Frequently Asked Questions

See also: https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/faq-question-list/ as of 4/4/26. This version is currently under revision and the formulations stated here are subject to change.

Introductory Questions

What Is Epicurean Philosophy All About?

Epicurean philosophy is a complete and integrated system for living well, built on natural science and aimed squarely at achieving a happy life in the real world. It is not a set of vague inspirational maxims or a call to withdrawal and passivity. It begins with a careful investigation of the nature of the universe, proceeds to a rigorous account of how we know what we know, and arrives at a practical guide for choosing and pursuing pleasure — the natural goal of every living creature — while avoiding unnecessary pain.

Because Epicurus used several key terms — particularly “pleasure,” “virtue,” “gods,” and “truth” — in ways that differ significantly from their common usage today, newcomers often find themselves misled by popular summaries of his philosophy. The best way to avoid this is to go directly to the ancient sources and to those reliable modern sources which correctly reflect them without influence from competing and incompatible perspectives.

The key points of Classical Epicurean Philosophy include:

Nothing Comes From Nothing or Goes To Nothing Supernaturally. Everything Happens Naturally From The Motion of Atoms Through Space. | Reference | Quotations | Discussion |
The Universe Is Infinite In Size And Eternal In Time And Has No Gods Over It. There Is No Supernatural Design Or Existence Outside Of Nature. | Reference | Quotations | Discussion |
True Divinity Is Incorruptible And Blessed. Beings Which Are Divine Do Not Reward Friends And Punish Enemies Or Intervene In Human Affairs. | Reference | Quotations | Discussion |
Death Is Nothing To Us. When We Die We Cease To Exist. | Reference | Quotations | Discussion |
There Is No Necessity To Live Under the Control of Necessity. There Is No Fate Or Destiny - We Decide How We Live. | Reference | Quotations | Discussion |
He Who Says Nothing Can Be Known Knows Nothing. Knowledge Of Reality Is Possible. | Reference | Quotations | Discussion |
All Sensations Are True. Error Is In The Mind And Not The Senses. | Reference | Quotations | Discussion |
The Criteria of Truth Are The Sensations, Anticipations, and Feelings. These Natural Faculties Connect Us With Reality. | Reference | Quotations | Discussion |
Dialectical Logic And Radical Skepticism Do Not Determine Truth. Reasoning Must Be Grounded In The Perceptions Of Our Natural Faculties. | Reference | Quotations | Discussion |
Platonic Ideal Forms, Aristotelian Essences, And Divine Revelation Do Not Exist. All Truth Exists In This World. | Reference | Quotations | Discussion |
Happiness Is the Goal of Life. A Life Of Happiness Is A Life In Which Pleasure Predominates Over Pain. | Reference | Quotations | Discussion |
Pleasure Is the Guide, Beginning, And End Of The Happy Life. Pleasure Includes Not Just Bodily Stimulation But All Mental And Physical Experience We Find To Be Agreeable. | Reference | Quotations | Discussion |
The Term “Pleasure” Is The Exact Equivalent Of “Absence of Pain.” All Experiences Of Life Are Either Pleasurable Or Painful, With No Middle Ground, So The Presence Of One Means The Absence Of The Other. | Reference | Quotations | Discussion |
Virtue Is Not Absolute Or An End In Itself. There Is Nothing Good But Pleasure And Nothing Evil But Pain. | Reference | Quotations | Discussion |
Life Is Desirable, But Unlimited Time Contains No Greater Pleasure Than Limited Time. A Life Full Of Pleasure Can Never Be More Than Full No Matter How Much Time Is Available. | Reference | Quotations | Discussion |

Each of these points connects to the others and the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Exploring them in depth — through the primary texts, reference works, and discussions with those who are true friends of Epicurean philosophy — is the real work of becoming an Epicurean.

After I Identify Pleasure As The Guide of Life, Which Pleasures Should I Pursue?

This is one of the most practically important questions in Epicurean philosophy, and Epicurus gave it serious, systematic attention. The short answer is: reasonably assess your sensations (the five senses) anticipations (your natural ability to recognize patterns), and feelings (of pleasure and pain) to identify and pursue those activities that will, on balance, lead to the most pleasant life. You aren’t looking necessarily for the most intense pleasures, or for the most numerous pleasures, or for those that last the longest. All of those are relevant factors, but in the end you want to pursue the actions that - when all their consequences are weighed - leave you feeling that you have made the best use of your life to achieve the greatest happiness - thought of generally as the predominance of pleasures over pains.

To work through this systematically, Epicurus provided a framework that can be applied at every stage of practical decision-making. It is important to note from the outset that Epicurus’s categories are tools for thinking, not rigid absolute rules — everything is contextual and must be evaluated in terms of actual pleasure and pain experienced by the individual concerned:

Epicurus’ division of the desires into natural and necessary categories is contextual and a tool of analysis and can neither be described or implemented in absolute terms.

“And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good.” — Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 129
Generally we wish to prioritize pursuit of desires that are necessary for life so that your future life will be more pleasurable than painful. In almost every instance this is possible, and in general it is a very small person who has more reasons for ending his life than living it. But this is not always true, as sometimes you will choose death when the alternative of living on would be worse.

“[The lofty spirit] is schooled to encounter pain by recollecting that pains of great severity are ended by death, and slight ones have frequent intervals of respite; while those of medium intensity lie within our own control: we can bear them if they are endurable, or if they are not, we may serenely quit life’s theater, when the play has ceased to please us.” — Torquatus in Cicero’s On Ends, I:XV
After obtaining the desires necessary for life, consider whether the additional pleasures you choose to pursue are natural (in that they have a limit) or unnatural (in that by their very nature you can never achieve them — such as unlimited amounts of time, fame, power, or riches). This analysis allows you to forecast whether the pursuit of a pleasure is likely to lead to more pain than pleasure.

“Nothing could be more useful or more conducive to well-being than Epicurus’s doctrine as to the different classes of the desires. One kind he classified as both natural and necessary, a second as natural without being necessary, and a third as neither natural nor necessary; the principle of classification being that the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense; the natural desires also require but little, since nature’s own riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount; but for the imaginary desires no bound or limit can be discovered.”
Once you have secured the pleasures that are necessary to life, and you have identified options likely to lead to more pleasure than pain, you choose from among those options according to considerations such as follows:
- 5.1. The “most pleasant” does not equate either to the largest quantity or the longest time.
  
  “And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.” — Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 126
- 5.2. All pleasures are not identical and interchangeable, because they do not all have the same intensity, last the same period of time, or affect the same areas of the body and mind.
  
  “PD09. If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.”
- 5.3. What others tell you is the most desirable or undesirable life is not the ultimate test of what is in fact most pleasant to you.
  
  “PD10. If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky, and death, and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires (and of pains), we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full with pleasures from every source, and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life.”
- 5.4. The ultimate test of which pleasure to pursue is reality — whether it in fact leads to your concluding that you are living the most pleasant life possible to you.
  
  “VS71. Every desire must be confronted by this question: What will happen to me if the object of my desire is accomplished, and what if it is not?”

The framework above is not a call to minimize pleasures or to live austerely. Epicurus was not an ascetic. The point of identifying the foundation of happiness in pleasures that most people can easily obtain is to show that happiness is genuinely available to all — not that we should never pursue anything beyond the minimum. Friendship, philosophy, good food, music, intellectual conversation — these and countless other pleasures beyond bare necessity are fully endorsed by Epicurean philosophy.

Which Is It? Is “Ataraxia” Or “Pleasure” Or “Tranquility” The Ultimate Epicurean Goal?

If you have spent any time reading about Epicurean philosophy online or in popular books, you have very likely encountered the claim that the real goal of Epicurean life is “ataraxia” — tranquility of mind — or “aponia” — freedom from bodily pain — and that these are either a special highest form of pleasure or something superior to pleasure itself. This claim is widespread, but it is wrong, and it is important to understand why.

The Epicurean Goal is “Pleasure” — not “Ataraxia.”

Questions frequently arise as to the role of “Tranquility” in Epicurean philosophy, and whether in the form of “Ataraxia” or “Aponia” Epicurus was advocating these terms as either some special and highest form of pleasure, or something higher than pleasure itself, to be pursued as the ultimate goal of life.

“Pleasure” is the term that Epicurus generally employs in describing the guide or goal of life. While there is no doubt that tranquility and concepts such as “Absence of pain” and “absence of disturbance” are important aspects of the best life, the Epicureans made clear that their primary focus was on “Pleasure” and how best to obtain it.

The evidence for this is abundant and direct. The ancient sources — including Epicurus’s own letters, the testimony of Cicero, the poem of Lucretius, and the inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda — speak consistently of “pleasure” as the ultimate goal. Ataraxia and aponia are descriptions of pleasure from the negative side (the absence of disturbance and the absence of bodily pain), not a separate or higher category standing above pleasure. The following sections lay out the argument in detail.

1. Philosophically speaking there can be only one ultimate goal, and Epicurus finds that in “Pleasure” rather than “Tranquility,” “Absence of Pain,” or “Absence of Disturbance.”

Cicero, On Ends Book One [29] IX: “The problem before us then is, what is the climax and standard of things good… Epicurus places this standard in pleasure, which he lays down to be the supreme good, while pain is the supreme evil… Every creature, as soon as it is born, seeks after pleasure and delights therein as in its supreme good, while it recoils from pain as its supreme evil… So he says we need no reasoning or debate to show why pleasure is matter for desire, pain for aversion.”
Cicero, On Ends Book One [42]: “It is plain that all right and praiseworthy action has the life of pleasure for its aim. Now inasmuch as the climax or goal or limit of things good (which the Greeks term telos) is that object which is not a means to the attainment of any thing else, while all other things are a means to its attainment, we must allow that the climax of things good is to live agreeably.”
Diogenes of Oinoanda, Fragment 32: “Since the issue is not ‘what is the means of happiness?’ but ‘what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?’, I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues… are in no way an end, but the means to the end.”

2. Epicurus never states that “Pleasure” and “Tranquility” are the same thing.

Common understanding of the terms indicates that “Pleasure” is the wider term: all Tranquility is Pleasure, but all Pleasure is not Tranquility. Epicurus nowhere in any text states that Tranquility is not a pleasure or that Tranquility is something superior to Pleasure.

The passage from the Letter to Menoeceus most often used to argue otherwise is part of a larger discussion whose intent is not to identify the two as equal but to explain how to pursue pleasure without encountering pains worse than those pleasures: “When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality… By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. [132] It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry… which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul.”

Diogenes Laertius, Biography of Epicurus: “Epicurus differs from the Cyrenaics about pleasure. For they do not admit static pleasure, but only that which consists in motion. But Epicurus admits both kinds both in the soul and in the body… ‘Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures, but Joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving motion.’”
Diogenes Laertius, Biography of Epicurus: “Epicurus held that the pains of the soul are worse, for the flesh is only troubled for the moment, but the soul for past, present, and future. In the same way the pleasures of the soul are greater.”

3. Reading the philosophy as a whole, there are overwhelming numbers of references identifying “Pleasure” (rather than “Tranquility”) as the Goal / Ultimate Good of life.

Letter to Menoeceus: “And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.”
Letter to Menoeceus [129]: “For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good.”
Diogenes Laertius, Biography of Epicurus: “‘I know not how I can conceive the good, if I withdraw the pleasures of taste and withdraw the pleasures of love and those of hearing and sight.’”
Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, Book 2, Line 1: “Not choose to see that nature craves for herself no more than this, that pain hold aloof from the body, and she in mind enjoy a feeling of pleasure exempt from care and fear?“

4. Epicurus never identified any pleasure as intrinsically “better” than another pleasure.

There is no hierarchy of pleasures in Epicurean philosophy which would justify identifying any single type of pleasure as a “best” pleasure. Therefore it would have made no sense for him to say that Tranquility or “Absence of Pain” or “Absence of Disturbance” are a “best” or “highest” pleasure.

Epicurus listed a number of pleasures “by which he was able to determine the good” but he did not list “Tranquility” among them, nor did he rank his list in order of importance. (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Philosophers, X.6: “I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound, and the pleasures of beautiful form.”)

5. Although Epicurus had no reason to identify a “best” or “highest” type of pleasure, Epicurus had a very strong reason for discussing and identifying a “limit” of pleasure.

One of the primary arguments of the established philosophy at the time of Epicurus was Plato’s Philebus, in which Plato argues that the nature of a highest good requires that it must have “a limit.” Epicurus was responding to this framework when he discussed limits.

Seneca, Letter to Lucilius 66.45: “What can be added to that which is perfect? Nothing… The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect.”
Seneca, Book I, Letter XVI: “Natural desires are limited; but those which spring from false opinion can have no stopping point. The false has no limits.”
PD03: “The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.” If Epicurus had wished to say that “Absence of pain is the very best pleasure and is the ultimate goal of life” he could clearly have done so, but he did not.

6. Numerous other ancient texts make clear that Epicurus held “Pleasure” as the term to describe the ultimate goal of life.

Cicero, In Defense of Publius Sestius, 10.23: Notes that the Epicureans held “that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures.” (Latin: nihil esse praestabilius otiosa vita, plena et conferta voluptatibus.)
Plutarch, That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible, 3, p. 1088C: “Epicurus has imposed a limit on pleasures that applies to all of them alike: the removal of all pain.”
Athenaeus, Deipnosophists, XII p. 546E: “For I at least do not even know what I should conceive the good to be, if I eliminate the pleasures of taste, and eliminate the pleasures of sex, and eliminate the pleasures of listening, and eliminate the pleasant motions caused in our vision by a visible form.”
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, III.18.41: “For my part I find no meaning which I can attach to what is termed good, if I take away from it the pleasures obtained by taste, if I take away the pleasures which come from listening to music, if I take away too the charm derived by the eyes from the sight of figures in movement, or other pleasures by any of the senses in the whole man.”
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, III.20.46: “‘Taste,’ he says, ‘and embraces and spectacles and music and the shapes of objects fitted to give a pleasant impression to the eyes.’”
Lactantius, Divine Institutes, III.7.7: “Epicurus thinks that the highest good is in the pleasure of the mind.”
Lactantius, Divine Institutes, III.17.38: “[Epicurus says, in effect:] ‘Let us serve pleasure, then, in whatever way we can, for in a short time we will be nothing whatsoever. Let us suffer no day, therefore, no point of time to flow by for us without pleasure…’”
Plotinus, Dissertations, 30 (Aeneids, II.9), 15: “Epicurus, who abolishes providence, exhorts to pursue all that remains: pleasure and its enjoyment.”
Antiochus of Ascalon, via Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies II.21 p. 178.43: “For of those that are ruled by pleasure are the Cyrenaics and Epicurus; for these expressly said that to live pleasantly was the chief end, and that pleasure was the only perfect good.”
Plutarch, On Peace of Mind, 2 p. 465F: “Not even Epicurus believes that men who are eager for honor and glory should lead an inactive life, but that they should fulfill their natures by engaging in politics and entering public life, on the ground that, because of their natural dispositions, they are more likely to be disturbed and harmed by inactivity if they do not obtain what they desire.”

Are Stoics, Buddhists, Judeo-Christians, Humanists, Minimalists, et al. Welcome To Participate in Discussion At EpicureanFriends.com?

People arrive at EpicureanFriends.com from many philosophical backgrounds, and that is entirely welcome. Curiosity about Epicurean philosophy is something we want to encourage, and all of our public resources exist precisely for that purpose.

EpicureanFriends.com welcomes all who are sincerely interested in Epicurean Philosophy to read our public forums and make use of our public resources. We have extensive public discussion threads and resources explicitly for the purpose of allowing people who do not consider themselves fully Epicurean to read and learn about the philosophy of Epicurus.

However, as an explicitly pro-Epicurean forum, our goal is to provide a place for those who do consider themselves to be primarily Epicurean to communicate productively with each other about Classical Epicurean Philosophy. For that reason, regular posting privileges and attendance at our online Zoom meetings are reserved only to those who agree to our Community Standards, our “Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean” statement, and our Key Posting Policy statement.

We make this distinction not out of hostility to any individual but out of respect for the coherence and distinctiveness of the Epicurean system. Epicurus did not design his philosophy to be a cafeteria from which ideas can be selected and mixed with Stoicism, Buddhism, or other frameworks at will — but as an integrated worldview. The goal of EpicureanFriends.com is to explore and practice that worldview seriously, and our posting standards are designed to make that possible.

Can You Suggest A Reading List For Learning About Epicurus?

Yes — we recommend two specific commentaries that provide a general approach to Epicurus, followed by the primary sources, rather than other modern summaries which often introduce significant distortions. The ancient texts are more accessible than many people expect, and once you have a general grounding in Epicurus’ approach you will find that reading Epicurus in his own words (even in translation) is the best way to understand what he actually taught.

For people brand new to Epicurus, we recommend starting with two books above all others:

Norman DeWitt’s Epicurus and His Philosophy is the most sweeping, thorough, and innovative textbook of Epicurean philosophy available. No other book presents the full sweep and detail of the philosophy as well as this one. It is available in full at the Internet Archive.

Emily Austin’s Living For Pleasure: An Epicurean Guide to Life is the most current and best general introduction to Epicurean ethics. It is a very readable introduction to Epicurean ideas on how to live that is consistent with the general approach here at EpicureanFriends. Dr. Austin won the inaugural Public History of Philosophy Prize for this work. Our 2023 interview with her on the Lucretius Today podcast is a good introduction to the book.

A word of caution applies to all books beyond these two: there are many different interpretations of Epicurus, and many are “adulterated” with Stoic, Buddhist, Judeo-Christian, Platonic, or other philosophies and religions, according to the preferences of their authors. DeWitt and Austin provide firm grounding in classical Epicureanism and point out where the reader can expect to find controversies elsewhere as to what Epicurus really taught. We recommend reading them — and Diogenes Laertius and Lucretius — before moving to other works.

Next pursue the primary texts. We maintain side-by-side reader editions of the key ancient sources:

The full reading list we recommend for students of Epicurus is as follows:

Epicurus and His Philosophy by Norman DeWitt
Living For Pleasure: An Epicurean Guide to Life by Emily Austin
The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius — which includes the surviving letters of Epicurus to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus, as well as the Principal Doctrines.
On the Nature of Things by Lucretius — a poetic abridgement of Epicurus’ On Nature.
Epicurus on Pleasure — an article by Boris Nikolsky.
The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor’s The Greeks On Pleasure.
Cicero’s On Ends — Torquatus Section.
Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods — Velleius Section.
The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda — Martin Ferguson Smith translation.
A Few Days In Athens by Frances Wright — with the criticisms referenced on the forum.
Lucian of Samosata — Lucian mentions Epicurus in a number of works; among the best are Alexander the Oracle-Monger, Hermotimus, and others listed on the forum.
Philodemus, On Methods of Inference — De Lacy version, including his appendix on the history of the Epicurean Canon.
Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom by David Sedley — an in-depth exploration of how Lucretius interpreted Epicurus.
The Sculpted Word by Bernard Frischer — a study of Epicurean bronzes and marbles from the ancient world.
Haris Dimitriadis’ Epicurus and the Pleasant Life.
Bernier’s Three Discourses by Gassendi, On Happiness, Virtue, and Liberty — with an important caution: Gassendi compromises with religion and deviates from Epicurus on gods, death, terminating one’s life when appropriate, and probably other issues. Another example is Chapter 5, which takes too ascetic a view of pleasure. These are significant problems which must be kept in mind, and they limit the book’s usefulness. That having been said, Gassendi generally makes clear where he departs from Epicurus, and even in his analysis of pleasure he makes clear that Epicurus should not be interpreted as advocating inaction. With these caveats, most of the remaining material is very useful and deserves review due to its importance as a link in the chain transmitting Epicurus to the modern world.
Consider also the following essays, lectures, and letters:
- The Letter of Cosma Raimondi
- Norman DeWitt’s “Philosophy For The Millions”
- John Tyndall’s Belfast Address
- An essay on Lucretius from George Santayana’s Three Philosophical Poets
- Prof. Ian Johnston’s Lecture on Lucretius
- Lucy Hutchinson’s Letter to the Earl of Anglesey, disavowing her very early translation of Lucretius

For those who are familiar with Epicurus and want to research the remaining fragments, the Harris edition of the Usener Epicurea is available in PDF form at EpicureanFriends.com.

What Did Epicurus Mean When He Spoke of “Pleasure?”

This is one of the most important questions to answer correctly, and also one of the most frequently misunderstood. Epicurus did not use the word “pleasure” in the narrow sense of bodily stimulation or sensory indulgence. He used it to mean all of life’s experience that is not painful — a broad category that includes rest, calm, friendship, intellectual activity, memory of past goods, anticipation of the future, and all ordinary healthy living. Understanding this is essential before anything else in the philosophy can be properly grasped.

What Epicurus meant by “pleasure” has been disputed for two thousand years, and that controversy continues today. The classical criticism of Epicurus fueled by Cicero and Plutarch was that Epicurus was a sensualist and pursued the pleasures of the moment over mental pleasures. More modern interpreters — often influenced by Stoicism, Buddhism, or other viewpoints — read Epicurus as advising a life of asceticism, total withdrawal from society, and the pursuit of “tranquility” above all else. In contrast, those who knew the Epicureans best understood Epicurus as teaching that “Pleasure,” and not “Tranquility” or any other particular type of experience, should be considered to be the ultimate goal of life. Rather than limiting pleasure to tranquility alone, Epicurus taught that “pleasure” should be considered to include every experience in life that is not painful.

Epicurus held this perspective because Nature gives us only two feelings — pleasure and pain — by which to determine what to choose and what to avoid. If we are alive and feeling anything at all, we are feeling either pleasure or pain, with no middle ground or third alternative. Every agreeable experience of life, whether of the body, of the mind, or of the spirit, comes within the meaning of “pleasure.”

“The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.” — Diogenes Laertius 10:34

“Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?” — Torquatus, speaking for Epicurus in Cicero’s On Ends 1:30

There Are Only Two Feelings: If You Are Alive And Not Feeling Pain, You Are Feeling Pleasure

The doctrine that there are only two feelings, and that if you are alive you are feeling one or the other, is well documented in Epicurean literature. Those who fail to understand this premise frequently make the mistake of thinking that “absence of pain” must mean something other than pleasure itself. Many of the most egregious misinterpretations of Epicurus arise from this failure.

If you are not feeling pain you are feeling pleasure. The word “pleasure” therefore includes not only agreeable sensory stimulation of mind and body but also all normal and healthy experiences of mind and body. Both are not painful, and both are therefore pleasurable. Pleasure includes every non-painful moment of life — whether “in motion” or “at rest” — and not just moments of stimulation:

“Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.” — Torquatus, speaking for Epicurus in Cicero’s On Ends 1:38

“For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.” — Torquatus, speaking for Epicurus in Cicero’s On Ends 1:39

An application of this perspective can be seen in Principal Doctrine 9: “If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” By referring to differences in intensity, duration, and which part of the body an experience affects, Epicurus is presuming that regardless of these differences, all non-painful experiences are properly considered to be within the wider meaning of the word “pleasure.”

Seen in this way, Epicurean philosophy is neither “hedonistic” nor “ascetic” as those terms are generally understood today. Epicurus assures us that all types of healthy, non-painful function of both body and mind are pleasurable and therefore desirable — and in this way a life full of pleasure is attainable.

There Is No Neutral State Or Third Alternative

The fact that pleasure and pain are separate and unmixed in any particular feeling was important enough to be listed among the top doctrines of Epicurus:

“PD03: The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.”

A parallel may be drawn with Epicurean physics to illustrate this. In Epicurean physics, every location in the universe is occupied by either matter or void, with no mixture or third alternative. Epicurean ethics holds that everything in life is similarly either agreeable or disagreeable — pleasure or pain. When we remind ourselves of the vast nothingness that passed before our birth and will pass after our death, we see that every moment of life when we are not in pain is worthy of being considered agreeable and pleasurable — and can in fact be so if we approach life with the proper attitude.

”Absence of Pain” Means Exactly the Same Thing As “Pleasure”

The insight that makes sense of the entire discussion is that Epicurus was defining all conditions of awareness where pain is not present as pleasure. This sweeping categorization is stated specifically in the exchanges between Cicero and Torquatus:

Cicero: ”…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that ‘freedom from pain’ does not mean the same thing as ‘pleasure.’” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.” — Cicero’s On Ends 2:9

Cicero: “Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: “Clearly the same, he says, and indeed the greatest, beyond which none greater can possibly be.” — Cicero’s On Ends 2:11

”Highest Pleasure” Does Not Refer To A Particular Or Unique Type of Pleasure

The realization that “absence of pain” is simply another term for pleasure dissolves any mystery about Epicurus’ view. “Absence of pain” does not constitute some special or superior kind of pleasure — it is simply the observation that the most complete pleasure is that which is unadulterated with any mixture of pain. As Norman DeWitt summarized this point:

“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.” — Norman DeWitt, Epicurus And His Philosophy, page 240

Continuous Happiness Is Achievable Through Seeing That Pleasures Can Outweigh Pains

By rejecting standard attitudes toward pleasure, Epicurus recognized that absence of pain is pleasure, just as absence of pleasure is pain. Once the error of seeing this formulation through Buddhist or Stoic eyes is stripped away, the full value of this perspective becomes clear: it lays the groundwork for actually achieving a life in which pleasure overshadows pain, and in which continuous happiness is possible:

“For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present… And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.” — Torquatus, speaking for Epicurus in Cicero’s On Ends 1:62

This is how Epicurus can say that the wise man is continuously feeling pleasure. He is not talking specifically about the most intense stimulation at every moment, but making the philosophical point that the most “complete” condition of pleasure is defined as any condition where all pain is gone. This does not mean that complete pleasure and total absence of pain is necessary for happiness, and the wise man recognizes this even in moments when acute pleasure is absent or acute pain is present.

Pleasure, Not Virtue or Piety, Is the Supreme Good

In this approach to the best life — to the dismay of other ancient philosophers — “Pleasure” is identified as the supreme good, rather than Virtue, Piety, Tranquility, Rationality, or any other conventional ideal. The Epicureans stated this boldly and emphatically:

“We are inquiring, then, into what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in Pleasure; Pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, and Pain the Chief Evil.” — Torquatus, speaking for Epicurus in Cicero’s On Ends 1:29

And Epicurus himself did not shy from stating his view plainly, even when it ran against the opinions of his time:

“For I would certainly prefer, as I study Nature, to announce frankly what is beneficial to all people, even if none agrees with me, rather than to compromise with common opinions, and thus reap the frequent praise of the many.” — Vatican Saying 29

The Deeper Foundation: Why Pleasure and Pain Exhaust All Feeling

Epicurus arrived at the pleasure-pain dichotomy using exactly the same foundational methodology he used in physics — and the parallel was neither accidental nor unconscious.

In Epicurean physics, the universe is mapped into two and only two fundamental, independently existing constituents: body and void (space). These two are defined as formal contradictories. Body is whatever has volume and the power of resistance; space is whatever lacks that power of resistance. Since everything with volume must be either resistant or non-resistant, there is no third possibility — no middle ground between body and space. This exhaustive division guarantees that body and space are the sole contents of the universe; nothing can fall outside it, and it also explains why Epicurean philosophy did not seek to label specific atom or explain each and every detail of the way atoms interact - the framework allows us to understand the system even though every detail is not available to us.

Sedley’s argument is that Epicurus applied the same structure to ethics. Just as body and space exhaust all of physical reality, pleasure and pain exhaust all of felt experience. Any feeling that is not painful is ipso facto pleasant, and vice versa — they are formal contradictories. As described by scholar David Sedley. Epicurus’s formal argument is that “all the intrinsic values of a sentient being lie in how it feels about things, and that any feeling that is not painful is ipso facto pleasant.” This eliminates any intermediate or neutral state between pleasure and pain in precisely the same way that the body-space dichotomy eliminates any third constituent of the universe.

This is why Epicurus rejected the position of the Cyrenaics, who held that the unstimulated state — neither actively delighted nor in pain — was a genuine neutral condition, neither pleasant nor painful. For Epicurus, this “neutral state” was no more a real third thing than a portion of the universe that is neither body nor space. Accepting a neutral state in ethics would have been as incoherent as accepting a third substance alongside matter and void in physics. The Cyrenaic position, on this view, smuggles in an unexamined assumption that Epicurus’s entire system was designed to rule out.

The practical consequence of this structural argument is enormous. It means that the Epicurean claim that “freedom from pain is itself pleasure” is not a quirky redefinition of an ordinary word, but a philosophically rigorous conclusion drawn from the same foundational methodology that grounds the entire Epicurean account of the universe. When Epicurus says that the wise man who is free from pain is already in a state of pleasure — and in the highest pleasure — he is not lowering the bar for what counts as a good life. He is asserting that the value-scale of felt experience has exactly two poles, just as the map of physical reality has exactly two constituents, and that freedom from pain is therefore not a neutral nothing but a genuine and complete occupancy of the positive side of that scale.

As a final point, this viewpoint also explains why Epicurus did not spend inordinate time attempting to catalog either atoms or pleasures and pains. It is identifying a framework of analysis that is important to us so we can live happily given our own feelings and circumstances. Within that context it makes no sense, and is in fact an impossibility, to attempt to label and categorize every atom or every feeling of pleasure or pain.

How Did Epicurus Arrive At the Conclusion That There Are Only Two Feelings, Pleasure and Pain?

This question gets at something philosophically fundamental, and the answer reveals that Epicurus’s treatment of pleasure and pain was not an isolated ethical claim but part of a unified and rigorously structured philosophical system.

Cambridge scholar David Sedley, in his essay “The Inferential Foundations of Epicurean Ethics,” makes a compelling case that Epicurus arrived at the two-feelings conclusion using the same foundational methodology he used in physics — and that the structural parallel between the two was deliberate. In physics, Epicurus began with a basic mapping of the universe into two and only two independently existing constituents: body (matter) and void (space). These two are treated as formal contradictories: body is whatever has volume and the power of resistance; void is whatever lacks that power. Because everything with volume must be either resistant or non-resistant, there is no third possibility. Body and void jointly exhaust all of physical reality, and no third constituent can exist alongside them.

Epicurus applied precisely the same reasoning to the domain of felt experience. Just as the universe contains body and void as its sole fundamental constituents, the life of a conscious being contains pleasure and pain as its sole fundamental feelings. The two are formal contradictories: pleasure is whatever is not painful; pain is whatever is not pleasurable. Since every feeling a living creature can have must be one or the other, there is no neutral state — no middle ground between pleasure and pain, any more than there is a middle ground between body and space. As Sedley summarizes the formal argument: all the intrinsic values of a sentient being lie in how it feels about things, and any feeling that is not painful is by that fact pleasant.

This is directly reflected in Torquatus’s presentation of Epicurean doctrine in Cicero’s On Ends:

“For since, when our pain is removed, we rejoice in the actual freedom from and absence of all pain, and since everything we rejoice in is a pleasure, just as everything we are upset by is a pain, the removal of all pain is rightly called pleasure. For just as, when hunger and thirst are dispelled by food and drink, the very elimination of the discomfort brings pleasure as its result, so too in everything the removal of pain generates pleasure in its wake. For this reason Epicurus did not believe that there was anything intermediate between pain and pleasure. For the very thing which some people considered intermediate, when all pain is lacking, he considered to be not just pleasure, but even the highest pleasure.” — Torquatus in Cicero’s On Ends 1:37–38

The philosophical payoff of this parallel is significant. It means that the claim “freedom from pain is itself pleasure — and the highest pleasure” is not a rhetorical exaggeration or a convenient redefinition of ordinary language. It follows necessarily from the same structural reasoning that undergirds Epicurean physics. Just as there is no “third thing” between body and void in the universe, there is no “third feeling” between pleasure and pain in conscious experience. The elimination of pain does not leave a neutral emptiness; it leaves pleasure — because pleasure simply is all of conscious experience that is not pain. This is why Epicurus could claim with full philosophical justification that the wise man who is free from pain is already continuously in a state of pleasure, not merely approaching it.

What Would Epicurus Say About The Search For “Meaning” in Life?

This is a question many people bring to Epicurean philosophy, often frustrated by the demands of religions or philosophical traditions that speak of higher callings, noble purposes, or transcendent meaning without explaining why any of those things should actually matter to a real living human being. Epicurus had a clear answer: the demand for “meaning” as something separate from and above pleasure is a confusion generated by the glamour of words, not by the evidence of nature.

We don’t have record of Epicurus addressing questions about “meaning” using that term. We do, however, have a great deal of information about Epicurus’ view of “virtue” and the claim that there are higher and nobler callings in life beyond “pleasure.” Calls to “meaningfulness” often seem to come from a similar perspective as “virtue,” and so the Epicurean analysis of virtue is helpful in assessing “meaningfulness.” The heart of that analysis is:

Cicero, On Ends, Book One, XIII (Torquatus speaking): “Those who place the Chief Good in virtue alone are beguiled by the glamour of a name, and do not understand the true demands of nature. If they will consent to listen to Epicurus, they will be delivered from the grossest error. Your school dilates on the transcendent beauty of the virtues; but were they not productive of pleasure, who would deem them either praiseworthy or desirable? We esteem the art of medicine not for its interest as a science, but for its conduciveness to health; the art of navigation is commended for its practical and not its scientific value, because it conveys the rules for sailing a ship with success. So also Wisdom, which must be considered as the art of living, if it effected no result would not be desired; but as it is, it is desired, because it is the artificer that procures and produces pleasure.”

The most extensive surviving Epicurean argument illustrating how Epicurus dealt with calls to “virtue” is contained in Cicero’s On Ends, Book One in the explanation given by the Epicurean Torquatus.

What Does Epicurean Philosophy Say About “Free Will”?

Epicurean philosophy takes a strong stand on free will, and it does so on the basis of physics, not mere assertion. The Epicurean account of the atomic “swerve” — the undetermined slight deviation in the paths of atoms — was introduced precisely to break the chain of pure mechanical causation and make room for genuine agency in living beings. Epicurus rejected both divine fate and hard determinism as equally enslaving errors.

Epicurean philosophy holds that free will frees us from determinism and fate.

(This answer will be expanded later.)

What Does Epicurean Philosophy Say About Engagement With Society?

The popular image of the Epicurean as a recluse who retreats from public life and “lives unnoticed” is one of the most persistent misrepresentations of the philosophy, and it is one that ancient critics such as Cicero and Plutarch worked hard to promote. The actual record — both in Epicurus’s own life and in the documented lives of his followers throughout the ancient world — tells a very different story. Epicureans were actively engaged in civic and political life wherever the evidence survives.

(This answer will be expanded later.)

How Does Epicurean Philosophy Differ From Stoicism?

Stoicism and Epicurean philosophy are often lumped together as ancient “self-improvement” systems, and in popular culture they are frequently combined into a single vague call to rational living. This conflation would have astonished the ancient philosophers themselves. The two schools disagreed on nearly every fundamental point — the nature of the universe, the standard of truth, the goal of life, the role of emotion, the nature of the gods, and the proper use of reason. Understanding the real differences is essential for anyone who wants to study either system seriously.

Short Answer: The differences between Stoicism and Epicurean philosophy are deep and profound. Modern advocates of variations of Stoicism tend to blur the differences, but the ancient authorities who knew both systems well considered them to be totally incompatible, especially in terms of the goal of life and the role of reason in the determination of truth.

(This answer will be expanded later.)

How Does Epicurean Philosophy Differ From Buddhism?

Both Epicureanism and Buddhism address suffering and how to achieve a better life, and superficial comparisons are common. But the foundational metaphysical and ethical positions of the two systems differ in ways that make facile comparisons misleading. Most importantly, Epicurus grounded his philosophy entirely in the natural world, held that pleasure is the goal of life, and had no concept of transcendence, rebirth, or the extinguishing of desire as a goal.

(This answer will be expanded later.)

How Can I Implement Epicurean Principles As Quickly As Possible?

The honest answer is: not as quickly as you might hope — and trying to rush past the foundational work is a recipe for implementing a distorted version of the philosophy that has little to do with what Epicurus actually taught. This is not advice not to try, but a practical warning. Epicurean philosophy has been systematically misrepresented for two thousand years by critics with their own agendas, and many of those misrepresentations have become embedded in mainstream accounts of the philosophy.

First and foremost, make sure you understand the fundamentals of what Epicurean philosophy really means before you attempt to implement anything. There are major controversies between modern commentators as to what Epicurus meant in important areas of his philosophy. For example:

Did Epicurus advocate any form of asceticism?
What is the meaning of the “natural and necessary” classification of desires?
What is the meaning of “pleasure” and how does it relate to “absence of pain?”
What did Epicurus advocate as to the goal of living?
What role does “simplicity” have in Epicurean living?
What is the meaning and use of “virtue” in Epicurean philosophy?
What was Epicurus talking about when he referred to “gods”?

Until you understand these and other fundamental points, it is a major mistake to think that you can implement what Epicurus taught on the question of how to live.

The good news is that the EpicureanFriends community exists precisely to help with this process. Start your reading with our Recommended Reading list elsewhere in this FAQ.

What Is The Epicurean Definition Of A God?

This is one of the most misunderstood topics in Epicurean philosophy, and it requires careful attention. Epicurus did not deny the existence of gods — he affirmed their existence plainly. What he denied was the conventional religious understanding of gods as supernatural beings who created the universe, control natural events, and intervene in human affairs. The Epicurean gods are entirely natural beings whose existence does not require abandoning the foundational principle that nothing supernatural governs the world.

Epicurus held that gods are totally natural. They are in no way supernatural, in no way omnipotent, in no way omnipresent. They are totally incapable of creating something from nothing. This is very different from the modern use of the term.

The subject of whether these Epicurean gods really exist in physical form in a far-off location, or whether they are simply constructions of the human mind which we conceive based on prolepsis arising through nature, is a very complex subject — please see additional discussion throughout the website.

What is not in dispute is the practical upshot of Epicurean theology: no supernatural power governs the universe, controls the heavens, or takes any interest in human life. This liberates us from the fear of divine punishment and from the wasted effort of prayer and supplication. The ancient sources are unambiguous on this point:

Nature Has No Gods Over Her

Epicurus to Herodotus, line 77 (Bailey): “The motions of the heavenly bodies and their turnings and eclipses and risings and settings, and kindred phenomena to these, must not be thought to be due to any being who controls and ordains or has ordained them and at the same time enjoys perfect bliss together with immortality (for trouble and care and anger and kindness are not consistent with a life of blessedness, but these things come to pass where there is weakness and fear and dependence on neighbors).”
Epicurus to Pythocles, line 97 (Bailey): “Next the regularity of the periods of the heavenly bodies must be understood in the same way as such regularity is seen in some of the events that happen on earth. And do not let the divine nature be introduced at any point into these considerations, but let it be preserved free from burdensome duties and in entire blessedness.”
Lucretius, Book 2, line 1090 — multiple translations:
- Bailey: “And if you learn this surely, and cling to it, nature is seen, free at once, and quit of her proud rulers, doing all things of her own accord alone, without control of gods.”
- Humphries: “Nature has no tyrants over her, but always acts of her own will; she has no part of any godhead whatsoever.”
- Brown (1743): “Nature will appear free in her operations, wholly from under the power of domineering deities, and to act all things voluntarily, and of herself, without the assistance of gods.”
- Munro: “Nature free at once and rid of her haughty lords is seen to do all things spontaneously of herself without the meddling of the gods.”
- M.F. Smith: “Nature is her own mistress and is exempt from the oppression of arrogant despots, accomplishing everything by herself spontaneously and independently and free from the jurisdiction of the gods.”
Notes: Alternate ways to consider this include: “There are no supernatural causes,” or “The gods, however they are defined, have no impact on the cosmos,” or “If gods exist, they don’t control the universe nor do they bestow blessings or curses on humans.” The point is that there are no supernatural, divine, or mystical forces that intervene in or create the universe.

What Is The Epicurean Definition Of “Anticipations” (“Prolepsis”)?

“Anticipations” — the Greek term is prolepseis — are one of the three criteria of truth in the Epicurean Canon, alongside the senses and the feelings of pleasure and pain. They are a pre-conceptual faculty of the mind by which patterns from repeated experience are assembled and recognized, allowing us to categorize and make sense of future observations. They are neither innate ideas in the Platonic sense nor simple generalizations from sensation — they are something more specific and distinctively Epicurean, and the topic repays careful study.

(This answer will be expanded later.)

What Is The Epicurean Definition of Happiness?

Happiness in the Epicurean sense is not a fleeting mood or an abstract philosophical ideal — it is the concrete, lived condition of a person whose life contains more pleasure than pain. It is achievable, practical, and available to anyone who understands and applies the Epicurean framework. Critically, it does not require wealth, political power, fame, or any other condition that depends on the goodwill of others or the accidents of fortune.

(This answer will be expanded later.)

What Was Epicurus’ Position On Skepticism and Dogmatism?

Epicurus had very little patience for the skeptical tradition that claimed knowledge was impossible, and he regarded radical skepticism as both philosophically self-refuting and practically destructive. His position was the opposite of the Academic Skeptics who dominated Greek philosophy in his time: knowledge is achievable, confidence in our understanding of the world is warranted, and the pretense that nothing can be known is itself a form of intellectual cowardice that prevents living well.

Epicurus taught that not everything can be known, and that we do not have freedom of choice in all things (we have no choice about death), but Epicurus held that some things can be known and some things are under our control. He was therefore strongly against what is termed today both radical Skepticism and hard Determinism.

Epicurus taught that it was important to have confidence in conclusions about matters which are clear. He advised “waiting” to form opinions about things which are not clear. Much of Epicurean doctrine is a reaction against radical skepticism, and in fact one of Epicurus’ sayings was: “The wise man will teach things that are definite, rather than doubtful musings.” (Bailey translation, from the Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius.)

Further examples:

Lucretius, Book Four (Bailey) [469]: “Again, if any one thinks that nothing is known, he knows not whether that can be known either, since he admits that he knows nothing… [478] You will find that the concept of the true is begotten first from the senses, and that the senses cannot be gainsaid. For something must be found with a greater surety, which can of its own authority refute the false by the true.”
Diogenes of Oinoanda (Smith), Fragment 5: “Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux… We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing is at no time apprehensible by sense-perception.”

What Did Epicurus Say About Desire? Is All Desire Bad and To Be Minimized?

A common misreading of Epicurean philosophy — often promoted by those who want to assimilate it to asceticism or Buddhism — holds that Epicurus taught that desire itself is problematic and should be minimized or eliminated. This is wrong. Epicurus analyzed desire carefully and distinguished between types, but his goal was to help us pursue the right desires effectively, not to suppress or discourage desire in general.

The answer to this question requires parsing the exact meaning of the word “desire” and examining the context in which the desire occurs. As with everything else, it’s not as if there’s some ideal form labelled “desire” floating out there in the atmosphere with a “good” or “bad” label attached to it.

At the highest philosophic level, everything, including desire, is contextual and needs to be evaluated according to whether it is in fact — in a particular person’s experience — something that leads to pleasure or to pain. From this perspective, too little desire can be every bit as bad as too much desire.

As to the major textual references advising not to pursue politics, riches, fame, or similar activities, the common thread is that you cannot be happy if you are going to depend on other people to provide your happiness. But there is also an important sense of not passively “accepting one’s lot in life,” and working hard to take advantage of those natural and proper pleasures that are within your power to achieve. Phrases such as “accepting one’s lot in life” connote ideas that are fatalistic and religious, and go against the central theme of Epicureanism, which is the pursuit of a pleasurable life.

Key textual references on this point:

PD 5: It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and honorably and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and honorably and justly without living pleasantly. — One CANNOT live happily unless one diligently pursues wisdom, honor, and justice.
VS 5: We place a high value on our characters as if they were our own possessions whether or not we are virtuous and praised by other men. So, too, we must regard the characters of those around us if they are our friends. — It DOES matter what we think of ourselves, and what others think of us.
PD 29: Of our desires some are natural and necessary, others are natural but not necessary; and others are neither natural nor necessary, but are due to groundless opinion. — We diligently pursue those that are natural and necessary, and we judge and act wisely in pursuit of those that are only natural (but we do not ignore them).
VS 33: The cry of the flesh is not to be hungry, thirsty, or cold; for he who is free of these and is confident of remaining so might vie even with Zeus for happiness. — We pursue diligently the goal of avoiding hunger, thirst, and cold.
VS 36: Epicurus’s life when compared to that of other men with respect to gentleness and self-sufficiency might be thought a mere legend. — Epicurus EXCELLED in gentleness and self-sufficiency.
VS 41: At one and the same time we must philosophize, laugh, and manage our household and other business, while never ceasing to proclaim the words of true philosophy. — We do NOT ignore or deprecate the value of the management of our household business.
VS 45: The study of nature does not create men who are fond of boasting and chattering or who show off the culture that impresses the many, but rather men who are strong and self-sufficient, and who take pride in their own personal qualities not in those that depend on external circumstances. — We are to excel in our strength, our self-sufficiency, and our personal qualities that do not depend upon others.
VS 58: We must free ourselves from the prison of public education and politics. — Freedom from these is required in order to secure our own happiness.
VS 63: There is also a limit in simple living, and he who fails to understand this falls into an error as great as that of the man who gives way to extravagance. — A direct statement that under-desiring is as much an error as over-desiring.

Notice particularly VS 63: there is a limit in simple living, just as there is a limit in extravagance. Epicurean philosophy is emphatically not a one-sided call to minimize desire — it calls for wisdom in navigating the full range of human experience.

What Is The Epicurean Definition of “Virtue”?

Virtue occupies an important but carefully defined place in Epicurean philosophy. Epicurus did not dismiss virtue — he valued it highly. What he rejected was the Platonic and Stoic claim that virtue is the goal of life, an end in itself that needs no further justification. For Epicurus, virtue is the most important means to the goal of a pleasurable life, and this instrumental role in no way diminishes it. A hammer is not less valuable because its value lies in what it builds.

This distinction matters because if virtue is treated as an absolute end in itself — independent of pleasure and pain — the result is a philosophy that demands sacrifice without being able to explain why that sacrifice is worthwhile. Epicurus had a clear answer: we pursue the virtues because they consistently produce pleasure and prevent pain, and for no other reason.

Epicurus held that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honorably, and justly, nor again to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice without living pleasantly. (PD05)
However, those who place the chief good in Virtue are beguiled by the glamour of a name, and do not understand the true demands of Nature. If they will simply listen to Epicurus, they will be delivered from the grossest error. (Torquatus — Cicero’s On Ends 1:IX)
These men speak grandly about the transcendent beauty of the virtues; but were they not productive of pleasure, who would deem them either praiseworthy or desirable? (Torquatus — Cicero’s On Ends 1:XIII)
We esteem the art of medicine not for its interest as a science, but for its conduciveness to health; the art of navigation is commended for its practical and not its scientific value, because it conveys the rules for sailing a ship with success. (Torquatus — Cicero’s On Ends 1:XIII)
So also Wisdom, which must be considered as the art of living, if it effected no result would not be desired. But as it is, wisdom is desired, because it is the artificer that procures and produces pleasure. (Torquatus — Cicero’s On Ends 1:XIII)
We must therefore act to pursue those things which bring happiness, not virtue, since, if happiness be present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed towards attaining it. (Epicurus to Menoeceus — Diogenes Laertius 10:122)
If the point at issue here involved only the means of obtaining happiness, and our enemies wanted to say “the virtues” — which would actually be true — we would simply agree without more ado. (Diogenes of Oinoanda, Fragment 32)
But the issue is not “what is the means of happiness,” but “what is happiness itself and what is the ultimate goal of our nature.” (Diogenes of Oinoanda, Fragment 32)
To this we say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that Pleasure is the end of the best way of life, while the virtues — which are messed about by our enemies and transferred from the place of the means to that of the end — are in no way the end in themselves, but the means to the end. (Diogenes of Oinoanda, Fragment 32)

What Did Epicurus Say About the Relationship Between Good and Evil?

In Epicurean philosophy there is no mysterious cosmic force of evil, no abstract Platonic Form of the Good, and no divine standard of righteousness handed down from above. Good and evil are grounded entirely in the experience of living creatures: good is what produces pleasure; evil is what produces pain. This is not a simplification — it is a rigorous philosophical position with far-reaching consequences for how we think about ethics, justice, religion, and the nature of the universe.

In the Epicurean system there is no such thing as a separate force or absolute nature of good and evil. Good exists only through the feeling of pleasure and evil only through the feeling of pain.

Letter to Menoeceus [124] (Bailey): “Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation.”
Letter to Menoeceus [129–130]: “For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good… Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good.”
Plutarch, That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible, 7, p. 1091A: “Epicurus makes a statement to the effect that the good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflection and gratitude that this has happened to you. His words are these: ‘That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about, prating meaninglessly about the good.’”
Yonge translation of Principal Doctrine 6: “For the sake of feeling confidence and security with regard to men… some men have wished to be eminent and powerful, in order that others might attain this feeling by their means; thinking that so they would secure safety as far as men are concerned. So that, if the life of such men is safe, they have attained to the nature of good; but if it is not safe, then they have failed in obtaining that for the sake of which they originally desired power according to the order of nature.”
Torquatus in On Ends, Book 1 [29–30]: “Epicurus places this standard in pleasure, which he lays down to be the supreme good, while pain is the supreme evil… Every creature, as soon as it is born, seeks after pleasure and delights therein as in its supreme good, while it recoils from pain as its supreme evil… So he says we need no reasoning or debate to show why pleasure is matter for desire, pain for aversion. These facts he thinks are simply perceived, just as the fact that fire is hot, snow is white, and honey sweet.”
Torquatus in On Ends, Book I, Section XII: “The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong…”
Arrian, Diatribes of Epictetus, II.20.9: “Is it to keep one or another of us from being tricked into believing that the gods care for men, or is it to keep one or another of us from supposing that the nature of good is other than pleasure? If this is indeed so, then back to your bed and go to sleep!”
Frances Wright, A Few Days In Athens, Chapter 3: “‘Virtue is pleasure; were it not so, I should not follow it.’”
Frances Wright, A Few Days In Athens, Chapter 16: “Let Epicurus be your guide. The source of every enjoyment is within yourselves. Good and evil lie before you. The good is — all which can yield you pleasure: the evil — what must bring you pain. Here is no paradox, no dark saying, no moral hid in fables.”

What Is The Relationship Between Epicurean Philosophy And Religion?

Epicurean philosophy and traditional religion stand in fundamental tension, and Epicurus did not try to soften that tension. His natural philosophy — the demonstration that the universe operates entirely by natural causes, that there are no gods who created or govern it, and that death brings complete unconsciousness with no possibility of posthumous reward or punishment — removes the foundations on which most religious fear and practice rest. Lucretius captured this with characteristic force.

There is probably no more well-known statement in Epicurean Philosophy than Lucretius’ “Tantum potuit religio suadere malorum,” roughly translated as “So great is the power of religion to persuade toward evil.” The hostility of the ancient Epicureans toward what they considered to be false religion can hardly be overstated.

On the other hand, the question ultimately turns on the definition assigned to the word “religion.” If “religion” is considered to be any sincerely held belief about the nature of divine beings, then a strong argument could be made that the opinions of the ancient Epicureans were as significant to them as any “religion” could possibly be.

The Epicurean gods — entirely natural, entirely non-interventionist, and worthy of contemplation as models of the blessed life — were genuinely revered by Epicurus himself, who participated in the religious practices of Athens throughout his life. The point was never to abolish reverence but to replace fear-based religion with a clear-eyed understanding of what the divine actually is.

What Is This I Read All Over The Internet About “Katastematic” and “Kinetic” Pleasure?

You will encounter these terms frequently in academic discussions of Epicurus, often presented as the key to understanding his ethics: the claim that Epicurus considered “katastematic” (static, calm, absence-of-pain) pleasure to be a higher and more truly Epicurean kind of pleasure than “kinetic” (active, stimulating) pleasure, and that this implies a preference for passivity and minimal desire. This interpretation is contested — and in our view, wrong. Both types of pleasure are genuine pleasures, and Epicurus did not establish a hierarchy between them.

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History of the Epicurean School

When Was Epicurus Born?

The question of Epicurus’s birthday is more complicated than it might appear, because the ancient Attic calendar does not map cleanly onto our modern calendar. Epicureans have long celebrated the “Twentieth” (Eikas) of each month in honor of Epicurus, and the question of which modern calendar date corresponds to the traditional celebration has been the subject of careful analysis within our community.

This is a complicated calculation which has been much discussed over the years. The current best discussion is on the dedicated lexicon page, based on the latest forum thread. The current consensus, as calculated by forum member Nate, is as follows:

“I think celebrating Epicurus’ Ceremonial Birthday (Gamelion 20) on January 20th is the way to go for anyone using the Julian calendar. Furthermore, it is the case that in 1987, 1998, 2006, 2017, 2025, 2036, and 2063, Gamelion 20 actually did/does fall on January the 20th, so there are a handful of days when Greeks who practiced according to the Attic calendar, and modern Twentiers who practice with the Julian calendar would have simultaneous celebrations.

According to my calculations, Epicurus’ birth year (Year 3 of the 109th Olympiad, which corresponds with Summer 342 BCE to Summer 341 BCE) would host Gamelion 7 on January 11, 341 BCE and would host Gamelion 20 on January 24, 341 BCE. Either way, during the year of Epicurus’ birth, both Gamelion 7 and Gamelion 20 fell in the Julian month of January.”

What Was The Basic Timeline of Events in the History of the Epicurean School?

The history of the Epicurean school spans several centuries and multiple continents, from Epicurus’s birth in Samos in 341 BCE through the flourishing of the school in Athens, its spread across the Greek world, its remarkable influence in Rome during the first century BCE, and its survival into the Roman imperial period. Assembling a clear chronology is an ongoing project in our community.

This is a work in progress. For current timelines, refer to the podcast episode forum thread for Episode One Hundred Forty-Nine, “Epicurus And His Philosophy” Part 05 — The Early Years of Epicurus.

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Who Were The Leading Figures In Epicurean History?

The Epicurean school produced a remarkable range of significant figures — from Epicurus’s immediate circle in the Garden to philosophers, diplomats, statesmen, and poets across centuries of Greek and Roman history. Learning who these people were and how they lived is one of the most rewarding parts of studying the philosophy.

For this please refer to the forum thread: “Famous Epicureans Throughout History (Including Nate’s Summary of Historic Epicureans).”

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Epistemology — The Science of Knowledge — The Canon Of Truth

What Is The Epicurean Science of Knowledge (the Canon of Truth)?

Epicurus devoted careful attention to the question of how we know anything at all — and he had strong, distinctive answers that set him apart from both the Platonists and the Academic Skeptics of his day. He called his account of knowledge “the Canon” because it provided the standard (kanon = rule, straightedge) by which truth could be measured. Understanding the Canon is essential for understanding why Epicurean ethics takes the form it does: ethics is grounded in nature, and the Canon is how we access the facts of nature reliably.

Knowledge of things that are relevant to us is attainable if we pursue that knowledge in ways consistent with the nature of the universe. It is therefore an error to think that knowledge must be based on:
- “Forms” or “models” or “ideals” held to exist in another reality (Plato and others).
- “Essences” held to exist as a part within the things we experience (Aristotle and others).
- Divine revelation or by reference to “gods” or “prime movers” who create all things according to their divine will (Judaism, Christianity, and others).
Knowledge should be pursued by studying the facts of nature, which means we must remember that we ourselves, as well as the subject of our knowledge and our means of considering it, derive from (1) the eternal properties of the elementary matter, and (2) the temporary qualities of the bodies formed by the combinations of elementary matter and void.
The Faculties of Observation provided by Nature are the tools by which we measure truth. These are three in number and are collectively referred to as the Epicurean “Canon of Truth”: (1) the five senses, (2) the feelings of pleasure and pain, and (3) the anticipations (prolepsis).
We should not seek to understand everything equally well, nor should we expect to understand that which is not possible for us to understand. We should seek to have firm convictions about those things which are necessary for our peace of mind.

From the Letter to Pythocles: “In the first place, remember that, like everything else, knowledge of celestial phenomena, whether taken along with other things or in isolation, has no other end in view than peace of mind and firm convictions. We do not seek to wrest by force what is impossible, nor to understand all matters equally well…”
“Reason” and “logic” are not in themselves faculties of observation like the three categories of the Canon of Truth.

Diogenes Laertius, Biography of Epicurus: “Every sensation, he says, is devoid of reason and incapable of memory… Nor is there anything which can refute sensations or convict them of error… reason is wholly dependent on sensation… all our notions are derived from perceptions, either by actual contact or by analogy, or resemblance, or composition, with some slight aid from reasoning.”
Therefore the opinions derived from “reason” or “logic” must constantly be tested against the data obtained from the canonical faculties. Opinions formed by reason should be concluded to be “true” when clear available evidence supports the conclusion and no clear evidence contradicts it. Opinions formed by reason should be concluded to be “false” when clear available evidence contradicts the conclusion. Opinions not based on data from our faculties of observation, or on which such data is unclear, must not be considered “true” but “speculative” at best, and we must “wait” for additional evidence before concluding the assertion is either true or false.

Epicurus was considered a “dogmatist” because he held that confidence in certain conclusions is possible. He did not consider it necessary to have omniscience in order to be confident in stating that something can be known. He was very careful, however, to point out the limitations of the senses and the need to verify conclusions and to be open to new facts.

What Did Epicurus Say About The Relation Between “Reason” and “The Senses?”

One of the most persistent misreadings of Epicurean philosophy is the claim that it is simply a form of empiricism — the view that knowledge comes from sensation alone. This misreading is largely traceable to Lucretius, who gives extensive treatment to the senses in De Rerum Natura but says little about the other two canonical criteria, the anticipations and the feelings. The full Epicurean account of knowledge is richer and more nuanced than a simple appeal to sensation, as Norman DeWitt explains in the following passage from his landmark study:

From Norman DeWitt’s Epicurus and His Philosophy, Chapter 4: “The Canon, Reason, & Nature”:

The Canon was not an afterthought, as the Stoics asserted, but occupied the first place in the triad of Canon, Physics, and Ethics. This arrangement is unalterable, because the Ethics were deduced from the Physics and the truth of both Physics and Ethics was subject to the test of the Canon, which included Sensations, Anticipations, and Feelings.

The task of expounding the Canon would be much simpler were it not for ancient and modern confusions and ambiguities that beset the topic. Epicurus disposed of it in a single roll. The word canon denotes a rule or straightedge but metaphorically includes all the instruments employed by a builder. A perspicuous account of it is presented by Lucretius, who mentions also the square and the plumb line. Apart from this passage, however, Lucretius misleads the reader, because he gives exclusive prominence to the Sensations and seems to have lacked a clear understanding of the workings of Anticipations and Feelings as criteria.

These last two criteria were not discussed in the Big Epitome which Lucretius had before him. In the graded textbooks of Epicurus the topic must have been reserved for advanced students. It is doubtful whether Lucretius was even acquainted with the roll that treated of the Canon. This is unfortunate, because his own one-sided treatment is largely to blame for the classification of Epicurus as an empiricist.

For further discussion of this topic, please see the related forum threads and Wiki entries at EpicureanFriends.com.

What Distinguishes Epicurus From Other Philosophers On the Nature of Truth?

The short answer is that Epicurus grounded truth in nature — specifically in the three canonical faculties of sensation, feeling, and anticipation — rather than in pure reason, dialectical logic, or divine revelation. This puts him in fundamental opposition to virtually every other major philosophical tradition of his time and ours.

Plato and Aristotle both treated “reason” or “logic” as the sovereign faculty of the mind, capable of grasping truths that the senses cannot reach. Plato held that the senses are deceptive and that genuine knowledge requires access to a higher realm of ideal Forms through purely rational contemplation. Aristotle replaced the Forms with “essences” inherent in things, but similarly elevated logical reasoning above sensory observation as the path to truth. Religious traditions from Judaism and Christianity through Islam held that divine revelation — not observation, not reasoning from nature — is the ultimate source of truth. Academic Skeptics in Epicurus’s own day claimed that nothing can be known at all.

Epicurus rejected all of these positions with equal vigor. He held that the senses report honestly and accurately what they perceive — the error is never in the sensation itself, but in the mind’s hasty or mistaken interpretation of sensory data. He held that reason is not an independent faculty of observation, but a tool that processes data received from the senses, the feelings, and the anticipations. And he held that confidence in conclusions — genuine knowledge — is achievable, which puts him squarely against the Academic Skeptics who denied this.

The practical consequence of this distinction is enormous. If pure reason or divine revelation were the ultimate arbiter of truth, then philosophers arguing about words and definitions, or priests claiming supernatural authority, could override the evidence of nature as experienced by ordinary people. Epicurus refused to allow this. Nature itself — as observed through the canonical faculties — is the final court of appeal. This is why Epicurus is sometimes called a “dogmatist”: he was confident that some things can be known, and that those who claim nothing can be known are self-refuting.

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Physics — The Science of the Nature of Man and the Universe

What Did Epicurus Say About the Nature of the Universe (Physics)?

Epicurean physics is not an optional add-on to the philosophy — it is the essential foundation on which the ethics rests. Epicurus held that a correct understanding of the natural universe is required before anyone can live well, because the greatest sources of unnecessary human misery are fear of the gods and fear of death, and only natural science can dissolve those fears by showing what the universe actually is.

The core of Epicurean physics can be summarized briefly: the universe consists entirely of two things — matter (atoms) and void (space). Everything that exists is either an atom or a combination of atoms moving through void. Nothing comes from nothing, and nothing goes to nothing — the total quantity of matter and void in the universe is constant and eternal. The universe has no beginning and no end; it is infinite in extent and eternal in time. There are no supernatural forces at work in it. The gods, if they exist, are natural beings composed of atoms like everything else; they neither created the universe nor play any role in governing it.

The full treatment of Epicurean physics, with primary source citations, is available in the Physics section of our Wiki and in the Physics forum at EpicureanFriends.com.

Why Should I Care About Epicurean Physics When So Much Science Has Changed in the Last 2,000 Years?

This is one of the most common and most important questions a newcomer to Epicurus can ask. The honest answer is that Epicurus’s specific physical claims — about the size of the sun, the nature of atoms, the structure of the cosmos — have been substantially revised or superseded by modern science, and Epicurus himself would have expected this. He consistently held that we should follow the evidence wherever it leads and never cling to positions that contradict clear observations.

But the framework of Epicurean physics — the insistence that natural causes govern the universe, that supernatural intervention is not a legitimate explanation for anything, that the universe is not designed for human benefit, and that death is simply the cessation of all sensation — these foundational positions are as relevant as ever, and nothing in modern science has displaced them. Epicurus explained precisely why physics matters for ethics:

“There is no way to dispel the fear about matters of supreme importance, for someone who does not know what the nature of the universe is but retains some of the fears based on mythology. Hence without natural philosophy there is no way of securing the purity of our pleasures.” — Epicurus, Principal Doctrine 12

“There is no benefit in creating security with respect to men while retaining worries about things up above, things beneath the earth, and generally things in the infinite.” — Epicurus, Principal Doctrine 13

In other words: if you believe that thunderstorms are divine punishment, that comets presage disaster, that death leads to reward or torture in an afterlife, or that there is a god who judges and intervenes in your life — then no amount of practical ethical advice can make you genuinely happy, because irrational fear will always be undermining your peace of mind. The study of nature, at whatever level of detail is available to us, is the antidote to these fears. That antidote is as necessary today as it was in 300 BCE.

Was Epicurus an “Atheist?”

The answer depends on your definition of the word. The American Heritage Dictionary defines “atheism” as “Disbelief in or denial of the existence of God or gods.” Under this definition, which does not specify that gods must be all-powerful or that they created the universe, Epicurus was not an atheist. Epicurus held there to be a race of perfect, immortal, natural beings who neither created the universe, control it, nor concern themselves with the happenings on Earth.

From the opening of Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus: “First believe that God is a living being immortal and blessed, according to the notion of a god indicated by the common sense of mankind; and so believing, you shall not affirm of him anything that is foreign to his immortality or that is repugnant to his blessedness… For there are gods, and the knowledge of them is manifest; but they are not such as the multitude believe… Not the man who denies the gods worshiped by the multitude, but he who affirms of the gods what the multitude believes about them is truly impious.”

The answer is different if your definition of “atheist” requires that gods be all-powerful, omniscient, or responsible for the creation and direction of the universe — in other words, that “god” means a “supreme being” in the theological sense. For example, Dictionary.com defines “atheist” as “a person who denies or disbelieves the existence of a supreme being or beings.” By this definition, Epicurus does qualify as an atheist, since all Epicurean texts refer to gods as “a part” of Nature, not as “supreme above” or “creator of” Nature itself.

The Epicurean argument for the existence of the gods rests on a fascinating application of the doctrine of infinity. Norman DeWitt explains:

In spite of a supercilious opinion to the contrary, Epicurus was not a muddled thinker but a very systematic one. It was from the principle of infinity that Epicurus deduced his chief theoretical confirmation of belief in the existence of gods… He so interpreted the significance of infinity as to extend it from matter and space to the sphere of values — to perfection and imperfection. In brief, if the universe were thought to be imperfect throughout its infinite extent, it could no longer be called infinite. This necessity of thought impelled him to promulgate a subsidiary principle, which he called isonomia — a sort of cosmic justice, according to which the imperfection in particular parts of the universe is offset by the perfection of the whole. — Norman DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy

What is not in dispute is the practical upshot: the Epicurean gods pay no attention to human affairs, do not reward the virtuous or punish the wicked, and are entirely irrelevant to how we should live. Whether one calls this “atheism” or not is primarily a terminological question.

Discussion of this question is in the forum thread “What Did Epicurus Say About Gods? Was Epicurus an Atheist?”

What Did Epicurus Say About Whether the Universe Had a Beginning?

Epicurus held firmly that the universe as a whole has no beginning and no end in time — it is eternal. This follows directly from his foundational principle that nothing comes from nothing and nothing goes to nothing. If the universe had a beginning, something must have existed before it to generate it — but there was no “before,” and no external force capable of creating it. The universe has always existed and always will exist.

From the Letter to Herodotus: “Nothing comes into being out of what is not. For in that case everything would come into being out of everything, with no need for seeds. Also, if that which disappears were destroyed into what is not, all things would have perished, for lack of that into which they dissolved. Moreover, the totality of things was always such as it is now, and always will be, since there is nothing into which it changes.”

This position was directly contrary to the prevailing Greek religious tradition, which held that the gods had created the cosmos, and to Plato’s Timaeus, which describes a divine craftsman (demiurge) ordering the universe from pre-existing materials. For Epicurus, the question of how the universe “began” was not just scientifically unanswerable — it was based on a philosophical error. The question presupposes that there was a time when the universe did not exist, which is incoherent on Epicurean grounds.

The full discussion of this topic and how it relates to modern Big Bang cosmology is available in our forum.

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What Did Epicurus Say About Whether Humans Have a “Soul”?

Epicurus held that what we call the “soul” is a real part of the living creature, but that it is entirely physical — composed of very fine, highly mobile atoms distributed throughout the body. It is what makes the body alive and capable of sensation. Crucially, the soul did not exist before birth and does not survive death. When the body is dissolved, the soul atoms disperse and all sensation ceases absolutely.

This is directly stated in the Letter to Herodotus: “The soul is a body of fine particles distributed throughout the whole structure, and most resembling wind with an admixture of heat.” (Diogenes Laertius 10.63)

The ethical consequence of this position is enormous — it is the foundation of the argument that “death is nothing to us.” If the soul is material and mortal, then death is simply the cessation of all experience. There is no posthumous existence, no realm of reward or punishment, no judgment of the dead. The fear of what comes after death is therefore groundless: nothing comes after death, because the “you” who might experience it no longer exists.

Epicurus was very clear that this view does not deprecate life or treat it as something from which death is a relief. On the contrary: understanding that we have only one life, and that it ends completely at death, makes the intelligent pursuit of pleasure in this life all the more urgent and worthwhile.

What Did Epicurus Say About the Size of the Sun and Whether the Earth Was Round or Flat?

This question touches on one of the most interesting and sometimes misunderstood aspects of Epicurean physics: the relationship between scientific observation and philosophical methodology.

On the size of the sun, Epicurus stated in the Letter to Pythocles that “the size of the sun and the remaining stars relatively to us is just as great as it appears.” This has sometimes been mocked as naive, but the full context shows a more careful position. Epicurus was explicit that celestial phenomena often admit multiple explanations consistent with observation, and that we should not force certainty where none is available. His point was that since we cannot change our perspective relative to the sun — we cannot get closer or further away — we have no direct evidence about its absolute size. The sun appears to be roughly the size we observe it to be, and in the absence of contrary evidence, we should not invent explanations that go beyond our observational access.

More importantly, Epicurus’s treatment of the sun was motivated by philosophical concerns: he was opposing the Platonic and Stoic positions that celestial bodies are divine or semi-divine, and that they must therefore be enormous. His specific claim about apparent size was less important than his insistence that the sun is entirely natural — material, finite, governed by the same physical laws as everything on Earth.

On the earth’s shape: the Epicureans appear to have accepted that the earth is spherical, as was the common educated view by their time. The Letter to Pythocles makes clear that celestial phenomena are to be explained by natural causes and not by divine intervention, regardless of the specific physical details.

The broader lesson is one that Epicurus states explicitly in the Letter to Pythocles: in the study of celestial phenomena, we should never force single explanations when multiple ones are consistent with observation, and we should never allow the absence of certainty to drive us toward supernatural explanations by default. Discussion of this topic and the forum’s analysis of the Epicurean methodology for handling astronomical questions is available in the relevant forum threads.

Does Living Happily Require a Knowledge of Physics and the Nature of the Universe?

Yes — and Epicurus was emphatic about this in a way that distinguishes him sharply from most popular self-help philosophies. The pursuit of pleasure requires understanding the nature of the universe because the greatest obstacles to a pleasant life are not material poverty or physical hardship, but irrational fears — above all, fear of the gods and fear of death. Natural science, properly understood, dissolves these fears by showing what the universe actually is and what actually happens when we die.

Epicurus stated this as one of his Key Doctrines:

“Were we not upset by the worries that celestial phenomena and death might matter to us, and also by failure to appreciate the limits of pains and desires, we would have no need for natural philosophy.” — Epicurus, Principal Doctrine 11

“There is no way to dispel the fear about matters of supreme importance, for someone who does not know what the nature of the universe is but retains some of the fears based on mythology. Hence without natural philosophy there is no way of securing the purity of our pleasures.” — Epicurus, Principal Doctrine 12

This is not an abstract academic point. If you believe that thunderstorms are divine punishment, or that earthquakes signal divine displeasure, or that death will bring suffering in an afterlife, then every moment of your life is shadowed by anxiety that no practical ethical advice can dispel. The study of nature removes the basis for these fears by showing that the universe operates by natural causes alone, that the gods (if they exist) are entirely indifferent to human affairs, and that death is nothing — neither good nor bad, simply the end of sensation.

Does “Big Bang” Theory Invalidate Epicurean “Eternal Universe” Theory?

This is a question that generates significant discussion in our community, and the short answer is: not necessarily, because the relevant question is what we mean by “universe.”

Modern cosmology speaks of the “observable universe” having a beginning — the Big Bang — approximately 13.8 billion years ago. But physicists who use this term typically acknowledge that it refers to what is observable from our position, not to “everything that exists.” Epicurus’s claim was that matter and void — the ultimate constituents of existence — have no beginning and no end. Whether the particular arrangement of matter and energy we can currently observe had a “beginning” in the sense cosmologists mean is a different question from whether matter itself had a beginning.

From an Epicurean perspective, the critical points are: (1) Epicurus held that nothing comes from nothing — any “beginning” would require a pre-existing cause; (2) the claim that the universe “began” in any absolute sense is philosophically problematic and has historically been exploited by theological arguments for creation; (3) Epicurus deliberately avoided forcing certainty on questions where our observational access is limited, and the edges of the observable universe are precisely such a case.

We always recommend approaching these questions with the Epicurean methodology: follow the evidence, do not accept conclusions that go beyond what the evidence actually shows, and be skeptical of interpretations that happen to align with religious agendas. The full discussion of this topic is available in our forum thread “What Would Epicurus Think of the Big Bang?”

Ethics — The Science of How To Live

What Are the Central Points of Epicurean Philosophy About How To Live (Ethics)?

Epicurean ethics begins from a single foundational claim — that pleasure is the goal of life — and builds from there into a comprehensive, carefully reasoned account of how to choose and live well. It is not a set of commandments or rules but a framework for thinking about choices in terms of their actual consequences for pleasure and pain.

The central points include: pleasure is the goal; pain is to be avoided except when chosen for the sake of greater pleasure; not all pleasures are to be pursued (some lead to greater pain); not all pains are to be avoided (some lead to greater pleasure); the good life is achievable and does not require wealth, fame, or power; friendship is the greatest available pleasure; fear of the gods and fear of death are the primary sources of unnecessary misery; and natural science is required to dispel those fears.

The full elaboration of Epicurean ethics, with extensive citations, is available in the Epicurean Ethics section of our Wiki, and in the Ethics forum at EpicureanFriends.com.

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What Did Epicurus Say About “The Good” and “The Greatest Good”?

In the Epicurean system, “the good” is not an abstract quality, a divine standard, or a Platonic Form — it is simply whatever produces pleasure. Good and evil have no existence apart from the sensations of living creatures: good is experienced through pleasure, evil through pain. This position is stated with great clarity:

“For all good and evil consists in sensation.” — Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus [124]

As for “the greatest good,” Epicurus is consistent: pleasure itself is the greatest good, and the greatest state of pleasure is one in which no pain is present. Life itself, because it affords the opportunity for pleasure, is the supreme good. Vatican Saying 42 captures this: “The same span of time includes both beginning and termination of the greatest good” — a pithy statement that life itself, bounded by birth and death, is the greatest good available to us.

What Epicurus deliberately avoided was identifying any particular type of pleasure as the “greatest good” in a way that would create a hierarchy of pleasures and deprecate others. Every pleasure is genuinely good by virtue of being a pleasure; the question of which to pursue at any given moment is a matter of practical calculation about consequences, not a matter of some pleasures being intrinsically superior to others.

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What Did Epicurus Say About “The Guide” and “The Goal” of Human Life?

Epicurus identified pleasure as both the guide and the goal of human life — the same thing serving both functions. This elegant symmetry is explicit in the Letter to Menoeceus:

“And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good.”

Pleasure is the guide because it is the faculty by which Nature directs all living creatures — from the moment of birth, every creature seeks what is pleasurable and avoids what is painful, without needing to be taught or reasoned into it. This immediate, pre-rational response to pleasure and pain is Nature’s own instruction. Pleasure is the goal because it is the end toward which all intelligent action should be directed — not as a secondary consideration, but as the single ultimate standard against which all choices are evaluated.

This double role — guide and goal — means that an Epicurean has a coherent answer to the question “how do I know what to do?” that does not depend on revelation, tradition, or abstract reasoning: follow pleasure, avoid pain, and reason carefully about which choices lead to more of the one and less of the other over the course of a life.

Does Epicurus Contradict Himself by Seeming to Say That Both Absence of Pain and Pleasure Are the Goal of Life?

No — and understanding why not is one of the keys to understanding Epicurean philosophy correctly. This apparent contradiction dissolves once you grasp that for Epicurus, “absence of pain” and “pleasure” are two ways of describing the same state of affairs, not two different goals.

Epicurus held that there are only two feelings available to conscious living creatures: pleasure and pain. There is no neutral third state between them. If you are alive, conscious, and not feeling pain, you are by definition feeling pleasure — because pleasure simply is all of conscious experience that is not painful. The term “absence of pain” is therefore not a description of nothingness or a neutral state; it is a description of pleasure from the negative direction, just as “not dark” describes light.

Torquatus states this without ambiguity in Cicero’s On Ends:

“Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain.” — Torquatus in Cicero’s On Ends 1:38

The apparent contradiction arises when people read “absence of pain” through a Stoic or Buddhist lens, imagining it refers to a passive, withdrawn, emotionless state. In Epicurean philosophy it means the opposite: it is the state of a person who is fully alive, fully engaged with experience, and free from any painful element in that experience. For a detailed discussion of why this is the Epicurean position rather than a distortion of it, see the FAQ entries on pleasure and on the physics-ethics parallel.

What Did Epicurus Say About Marriage?

Epicurus’s views on marriage were practical rather than ideological. He did not condemn marriage as such, but he recognized that for most people — and particularly for the philosopher dedicated to the study of nature — the entanglements that typically come with marriage (family obligations, financial pressures, the demands of maintaining a household and raising children) tend to generate more pain than pleasure and to undermine the tranquility and freedom necessary for the philosophical life.

Diogenes Laertius records that Epicurus advised: “The wise man will not marry and rear children; though indeed he will sometimes do so in accordance with the special circumstances of his life.” This reflects the Epicurean principle that rules cannot be applied absolutely — everything depends on context and on what will actually lead to the most pleasurable life in a particular person’s circumstances. Some people may find that marriage and family genuinely enrich their lives with pleasure; others may not.

The Garden itself was notably open to women and included several in the circle of Epicurus’s closest friends and students — an unusual feature for ancient philosophy. Epicurus clearly believed that women were as capable of philosophy and friendship as men, and several female philosophers were among his most distinguished followers.

Discussion of this question continues in our forum.

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What Did Epicurus Say About Children?

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What Did Epicurus Say About the Value of Friendship?

Friendship is, for Epicurus, the greatest of all the goods that wisdom provides for a happy life. This is not a peripheral claim but a central one:

“Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship.” — Epicurus, Principal Doctrine 27

This places friendship above all other pleasures in terms of its contribution to a happy life — above wealth, health, fame, or any of the other goods that people commonly pursue. Friendship provides not only the direct pleasure of affectionate human companionship, but also security: knowing that there are others who care about your wellbeing gives you confidence about the future that no amount of solitary wealth can provide.

The Epicurean school itself was organized as a community of friends, and Epicurus’s own relationships with his companions were held up as a model by all later Epicureans. The Garden was not merely a school but a household of friends living together.

There is also a philosophical depth to Epicurus’s account of friendship that goes beyond the simple observation that companionship is pleasant:

“Friendship dances around the world bidding us all to awaken to the recognition of happiness.” — Vatican Saying 52

“We show our feeling for our friends’ suffering, not with laments, but with thoughtful concern.” — Vatican Saying 66

“The noble man is chiefly concerned with wisdom and friendship; of these, the former is a mortal good, the latter an immortal one.” — Vatican Saying 78

The full discussion of Epicurean friendship, including how later Epicureans developed and sometimes debated the account, is available in our forum.

What Advice Did Epicurus Give About One’s General Attitude Toward the Future?

Epicurus’s advice about the future is striking for its combination of practical wisdom and philosophical depth. The general principle is: do not let anxious preoccupation with what might happen in the future rob you of the pleasure available in the present, but do exercise reasonable foresight about consequences when making choices.

Several Vatican Sayings capture this well:

“We are born once and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not master of tomorrow, postpone your happiness: life is wasted in procrastination and each one of us dies without allowing himself leisure.” — Vatican Saying 14

“Do not spoil what you have by desiring what you have not; remember that what you now have was once among the things you only hoped for.” — Epicurus (attributed)

At the same time, Epicurus encouraged his followers to look forward with confidence rather than anxiety. The wise man remembers past pleasures with gratitude, fully inhabits the present, and awaits the future without being enslaved to it:

“For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy… he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present.” — Torquatus in Cicero’s On Ends 1:62

The specific fears about the future that most undermine happiness — fear of death, fear of divine punishment, fear of running out of what is necessary for life — are addressed directly by the physics and by the analysis of natural and necessary desires. Remove these fears through correct understanding, and the future becomes something to approach with reasonable anticipation rather than dread.

Would An Epicurean Hook Himself Up To an “Experience Machine” or a “Pleasure Machine” If Possible?

This thought experiment, introduced by philosopher Robert Nozick, asks whether someone committed to pleasure as the ultimate good would choose to be permanently connected to a machine that provides any desired experience while the body floats in a tank, if the experiences were indistinguishable from reality. The argument is sometimes used to claim that hedonism is self-refuting: if pleasure is all that matters, surely everyone would plug in — but most people would not, which suggests they value something other than pleasure.

From a Classical Epicurean perspective, there are several reasons why a well-informed Epicurean would decline such an arrangement — but these reasons are grounded in practical reality and not theoretically inconsistent with the Epicurean commitment to pleasure as the goal. In the following discussion it is essential to step back and remember the limitations of all hypotheticals: pure logical constructions are not reality, and it is impossible in a hypothetical to account for and incorporate all aspects of human life. Within that consideration that it is impossible to consider all relevant aspects, there are a number of key specific considerations:

Depending on the terms of the hypothetical:

the machine severs the connection between the person and nature. Epicurean pleasure is grounded in the Canon of Truth — in sensation, feeling, and anticipation that accurately report the actual state of the world. A pleasure machine does not provide real sensations from nature; it provides simulated inputs. There is therefore no way for the person inside the machine to apply the Canon, to distinguish real from false opinion, or to conduct their life in accordance with the actual facts of the universe. An Epicurean life is explicitly not a life of illusion.
Moreover, the machine creates an artificial dependency that violates the Epicurean commitment to self-sufficiency (autarkeia). The Epicurean wise man seeks pleasures that are natural and that do not make him hostage to external conditions. A machine that controls all his experience is the ultimate dependency — not a form of freedom.
Finally, friendship — identified by Epicurus as the greatest good wisdom provides — is simply not available inside the machine. No simulated friend is a real friend; no simulated conversation provides the genuine human connection that the Epicurean school made central to the good life.

This thought experiment does not refute Epicurean hedonism; it illustrates that Epicurean pleasure is richer and more demanding than the crude caricature of it.

This document was compiled from the EpicureanFriends.com FAQ page. The FAQ is an ongoing work in progress; for the most current version of any entry and for links to discussion threads, please visit the original page at https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/faq-question-list/

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