numerables, nor is capable of being ranked as a universal, and that the infinite (particulars) do not participate in it.—[293] Moreover, the Idea of the One, by participation in which each thing is conceived as one, is either one Idea of the One or several Ideas of the One. And if it is one, each of the numerables partakes either of the whole of it or of a part of it. And if it partakes of the whole, the Idea is not one; for if A (so to call it) has the whole of the Idea of the One, B, as it has nothing whereof to partake, will of necessity not be one; which is absurd. [294] But if the Idea of One is multipartite and each of the numerables participates in some one part of it, then, in the first place, each of the existents will be participating not in the Idea of the One but in a part of it, and for this reason will no longer become one; for just as the part of a man is not a man and the part of a word is not a word, so the part of the Idea of the One will not be the Idea of the One so that what partakes thereof may also become one. [295] And secondly, the Idea of the One becomes no longer an Idea of one, nor itself one but several. For the One, in so far as it is one, is indivisible, and the monad, in so far as it is a monad, is not dissected; or if it is divided into many parts, it will become an aggregation of several monads and no longer a monad. [296] And if there are several Ideas of the One, then, since each of the numerables partakes of a separate Idea owing to which it is conceived as one, either the Idea of A and the Idea of B participate in some one Idea, owing to which each of them is termed one, or they do not participate. [297] And if they do not participate, then, just as these can have the title “one” assigned to them although they do not participate in any supreme Idea of the One, so also everything which is in any way called one can be designated “one” without participation in the Idea of the One. [298] But if they do participate, the original difficulty remains; for how can the two Ideas partake of the one Idea? Will each partake of the whole or of a part of it? For whichever answer they give, those difficulties which we mentioned a short while ago will be brought up against them.

[299] And besides; since everything perceived by man is perceived either by sense and through mere occurrence or by intellect, number also, if it is perceptible by man, will certainly be apprehended either by sense or by intellect. [300] But it will not be perceived by sense and simple impression; for the nature of the numerables leads some people astray, since, when they see these to be white or black, or, in general, objects of sense, they suppose that number too is an object of sense and an apparent thing, whereas the truth is otherwise. For the white thing and the black, and (shall we say?) the plant and the stone and the stick and each of the numerables is apparent and is perceptible by sense, but number, as number, [301] is not an object of sense for us nor is it apparent.—But let us consider it in this way:—The sensibles, as sensibles, are perceived by us without teaching; for no one is taught to see the white or the black, or to perceive the rough or the smooth. But number, as number, is not perceived by us without teaching; for it is by learning that we get to know that twice two is four, and that three times two is six, and ten times ten a hundred. Therefore number is not an object of sense.—And if number becomes known by [302] memory through the combination of certain things, when one has left the sensibles one will be perplexed, even as Plato was perplexed in his book On the Soul as to how the two when existing separately are not conceived as two but become two when they are combined together. For if they are of the same sort after the combination as they were before the combination, and before the combination each of them was one, then each of them will also be one after the combination; since if we admit that after the combination some further new attribute was bestowed on them, such as duality, the combination of the two will make four. [304] For if to the one and one which were combined the Dyad is attached as something further, then, since a monad and a monad are conceived as existing therein, a four will be formed by the combination of the one and the one,—the things combined being conceived as two, and the Dyad attached to them being of its own nature twofold.—And again, if to the numbers which by combination make up the Decad the Decad is attached in addition, since the nine is conceived as included in the Decad, and the eight and the seven and the rest of the numbers in descending order, the ten will be infinity times infinity in number, as we have previously pointed out.

[305] And Plato attempts also to argue in another way. If the one, he says, when it is divided and separated is conceived as two, the combination of each of these single ones taken together will certainly not be conceived as two; for the second cause is opposed to the first, and if the separated parts of the same thing are two, those which are brought together and set side by side will not be two. His statement is put [306] in this form: “For I am surprised that, whereas when each of them was apart from the other each of them was one and they were not then two, yet when they came close to each other this coming together in mutual juxtaposition actually proved the cause of their becoming two. Nor can I yet come to believe that if a man bisects a one the act of bisection likewise is the cause of its having become two; for this cause of its becoming two is the opposite of the former cause; for then it was because the ones were brought close to each other and added to each other, but now it is because they are taken apart and separated the one from the other.” [307] In these words he says expressly that if the mere combination of one and one and their simple juxtaposition is the cause of those which formerly were not two becoming two, how can I still believe that the one when it is separated and pulled apart becomes two? For bisection and separation is the opposite of combination.

Such, then, is Plato’s view. [308] But it is also possible to argue thus: “If number is anything, when something is set beside another, say the monad beside the monad, then either something is added to the combined monads or subtracted from them, or nothing is either added to them or subtracted. But if nothing is either added to them or subtracted from them, there will not be a dyad because of the setting of the one beside the other, just as none existed before the combination. [309] And if something is subtracted because of their being set side by side, there will be a decrease of one monad and no longer will a dyad come into existence. And if something is added to them, say the dyad, those which ought to be two will become four; for the added dyad was a monad plus a monad; when, then, this is added to the monad and monad which are being combined, it will make the number four; which is absurd. So then, number is nothing.

Chapter V. Concerning Becoming and Perishing

Section titled “Chapter V. Concerning Becoming and Perishing”

[310] The inquiry concerning becoming and perishing, as undertaken by the Sceptics against the Physicists, is practically concerned with the Whole of things, seeing that of those who have investigated the structure of the Universe some have generated all things from one, others from several things; and of those who have generated them from one, some have done so from an unqualified and others from a [311] qualified thing; and of those who have done so from a qualified thing, some make this air, others water, others fire, others earth; and of those who have generated all from several things, some have done so from numerable things, others from things infinite in number; and of those who adopt numerables, some make them two, others four, others five, others six; and of those who adopt things infinite in number, some make these like to the things generated, others unlike; and some of these last make them impassive, others passive things. [312] Thus the Stoics supposed the becoming of all things to be derived from one unqualified body; for the principle of existing things, according to them, is the unqualified and wholly convertible matter, and by its changes the four elements come into being,—fire and air, water and earth. [313] But Hippasus and Anaximenes and Thales hold that all things have become from one thing which is qualified; and of these Hippasus—and, according to some, Heracleitus of Ephesus—derived the becoming from fire, but Anaximenes from air, and Thales from water, and Xenophanes (according to some) from earth,—

All things spring from the earth, and all in the earth have
their ending.

[314] And of those who derive all from things several and numerable, the poet Homer makes them two, earth and water, as he says in one place—

Ocean, sire of the gods, and Tethys the mother that bare
them;
and again,
Nay, but I would that ye all might be turned to earth and
to water.

And with him Xenophanes of Colophon is thought by some to agree; for he says—

All we men from earth and from water have our beginning. [315] And Euripides (derives all things) from earth and aether, as one may gather from his saying—

Aether I hymn and Earth, the goddess-mother of all things. And Empedocles from four things—

Four are the roots of all things, and list thou first to their
titles:—
Shining Zeus, and Hera the life-bringer, and Aldoneus,

Nestis too, who wetteth with tears the fountain of mortals. [316] And from five things Ocellus the Lucanian and Aristotle; for along with the four elements they also adopted the fifth body which revolves in a circle, and from which they say that the celestial objects are derived. [317] And Empedocles assumed that the generation of all things is from the six. For in the verses where he speaks of “the four roots” of all things he makes their generation to be from four; but when he adds—

Strife pernicious, divided from these and evenly balanc’d.

Love, together with these, in length and breadth perfectly
equal,—

he is handing down six as the principles of existing things, four material (earth, water, air, fire), and two efficient (Love and Strife). [318] But Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and Democritus and Epicurus and a host of others held that the generation of things is from innumerables; yet whereas Anaxagoras said that these are like to the things generated, Democritus and Epicurus said that they are unlike and impassive (namely, the atoms), while Heracleides of Pontus and Asclepiades said that they are unlike but passive (namely, the irregular molecules).

[319] Having, then, first grasped the fact that the physical theory of all these men is shown to be hopeless if becoming and perishing are abolished, let us deal with their arguments all the more confidently. Yet, if we examine them, the main point has been sufficiently established already by our previous arguments. [320] For what becomes and perishes becomes and perishes in time; but, as we showed above, time does not exist, so that what becomes and perishes [321] will not exist either.—Also, becoming and perishing are always change-causing motions; but, as we have previously shown, motion is nothing; neither, then, will becoming and perishing exist. [322] Nothing, too, which is generated or perishes is generated or perishes without an agent and a patient, but nothing is agent or patient, so that nothing is generated or perishes.—[323] Moreover, if anything becomes and perishes, something must be added to something and something be subtracted from something or something changed from something. For becoming and perishing must come about in some one of these three ways,—as, for instance, in the case of the ten, the nine becomes through the subtraction of the one but the ten perishes; and again, in the case of the nine, through the addition of the one the ten becomes but the nine perishes. And the same account holds of the things which perish or are generated through conversion; for in this way wine perishes and vinegar becomes. [324] If, then, everything which is becoming and perishing becomes and perishes either through addition or through subtraction or through change, then, since we have established that neither addition exists nor subtraction nor change, we have already virtually established that neither does becoming or perishing [325] exist.—And further, that which is being generated or is perishing must be touching that wherefrom it perishes and that whereinto it changes; but, as has been shown, touch is nothing; so then, becoming or perishing cannot subsist either.

[326] It is also possible for us, as doubters, to argue directly that if a thing becomes, either the existent becomes or the non-existent. But the non-existent does not become; for the non-existent has no property, and of that which has no property neither is becoming a property. [327] And again: what becomes is affected, but the non-existent cannot be affected at all; for affection belongs to the existent; therefore the non-existent does not become. Nor yet does the existent; for the existent exists already and has no need of becoming; neither, therefore, is the existent generated. But if neither the existent becomes nor the non-existent, and besides these no third thing can [328] be conceived, nothing is generated.—And again, amongst things apparent some are observed to be generated from one thing through change, others from several [329] things by combination; and from one thing through change come all those which take on one quality in place of another while the same substance remains,—as for example when, while the same fluid remains in the same quantity, the must disappears and wine becomes, or the wine disappears and vinegar is formed; or, while the wax remains, its hardness disappears and softness becomes, or the converse. [330] But (others are formed) from several things by combination, such as the chain formed by the joining together of the links and the house by the combination of stones, and the [331] robe by the weaving together of woof and warp.—And if amongst the intelligibles also something becomes, something becomes either from an existent thing or from a non-existent. But from the non-existent nothing can become; for that which is generative of anything must possess existence and admit of qualified motion, so that nothing will be generated from the non-existent. Nor yet from the existent. [332] For if anything becomes from the existent, it becomes either from one thing or from several. And it will not be generated from one. For if it becomes from one, it becomes through this being increased or decreased or remaining in the same state. [333] But it is not possible for the same thing to increase and decrease, and the same thing will not be able to be made into something greater than itself or less than itself. For if it should become more than itself, it will get the addition from a non-existent, since it has nothing more beyond itself; and again, if it becomes less than itself, what vanishes from it will vanish into the non-existent, since it has nothing except itself. Nothing, therefore, can become from what increases or decreases. [334] Nor yet will that which is generated be from that which remains in the same state. For if so, something is generated from it either while it remains unconverted and unchanged or while it is being converted and changed. But while it is unconverted and remaining constantly as it was nothing will be generated from it; for becoming is a form of alteration. [335] And if it is being converted and changed, that which is being generated from it becomes while it is changing either into itself or into another. And if that which is generative of something changes into itself, it remains again the same, and remaining the same it will not be generative of anything further. And if it is converted into another thing, either it passes out from its own substance when it is converted and generated, or it remains in its proper substance and is generated by assuming one form instead of another, just like the wax which changes its shape and receives various forms at various times. [336] But if it passes out from its own substance it will perish into the non-existent, and perishing into the non-existent it will generate nothing. And if it is generated while remaining in its own substance and assuming one quality in place of another, it is defeated by the same difficulty. [337] For the second form and the second quality become either while the first form and the first quality remain in it or while they do not remain. But, as we showed before when we were investigating “the patient,” the second form does not become either while the first form remains or while it does not remain. So then, what is generated does not become from one [338] thing.—Nor yet does it become from several things. For when two things are combined a third will not become while the two remain; and again, if there are three, a fourth will not become while the three remain. But we made a more precise statement about these matters when we were investigating the substance of Man and showed that Man is neither body nor soul nor the compound of both. [339] Wherefore, if the thing generated is neither from one thing nor from several, and besides these there is no further possibility, then of necessity no existent thing is generated.

[340] Such are the arguments concerning Becoming which the Doubters rehearse in detail; but the Dogmatists, without resorting to reason, take refuge once more in examples drawn from the evidence of sense. Thus water being warm, and not being cold, becomes cold; and the bronze, which is not a statue, becomes a statue; and the egg is potentially a chick but is not so actually [but is said to be a chick potentially until it is one actually]. Both the existent, then, and the non-existent can become. Moreover, we also see a baby generated from a human being, and juice from grass. So that all the argumentation of the Sceptics runs contrary to the evidence of sense.—[341] But those who say this are in error, and are not facing the problem before them. For the water which is hot and is not cold neither becomes hot by being so nor cold by not being so; but besides being and not being nothing exists; not even, therefore, in the case of water is there any becoming. And again: neither does the bronze become bronze by being so nor a statue by not being so. [342] And the same may be said of the cases of potentiality and actuality.—And further, there either is or is not something more in the actual than in the potential; and if there is nothing more, it follows that nothing becomes by existing potentially; but if there is something more, this becomes from the non-existent, which is absurd. [343] Yes, (they reply,) but the babe is generated from the mother, and juice is formed from the grass. And how, we shall ask, does this affect the question? For neither does the babe become by being born (being merely brought from obscurity into sight), nor does the juice become (for it was preexisting in the grass, and in becoming outside the grass it has merely changed its place). As, then, we do not say that the man who has advanced out of the darkness into the light is becoming, but that he has passed on from place to place, so in the same way we shall not say that the babe becomes, but that it passes on from one place to another place. Nothing, then, is generated.

[344] Nor, for the same reasons, does anything perish. For if anything perishes, either the existent perishes or the non-existent. But the non-existent does not perish; for what perishes passes into a state of nonexistence, but the non-existent, as it is already in the state of non-existence, does not require transference into this state. So then, the non-existent does not perish. Nor yet does the existent. [345] For it perishes either while remaining in existence or while not remaining. And if it does so while remaining, it will be at once existent and non-existent, perished and not perished; but if it does so while not remaining, it is destroyed, and it is no longer the existent but the non-existent which perishes. So that if neither the existent nor the non-existent perishes, and besides these there is nothing, nothing perishes.

[346] Some also, fastening on the times of becoming and perishing, argue thus: If Socrates died, he died either when he was living or when he was dead. But he did not die while living; for assuredly he was living, and as living he had not died. Nor when he died; for then he would be twice dead. Therefore [347] Socrates did not die.—And to the same effect, although using a different example, Cronos propounded an argument of this kind: If the wall perishes, the wall perishes either while the stones are touching one another and are fitted together or when they are disparted. But neither when they touch one another and are fitted together nor when they are disparted does the wall perish; therefore the wall does not perish. [348] Such is the argument, and the force of it is quite plain. There are two times conceived, that in which the stones touch one another and are fitted together and that in which they are disparted; and besides these no third time can be conceived. If, then, the wall perishes, it must perish in one or other of these times. [349] But it cannot perish in the time when the stones are touching one another and are fitted together; for it still exists as a wall, and if it exists it does not perish. Nor in the time when they are disparted from one another; for then it no longer exists as a wall, and the non-existent cannot perish. If, then, the wall does not perish either when the stones are touching one another or when they are disparted [350] from one another, the wall does not perish.—And it is also possible to argue thus: If a thing both becomes and perishes, it becomes and perishes either in the time in which it exists or in that in which it does not exist. But in that in which it exists it neither becomes nor perishes; for inasmuch as it exists as this thing it neither becomes nor perishes. Nor yet will it undergo any of these affections in the time in which it does not exist; for in the time in which a thing does not exist it can neither affect nor be affected at all. And if so, nothing either becomes or perishes.

[351] Let these, then, be our answers to those of the philosophers who are Physicists; but now it will be time for us to pass on to those who have embraced the Ethical division of philosophy.

Against the Ethicists

Section titled “Against the Ethicists”

[1] We have already discussed the difficulties brought forward by the Sceptics with regard to the Logical and Physical divisions of philosophy, and now it remains for us to subjoin further those which can be brought against the Ethical division; for in this way, by acquiring the perfect and sceptical frame of mind, each of us will (in the words of Timon) pass his life—

In great comfort and calm,
Ever devoid of care, uniformly free from distraction,

Quite regardless of all Sweet-voiced Science’s tales. [2] But since almost all have with one accord supposed that the study of Ethics is concerned with the distinction between things good and evil,—even as Socrates, who is thought to be the first who introduced it, proclaimed as the most necessary subject of inquiry—

Whatso of evil and good within these homes is enacted, we too shall have to begin at once by considering the difference which exists between them.

Chapter I. What Is the Main Difference in the Things Which Concern Life?

Section titled “Chapter I. What Is the Main Difference in the Things Which Concern Life?”

[3] All the philosophers who seem to teach systematically the principles (of Ethics), and, most notably of all, those of the Old Academy and the Peripatetics, and the Stoics also, are accustomed to make a distinction by saying that “of existing things some are good, some evil, some between these two,” and these [4] last they term “indifferent”; but Xenocrates, in phrases peculiar to himself and using the singular case, declared that “Everything which exists either is good or is evil or neither is good nor is evil.” [5] And whereas the rest of the philosophers adopted this division without a proof, he thought it right to introduce a proof as well. “If,” he argued, “anything exists which is apart from things good and evil and things neither good nor evil, that thing either is good or is not good. And if it is good, it will be one of the three; but if it is not good, it is either evil or neither evil nor good; and if it is evil, it will be one of the three, and if it is neither evil nor good, again it will be one of the three. Therefore everything which exists either is good or is evil or neither is good nor is evil.” [6] But he, too, virtually accepted the division without proof, since the argument adopted to establish it is nothing else than the division itself; hence, if the proof contains in itself the confirmation, the division, too, will be its own confirmation as it does not differ from the proof.

[7] But yet, although it seems to be agreed by all that the distinction between existing things is threefold, none the less some people invent captious objections, and while allowing that the distinction between things is of this kind, yet attack the division as set forth in sophistical fashion. And this we shall learn when we have first gone back a little.

[8] The professional Logicians assert that the definition differs merely in its verbal construction from the universal, being identical in meaning. And rightly; for he who says “Man is a rational, mortal animal’ says what is identical in meaning, though different in wording from him who says “Whatever thing is man, that thing is a rational, mortal animal.” [9] And that this is so is plain from the fact that not only is the universal inclusive of the particulars but the definition also extends to all the particular instances of the thing in question,—that of Man, for example, to all the particular men, and that of Horse to all the horses. Also, if one false instance is classed under it each of them is vitiated, both the universal and the definition. [10] Well then, just as these, which vary in wording, are identical in meaning, so also, they declare, the perfect division, which has a universal meaning, differs from the universal in verbal construction. For he who divides in this fashion—“Of men some are Greeks, others barbarians”—says what is equivalent to “Whosoever are men, they are either Greeks or barbarians.” For if any man is found who is neither a Greek nor a barbarian, the division must necessarily be vicious and the universal false. [11] Hence, too, a statement in the form “Of existing things some are good, others evil, others between these two,” is virtually, according to Chrysippus, a universal such as this—“Whatsoever things are existent, they either are good or are evil or indifferent.” Such a universal, however, is false if a false instance is classed under it. [12] For, they say, when two things subsist, the one good and the other evil, or the one good and the other indifferent, or an evil and an indifferent, the statement “This one of existing things is good” is true, but “These things are good” false; for they are not (both) good, but the one is good and the other evil. [13] And again the statement “These things are evil” is false; for they are not (both) evil but only the one of them. And so likewise in the case of the things indifferent; for “These things are indifferent” is false, just as is “These things are good, or evil.” [14] Something like this, then, is the objection, but it appears not to affect Xenocrates because he does not employ plural cases, which would result in the falsification of his division when things of different kinds are to be indicated.

[15] And others have raised the following objection: Every sound division, they say, is the cutting up of a genus into its proximate species, and for this reason a division such as this is unsound—“Of men some are Greeks, others Egyptians, others Persians, others Indians.” For the first proximate species has matched against it not its correlative proximate species but the sub-species of this, the correct statement being, “Of men some are Greeks, others barbarians,” and next, by subdivision, “And of barbarians some are Egyptians, others Persians, others Indians.” [16] And this applies also to the division of existing things, since all such as are good and evil are “different” to us, but all that lie between the good things and the evil are “indifferent” to us. The division, then, ought not to have been stated in its present form but rather in this form—“Of existing things some are indifferent, others different; and of the different some are good, others evil.” [17] For this form of division resembles that which runs—“Of men some are Greeks, others barbarians; and of the barbarians some are Egyptians, others Persians, others Indians”; but the division put forward resembled one of this type—” Of men some are Greeks, others Egyptians, others Persians, others Indians.”

However, there is no necessity now to speak at [18] length about these objections; but it will, perhaps, be fitting to explain first that the word” is” has two meanings, one of these being” really exists” (as, at the present moment, we say “it is day” for” day really exists”); and the other appears” (as some of the mathematicians are frequently in the habit of saying that the distance between two stars” is” a cubit’s length, this being equivalent to “appears to be but is not really”; for perhaps it is really “one hundred stades” but appears to be a cubit owing to its height and owing to the distance from the eye). [19] When, then, as Sceptics, we say that” Of existing things some are good, others evil, others between these two,” as the element” are” is twofold in meaning, we insert the” are” as indicative not of real existence but of appearance. For concerning the real and substantial existence of things good and evil and neither we have contests enough with the Dogmatists; but as regards the appearance of each [20] of these things we are in the habit of designating it good or evil or indifferent, even as Timon seems to make plain in his “Images,” when he says—

Verily I will relate each fact as to me it appeareth,
Standard exact of truth having in this my speech,
How that the nature of God and of Goodness abideth for
ever,
Whence proceedeth for man Life that is equal and just.

So then, the division mentioned above having been laid down in the form described, let us see what view we should take of the terms contained in it, beginning our discussion with the conception (implied by those terms).

Chapter II. The Essence of Good and Evil and Indifferent

Section titled “Chapter II. The Essence of Good and Evil and Indifferent”

[21] Since the controversy which we wage on this subject with the Dogmatists has for its most important point the differentiation of things good and evil, it will be fitting first of all to formulate a conception of these; for, according to the sapient Epicurus, “It is not possible either to seek or to doubt without a preconception.” [22] Now the Stoics, holding fast to the common notions (so to call them), define the good in this way—“Good is utility or not other than utility,” meaning by “utility” virtue and right action, and by “not other than utility” the good man and the friend. [23] For virtue, being a certain state of the regent part, and right action, being an activity in accordance with virtue, are exactly utility; and the good man, again, and the friend, belonging also themselves to the class of “good things,” cannot be said either to be utility or to be other than utility, for the following reason: [24] The parts, say the sons of the Stoics, are neither the same as their wholes nor of a different kind from their wholes, even as the hand (for instance) is neither the same as the whole man (for the hand is not the whole man), nor other than the whole (for the whole man is conceived as man when including the hand). Since, then, virtue is a part both of the good man and of the friend, and the parts are neither the same as their wholes nor other than their wholes, the good man and the friend are called “not other than utility.” So that every good thing is comprehended in the definition, whether it be directly “utility” or whether it be “not other than utility.” [25] Next, and by way of corollary, they state that “good” has three senses, and in each of its significations, again, they portray it by a separate description. In one sense “good,” they say, means that by which or from which “utility” may be gained, this being the most principal good and virtue; for from virtue, as from a fountain, all utility naturally springs. [26] And in another sense, good is that of which utility is an accidental result; thus not only will the virtues be called “good,” but also the actions in accordance therewith, inasmuch as utility results also from them. [27] And in the third and last sense, “that which is capable of being useful” is termed “good,” this description comprehending the virtues and the virtuous actions and the friends and the good men, and both gods and good daemons.—[28] And because of this Plato and Xenocrates do not mean the same as the Stoics when they say that “good” has several senses. For when the former declare that the Idea is termed “good” in one sense and that which partakes of the Idea in another sense, they propose significations which differ greatly from one another and have no connexion, as we see in the case of the word “dog.” [29] For just as by this is signified a meaning under which falls the barking animal, and also the marine animal, and besides them the philosopher, and moreover the star as well; but these meanings have nothing in common, and the first is not included in the second nor the second in the third,—so also in the statement that the Idea is good, and also that which partakes of the Idea, we have a declaration of significations, but of such as are separate and display no mutual connexion. [30] Such then, as said before, were the views of the earlier thinkers; but the Stoics hold that, in the case of the term “good,” the second signification should be inclusive of the first and the third inclusive of the other two. And there have been some who have asserted that “good” is “that which is desirable for its own sake.” And others put it thus: “Good is that which contributes to happiness”; and some—“that which helps to fulfil happiness.” And happiness, as Zeno and Cleanthes and Chrysippus have defined it, is “an equable flow of life.”

Such, in fine, is the general form of the definition of “the good.” [31] But as “the good” is used in three senses, with regard to the definition of the first signification [which says “The good is that by which or from which utility can result”] some are wont to argue further that if in very truth good is “that from which utility can result,” we must declare that generic virtue alone is good (for it is from this alone that utility results), and that each of the particulars—such as wisdom, temperance, and the rest—fall outside the definition. [32] For the precise fact of being useful does not result from any of these, but from wisdom “being wise” results and not “being useful” more generally, (for if just this—namely, being useful—were its result it would not be wisdom in particular but generic virtue), and from temperance results what is named after it (namely, “being temperate” ) and not the general result (namely,” being useful” ), and similarly with the rest.—[33] But those who resist this indictment say this: When we state that “good is that from which utility results,” this is equivalent to saying “good is that from which results one of the things useful in life.” For thus each of the particular virtues also will be a good, not as procuring utility in general but as providing some one of the things useful in life—one of them (namely, wisdom) providing the state of being wise, and another (namely, temperance) the temperate state. [34] But these men, in attempting by this defence to escape the previous charge, have involved themselves in another one. For if the statement is this—“Good is that from which results one of the things useful in life,” then generic virtue, which is a good, will not fall under the definition; for none of the things useful in life results from it (since otherwise it will become one of the particulars), but simply utility.

[35] And other objections, which partake of Dogmatic over-subtlety, are customarily made against these definitions. But for us it is sufficient to show that he who asserts that the good is “the useful,” or “what is choiceworthy for its own sake,” or “that which contributes to happiness,” or gives some such description of it, does not teach us what good is but states its accidental property. But he who states the property of the good does not show us the good itself. For certainly all agree that the good is useful and that it is choiceworthy (and for this reason it is called “good” as being “delightful”), [36], and that it is productive of happiness; but if one inquires further what this thing is which is useful and choiceworthy for its own sake and productive of happiness, they will no longer be of one mind, although they previously agreed in calling it the useful and the choiceworthy, but will be swept away into a truceless war, one man calling it virtue, another pleasure, another painlessness, another something else quite different. [37] But if it had in fact been shown by the definitions mentioned above what the good is, they would not have been at strife as though the real nature of the good were unknown. So then, the definitions set forth do not teach us what the good is but the accidental property of the good. Consequently, they are unsound not only in this respect but also inasmuch as they aim at something which is [38]impossible; for he who is ignorant of an existing object cannot get to know the property of that object either. For example, the man who says to one who is ignorant of what a horse is, “A horse is an animal capable of neighing,” does not teach him what a horse is; for “neighing,” too, is unknown to the person who does not know the horse, as it is a property of the horse. And he who to the man who has not grasped what an ox is propounds the definition, “An ox is an animal capable of bellowing,” does not explain the ox, for “bellowing” too is equally uncomprehended by the man who does not know the ox, it being a property of the ox. [39] Therefore also it is vain and useless to say to the man who is devoid of a conception of the good that the good is the choiceworthy or the useful. For one ought first to learn the real nature of the good itself, and then, in the next place, perceive that it is useful and that it is choiceworthy and productive of happiness. But if this is unknown such definitions as these do not inform us of what we seek.

[40] It will be enough, then, to have said thus much, by way of illustration, regarding the conception of the Good. And from this the logical subtleties which the Dogmatists devise regarding Evil will also be plain. For the evil is the contrary of the good; and it is harm or not other than harm; and it is “harm” as in the case of badness and wicked action, but “not other than ‘ harm’” as in the case of the wicked man and the enemy. [41] And between these (I mean, between the good and the evil, and termed the “indifferent” ) is that which is in neither state. And what the significance of these definitions is, and what is to be said against the definitions, one may learn from our discussion of the good. But now, on the assumption that these are already established, let us pass on and consider whether good and evil are really existent in the way in which they are conceived.

Chapter III. Do Good and Evil Really Exist?

Section titled “Chapter III. Do Good and Evil Really Exist?”

[42] Now that the Dogmatists have not described the conception of Good and Evil convincingly we have already argued; but in order to become more easily familiar with the arguments about its existence it is quite sufficient to say that, after all (as Aenesidemus used to assert), whereas all men consider that the good is what attracts them, whatever that may be, the particular views they hold about it are conflicting. [43] And just as, although men agree (shall we say?) that comeliness of body exists yet they are at variance about the comely and beautiful woman,—the Ethiopian preferring the blackest and most snub-nosed, and the Persian approving the whitest and most hook-nosed, and someone else declaring that she who is intermediate both in feature and in colouring [44] is the most beautiful of all,—so in the same way both laymen and philosophers share the same pre-conception and believe that good and evil exist,—good being that which attracts them and is useful, and evil that which is of the opposite nature,—but as to particular instances they are at war with one another:—One thing is pleasing to one man, another thing to another, and, in the words of Archilochus,—

Men differ as to what things cheer their hearts, seeing that this man welcomes glory, that man wealth, another well-being, and another pleasure. And the [45] same account applies to the philosophers. For the Academics and the Peripatetics assert that there are three classes of goods, and that some belong to the soul, some to the body, and others are external to both soul and body,—the virtues belonging to the soul, and to the body health and well-being and keenness of sense and beauty and everything which is of a similar character, and external to soul and body being wealth, country, parents, children, friends, and the like. [46] But the Stoics, though they too declared that there are three classes of good things, yet classed them differently, saying that some of them belong to the soul, that some are external, and that some are neither psychical nor external, and eliminating the class of bodily goods as not being goods. Thus those belonging to the soul are, they say, the virtues and right actions; and external are the friend and the good man and good children and parents and the like; and neither psychical nor external is the good man in his relation to himself, for it is impossible for him to be either external to himself or psychical; for he is composed of soul and body. [47] And there are some who are so far from eliminating the class of bodily goods that they even assign to them the most principal good; and of this sort are they who approve of carnal pleasure. But lest we may seem now to be unduly prolonging our argument in showing that the judgement of men regarding Good and Evil is discordant and conflicting, we shall base our exposition on one example only—namely health, since the discussion of this is specially familiar to us.

[48] Health, then, is by some considered to be a good, by others not a good; and of those who suppose it to be a good some have declared it to be the greatest good, others not the greatest; and of those who have said that it is not a good, some have counted it “a preferred indifferent,” others an indifferent but not [49] “preferred.” Now that health is a good, and the prime good, has been asserted by not a few of the poets and writers and generally by all ordinary folk. Thus Simonides the lyric poet declares that “Even fair Wisdom lacks grace unless a man possesses august Health.” And Licymnius, after first uttering this prelude—

Mother sublime, with eyes bright-shining,
Lov’d queen of the holy throne of Apollo,
Gently-smiling Lady of Health—
adds this lofty strain—
Where is the joy of wealth or of kindred,
Or of kingly dominion that maketh man god-like?

Nay, parted from thee can no one be blessed. [50] And Herophilus in his Dietetics affirms that wisdom cannot display itself and art is non-evident and strength unexerted and wealth useless and speech powerless in the absence of health.—[51] Such then are the views of these men. But the Academics and Peripatetics said that health is indeed a good, but not the prime good. For they held that one ought to assign to each of the goods its own proper rank and value. Hence Crantor, wishing to bring us to have a clear image of the object under discussion, made use of a very delightful illustration. [52] If we were to imagine, he says, a general theatre, common to all the Greeks, and that each of the goods were to come and present itself in this and challenge for the first prize, we should be brought at once to a realization of the difference between the goods. [53] For in the first place Wealth, springing to the front, will say—“I, all ye Greeks, by providing adornment to all men and garments and shoes and all other comforts am indispensable both to the sick and to the whole, and while I furnish delights in peace, in war I become the sinews of action.” [54] Then all the Greeks, on hearing these words, will with one consent give orders that the first prize be bestowed on Wealth. But if, whilst he is already being proclaimed the victor, Pleasure should present herself—

In whom love doth abide and longing and amorous converse, Speech seductive which stealeth the wits, yea e’en of the wisest,—

[55] and taking her stand in the middle should declare that it is right to proclaim her victor—

For unsure is Wealth: it lasteth but a day, Then, after briefest flow’ring, takes to flight, also it is pursued by men not for its own sake but for the enjoyment and pleasure which accrue because of it,—then certainly all the Greeks, conceiving that this is in fact the case, will cry aloud that they must crown Pleasure. [56] But when she, too, is about to carry off the palm, as soon as Health makes her entry in company with her fellow-deities, and explains that in her absence there is no profit either in pleasure or in wealth—

What doth wealth profit me when I am sick?

Better a little portion day by day With painless life than riches with disease—[57] then, once again, when they have heard her and have come to realize that happiness cannot exist when bed-ridden and diseased, all the Greeks will declare that Health is the victor. But even while Health is already claiming the victory, as soon as Courage enters, surrounded by a great press of nobles and [58] heroes, and taking her stand speaks thus—“If I am not present, O ye Greeks, the ownership of your goods falls into other hands, and your enemies would pray that you might abound in all things good since they intend to conquer you”; then, on hearing this, the Greeks will assign the first prize to valour, and the second to health, and the third to pleasure, and they will rank wealth last.

[59] Thus Crantor put health in the second place, adopting the order of the philosophers previously mentioned; but the Stoics affirmed that it is not a “good” but an “indifferent.” They suppose that the term “indifferent” has three senses: in one sense it is applied to that for which there exists neither inclination nor disinclination,—such as the fact that the stars or the hairs of the head are odd in [60] number or even; in another sense it applies to that for which there exists inclination and disinclination but not more for this thing than for that—as in the case of two drachmae indistinguishable both in markings and in brightness, when one is required to choose one of them, for there exists an inclination for one of them but no more for this one than for that. [61] And in the third and last sense the indifferent, they say, is that which contributes neither to happiness nor to unhappiness; and indifferent in this signification, they say, are health and disease and all things of the body and most external things because they tend neither towards happiness nor towards unhappiness. For that which it is possible to use either well or ill will be indifferent; and whereas one always uses virtue well and vice ill, one can use health and the things of the body at one time well and at another ill, and consequently they will be indifferent.—[62] And they say too that of things indifferent some are “preferred,” others “rejected,” others neither preferred nor rejected, and that the preferred are those which have considerable “worth,” and the rejected those which have considerable “unworthiness,” and that extending the finger, for example, or contracting it, and everything like that, is neither preferred nor rejected. [63] And amongst the things preferred are ranked health and strength and beauty, wealth and glory and the like; but amongst the things rejected, sickness and poverty and pain and suchlike.—[64] So say the Stoics; but Ariston of Chios affirmed that health, and everything of a similar kind, is not a “preferred indifferent”; for to call it a “preferred indifferent” is equivalent to claiming it to be a “good,” and practically differs only in name. [65] For, without exception, amongst the indifferent things which lie between virtue and vice there is no distinction; nor are some of them preferred, others rejected naturally, but owing to the different circumstances of the various occasions; (so that) neither are those said to be preferred inevitably preferred, nor those said to be rejected necessarily rejected. [66] Were it, for instance, obligatory that men in sound health should serve under the tyrant and on this account be destroyed, but that the sick should be set free from that service and freed likewise from destruction, on such an occasion the wise man would choose sickness rather than health. And thus neither is health inevitably preferred nor sickness rejected. [67] As, then, in the writing of names we place different letters first at different times, adapting them to the varying circumstances,—Delta when we are writing the name of Dion, Iota when it is Ion, Omega when it is Orion,—no one letter being preferable to the others by nature, but the occasions compelling us to act thus,—so also in the things which lie between virtue and vice there exists no natural precedence of some before others, but rather a precedence due to circumstance.

[68] But now that we have thus shown, mainly by means of examples, that there is no agreement about the preconception regarding things good and evil, and the indifferent as well, it will be our next task to deal with the arguments of the Sceptics about the problem before us. [69] If, then, there exists anything good by nature or anything evil by nature, this thing ought to be common to all men and be good or evil for all. For just as fire which is warmth-giving by nature warms all men, and does not warm some but chill others,—and like as snow which chills (by nature) does not chill some and warm others, but chills all alike,—so what is good by nature ought to be good for all, and not good for some but not good for others. [70] Wherefore also Plato, in establishing that God is good by nature, argued on similar lines. For, he says, as it is the special property of heat to make hot and the property of cold to chill, so also it is the special property of good to do good; but the Good is God; therefore it is the property of God to do good. So [71] that if there exists anything good by nature, this is good in relation to all men, and if there exists anything evil by nature, that is evil in relation to all. But there is nothing good or evil which is common to all, as we shall establish; therefore there does not exist anything good or evil by nature. [72] For we must declare either that everything which is supposed by anyone to be good is in very truth good, or not everything. But we must not declare that everything is so; for if we should call good everything which is supposed by anyone to be good, then, since the same thing is supposed by one man to be evil, and by another good, and by yet another [is held to be] indifferent, we shall be granting that the same thing is at once both evil and good and indifferent. [73] Epicurus, for example, asserts that pleasure is a good, but he who said “I would rather be mad than enjoy pleasure” a counted it an evil, while the Stoics say it is indifferent and not preferred; but Cleanthes says that neither is it natural nor does it possess value for life, but, like a cosmetic, has no natural existence, whereas Archedemus says that it has a natural existence, like the hairs in the armpit, but possesses no value, and Panaetius that it exists partly by nature [74] and partly contrary to nature.—If, then, everything that seems good to anyone is altogether good, then, since pleasure seems good to Epicurus, and evil to one of the Cynics, and indifferent to the Stoic, pleasure will be at once good and evil and indifferent; but it is impossible for the same thing to be by nature opposite things,—at once good and evil and indifferent; therefore we must not declare that everything which seems good or evil to anyone is good or evil.—[75] But if what seems good to anyone is not in all cases altogether good, we ought to be gifted with discernment and able to distinguish the difference between the supposed goods so as to declare that this thing which is supposed by this man to be good is in very truth good, whereas that thing which is supposed by that man to be good is not also good by nature. [76] This difference, then, comes to be perceived either through sensible evidence or through a process of reasoning.—But it cannot be through sensible evidence. For everything which causes an impression through sensible experience is of such a nature as to be perceived with one accord by all in common who have their perceptions undistorted, as one may see in the case of nearly all appearances. But the same thing is not accounted good by all with one accord, but by some virtue and what partakes of virtue, by others pleasure, by others painlessness, by others something else. Therefore the really good does not impress all men through sense-evidence.—[77] And if it is perceived by reasoning, then, since each of those persons who are held in honour in the different sects has his own peculiar reason—Zeno one by which he opined that virtue is the good, Epicurus another by which he chose pleasure, Aristotle a different one by which he chose health,—each of them likewise will introduce his own peculiar good, which is not a good by nature nor common to all. [78] So then nothing is good by nature. For if the private good of each is not the good of all nor by nature, and besides the private good of each there exists no good upon which all are agreed, no good exists.

[79] Moreover, if good exists, it ought to be desirable on its own account, since every man desires to obtain it even as he desires to escape evil. But, as we shall show, nothing is desirable on its own account; therefore there does not exist any good. [80] For if there is anything desirable on its own account, either the desire itself is desirable or something other than this,—for example, either the desire for wealth is desirable or wealth itself is desirable. [81] But the desire itself will not be desirable. For if the desire is desirable on its own account, we ought not to be eager to obtain that which we desire lest we should cease from desiring any longer. For just as (we ought to avoid) drinking or eating lest by having eaten or drunk we should cease to wish any longer to drink or eat, so, if the desire for wealth or health is desirable, we ought not to pursue after wealth or health, lest by acquiring them we cease to desire them any longer. [82] But we do desire the acquisition of them; therefore the desire is not desirable but rather to be avoided. And just as the lover is eager to obtain his beloved that he may escape from the distress which love entails, and as the thirsty man hurries to drink that he may escape the torment of thirst, so also he who is distressed through his desire for wealth hurries to obtain wealth that he may be relieved from further desire.—[83] But if the desirable is something other than the desire itself, it is either a thing separate from ourselves or a thing belonging to ourselves. And if it is separate from us and external, either some effect is produced in us by means of it, or no effect; as, for instance, by the friend or the good man or the child, or any other of the so-called external goods, either there is produced in us a pleasing motion and a welcome state and a delightful affection, or no such result occurs and we do not experience any different motion when we regard the friend or the child as desirable. [84] And if absolutely no such effect is produced in us, no external thing at all will be desirable in our eyes. For how can we possibly have a desire for a thing in regard to which we feel no emotion? [85] And besides, if the enjoyable is so conceived because we get joy from it, and the painful because we get pain, and the good because we get delight, it will follow that no desire is implanted by that which produces in us no joy nor delightful feeling nor agreeable emotion. [86] But if there is produced in us by an external object, such as the friend or the child, a welcome state and an agreeable affection, the friend or the child will not be desirable for his own sake but for the sake of this welcome state and agreeable affection. But such a state is not an external thing but is personal to ourselves. Therefore none of the external things is desirable for its own sake or good.—[87] Nor yet is the desirable and good one of the things personal to ourselves. For it is either solely corporeal or psychical. But it will not be solely corporeal; for if it really were solely corporeal, and no longer a psychical affection, it would elude our perception (for all perception is a property of the soul) and it would be on a par with the things which exist externally and have no fellowfeeling with us. [88] But if the pleasure it contains extends to the soul, it will be desirable and good on account of this but not on account of its being a merely corporeal motion. For every desirable thing is judged to be so by means of a sensation or perception and not by means of an irrational body. But the sense or intelligence which apprehends the desirable is of the soul; therefore none of the things which happen to the body is desirable for its own sake and [89] good, but, if any, those which happen to the soul; and this involves us once again in the original difficulty. For since the intelligence of each man disagrees with that of his neighbour in respect of its judgements, each must necessarily regard as good that which appears so to himself. But what appears good to each man is not good by nature. So in this way, too, nothing is good.

And the same argument applies also to evil. [90] For it virtually results from our investigation of the good that, in the first place, when one of these is abolished the other also is abolished along with it (for each of them is conceived in its relation to the other); and next, since it is possible (for us to establish) this directly, (we shall attempt) once more to base our argument upon a single example, namely folly, which alone, say the Stoics, is evil. [91] For if folly is evil by nature, then, just as the hot is known to be hot by nature from the fact that those who approach it are made hot, and the cold from their being made cold, so also it will be necessary for folly to be known as being evil by nature from the fact that people are made evil. Either, then, it is those who are called fools that are made evil by folly, or the wise. [92] But the wise are not made evil; for they are outside of folly, and they will not be made evil by an evil which is not present with them but separated. And if folly makes evil the fools, it makes them evil either when evident to them or when non-evident. [93] But certainly not when non-evident; for if it is non-evident to them it is neither evil for them nor to be avoided, but just as a man neither avoids nor is perturbed by a non-apparent pain and a non-perceptible pang, so also no one will account as evil the folly which is unsuspected and non-evident. [94] But if it is quite plainly perceived by them and is evil by nature, the fools ought to have avoided it as evil by nature. But the fools do not avoid as an evident evil that which is called by outsiders “foolishness,” but each one accepts his own judgement and reckons that of the man who holds an opposite opinion to be evil. [95] So that it is not evident to the fools that folly is evil by nature. Hence, if neither are the wise made evil at all by folly nor is folly a thing avoided by the fools, we must declare that folly is not a thing evil by nature. And if it is not, neither is any other of the so-called evils.

[96] But some of those who belong to the sect of Epicurus, in answer to these objections, are wont to argue that the animal avoids pain and pursues pleasure naturally and without teaching; thus when it is born, and is not as yet a slave to opinions, it cries and screams as soon as it is smitten by the air’s unwonted chill. But if it naturally has an inclination for pleasure and a disinclination for toil, toil is a thing naturally avoided by it and pleasure a thing desirable. [97] But they who argue thus have failed to notice, in the first place, that they are giving a share in the good even to the basest animals (for they too have a large share in pleasure); and, next, that toil is not a thing to be absolutely avoided; for, in fact, pain is alleviated by toil, and health of body, as well as strength and growth, comes by means of toils, and men do not acquire the most exact arts and sciences without toil, so that toil is not a thing naturally to be avoided altogether. [98] Moreover, what seems to be pleasant is not in all cases naturally desirable; thus it often happens that things which on their first occurrence affect us pleasurably, on the second occasion, although they are the same, are deemed unpleasant, just as though the pleasant were not so by nature, but affected us now this way and now that according to the differing circumstances.

[99] Yes, but even those who hold that only the fair is good think that it is proved by the irrational animals that this is desirable by nature. For we see, they say, how certain noble animals, such as bulls and cocks, contend unto the death even when they have no feeling of delight and pleasure. [100] And those men who have given themselves over to destruction for the sake of country or parents or children would never have done so, when they had no hope of pleasure after death, unless the fair and good had naturally drawn them, and every noble animal, to desire it. [101] But these people, too, fail to notice that it is perfectly silly to suppose that the animals just mentioned contend to their last breath owing to a conception of the good. For one may hear them declaring themselves that it is only the wise state of mind which beholds the fair and good, while folly blinds men for discerning it; and hence the cock and the bull, as they have no share in the wise state of mind, will not behold the fair and good. [102] And besides, if there is anything about which these animals contend unto the death, it is nothing else than victory and leadership. But sometimes it is a fairer thing to be vanquished and subdued, at least where either result is indifferent. Therefore victory and leadership is not good by nature but indifferent. [103] And besides, if they should assert that the cock or the bull or any other of the valiant animals strives after the fair, whence comes it that man also aims at the same thing? For in proving that those animals have a preconception of this, it is [104] not proved that man is of a like kind, since, to be sure, if man too is said to have a preconception of the fair because some animals are valiant and contemptuous of pleasure and capable of resisting pains, then, since most of them are greedy and the slaves of their bellies, we shall declare also, conversely, that man is still more eager for pleasure. [105] And if they should argue that, though some animals are pleasure-loving, man is not wholly so, we too shall turn round and say that it does not at once follow that, if some animals for a natural reason pursue after the fair, man also aims at the same goal.—[106] But some other man will assert that victory and leadership is a thing highly prized by the animals not for its own sake but for the sake of the delight and joy of soul which follow upon it, this being an agreeable state. And one may suppose that this is even more true of men, with whom reputation and praise and gifts and honours are sufficient to please and thrill the mind and because of this to render it capable of resisting hardships. [107] Whence, too, it is probably owing to this cause that those who prove valiant to the end and devote themselves to destruction for their country’s sake struggle manfully and die. For even if they die and depart from life, yet to be sure while they are alive they take pleasure and joy in the praise. [108] And it is likely also that some of them believe further that similar praise awaits them after death, and thus they desire a conspicuous death. And it is not improbable that others endure death through seeing that the woes of life will be still harder for them to endure, when they behold—

Death overtaking their sons and ravishers seizing their
daughters,
Plunderers wrecking their chambers, and even their infant
children
Brutally dashed to the ground in the fearful fury of
fighting.

[109] It is for many reasons, then, that some desire death with glory, and not because they regard “the fair” (so harped upon by certain of the Dogmatists) as a thing to be greatly sought after. But let this serve to conclude our discussion of these problems.

Chapter IV. Assuming That Things Good and Evil Exist by Nature, Is It Possible to Live Happily?

Section titled “Chapter IV. Assuming That Things Good and Evil Exist by Nature, Is It Possible to Live Happily?”

[110] We have, then, sufficiently considered the question of the non-existence of any thing good or evil by nature; and now let us inquire whether, if (the existence of) these be conceded, it is possible to live at once equably and happily. Now the dogmatic philosophers assert that this, and nothing else, is actually the case; for according to them the man who acquires the good and avoids the evil is happy. Wherefore also they allege that wisdom is a science of life, it being capable of distinguishing things good and evil and of securing happiness.

But the Sceptics, in neither affirming nor denying anything rashly but subjecting all things to criticism, maintain that those who assume the existence of good and evil by nature have in consequence an unhappy life, whereas for those who refuse to define and suspend judgement—

Freest from care is the life they lead.·
And this we may learn if we first go back a little.

Now every unhappy state occurs because of some perturbation. But every perturbation in men is a consequence due either to an eager pursuit of certain things or to an eager avoidance of certain things. [113] And all men eagerly pursue what is believed by them to be good and avoid what is supposed to be evil. Therefore every case of unhappiness occurs owing to the pursuit of the good things as good, and the avoidance of the evil things as evil. Since, then, the Dogmatist firmly believes that this thing is good by nature and that thing is evil by nature, as he is always pursuing the one and avoiding the other and being, consequently, perturbed, he will never be happy. [114] For either everything which anyone pursues is at once and by nature good and everything which anyone avoids as a thing to be avoided is such in reality; or else some one of the things pursued is desirable, but not every one, and some one of the things avoided is to be avoided; or else these things belong to the relative class, and in relation to this man this thing is desirable or to be avoided, whereas in relation to the real nature of the things it is neither desirable nor to be avoided, but at one time desirable, at another to be avoided.—[115] If, then, a man should assume that everything which is in any way pursued by anyone is good by nature and that everything which is avoided is by nature to be avoided, he will have a life that is unlivable, through being compelled both to pursue and to avoid at the same time the same thing,—to pursue it, inasmuch as it is conceived by some to be desirable, but to avoid it, in so far as it is deemed by [116] others a thing to be avoided.—But if he were to say not that everything which is pursued or avoided is desirable and to be avoided, but that some one of them is desirable and some one to be avoided, he will have a life indeed, but not a life free from perturbation; for through continually pursuing what he believes to be good by nature and shunning what he supposes to be evil he will never be clear of perturbation, but both when he has failed as yet to grasp the good he will be extremely perturbed because of his desire to gain it, and when he has gained it he will never be at rest owing to the excess of his joy or on account of keeping watch over his acquisition. [117] And the same argument applies also to evil; for neither he who is without it is care-free, as he is no little tormented by the perturbation caused both by avoiding it and by taking precautions; nor does he who is in an evil state have any cessation of his torments, through taking thought—

How to escape from the steep of destruction.

[118] But if a man should declare that nothing is by nature an object of desire any more than of avoidance, nor of avoidance more than of desire, each thing which occurs being relative, and, owing to differences of times and circumstances, being at one time desirable, at another to be avoided, he will live happily and unperturbed, being neither exalted at good, as good, nor depressed at evil, manfully accepting what befalls him of necessity, and being liberated from the distress due to the belief that something evil or good is present. This, in fact, will accrue to him from his belief that nothing is good by nature or evil. Therefore it is not possible to live happily if one posits any things good or evil by nature.

[119] Moreover, that which is productive of any evil is certainly to be avoided, just as is the evil. For instance, if pain is an evil, certainly also what is productive of the pain will take rank with the pain as a thing to be avoided; and if death is one of the evils, what causes death will also be at once both evil and a thing to be avoided. So then in general, if evil is to be avoided, what is productive of evil will of necessity be a thing to be avoided and an evil. [120] But, as we shall show, things which are said by some to be good are also productive of evils. Therefore the things which are said by some to be good are potentially evil, and on account of this are causes of unhappiness. For, in fact, it is owing to such goods that all these evils exist,—love of money and love of fame and love of strife and love of pleasure and all the other things which resemble these. [121] For it is by pursuing earnestly and with extreme persistence what he himself believes to be good and desirable that each man unwittingly falls into the evil lying next-door. Thus for instance (for our meaning will be clear if we take examples [122] familiar to us), the man who has already assumed that wealth is a good must make every effort for the obtaining of wealth, and keep always rehearsing to himself the injunction of the Comedy—

Winter and summer get thee gain, good sir; and he must accept what the Tragedy says—

Thou fairest of all boons to mortals, Gold! But to make every effort for the gaining of wealth is nothing else than to be a money-lover. Therefore he who imagines wealth to be the greatest good, in his zeal for this, becomes a money-lover. [123] Again, the man who supposes fame to be desirable earnestly strives for fame, and the earnest striving for fame is love of fame; therefore the supposition that fame is desirable and good by nature serves to generate a great evil, love of fame. [124] And in the case of pleasure we shall find the same thing; for to those who are eager for its acquisition there results necessarily a certain depraved condition, love of pleasure. So that, if what is productive of evils is evil, and it has been shown that the things which are believed by some philosophers to be good are productive of all the evils, one must declare that the things believed by some to be good are potentially evil.

[125] Moreover, it is not possible for our opponents to argue that although, through their pursuit of them and their impulse towards them, there accrues some evil to the subjects of the impulse and the pursuit (love of money, for example, to the man who goes after wealth, and love of fame to him who goes after fame, and some other kind of perturbation to him who is after something else), yet as a result of their acquisition there comes about a relief from the perturbations and a cessation of the previous distress; [126] for he who has acquired the wealth no longer seeks earnestly after wealth, and he who has got the pleasure will relax the intensity of his zeal for it. For just as the animals which haunt the crags are driven for the sake of drinking through pain to pleasure and as soon as they are satisfied cease from their previous distress, so also man is necessarily distressed during his efforts after the good, but when he has gained what he yearned for he is also relieved from [127] his distress.—But we assert that it is not possible to argue thus, nor is this the truth of the matter. For even if men obtain what they regard as goods, they are still more oppressed and vexed that they are not alone in possessing them; for it is when accompanied with this—with their being alone in possessing them—that they regard the goods as precious and highly to be prized, and hence they are infected with jealousy towards their neighbours and ill-will and envy. So that while the pursuit of the things said to be goods is not devoid of misery, the acquisition of them is the heaping up of more numerous evils.—[128] And again, the same account holds good also of the evils themselves. For when a man has a preconception that certain things are by nature evil (such as ill-repute, poverty, lameness, pain, disease, folly in general), he is not distressed by these alone but also by hosts of other evils due to them. [129] For when they are present he is tempest-tost not only by them but also by his belief about them, through which he is convinced that evil is present with him; and by such a preconception he is devastated as by a greater evil. And he is equally devoid of rest when they are not present, and, either through taking precautions against the future or through fear, he has anxiety as his house-mate. [130] But when reasoning has established that none of these things is good by nature or evil by nature, we shall have a release from perturbation and there will await us a peaceful life.

Well then, it is plain from what has been said that a multitude of evils occur as the result of the things believed by some to be goods, and as a result of the evils other evils come about, so that owing to these happiness becomes unattainable. [131] And, in the next place, we must show that we cannot gain assistance either by taking the road of the dogmatic philosophy. For if anything good by nature or evil by nature is assumed to exist, he who is consoling the man who is perturbed owing to his strenuous pursuit of the good as good, or his excessive avoidance of the evil as evil, checks the perturbation either by declaring that it is a duty neither to pursue the good nor to avoid the [132] evil, or by showing that the object which the man pursues possesses very little value and that it is not proper to pursue it, whereas this other object has greater value and to follow after it is a fitting thing (wealth, for example, possesses less and virtue more value, and one ought not to pursue the former but the latter); or (by showing) that this object is of little use and entails many annoyances, whereas that object is of great use and entails few annoyances. [133] But to declare that it is not proper either to pursue the good or to avoid the evil strenuously is contrary to the view of the Dogmatists, who are always harping on the selection or rejection of these things and on desires and avoidances. [134] And to say that one ought not to pursue this object as being base, but to strive after that object as being more noble, is the action of men who are not getting rid of the perturbation but effecting a change in its position; for just as the man who pursued the first object was distressed, so also he who pursues the second will be [135] distressed, so that the philosopher’s discourse creates a new disease in place of the old, since, by turning away the man who strives after wealth or fame or health, as being a good, towards the pursuit not of these things but of “the fair” (shall we say) and of virtue, he does not set him free from the pursuit [136] but makes him change over to another pursuit.—As, then, the physician, if he does away with a pleurisy but creates inflammation of the lungs, or removes brain-fever but in its place introduces lethargy, does not get rid of the danger but shifts it over, so also the philosopher, who introduces one perturbation in place of another, gives no succour to the person perturbed. [137] For it is not possible to argue that the perturbation introduced is a moderate one, whereas the one removed was more violent. For the perturbed person has the same sort of belief about the second object of pursuit as he had about the previous one; but he believed that the first object was good [138] and because of this he went after it eagerly; so, as he also believes that the second is good and goes after it with equal eagerness, he will be equally perturbed, or perhaps even more violently in so far as he has been converted to the belief that his present object of pursuit is of greater value. If, then, the philosopher should cause the distressed person to pursue one object in place of another, he will not rid him of his distress. [139] And if he simply teaches that this object is of little use but entails many annoyances, (while that object is of great use and entails few annoyances,) he will be making a comparison between one desire and avoidance and another desire and avoidance, and will not be removing the perturbation. But this is absurd; for the person in distress does not wish to learn which thing is more distressing and which less, but yearns to be rid of his distress. [140] It will only be possible, then, to avoid this by making it evident to the person who is in distress, owing to his avoidance of evil or his pursuit of good, that there does not exist anything which is either good or evil by nature,—

But by the judgement of men Sentence upon them is
pass’d,

as Timon says. And to teach this is, in fact, the peculiar task of Scepticism; therefore it belongs to it to secure a happy life.

Chapter V. Is He Who Suspends Judgement Regarding the Nature of Things Good and Evil in All Respects Happy?

Section titled “Chapter V. Is He Who Suspends Judgement Regarding the Nature of Things Good and Evil in All Respects Happy?”

[141] He, then, is happy who lives to the end without perturbation and, as Timon said, existing in a state of quietness and calm—

For on all sides calm was prevailing,
and—

Him when thus I descried in a calm with no winds to disquiet. And of the goods and evils which are said to exist some are introduced by belief, others by necessity. [142] Thus by [rational] belief are introduced all those which men pursue or avoid of their own judgement,—as, for example, amongst things external, wealth and fame and noble birth and friendship, and everything of the kind, are called desirable and good; and, amongst qualities of the body, beauty and strength and sound condition; and, amongst qualities of the soul, courage and justice and wisdom and virtue in general; and the opposites of these are regarded as things to be avoided. [143] But by necessity are brought about all such things as befall us because of an irrational affection of sense, and all that some natural necessity brings about, “but no one would willingly choose them,” or avoid them,—such as pain and pleasure. [144] Hence, since there exists such a difference as this in these things, the fact that it is only the man who suspends judgement about all things who lives to the end an unperturbed life in respect of the goods and evils due to belief we have already established, both in our previous discussion of the Sceptic “end,” and also on the present occasion when we showed that it is not possible to be happy if one assumes the existence of anything good and evil by nature. [145] For he who does this is tossed about with endless perturbations, through avoiding these things and pursuing those, and drawing upon himself many evils because of the goods, and being afflicted by many times more evils because of his belief about evils.—[146] Thus the man who declares that wealth (shall we say?) is a good and poverty an evil is perturbed in two ways if he has not wealth,—both because he has not the good and because he is toiling for the acquisition of it,—and when he has acquired it he is punished in three ways,—because he is immoderately overjoyed, and because he toils to ensure that his wealth stays with him, and because he is painfully anxious and dreads the loss of it. [147] But he who ranks wealth neither amongst the natural goods nor amongst the natural evils, but utters the formula “Not more,” is neither perturbed at its absence nor overjoyed at its presence, but in either case remains unperturbed. So that in respect of the things held, as a matter of belief, to be good and bad, and in respect of the desires and avoidances [148] thereof, he is perfectly happy, while in respect of the sensible and irrational affections he preserves a due mean. For the things which occur, not because of a distortion of the reason and foolish belief but, owing to an involuntary affection of the sense it is impossible to get rid of by means of the Sceptical [149] argument; for in a man who is distressed because of hunger or thirst, it is not feasible to implant, by means of the Sceptical argument, the conviction that he is not in distress, and in the man who is overjoyed at getting relief from these sufferings it is not in its power to implant the belief that he is not overjoyed. [150] —What help, then, towards happiness (ask the Dogmatists) do we get from suspension of judgement if one has to be perturbed in any case and unhappy because perturbed? Great help, we shall reply. For even though he who suspends judgement about all things is perturbed owing to the presence of what causes pain, yet as compared with the Dogmatist he bears the [151] distress more lightly, because, firstly, to pursue goods and to shun evils which are endless in number and thus to be harassed by the perturbations due to these pursuits and avoidances as by Furies is much worse than not to suffer thus but merely to be engaged in avoiding and guarding against only one isolated form of evil. [152] And, secondly, even the thing which the Ephectics avoid as evil, is not excessively perturbing. For the suffering is either small, such as that which befalls us every day,—hunger or thirst or cold or heat or [153]something similar;—or, on the contrary, it is very violent and intense, as in the case of those afflicted with incurable torments, during which the doctors often provide powerful anodynes to assist the patient in obtaining some relief; or else it is moderate and protracted, as in some diseases. [154] And of these, that which faces us every day perturbs us least as the remedies for it (food and drink and shelter) are easy to provide; and that which is most intense and in the highest degree perturbing terrifies us, after all, but for a moment, like a lightning-flash, and then either destroys us or is destroyed. [155] And the moderate and protracted kind neither remains all through life nor is continuous in its nature but has many intervals of rest and periods of relief; for were it unceasing it would not have been protracted.—The perturbation, then, which befalls the Sceptic is moderate and not so very alarming. [156] Notwithstanding, even if it be very great, we ought not to blame those who suffer involuntarily and of necessity but Nature, Who recks not aught of custom, and the man who through his beliefs and owing to his own judgement draws upon himself the evil. For just as the man with a fever is not to be blamed because he has a fever (for he has the fever involuntarily), but the man who does not abstain from things inexpedient is to be blamed (for it lay in his own power to abstain from things inexpedient),—so the man who is perturbed at the presence of painful things is not to be [157] blamed; for the perturbation caused by the pain is not due to himself but is bound to occur of necessity whether he wishes it or not; but he who through his own imaginations invents for himself a host of things desirable and to be avoided is deserving of blame; for he stirs up for himself a flood of evils.—And one may see the same thing in the case of the so-called “evils” themselves. [158] For he who has no additional belief about pain being an evil is merely affected by the necessitated motion of the pain; but he who imagines in addition that the pain is objectionable only, that it is evil only, doubles by this belief the distress which results from its presence. [159] For do we not observe frequently how, in the case of those who are being cut, the patient who is being cut manfully endures the torture of the cutting—

His fair hue paling not, nor from his cheeks
Wiping the tears away,

because he is affected only by the motion due to the cutting; whereas the man who stands beside him, as soon as he sees a small flow of blood, at once grows pale, trembles, gets in a great sweat, feels faint, and finally falls down speechless, not because of the pain (for it is not present with him), but because of the belief he has about pain being an evil? [160] Thus the perturbation due to the belief about an evil as evil is sometimes greater than that which results from the so-called evil itself.—He, then, who suspends judgement about all things which depend on belief wins happiness most fully, and during involuntary and irrational affections although he is perturbed—Yea, for he is not sprung from a rock or an oak primeval But of the race of men was he, yet his state of feeling is moderate. [162] Hence, too, one must scorn those who fancy that he is confined to a [163] state of inactivity or of inconsistency,—to inactivity, because, as all life consists in desires and avoidances, he that neither desires nor avoids anything is virtually [164] rejecting life and remaining like a vegetable; and to inconsistency because, should he ever be subject to a tyrant and compelled to do something unspeakable, either he will not submit to the order given him but will choose a voluntary death, or else to avoid torture he will do what is commanded, and thus he will no longer be (in Timon’s phrase) “unmov’d by choice and avoidance,” but will choose the one and refuse the other, which is the action of those who confidently hold that something to be avoided and desirable exists.—[165] Now in arguing thus they do not comprehend that the Sceptic does not conduct his life according to philosophical theory (for so far as regards this he is inactive), but as regards the non-philosophic regulation of life he is capable of desiring some things and avoiding others. [166] And when compelled by a tyrant to commit any forbidden act he will perchance choose the one course and avoid the other owing to the preconception due to his ancestral laws and customs; and as compared with the Dogmatist he will certainly endure hardship more easily because he has not, like the other, any additional beliefs beyond the actual [167] suffering.—But we have discussed these matters more exactly in our discourse “On the Sceptic End,” and there is no necessity Once again to repeat an account most plainly deliver’d. Hence, as we have completed our account of things good and evil, the difficulties raised by which extend over almost the whole sphere of Ethics, come and let us consider next whether there exists any art of life

Chapter VI. Does There Exist Any Art of Life?

Section titled “Chapter VI. Does There Exist Any Art of Life?”

[168] We have proved sufficiently that it is possible to live a satisfactory life by adopting suspension of judgement about all things; but nothing hinders us from examining also in a similar fashion the view of the Dogmatists, although it has been partially examined already. For they promise to present us [169] with an “art of life,” and because of this Epicurus declared that “philosophy is an activity which secures the happy life by arguments and discussions”; [170] while the Stoics assert outright that “wisdom, which is the science of things good and evil and neither, is an art of life, and only those who attain this become fair, only they rich, as only they are wise. For he who possesses things of great value is rich, and virtue is of great value, and it only the Wise man possesses; therefore the wise man only is rich. And the lover of the valuable is fair, but the wise man only is a lover of the valuable; therefore the wise man only is fair.” [171] Now promises such as these capture the young with fruitless expectations, but they are not also true. Wherefore also Timon in one place scoffs at those who promise us to provide us with these things, calling them—

Spoilers of many a doctrine and masters of knavish im- posture;

[172] and in another place he brings in the people who have paid attention to them, repenting of the vain labours they have undergone, in these words—

One, then, lamenting did cry, as men are wont when lamenting,
“Oh, what is to befall me? Where now shall I gain any
wisdom?

Beggar’d in soul I am, and of sense not a grain is within me. Vainly methinks shall I try to escape from sheerest destruction. Thrice, yea four times, blessed are those devoid of possessions, Those who never have wasted their goods in idle existence. But my fate it is now to be stricken by grievous contentions, Penury, too, and what else doth harry the drones amongst mortals.”

[173] And the reason why this is so we may learn if we attend to the following point. The art of life which, it is claimed, exists and owing to which they suppose that men are happy, is not one art but many and dissimilar—that, for instance, of Epicurus, and that of the Stoics, and another of the Peripatetics. Either, then, one must follow all alike or one only or none. [174] But to follow them all is impracticable because of their conflicting character; for what this one enjoins as desirable that one forbids as a thing to be avoided, and it is not feasible both to pursue and avoid simultaneously the same object. [175] And if one ought closely to follow one art, either this is anyone whatsoever, which is impossible; for then, to follow one is equivalent to being willing to follow them all; for if we should give heed to this one, why to this one rather than that other? and conversely. It only remains, then, to say that we ought to follow that one art which has been judged best. [176] Either, then, we shall follow that which is judged best by another art or that which is judged best by itself. And if it is that judged best by itself, it will be distrusted or else we shall have to count them all trustworthy; for if this one is trustworthy inasmuch as it is judged by itself, the rest also will be trustworthy; for each of them is judged by itself. [177] But if it is judged by another art, even in this case, again, it will have to be distrusted; for just as it, in so far as it differs from the rest, needed judgement, so also the art which judges it, in that it differs from the other doctrines, will need one to judge it, and owing to this fact it will not be a trustworthy criterion of the other. If, then, it is not feasible to follow either all the arts of life or one, it [178] only remains to follow none.—And again: since, as I said above, there are many arts of life, he who abides by one of them must necessarily be unhappy, not only for the reasons previously stated but also for that which shall be stated as our argument proceeds. For each individual man is subject to a certain affection; for either he is a lover of wealth or a lover of pleasure or a lover of fame; and being such, he cannot be calmed down by any of the dogmatic [179] doctrines; nay, the lover of wealth or the lover of fame is further enkindled in his desire by the Peripatetic philosophy, according to which wealth and fame are among the goods; and the lover of pleasure is further inflamed by the doctrine of Epicurus (for on his showing pleasure is proved to be the perfection of happiness); and the lover of fame is also plunged headlong into this very affection by the Stoic arguments, according to which virtue alone is good and that which results from virtue. [180] In every case, then, what is called by the Dogmatic philosophers “the science of life” is a bulwark in defence of the evils of mankind rather than an aid against them.

And even if we grant that there is one art of life, and this an agreed one,—for instance, the Stoic,—not even so shall we accept it, since along with itself it brings many and diverse calamities. [181] For if the art of life, as consisting in wisdom, is a virtue, and only the Sage possesses virtue, the Stoics not being sages will not possess wisdom nor any art of life, and not possessing this neither will they teach it to others.—Also, if, on their showing, no art can be constructed, neither will the art of life be constructed; but in fact the first (is true); therefore the second (is true). [182] For an art is “a system constructed of apprehensions,” and apprehension is “assent to an apprehensive presentation.” But no apprehensive presentation exists because neither is every presentation apprehensive (owing to their conflicting character), nor yet any one of them (owing to their being unjudged). And if an apprehensive presentation does not exist, neither will there be any assent to it, and thus there will not be any apprehension either. And if there is no apprehension, neither will there be a system of apprehensions, that is to say, an art. Wherefrom it follows that there is no art of life either.—[183] Furthermore, according to the Stoics the apprehensive presentation is judged to be apprehensive by the fact that it proceeds from an existing object and in such a way as to bear the impress and stamp of that existing object; and the existing object is approved as existent because of its exciting an apprehensive presentation. But if the existent must be ascertained in order that the apprehensive presentation may be judged, and if the apprehensive presentation must be established in order that the existent may be apprehended, and each of these is untrustworthy because of the other,—then, as the apprehensive presentation is unknowable, art also is abolished, it being a system of apprehensions.

[184] Also, if the science of life,—that is, wisdom,—is cognisant of things good and evil and neither, either it is other than the goods whereof it is said to be the science, or it is itself the good, even as some of them assert in their definition—“Good is virtue or what [185] partakes of virtue.” And if it is other than the goods whereof it is said to be the science, it will not be a science at all; for every science is the knowledge of certain existing things, but we have previously shown that goods and evils are non-existent, so that neither will there exist any science of goods and evils. [186] But if it is itself the good and claims to be the science of the goods, it will be the science of itself; and this again is absurd. For the things which form the object of a science are conceived before the science. Thus medicine is said to be the science of things healthy and morbid and neither; but the healthy and morbid things are in existence before medicine and precede it. And again: Music is the science of things in tune and out of tune, rhythmical and unrhythmical; but previous to these Music does not exist. [187] The Stoics, too, have said that Dialectic is “the science of things true and false and neither”; so, then, before Dialectic the true and false and neither pre-existed. If, then, wisdom is the science of itself, it must have existed before itself; but nothing can have existed before itself; so that neither in this way can it be asserted that any art of life exists.

[188] Also, every existing art and science is apprehended by means of the artistic and scientific effects which it produces,—medicine, for instance, by its medical results, and harp-playing by those of the harper, and painting and sculpture as well, and all arts of a like kind. But the art which is supposed to be conversant with life has no resultant effect, as we shall establish; therefore, no art of life exists. [189] Thus, since much is said by the Stoics both about the education of children and about the honouring of parents, and also about piety towards the departed, we shall select a few points under each of these heads by way of illustration and bring them forward in support of our criticism.

[190] Well then, as regards the education of children, Zeno, the founder of the School, gives the following exposition in his discourses: “Have carnal knowledge no less and no more of a favourite than of a non-favourite child, nor of a female than of a male; favourite or non-favourite, males or females, no different conduct, but the same, befits and is befitting in respect of all alike.” And again,—“Have you had intercourse with your beloved one? I have not. Did you not desire to have intercourse with him? Certainly. But, though desiring to win him for yourself, were you afraid of inviting him? Not at all. But you invited him? Certainly. Then he did not yield to you? [191] He did not.”—And with regard to honouring one’s parents one might adduce the cases of incest which they harp upon. Thus Zeno, after stating the facts about Jocasta and Oedipus, asserts that there was nothing dreadful in his rubbing his mother. “If she had been ailing and he had done her good by rubbing her body with his hands, it had not been shameful; what shame was it, then, if he stopped her grief and gave her joy by rubbing her with another member, and begat noble children by [192] his mother?” And Chrysippus, in his State says expressly: “I approve of carrying out those practices—which, quite rightly, are customary even nowadays amongst many peoples—according to which (the mother has children by her son, and) the father by his daughter, and the brother by his full sister.”—And their recommendations concerning cannibalism may serve as an example of their piety towards the departed; for they deem it right to eat not only the dead but even their own flesh, if ever any part of their body should happen to be cut off. This is what is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On Justice:—[193] “And if any part of the limbs be cut off that is good for food, we should neither bury it nor otherwise get rid of it, but consume it, so that from our parts a new part may arise.” [194] And in his book On Duty, when discoursing about the burial of parents, he says expressly: “When our parents decease we should use the simplest forms of burial, as though the body—like nails or hair—were nothing to us, and we need bestow on it no care or attention of that kind. Hence, also, when their flesh is good for food, men shall make use of it, just as also of their own parts,—when, for instance, a foot is cut off it is proper for them to use it, and things like it; but when the flesh is not good, either they shall bury it and lay the mound upon it, or burn it up and scatter the ashes, or cast it far away and pay no more regard to it than to nails or hair.”

[195] Such is the Stoics’ doctrine; but against them we must bring the next point in our criticism. Either they enjoin these actions with the idea that young people will perform them or with the idea that they will not perform them. But certainly not with the idea that they will perform them; for the laws forbid them, unless it shall be their lot to live amongst the Laestrygones and Cyclopes, where it is permissible—Human flesh to devour, and pure milk swallow thereafter. [196] And if they enjoin them with the idea that they will not perform them, the art of life becomes redundant, as the practice of it is impossible. For just as painting is useless in a country of the blind (for this art is for men who have sight), and just as harp-playing is valueless in a city of the deaf (for it is those who have hearing that it delights), so also the art of life is of no benefit to those who are unable to make use of it.

[197] Moreover, every art, whether it be theoretical, like geometry and astronomy, or practical, like the military art, or creative, like painting and sculpture, possesses a special work of its own whereby it differs from the other states of mind, (whereas there is no special work which belongs to wisdom,) as we shall establish; therefore wisdom is not an art of life. [198] For just as the work common to the musical man and the unmusical is not music, and the work common to the literary and the non-literary is not literature, so too, in general, the work common to the artistic and the non-artistic is not artistry. Hence also the work common to the wise man and the unwise will not be the special work of wisdom. [199] But in fact every work which seems to be done by the wise man is found to be a work common also to the unwise; if, for example, we count honouring parents as a work of the wise man, or rendering back a deposit to those who have entrusted it, or any other thing of the kind, we shall also find men who are not virtuous doing any one of these things. So that there is no work peculiar to the wise man whereby he shall differ from the not wise. And if this is so, neither will wisdom be an art of life, as it has no artistic work peculiar to itself.

[200] But in reply to this they say that although all the works are common to all men, yet they are distinguished by their proceeding either from an artistic or from a non-artistic disposition. For the work of the virtuous man is not that of caring for his parents and generally honouring his parents, but doing this [201] because of wisdom is the act of the virtuous; and just as procuring health is common both to the medical man and to the layman, but to procure health medically is peculiar to the man of art, so also honouring one’s parents is common both to the virtuous man and the non-virtuous, but the honouring of his parents because of wisdom is peculiar to the wise man, so that he possesses also an art of life, of which the special work is the performance of each of his actions [202] from the best disposition.—But those who make this reply would seem to be wilfully deaf, and doing anything rather than answer the question before them. For when we were definitely proving that there is no work peculiar to the wise man whereby he differs from the not wise, but everything which is done by him is done also by those who are not virtuous, the Stoics were unable to disprove this; but they assert irrelevantly that the work common to both proceeds in the one case from a wise disposition and in the other from a foolish. [203] But this is not a proof that there is no work common both to those who are wise and those who are not so, but itself needs proof, since one might inquire how we are to discern when these works proceed, and when they do not proceed, from a wise disposition; for the common works themselves do not make this clear, inasmuch as they are common.—[204] Hence, too, the example brought forward from the art of medicine is found to tell rather against them. For when they assert that procuring health, which is a thing common both to the medical and the nonmedical man, belongs specially to the man of art when it is effected medically, then either they know that there is some difference in what is done by the doctor as compared with the layman,—the work being, for instance, rapid and painless and done systematically and on a definite plan,—or else they do not know this, but conceive that all these things are also common to laymen. [205] And if they know it, they are directly confessing that there is an apparent work which is peculiar to the doctor, and their next task is to pass on from this and to show that there is also a work peculiar to the wise man, wherein he will differ from the not wise. But if they do not know it, but shall declare that everything which is done by the doctor is also done by the layman, they will be robbing the doctor of his own peculiar work, and,—since there exists, apparently, exact similarity in the works executed,—they will not distinguish between the expert and the non-expert, nor between what is performed by an artistic disposition and by a non-artistic, because the disposition of the individual cannot be discerned of itself, as it is non-apparent. [206] So then, it does not profit them at all to agree that the works performed by the wise man and by the not wise are common to both, while alleging that they differ by being done in the one case from a wise disposition, in the other from an unwise.

But there are others who think that these works are distinguished by (the presence or absence of) unvarying quality and order. [207] For just as in the case of the intermediate arts it is the peculiarity of the artist to produce a thing in an orderly way and to be unvarying in his products (for the layman, too, may at times produce an artistic work, but rarely and not at all times, nor consistently and in the same way),—so also they say that the work of the wise man is to be unvarying in his right actions, and that of the unwise the opposite. [208] But these men, too, are evidently not dealing with the question in hand according to the real state of the facts. For that there exists some order of life definitely formulated by the artistic reason seems rather like an illusory hope. For no man, in preparing himself to meet the different and varied occurrences, is ever able to preserve the same order, and, least of all, the wise man who is aware both of the instability of fortune and the insecurity of events. [209] And besides, if the wise man had a single definite order of life, he would also have been plainly recognized through this by the not wise; but in fact he is not recognized by them; so then, the wise man cannot be discerned through the order of his works. Hence, if every art is apparent through its own special works, whereas of wisdom there is no special work through which it is apparent, then wisdom will not be an art of life.

[210] Moreover, if wisdom is an art of life, it would have benefited no one more than the wise man who possesses it, by furnishing him with self-control in his inclinations towards evil and in his disinclinations towards good. But wisdom does not in fact benefit the wise man, as we shall establish; therefore it is not an art of life. [211] For the wise man who is termed “self-controlled” is termed self-controlled either in respect of the fact that he has no inclination towards evil or disinclination towards good, or in respect of the fact that he has foolish inclinations but keeps them in control by his reason. But in respect of his not forming foolish judgements he will not be called self-controlled; for he will not control what he has not got. [212] And just as one would not call the eunuch self-controlled as regards sexual intercourse, nor the man with a bad stomach as regards the enjoyment of food (for they do not possess any appetite at all for these things, so that through self-control they might rise superior to the appetite),—in the same way one ought not to call the wise man self-controlled because the thing which he is to keep in control does not arise in him. [213] And if they shall maintain that he is self-controlled in respect of the fact that he forms foolish judgements but keeps them in control by his reason, they will be granting, firstly, that his wisdom has not benefited him at all, as he is still beset by perturbations and needing succour, and, secondly, that he is found to be even more unhappy than the foolish. [214] For in that he has an inclination for something he is certainly perturbed, and in that he controls it by his reason he retains the evil within himself and is, on this account, more perturbed than the fool who is no longer affected in this way; for the latter is perturbed in that he feels inclination, but in that he obtains the things desired he has his perturbation gradually diminished. So then the wise man is not [215] self-controlled in virtue of his wisdom; or if he is so, he is of all men the most unhappy. But if every art especially benefits him who possesses it, and it has been shown that that which is, as they maintain, the art of life does not even benefit its possessor, one must declare that there does not exist any art of life.

Chapter VII. Can the Art of Life Be Taught?

Section titled “Chapter VII. Can the Art of Life Be Taught?”

[216] Now in the proof that no art of life exists there is virtually involved the proof that it is incapable of being taught; for there is no learning of non-existent things. However, let us concede, gratuitously, that it exists, and let us teach that it cannot be taught. [217] Now amongst the philosophers the arguments about learning are many and varied; but we, for our part, shall select and state the most important points, of which some are the more general criticisms of the Sceptics which go to show that learning is nothing, and others the more special discussions of wisdom itself. And first in order let us consider the more general criticisms.

[218] In every instance, then, of learning there ought to be agreement regarding the subject taught and the teacher and the learner and the mode of learning; but, as we shall show, none of these things is agreed; therefore no learning exists. And since we have mentioned first the subject taught, we must raise questions about it first. [219] Now if any subject is taught, either the existent is taught or the non-existent. But neither is the existent taught, as we shall show, nor the non-existent, as we shall argue; therefore no subject is taught. Now the non-existent is not taught; for it has no property, so that it has not that of being taught. And besides, if the non-existent is [220] taught, the non-existent will be true; for learning is of things true. And if the non-existent shall be true, it will straightway be real as well: for certainly the Stoics say that “the true is that which is real and is opposed to something.” But it is absurd that the non-existent should be real. Therefore the nonexistent is not taught. And, certainly, what is taught excites an impression when being taught, but the non-existent cannot excite an impression; therefore the non-existent is not capable of being taught. [221] Furthermore, if the non-existent is taught, nothing true is taught; for the true belongs to the class of things existent and real. And if nothing true is taught, everything which is taught is false. But it is, in fact, absurd that everything which is taught should be false; so then the non-existent is not taught. For, of course, if the non-existent is taught, it is taught either in virtue of its non-existence or in virtue of something else. Now it is not taught in virtue of its non-existence; for if the nonexistent is taught in virtue of its non-existence, nothing existent will be taught; which is absurd. Nor yet in virtue of something else; for that “something else” exists, but the non-existent does not exist. So that the non-existent will not be [222] taught.—It remains then to say that the existent is taught; and this too we shall prove to be a thing impossible. For if the existent is taught, it is either in virtue of its existence or in virtue of something else. But if it is taught in virtue of its existence, nothing will be untaught; and if of existing things none is untaught, neither will there exist anything taught; for something untaught must exist in order that from it learning may come about. So that the existent will not be taught in virtue of its existence. [223] Nor yet in virtue of something else; (for the existent has no other) property belonging to it which is nonexistent, but every property which belongs to it is existent. So that if the existent is not taught in virtue of its existence, neither will it be taught in virtue of something else; for that other property, whatsoever it be, which belongs to it is existent. If, then, neither the existent is taught nor the nonexistent, and besides these there is no other alternative, no existing thing is taught.

[224] And again: since of the “Somethings” some are bodies, others incorporeal, if something is taught either it is a body that is taught or an incorporeal; but neither is the body taught nor the incorporeal; therefore nothing is taught. Now the body is not taught, according to the Stoics especially; for the things taught are “expressions,” and expressions are [225] not bodies. And besides, if the body is neither sensible nor intelligible, the body is not taught. For what is taught must be either sensible or intelligible, and if it is neither it is not taught. And the fact that body is neither sensible nor intelligible we have established in our treatise Against the Physicists. [226] For whether body is, as Epicurus asserts, a combination of size and form and solidity, or whether it is that which has the three dimensions plus solidity, since it is not the part of the irrational sense but of some rational faculty to perceive everything which is perceived owing to the concourse of several elements, body will not be an object of sense. [227] And even if it should be sensible, it will, once again, be incapable of being taught. For no sensible thing is taught,—as, for instance, no one learns to see the white, or to taste the sweet, to derive a sweet smell from something, to feel cold or heat, but the perception of all these things is untaught. So, then, neither is body sensible nor, should it be sensible, will it on that account be capable of being taught.—[228] Moreover, even supposing it to be intelligible it cannot be taught. For if neither length by itself is body, nor breadth nor depth, but the compound of them all, as they are all incorporeal we shall have to conceive of the combination of them as being incorporeal and not body; and because of this body is also incapable of being taught. [229] Also, some bodies are sensible, others intelligible. Hence, if body is taught, either the sensible is taught or the intelligible. But neither is the sensible taught (because it appears and is of itself quite evident to all), nor the intelligible (because of its obscurity and the hitherto undecided controversy about it, some saying that it is indivisible, others divisible, and some that it is without parts and minimal, others that it has parts and can be divided ad infinitum). Body, therefore, is not capable of being taught.—Nor, indeed, is the incorporeal. [230] For it is either a Platonic Idea, or the “expression” of the Stoics, or void or place or time or something else of the kind. But whichsoever of these it be, its real existence is still a matter of doubt and of unsettled controversy. [231] But to say that things still in dispute are taught as though they were uncontroverted is perfectly absurd. But if of things existent some are bodies, others incorporeal, and it has been shown that none of these is taught, then what is taught is nothing.

[232] Yet again: if anything is taught, it is either true or false. But it is not false, as is apparent at once; and if it is true it is doubtful, as we have shown in our chapter “On the Criterion,” and concerning things doubtful no learning exists. Therefore what [233] is taught does not exist.—Furthermore, what is taught is either technical or non-technical. But it is not non-technical, since then it would not require learning. And if it is technical, either it is apparent of itself or it is non-evident. But if it is apparent of itself, it is both non-technical and incapable of being taught; while if it is non-evident, because of the very fact of its being non-evident it is not capable of being taught.

[234] By these arguments it is established that the thing taught is open to doubt; and along with it both the teacher is abolished, because he will have nothing to teach, and the learner, because he will have nothing to learn. None the less, in their case also it will be possible to raise similar difficulties. [235] For if a teacher exists and a learner exists, either the expert will teach the expert, or the non-expert the non-expert, or conversely the expert the non-expert, or the nonexpert the expert. But neither can the non-expert teach the non-expert (just as the blind cannot lead the blind) nor the expert the expert, for certainly he has nothing to teach him. Nor yet the non-expert the expert, just as the blind man can never lead the man who sees; for the layman is incapacitated for grasping the theorems of the art, and on this account is [236] unfitted for teaching.—It remains, then, to say that the expert teaches the layman, which again is a thing impracticable; for together with the theorems of the [237] art the expert was doubted by us; and the non-expert too, if he is taught and becomes an expert, becomes an expert either when he is non-expert or when he is expert; but he cannot become an expert when he is non-expert, and when he is expert he no longer becomes an expert but is one. [238] And reasonably so; for the non-expert resembles the man who is blind or deaf from birth, and just as he who is blind from birth does not attain to a conception of colours, nor does he who is deaf from birth attain to a conception of sounds, so also the non-expert, in so far as he is nonexpert, seeing that he is incapacitated for grasping the technical theorems cannot possess knowledge of them. And the expert is no longer being taught but has been taught.

[239] Moreover, just as these things are doubtful, so also is the method of learning doubtful. For learning takes place either by the evidence of the senses or by speech. But, as we shall establish, it takes place neither by evidence nor by speech, so that the method of learning is not free from doubt either. [240] Now learning is not by means of evidence, since evidence is of things pointed out. But what can be pointed out is apparent; and the apparent, in so far as it is apparent, is perceptible by all alike, and what is perceptible by all alike is incapable of being taught. Therefore what is pointed out by evidence is not capable of being taught. Nor yet is anything taught by speech. [241] For either the speech signifies something or it signifies nothing. But if it signifies nothing it will not be a teacher of anything. And if it signifies something, it signifies either by nature or by convention. But it does not signify by nature, because all men do not hear all men,—Greeks, for instance, barbarians and barbarians Greeks. And if it signifies [242] by convention, evidently those who have apprehended beforehand the objects to which the terms are assigned will comprehend those terms, not because they are taught by them things of which they were ignorant but by recalling and being reminded of the things which they knew; while those who need to learn the unknown things, and are in ignorance of the things to which the terms are assigned, will have no comprehension of anything. Wherefore, if neither [243] the thing taught exists nor the teacher nor the learner nor the method of learning, learning is nothing.

These, then, are the objections of a more general character brought forward by the Sceptics to show the non-existence of learning; and it will be possible also to apply these difficulties in turn to the so-called art of life. For either the wise man will teach this to [244] the wise, or the unwise to the unwise, or the unwise to the wise, or the wise to the unwise. But neither would the wise man be said to teach it to the wise (for both are perfect in virtue and neither of them needs to learn), nor the unwise to the unwise (for both of them have need of learning and neither of them is wise so as to teach the other). [245] Nor yet will the unwise teach the wise; for neither is the blind man capable of instructing the man who sees about colours. It only remains, therefore, that the wise man is capable of teaching the unwise; and this too is a matter of doubt. [246] For if wisdom is “the science of things good and evil and neither,” the unwise man, when the wise man is teaching him the things good and evil and neither, will merely hear the things spoken and will not know the things themselves, since he does not possess any wisdom but is in ignorance of all these things. For if he should comprehend them while he is in a state of unwisdom, unwisdom will be capable of knowing things good and evil and neither. But, according to them, unwisdom is not capable of perceiving these things; therefore the unwise man will not comprehend the things said or done by the wise man in pursuance of the rule of his wisdom. [247] And just as he who is blind from birth, so long as he is blind, has no conception of colours, and he who is deaf from birth, so long as he is deaf, does not apprehend sounds, so also the unwise man, in so far as he is unwise, does not comprehend things wisely said and done. Neither, therefore, can the wise man guide the unwise in the art of life.—[248] Moreover, if the wise man teaches the unwise, wisdom must be cognisant of unwisdom, even as art is of lack of art; but wisdom cannot be cognisant of unwisdom; therefore the wise man is not capable of teaching the unwise. For he who has become wise owing to some joint exercise and practice (for no one is such by nature) either has acquired wisdom in addition while his unwisdom still subsists within him, or else has become wise through getting rid of the latter and acquiring the former. [249] But if he has acquired wisdom in addition while his unwisdom still subsists within him, the same man will be at once both wise and unwise, which is impossible. And if he has acquired the former by getting rid of the latter, he will not be able to know his pre-existing condition, which is not now present, by means of a condition of later origin. [250] And naturally so; for certainly the apprehension of every object, whether sensible or intelligible, comes about either empirically by way of sense-evidence or by way of analogical inference from things which have appeared empirically, this latter being either through resemblance (as when Socrates, not being [251] present, is recognized from the likeness of Socrates), or through composition (as when from a man and a horse we form by compounding them the conception of the non-existent hippocentaur), or by way of analogy (as when from the ordinary man there is conceived by magnification the Cyclops who was

Less like a corn-eating man than a forest-clad peak of
the mountains,

and by diminution the pygmy). [252] Hence, if unwisdom is perceived by wisdom and also the unwise man by the wise, the perception takes place either by experience or by inference from experience. But the perception does not take place by experience (for no one gets to know wisdom in the same way as white and black and sweet and bitter), nor by inference from experience (for no existing thing resembles unwisdom) [But if the wise man makes the inference from this, it is either through resemblance or through composition or through analogy]; so that wisdom will never [253] perceive unwisdom.—Yes, but possibly someone will say that the wise man can discern the unwisdom of another by the wisdom within himself; but this is puerile. For unwisdom is a condition productive of certain works. [254] If, then, the wise man sees and apprehends this in another, either he will apprehend the condition directly by means of itself, or by attention to its works he will also get to know the condition [255] itself, just as one knows the condition of the medical man from works in accordance with the art of medicine, and that of the painter from works in accordance with the art of painting. But he cannot perceive the condition by means of itself; for it is obscure and invisible, and it is not possible to view it closely through the shape of the body; nor by means of the works which result from it; for all the apparent works are, as we showed above, common to wisdom and unwisdom alike. [256] But if it is necessary that the wise man, in order that he may teach the art of life to the unwise, should himself be capable of perceiving unwisdom—even as the artist lack of art,—and it has been shown that unwisdom is to him imperceptible, then the wise man will not be able to teach the unwise the art of life.

[257] So now that we have critically discussed the most essential of the problems which belong to the department of Ethics, we herewith bring to a close the whole of our exposition of the Sceptic Way.