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Absurdities Of The Skeptics

A philosophy has to be lived, not just argued. The Skeptics taught that nothing can be known, and that the wise man should withhold assent from everything. The obvious reply, made in antiquity by Epicureans, Stoics and nearly everyone else, was that no one can actually live that way. A man who truly suspended judgment on everything would not know whether to eat or starve, whether to step off a cliff or walk around it, whether to walk through a door or into the wall. Lucretius put the point plainly:

For not only would all reasoning fall away; life itself too would collapse straightway, unless you chose to trust the senses, and avoid headlong spots and all other things of this kind which must be shunned, and to make for what is opposite to these. Know, then, that all this is but an empty store of words, which has been drawn up and arrayed against the senses.

— Lucretius, De Rerum Natura IV.507-512 (tr. Bailey)

The ancient writers preserved a number of stories about the leaders of the Skeptical schools that show this objection in action. Some of the stories come from hostile witnesses, and the Skeptics’ friends denied some of them. But together they show two things. First, the critics saw at once that Skepticism could not be lived. Second, when it came to living, the Skeptics themselves fell back on trusting what they saw, and so conceded in practice what they denied in argument. One of them said so outright: “Of these things, my boys, we talk in our discussions one way, but we live in another.”

The stories are collected here as a reference for reading Cicero’s defense of the Academic Skeptics in the Academic Questions.

Pyrrho (about 360-270 BC) gave his name to the more extreme form of Skepticism. Diogenes Laertius reports that he tried to live as his doctrine required, and needed his friends to keep him alive:

And his life corresponded to his principles; for he never shunned anything, and never guarded against anything; encountering everything, even waggons for instance, and precipices, and dogs, and everything of that sort; committing nothing whatever to his senses. So that he used to be saved, as Antigonus the Carystian tells us, by his friends who accompanied him. And Ænesidemus says that he studied philosophy on the principle of suspending his judgment on all points, without however, on any occasion acting in an imprudent manner, or doing anything without due consideration.

— Diogenes Laertius IX.62 (tr. Yonge)

Note that Aenesidemus, a later Pyrrhonist, denied the story. His defense is revealing. If Pyrrho never acted imprudently, then he trusted his senses about wagons and cliffs like everyone else.

When his own teacher fell into trouble, Pyrrho’s “indifference” took a form that most people would call heartless:

And once, when Anaxarchus had fallen into a pond, he passed by without assisting him; and when some one blamed him for this, Anaxarchus himself praised his indifference and absence of all emotion.

— Diogenes Laertius IX.63 (tr. Yonge)

But faced with a dog, his doctrine failed him. Aristocles, quoted by Eusebius, gives the story from Antigonus of Carystus, who wrote Pyrrho’s biography:

Antigonus, for instance, of Carystus, who lived about the same times and wrote their biography, says that Pyrrho being pursued by a dog escaped up a tree, and, when laughed at by those who stood by, said that it was difficult to put off the man. And when his sister Philiste was to offer a sacrifice, and then one of her friends promised what was necessary for the sacrifice and did not provide it, but Pyrrho bought it, and was angry, upon his friend saying that his acts were not in accord with his words nor worthy of his impassivity, he replied, In the case of a woman certainly we ought not to make proof of it. Nevertheless his friend might fairly have answered, If there is any good in these arguments of yours, your impassivity is useless in the case even of a woman, or a dog, and in all cases.

— Aristocles, in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV.18 (tr. Gifford)

Diogenes Laertius tells the same two stories, and adds that “he carried his indifference so far that he even washed a pig” (DL IX.66). His reply about the dog in that version is: “That it was a difficult thing entirely to put off humanity.”

Aristocles drew the conclusion:

For if on the other hand things were in reality of this kind, what would remain but that we must live as if asleep, in a random and senseless fashion? So that our lawgivers, and generals, and educators must all be talking nonsense. To me, however, it seems that all the rest of mankind are living in a natural way, but only those who talk this nonsense are puffed up with conceit, or rather are gone stark mad.

— Aristocles, in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV.18 (tr. Gifford)

Diogenes Laertius also records that Epicurus took an interest in Pyrrho. Nausiphanes, who had heard Pyrrho and is said to have taught Epicurus, admired Pyrrho’s calm manner:

And he used to say that he should like to be endowed with the disposition of Pyrrho, without losing his own power of eloquence. And he said too, that Epicurus, who admired the conversation and manners of Pyrrho, was frequently asking him about him.

— Diogenes Laertius IX.64 (tr. Yonge)

What Epicurus admired, on this report, was Pyrrho’s conduct and his freedom from agitation, not his doctrine. On the doctrine Epicurus was Pyrrho’s opponent. He held that the senses give us knowledge of the world, and Lucretius dismissed the man who says that nothing can be known as one “who plants himself with his head in the place of his feet.” The Epicureans did seek a life free from disturbance, but they held that it comes from knowing the truth about nature, not from giving up on knowledge.

Arcesilaus: The Man Who Never Said The Same Thing Twice

Section titled “Arcesilaus: The Man Who Never Said The Same Thing Twice”

Arcesilaus (about 316-241 BC) turned Plato’s Academy toward Skepticism. Diogenes Laertius says he was “the first man who professed to suspend the declaration of his judgment, because of the contrarieties of the reasons alleged on either side,” and “the first who attempted to argue on both sides of a question” (DL IV.28). Because he suspended judgment on everything, “he never, as it is said, wrote one single book. But others say that he was once detected correcting some passages in a work of his” (DL IV.32). His mixed teaching was summed up in a line of verse by Ariston: “First Plato comes, and Pyrrho last, And in the middle Diodorus” (DL IV.33).

Numenius the Pythagorean, quoted by Eusebius, described what it was like to argue with him:

For to keep to one argument and ever say the same thing, was not possible for him, nor indeed did he ever think such a course by any means worthy of a clever man… . he could neither know anything himself nor let others know: he spread terror and confusion, and in carrying off the prize for sophistries and deceitful arguments, he rejoiced over his disgrace, and prided himself wonderfully on not knowing either what is base or noble, or what is good or bad, but after saying whichever came into his thoughts, he would change again and upset his argument in many more ways than he had constructed it. So he would cut himself and be cut in pieces like a hydra, neither side being distinguished from the other …

— Numenius, in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV.6 (tr. Gifford)

Epicurus himself was not impressed. Plutarch reports that Epicurus said of Arcesilaus “that, delivering nothing peculiar to himself or of his own invention, he imprinted in illiterate men an opinion and esteem of his being very knowing and learned” (Plutarch, Against Colotes 26, Goodwin ed.).

Lacydes succeeded Arcesilaus as head of the Academy. Diogenes Laertius tells a short version of a story about his housekeeping (DL IV.59). Numenius tells the whole of it, and it is the best-known Skeptic absurdity of all. Lacydes locked his storeroom, sealed it with his ring, and dropped the ring inside through the keyhole. His servants found out the trick, helped themselves whenever he went out, and dropped the ring back in. Lacydes found his jars empty and the ring still inside, and concluded that this proved the Academic doctrine:

And then he began and described the whole misfortune which had happened to him about the storeroom. What then, said he, could Zeno now say against “incomprehensibility” thus in all points proved manifest to me in such circumstances as these? For as I locked it up with my own hands, sealed it myself, and myself threw the ring inside, and when I came again and opened it, saw the ring inside but not my other property, how can I fail to be justly incredulous of all things? For I shall not dare for my part to say that any one came and stole the things, as there was the ring inside.

— Numenius, in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV.7 (tr. Gifford)

His listener burst out laughing, and Lacydes stopped throwing the ring inside. But the servants then learned the Skeptics’ own arguments and used them against their master:

But they suspected his attacks, and began to think that he was making sport of them; since Lacydes, who was a philosopher, had decided that he could have no opinion, and therefore no memory, for memory is a kind of opinion; a short time ago at least they had heard him, they said, speak thus to his friends… . Then he would find fault with the Stoics; but his servants would put aside his accusations by alleging “incomprehensibility” with no little jeering. So discussions went on there on all points, and arguments and counter-arguments; and in the meanwhile there was not a single thing left, no vessel, nor anything that was put in the vessel, nor any other things that make up the furnishing of a house.

— Numenius, in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV.7 (tr. Gifford)

In the end Lacydes gave up the pretense:

And when he could do no good, he began to suspect what his philosophy was coming to, and opened his mind. Of these things, my boys, said he, we talk in our discussions one way, but we live in another.

— Numenius, in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV.7 (tr. Gifford)

Carneades: For Justice On Monday, Against It On Tuesday

Section titled “Carneades: For Justice On Monday, Against It On Tuesday”

Carneades (214-129 BC) was the most formidable of the Academic Skeptics, and it is his views that Cicero defends most often in the Academic Questions. When Athens sent him to Rome as an ambassador in 155 BC, he gave a public demonstration of arguing on both sides:

This Carneades, when he had been sent by the Athenians as ambassador to Rome, disputed copiously on the subject of justice, in the hearing of Galba and Cato, who had been censor, who were at that time the greatest of orators. But on the next day the same man overthrew his own argument by a disputation to the contrary effect, and took away the justice which he had praised on the preceding day, not indeed with the gravity of a philosopher, whose prudence ought to be firm and his opinion settled, but as it were by an oratorical kind of exercise of disputing on both sides.

— Lactantius, Divine Institutes V.15 (tr. Fletcher)

Diogenes Laertius adds that he was so absorbed in argument that “he used to let his hair and his nails grow,” and that “he used to decline all invitations to entertainments” (DL IV.62-63). For a man who held that nothing is certain, he was surprisingly certain that death was to be feared:

He appears to have been beset with fears of death; as he was continually saying, “Nature, who has put this frame together, will also dissolve it.” And learning that Antipater had died after having taken poison, he felt a desire to imitate the boldness of his departure, and said, “Give me some too.” And when they asked “What?” “Some mead,” said he.

— Diogenes Laertius IV.64 (tr. Yonge)

Numenius records that when it mattered to him, Carneades had no trouble trusting his own eyes:

Mentor was a disciple of Carneades at first, yet not his successor: for while still living Carneades found him familiar with his mistress, and not merely from a probable presentation, nor as failing to comprehend, but most fully believing his own eyes, and with a clear comprehension, rejected him from his School.

— Numenius, in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV.8 (tr. Gifford)

And Numenius says that in private Carneades talked like anyone else:

But nevertheless, although from his jealousy of the Stoics he stirred up confusion in public, he would himself in secret with his own friends agree, and speak candidly, and affirm, as much as any other ordinary person.

— Numenius, in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV.8 (tr. Gifford)

The Epicurean Colotes, a pupil of Epicurus, wrote a book arguing that the doctrines of the other philosophers make life impossible. Plutarch wrote a reply, and in it he preserves Colotes’ challenge to the Skeptics:

“But how comes it to pass,” perhaps you will say, “that he who is thus doubtful and withholds his assent hastens not away to the mountain, instead of going to the bath? Or that, rising up to go forth into the market-place, he runs not his head against the wall, but takes his way directly to the door?”

— Plutarch, Against Colotes 27 (Goodwin ed.)

Plutarch’s answer is that “the bath appears to him not a mountain, but a bath; and the door seems not a wall, but a door.” But that is no answer at all. It concedes the Epicurean point: the Skeptic walks through the door because he trusts what his eyes tell him, as everyone does. The later Pyrrhonists gave the same answer. Sextus Empiricus says that “adhering, then, to appearances we live in accordance with the normal rules of life, undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive,” following nature, the feelings, custom and the arts (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.23, tr. Bury). Diogenes Laertius reports that when pressed, the Skeptics would even admit, “we certainly do know that it is day, and that we are alive; and we admit that we know many other of the phænomena of life” (DL IX.103).

There was a darker form of the same objection. If the Skeptic has no settled judgment about right and wrong, what keeps him from doing anything he is told? Diogenes Laertius records the charge and the reply:

But when the dogmatic philosophers object that the Sceptic, on his principles, will not refuse to kill his own father, if he is ordered to do so; so that they answer, that they can live very well without disquieting themselves about the speculations of the dogmatic philosophers; but, suspending their judgment in all matters which do not refer to living and the preservation of life. Accordingly, say they, we avoid some things, and we seek others, following custom in that; and we obey the laws.

— Diogenes Laertius IX.108 (tr. Yonge)

So the Skeptic’s protection against wrongdoing is local custom and the laws, whatever they happen to be.

Behind all the stories lies the same logical problem, which the critics never tired of pointing out. Aristocles put it this way:

For at present there is no method in their madness, while, in the very act of admonishing us to have no opinion, they at the same time bid us to form an opinion, and in saying that men ought to make no statement they make a statement themselves: and though they require you to agree with no one, they command you to believe themselves: and then though they say they know nothing, they reprove us all, as if they knew very well.

— Aristocles, in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV.18 (tr. Gifford)

Lucretius had made the same point first:

Again, if any one thinks that nothing is known, he knows not whether that can be known either, since he admits that he knows nothing. Against him then I will refrain from joining issue, who plants himself with his head in the place of his feet.

— Lucretius, De Rerum Natura IV.469-472 (tr. Bailey)

The stories are funny, but the point is serious. A philosophy that cannot be lived is not a philosophy for human beings. Epicurus held that our senses, honestly used, give us knowledge of the world, and that reasoning which agrees with the senses can give us knowledge of what we cannot see. The Epicurean lives as he teaches. He walks through the door because he sees that it is a door, and he says so. He does not need one philosophy for the lecture hall and another for the storeroom.

The Skeptics, by contrast, had to keep two sets of books. In argument they held that nothing could be known. In life they avoided wagons, climbed trees to escape dogs, feared death, expelled disloyal students on the evidence of their own eyes, and agreed and affirmed in private “as much as any other ordinary person.” Lacydes spoke for all of them: “we talk in our discussions one way, but we live in another.”

Cicero’s Academic Questions is the fullest surviving defense of the Academic Skeptics. As Cicero builds his case, these points of comparison are worth keeping in view:

  • When Lucullus argues that the Skeptics “utterly overturn the whole of life” (II.X) and that unless something appears true to a man “he will actually never do anything” (II.VIII), compare Pyrrho and the wagons, and Colotes’ wall and door.
  • When Cicero lays out the syllogism that the wise man, never following opinion, never assents to anything (II.XXI), compare Lacydes, who “decided that he could have no opinion, and therefore no memory,” and see Is The Wise Man Guided By Opinion?
  • When Cicero says the wise man follows what is “probable” and can act on it without assent (II.XXXI), compare Carneades expelling Mentor “most fully believing his own eyes, and with a clear comprehension.”
  • When Cicero praises Carneades for the “Herculean labor” of extracting assent from our minds (II.XXXIV), compare Carneades arguing for justice and against it on successive days, and agreeing in private “as much as any other ordinary person.”
  • When Cicero presents his own position as the most modest and honest (II.XX), compare Lacydes’ confession: “we talk in our discussions one way, but we live in another.”